While many in Syria seem satisfied with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, this satisfaction is accompanied by great concern about what the future holds for Syria and its people. They remember the revolutionaries of Tunisia, Egypt, and even Libya well.

In Libya, when the images of Gaddafi’s fall and death were broadcast on television, the revolutionaries and the people of Libya, overwhelmed with joy, did not expect that after 13 years, none of the goals of the Libyan revolutionaries would be achieved and they would be trapped in an endless cycle of violence. This was the experience of all revolutionaries after the so-called Arab Spring.

Post-Assad Syria may face Libya-like instability with rival factions creating a fragmented state prone to long-term conflict.

In Syria, too, power may be in the hands of Tahrir al-Sham and its leader, Muhammad al-Julani, in the media, but on the ground, the situation is different, and at least one or two other rivals are present. Removing these rivals will not be so easy and could plunge Syria into an endless cycle of violence or even disintegration.

It seems a bit difficult for the Salafis to reach an agreement with the Kurds and other minorities on an inclusive government. In the absence of a unified government and international recognition in Syria, it is unlikely that the situation will change and the country will be prepared to lift sanctions and improve.

Under such circumstances, cracks will wide open even within the various groups that conquered Damascus, and Syria will become an endless crisis and a source of extremism in the region. The following passages examine three different scenarios for the future of Syria after Assad.

1- Another Libya:

A striking scenario for post-Assad Syria is a repeat of the fate that befell Libya after Gaddafi.

The formation of a transitional government is reminiscent of the “National Transitional Council” that opponents of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime formed during the 2011 Libyan uprising to provide political guidance for their revolution.

Now, with the fall of the Assad government and the threat of a power vacuum, Syria is at a critical juncture: a country that is fragmented both geographically and socially between at least three dominant factions with distinct ideologies, foreign backers, and territorial ambitions.

A country that was once a symbol of cultural and historical diversity now faces a deep wound that could plunge it into long-term instability. What adds to this concern is at least three power triangles that have overshadowed the country. These three groups, each acting in some way as representatives of foreign powers, could expose Syria to the tragic possibility of an unofficial partition.

These groups can be described as follows:

• • Syrian armed opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Syrian opposition forces, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have emerged as the most powerful force in Syria. Their territory stretches from the Turkish border in the north to Jordan in the south and includes vital economic and agricultural areas.

With its roots in terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Tahrir al-Sham has redefined itself as a quasi-sovereign entity, although its hold on Syria appears to be fragile. While Türkiye has provided military and logistical support to these groups, they are by no means homogeneous; they range from remnants of Takfiri and Salafi terrorists such as ISIS and al-Qaeda to secular groups such as the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is made up of deserters from Assad’s army.

Despite a shared Sunni identity, internal rivalries among these groups have historically undermined efforts to create a united front. Internal divisions raise concerns about the ability of these groups to form a coherent government. The reality is that there is no unified vision among most of the fighters, and failure to agree on power-sharing arrangements increases the likelihood of further civil war.

• • Kurdish forces in the northeast:

The second post-Assad players in Syria are concentrated in the northeast of the country. In recent years, Kurdish groups have created semi-autonomous regions by exploiting the weakness of the central government and benefiting from a strategic alliance with the United States. These forces, organized under the name of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), control large parts of the border areas of Turkey and Iraq.

The US military presence in Syria to dominate Damascus oil is in the Al-Tanf oilfield, which is the same area where the Kurds are present.

In its first statement after the fall of Assad, the Pentagon announced that it would not abandon its positions in Syria. It is clear that the Al-Tanf military base in eastern Syria will become a place to provoke the Kurds in the region. This is precisely the point of tension and conflict of interest between the US and Türkiye.

Despite their military capability and autonomous governance structures, Kurdish groups face a significant challenge from Türkiye in achieving international recognition or widespread legitimacy within Syria.

• • Alawite forces and Assad loyalists:

In the western coastal areas, Alawite forces remain entrenched. They were linked to Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah. Key cities such as Latakia and Tartus serve as major bases for Assad loyalists, who continue to enjoy Iranian and Russian support.

The sharp divisions between these factions, coupled with foreign interference, suggest that Syria is unlikely to achieve a unified national state in the short term.

Each group’s reliance on foreign backers introduces conflicting agendas into the equation, ultimately rendering dialogue and cooperation meaningless.

In addition, Syria’s fractured society bears the scars of war. Sectarian divisions, ethnic tensions, and economic devastation have created fertile ground for extremism and lawlessness.

Even if the victor in this battle were to establish a transitional government, its ability to exert authority over diverse regions and populations remains to be questioned. The post-Assad era could resemble the experience of Libya, where rival militias have effectively divided the country into autonomous regions.

2- Formal Partition into Three Countries:

Another possibility for Syria after Assad is the formal partition of the country into three separate countries. A scenario that is, of course, less likely, or at least unlikely to happen anytime soon, given the geopolitical situation in the region.

The majority of Syrians are Sunni Arab Muslims. They make up about 70 percent of the population. However, the country is still home to significant minority groups, including 8 percent Sunni Kurds, 10 percent Alawites—mostly living in coastal areas—1 percent Shiites, 8 percent Christians, and 2 to 3 percent Druze.

While this diversity offers vast cultural and developmental potential, it also carries the risk of sectarian and ethnic tensions, especially in a country where governance has been centered on Bashar al-Assad, who has disproportionately empowered the Alawite minority.

Considering the realities of Syria, the possibility of this disintegration cannot be considered very high, but the great powers’ designs on the region should not be ignored.

The West’s “New Middle East” plan, as well as Israel’s vision of a “Greater Middle East,” aimed at dividing countries to dominate them and prevent them from threatening American interests, has raised concerns about the disintegration of Syria and the entire region.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly mentioned the idea of ​​rebuilding the Middle East with the aim of ensuring Israel’s security by weakening regional states such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran. This vision could be aligned with efforts to divide Syria into different states, each influenced by different external forces. The long-term consequences of such a strategy could lead to the creation of distinct entities in Syria, each influenced by different geopolitical powers.

Within this framework, the scenario of Syria’s division into three separate countries can be categorized as follows:

• • Kurdish State:

Kurdish forces have enjoyed considerable autonomy under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with military and logistical support from the United States. An independent Kurdish state could possibly be achieved in northeastern Syria, where the Kurdish population is concentrated. The creation of a Kurdish state would deal a severe blow to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Türkiye, as both have significant Kurdish populations. For Türkiye, in particular, a Kurdish state on its southern border would be a national security threat, as it could strengthen Kurdish separatist movements within its borders.

• • Sunni Islamist State:

A Sunni Islamist state in central and northern Syria, likely under the influence of Türkiye and Qatar, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, would take shape. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Türkiye has supported various Sunni rebel groups. With the rise of radical Islamist groups in Syria, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, Türkiye has sought to exert its influence over Sunni areas of Syria. This Sunni State would likely act as a proxy for Turkish interests and could become a hub for the spread of radical Islamist ideologies and Salafi movements, further destabilizing the region.

• • A Christian-Alawite State:

The third State in this disintegration involves the formation of a Christian-Alawite entity on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, centered around the strategic city of Latakia. Home to the Alawite minority, the region is seen as a stronghold for the remnants of the Assad government. Such an entity could serve the purpose of maintaining Russian influence in the Mediterranean, as well as creating a buffer zone against Western influence.

3- Formation of a Brotherhood-Turkish State:

A third possible scenario for post-Assad Syria is the formation of an Islamist Brotherhood state under the Turkish banner. Türkiye has played a significant role in providing arms, reinforcements, and logistical support to Sunni Salafi rebel groups in Syria over the past decade. Given the close ties between the Turkish government and the Muslim Brotherhood, it is likely that Syria will witness the formation of a state that is very much aligned with Turkish interests and ideologies, with the Muslim Brotherhood at its mainstream leadership.

Such a Turkish-influenced state would likely be shaped in a way that would serve Türkiye’s interests in the region and its domestic goals. For Türkiye, an Islamist state in Syria could strengthen its geopolitical interests, particularly by consolidating its influence in the Arab world and countering the growing influence of Iran and Russia in the region.

Conversely, such a state is unlikely to pose a threat to Israeli interests. Türkiye has maintained strategic relations with Israel in the past. A Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Syria would likely seek to maintain the status quo in relations with Israel.

However, the establishment of such an Islamist state in Syria raises serious concerns, particularly regarding Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious composition.

Syria is home to various minority groups, including Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze, who together make up about 30 percent of the population. The rise of a Sunni Islamist state could exacerbate existing religious divisions and lead to the repression of these minorities.

While Sunni Islamists, especially those who were repressed under Assad, are likely to see a Muslim Brotherhood-led government as a form of revenge, the imposition of a Salafi Islamist state could be a double-edged sword. In their quest for power and revenge, Sunni Islamist groups may seek to reproduce the cycle of repression and violence.

This could lead to the marginalization, persecution, or even expulsion of Alawite, Shiite, Christian, Kurdish, and Druze populations, whom extremist groups perceive as political enemies or religious infidels.

In such a scenario, Syria could once again enter a cycle of sectarian violence similar to the tragedies of the civil war and its aftermath. The return of such sectarian violence could ignite another civil war, this time between Sunni Islamists and the minorities they oppress. Such outbreaks of violence will not only further destabilize Syria but also pose a threat to regional peace as neighboring countries with minority populations, such as Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Türkiye, will also be drawn into the conflict, either as direct participants or as shelters for refugees.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.