The US Intelligence Community’s (IC) latest Annual Threat Assessment report focuses on non-state actors like transnational criminals and terrorists, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the cooperation between the last four-mentioned countries. This analysis won’t review everything in detail but only highlight some of the most important assessments about Russia. Regardless of whether or not one takes the US IC’s claims at face value, they nevertheless form the public premises upon which policy is formulated.
Russia’s current geopolitical, economic, military, and domestic political trends underscore its resilience and enduring potential threat.
According to them, Russia’s goal in the special operation is “to restore Russian strength and security in its near abroad against perceived U.S. and Western encroachment”. They also note how “Russia’s current geopolitical, economic, military, and domestic political trends underscore its resilience and enduring potential threat to U.S. power, presence, and global interests.” The aforesaid resilience is partially attributable to support from China, Iran, and North Korea, which led to the failure of Western sanctions.
In their assessment, Russia plays a spoiler role in Western-centric forums like the UN while using BRICS to promote de-dollarization, the second claim of which contradicts Russia’s official stance. Moving along, Russia’s economy is praised as the world’s fourth-largest by PPP, while it’s observed that its armed forces remain largely intact, especially its air and naval branches, despite three years of conflict. Russia is also assessed to have learned a lot about Western arms and strategy that it’s sharing with its partners.
This segues into what was written about the Ukrainian Conflict’s prospects. According to the US IC, Putin and Zelensky are interested in ending the conflict but not on what they perceive to be disadvantageous terms for their respective side, with the first having “strategic patience” to carry on due to it having “seized the upper hand” over the past year while the second fears domestic political consequences. The longer that the conflict drags on for, however, the more strategic risks there are for the US.
These are described as an “unintended escalation to large-scale war, the potential use of nuclear weapons, heightened insecurity among NATO Allies, particularly in Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe, and a more emboldened China and North Korea.” The Russian section of the US IC’s report then transitions to reaffirming that alleged cyber, malign influence, and WMD threats from Russia remain constant, the last of which isn’t a surprise given that Russia is the world’s largest nuclear power.
Putin and Zelensky are interested in ending the conflict but not on disadvantageous terms.
It’s the part about alleged space threats from Russia that’s the most newsworthy. According to them, Russia is expanding its kinetic (ex: missiles) and non-kinetic (ex: jamming, directed energy weapon, etc.) anti-satellite capabilities, with the highlight being its reported plans to field a nuclear-armed satellite in space for destroying a broad swath of its rivals’ associated capabilities in the event of a conflict. This builds upon a sensational report from a Republican Congressman one year ago.
The last part of the Annual Threat Assessment report’s Russian section concludes by touching upon some of Russia’s supposed challenges. These include socio-economic ones like population decline and structural economic weaknesses, geopolitical ones like friendly countries such as Armenia moving closer to the West since 2022, and strategic ones like Russia’s growing dependence on China. All of these assessments enable one to obtain a better grasp of American interests and how it aims to advance them.
As can be seen, the US is well aware of the conventional military threat that Russia poses while also fearing that it’s fallen too much under Chinese influence over the past three years, with these two factors serving to drive Trump’s envisaged “New Détente” with Russia more than any others. This has taken the form of prioritizing a political resolution to the Ukrainian Conflict so as to reduce the risk of World War III, to which end some concessions are being made to Russia to pull it out of China’s orbit.
Trump therefore hopes to proverbially kill two birds with one stone, the goals of which are also shared in principle by Putin, too, ergo his receptiveness to the nascent Russian-US “New Détente”. To elaborate, Putin has always spoken about reducing the risk of World War III but also praises the strength of Sino-Russian ties, though his offer to have US companies invest in Russia’s Arctic energy, Siberia’s aluminum industry, and Donbass’ rare earth minerals suggests an interest in balancing China’s economic influence.
Russia can indeed continue waging its special operation until it obtains at least most of its maximum goals due to its previously mentioned impressive resilience in the face of this proxy war and Western sanctions, but achieving them through diplomatic means keeps the risk of World War III manageable. It also avoids the scenario of Russia feeling compelled to expand its ground campaign beyond the four formerly Ukrainian regions that joined it in September 2022 and thus risking a US escalation in response.
Russia is expanding its anti-satellite capabilities, including a potential nuclear-armed satellite.
Putin’s strongly implied nuke threats over the past three years and his decision to authorize Russia’s use of its hitherto top-secret medium-range hypersonic Oreshnik missile in late November raised fears that he was willing to “escalate to de-escalate” in pursuit of his goals just like the US had already been doing. Accordingly, since this could spike the risk of a hot Russian-US war by miscalculation, there was a more urgent need than ever for resuming diplomacy on negotiating an end to their proxy war in Ukraine.
The then-going Biden Administration wasn’t going to initiate this process since most of its leading members remained ideologically opposed to a deal with Russia up to their last day in office, and they also didn’t have enough time to partake in this anyhow even if they belatedly realized its importance. The then-incoming Trump Administration had a totally different view of the conflict and planned to prioritize a political resolution so as to reduce the risk of World War III and pull Russia out of China’s orbit.
Seeing as how the latest Annual Threat Assessment report claims that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening U.S. interests globally”, there’s a logic in the Trump Administration’s focus on China, both directly via its “Pivot (back) to Asia” and indirectly by helping Russia rebalance their ties. These interconnected imperatives require a political solution to the Ukrainian Conflict that also includes some concessions to Russia aimed at counteracting China’s growing economic influence over it.
Trump aims to reduce WWIII risks and rebalance Russia-China ties through a ‘New Détente’.
Viewed in this way as informed by the US IC’s official perception of the threats that China and Russia allegedly pose, which form the public premises upon which policy is formulated regardless of their veracity, Trump’s envisaged “New Détente” makes perfect sense and advances core US interests. It’s only through the dishonest decontextualization of his grand strategy, such as what his enemies are guilty of, that false credence is lent to claims that Trump’s bold policy is counterproductive and even treasonous.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
