Hafez al-Assad, a military general from Syria’s Alawite ethno-religious minority, held power through a military coup in 1970 and aligned himself with the Ba’ath party. After his death, his son, Bashar al-Assad, succeeded him, becoming the first Alawite president of Syria, a transition facilitated through a constitutional amendment. The much-needed constitutional amendment reduced the required age for the presidency from 40 to 34.

This event marked the emergence of a neo-patrimonial regime in which power was centered on ruling families and bureaucratic loyalists. Although Bashar al-Assad had promised modernization policies and economic reforms in Syria, he largely failed to bring such successful policies, further fueling animosity and hate within the Sunni majority population.

Bashar al-Assad’s reliance on Iran and Russia deepened sectarian divisions and prolonged the Syrian Civil War.

Furthermore, the 2011 Arab Spring episode, inspired by the death of Muhammad Bouazizi, initiated widespread protests aimed at overthrowing long-standing authoritarian regimes in Arab countries. In the same context, the Syrian Sunni majority population rose against the Assad regime. In response, Bashar al-Assad adopted a more aggressive approach and turned to regional powers, including Iran and Russia, for military, economic, and diplomatic support.

This external backing proved to be instrumental in dissenting and suppressing opposition, intensifying sectarian divides, and contributing to the protracted Syrian Civil War with proxy strategies. The entrance of Iran and Russia into the Syrian civil war established an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and the United States to play their cards in this proxy war. The transition of Syria from a civil war to a proxy war changed power dynamics in the region, further enabling major and regional powers to manipulate the future of the Syrian people.

It is also important to understand that the United States and Russia have been known for their extreme adversaries in the pre- and post-Cold War era. Both the global powers have historically followed a policy of “no direct interference” and a policy of “restraint”; nevertheless, strategic and ideological motivations in the Middle East drove them into a proxy war. For better understanding, “proxy war is defined as “avoiding direct military confrontation and its long-term consequences, states engage in a proxy war to gain strategic interests without direct intervention into a conflict”. Hence, these global powers, along with regional states and non-state actors, saw Syria as a theatre for their geopolitical goals in the Middle East.

The U.S-Russia Proxy

However, the great powers’ involvement became a new normal in the Middle East. The United States entered into the Syrian conflict when President Obama adopted a “red line” policy, warning that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians would invite serious consequences. When the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians, the U.S. started supporting rebels who were opposing Assad’s governance. Following the disintegration of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the United States emerged as a dominant global power aimed at gaining strategic interests and countering any potential resurgence of Russia. On the other hand, the strengthening and expansion of NATO were perceived as threats by Russia to its future ambitions of becoming a global power in the post-Cold War era.

The Syrian conflict became a proxy arena for U.S.-Russia and Saudi-Iran rivalries.

Therefore, the Syrian civil war opened a new window for Russia to dominate and counter American influence in the Middle East. Moscow established close diplomatic relations with the countries in the Middle East, particularly with Syria and Iran, to safeguard its strategic interests and political sovereignty. So now we can easily drive the proxy war strategies of both Russia and the United States in this conflict of “no direct interference. Russia’s proxy war strategy was motivated by Russia’s interest in keeping the Assad regime in power and strategic ally to exert Russian military and diplomatic influence in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia followed this strategy as it fulfilled Putin’s ultimate goal to make Russia great again in the post-Cold War era.

In contrast, the United States’ proxy war strategy was opposite to that of Russia’s, given their historic hostilities towards each other. The U.S. proxy war strategy functioned as a way to undermine both Iranian and Russian influence in the region by removing Assad from power. This proxy war strategy was motivated by the humanitarian approach that the United States adopted against Assad while accusing Assad of carrying out atrocities against Syrian civilians. It is also because violations of human rights and human dignity were not in line with Western ideals and beliefs. In the context of regime security, the US proxy war was motivated by the Presidential administration’s reluctance to commit direct military intervention after highly economically and socially costly military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Saudi-Iran Proxy

The Saudi-Iran rivalries trace their roots back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, which significantly altered the regional power dynamics. Rivalry intensified further during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), where Saddam Hussein was militarily and economically supported by both Saudi Arabia and the United States. As part of its foreign policy, Iran started supporting Syria against Saudi Arabia and other non-state actors, including Hezbollah and Hamas, against Israel as a broader Middle Eastern strategy. Riyadh initially supported the Assad regime in an attempt to strategically and diplomatically distance itself from its key ally, Iran.

Assad’s fall in December 2024 shifted Middle East power, elevating U.S. and Israeli influence while isolating Iran.

However, as Assad’s ties with Iran deepened and his regime increasingly used brutal tactics against Syrian Sunni Muslims, Saudi Arabia shifted its foreign policy to oppose Assad. The Saudi clerical elites viewed this conflict as the Shi’ites’ brutal repression of the Sunni majority, framing it in sectarian terms. This narrative appealed to both states and individuals, mobilizing support either for the Syrian opposition or the Syrian regime, exacerbating Sunni-Shia divides.

Iran’s proxy war strategy was based on keeping the Assad regime in power as a strategic ally against Saudi Arabia to limit Sunni influence in the Middle East. Whereas Saudi Arabia’s proxy war, opposite to that of Iran, was based on Riyadh’s self-proclamation of Sunni sect leadership. Increasing Iranian influence in the region was perceived as a national security threat by Riyadh; therefore, protecting the Sunni people became an ultimate goal for Riyadh.

Notably, the tension between Israel and Syria is primarily based on a protracted conflict over the Golan Heights. Due to animosity with Israel over the “Golan Heights”, Syria allowed Iran to support anti-Israel factions, including Hezbollah and Hamas in the region to expand Tehran’s influence as a counter-balance to Riyadh’s increasing regional control. This strategic alignment enabled Iran to establish political and military organizations within Syria to advance its interests.

Who Holds the Cards Now?

The answer is the “U.S”. Yes! The United States, along with Israel, has been successful in gaining its planned objectives. Non-state organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas served as a formidable and effective counterforce against Israel in the Middle East. The weakening and toppling of power towers of these organizations have unintentionally facilitated Israel’s emergence as a regional hegemon in the Middle East. The United States has been successful in isolating Iran in the region that has persistently backed these resistance forces against the Westernization of the Middle East and the Zionisation of Palestinian land.

Furthermore, the strength and dominance of Israel in the Middle East would enable the U.S. to counter the global ambitions of both Russia and China. Russia had maintained close relationships with the Assad regime, and China had also established strong diplomatic ties with Syria’s Assad. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, sent a loud and clear message to both Moscow and Beijing: “Don’t try to assert dominance in this region, only the United States holds global supremacy.”

Trump’s renewed defense agreements with Saudi Arabia heighten Beijing and Moscow’s regional concerns

Many scholars and social scientists believed Trump 2.0 would exacerbate instability in the Middle East; he did and he continues to do so. Trump, in his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, has signed new defense agreements, raising alarms in both Beijing and Moscow as part of a broader Middle East policy to curtail their influence in the region. Following the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, the United States and Israel have asserted themselves as dominant global and regional powers. Trump now appears to have aligned himself with new political actors, particularly Ahmad al-Shara (President of Syria), demonstrating a shift in alliances in the Middle East. This significant development poses serious challenges for Tehran and Moscow, as they struggle to maintain the pre-7 October hegemony they enjoyed.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.