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Web of Conspiracies: PTI’s Destructive Playbook

By
Dr Shama Junejo
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0
Disinformation

December 16th is a date deeply tied to Pakistan’s history. From the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 to the tragic APS Peshawar massacre in 2014, it reminds us of the heavy price of division, wrong decisions, and conspiracies. Today, in 2024, while the wounds of 1971 feel slightly less painful due to the political changes in Bangladesh, the day brings more conspiracies.

Imran Khan, the jailed former prime minister, has hinted at starting a civil disobedience movement from today if talks fail—though no negotiations with the government have even begun, despite PTI’s fake claims to grab headlines. The fear of this call is so intense that the government has declared a public holiday, citing it as a precautionary measure due to security threats. This highlights yet again the danger of false narratives and propaganda in an already struggling Pakistan.

PTI’s deliberate weaponisation of disinformation seeks to provoke instability and weaken Pakistan’s state institutions and social fabric.

The dangers of such calls for anarchy are not limited to physical disruption; they penetrate deeper into the national psyche, eroding trust in state institutions and creating fractures that foreign and domestic elements alike can exploit.

However, what compounds the peril is the deliberate weaponisation of disinformation by PTI, a party that has consistently blurred the lines between political activism and anti-state propaganda. Their “factory of fake news,” as it is often referred to, has now set its sights on creating fissures between Pakistan’s key political and institutional actors—this time targeting the presidency and the prime minister.

In the past week, PTI operatives have unleashed a calculated disinformation campaign to drive a wedge between President Zardari and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, exploiting old grievances and concocting baseless narratives. It started with Muhammad Ali Durrani and Barrister Saif making calculated appearances on TV channels, pushing the narrative of a conspiracy within the presidency to unseat the prime minister and elevate Bilawal Bhutto Zardari as the new prime minister.

This claim falls apart when scrutinised against parliamentary numbers, exposing it as pure propaganda. Their lies do not stop here. In private conversations, PTI parliamentarians have floated the bizarre proposition of supporting Bilawal as prime minister—on the condition that President Zardari grants a pardon to Imran Khan in the unlikely event of a military trial.

However, no such trial has even commenced, nor is there any realistic likelihood of Imran Khan facing the death penalty, despite his orchestration of chaos, particularly his involvement in the events of 9th May and his continued conspiracies to destabilise the state. This disinformation serves a singular purpose: to create fractures in a government that, despite all odds, remains united against PTI’s destructive agenda.

Their social media brigades have amplified baseless claims surrounding Senator Faisal Vawda’s recent statements, which were critical of the PML-N while favouring the PPP, alleging that he is acting on behalf of the establishment. However, anyone familiar with Vawda’s fiery nature and tendency for straightforward, unfiltered remarks knows he is not the kind of individual who orchestrates conspiracies.

Claims of a conspiracy between President Zardari and PM Shahbaz Sharif are baseless and serve to fuel political propaganda.

He acts impulsively, often saying exactly what he feels without calculated thought. Further, they muddied when Sher Afzal Marwat, a PTI parliamentarian, was photographed with Governor KP Faisal Karim Kundi in the office of Speaker Ayaz Sadiq. The photograph was twisted into “proof” that the presidency, influenced by Zardari, was conspiring to destabilise the federal government—a narrative utterly detached from reality.

To discern fact from fiction, I contacted multiple high-level sources across government and institutional corridors, from the presidency to the Prime Minister, his Office, Governor KP, PMLN ministers, PPP sources, and other relevant quarters of the establishment. After rigorous inquiry and analysis, the conclusion was unequivocal: no such conspiracy exists.

On the contrary, President Zardari and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif are navigating one of the most harmonious civil-military collaborations in recent history. This unity is vital for stabilising Pakistan, especially with ongoing foreign investments from allies like China and Saudi Arabia, which hinge on political and economic stability, as witnessed in the historical rise of the Pakistan stock exchange.

So why, then, does PTI persist in peddling such dangerous narratives? The answer lies in its strategic use of disinformation to provoke instability and weaken the state. By targeting the presidency—a symbol of the federation—and the prime minister, PTI seeks to exploit any perceived cracks in the coalition government.

Their goal appears twofold: to rekindle Zardari’s historical tensions with the establishment, referencing his infamous 2016 statement against the military leadership, and to fracture the cohesive working relationship between the president and the prime minister.

This strategy, however, is not just about domestic politics; it carries a broader agenda. PTI’s social media campaigns, often orchestrated by operatives abroad, amplify their falsehoods on an international stage, seeking to delegitimise Pakistan’s institutions in the eyes of foreign stakeholders. They have actively lobbied in the US Congress, the UK Parliament, and international news media, twisting facts and manipulating narratives to extract statements and resolutions favourable to their agenda.

From fabricating the so-called ‘Islamabad massacre’ to calls for boycotts of military-linked products like Fauji cornflakes, PTI has shown an alarming willingness to undermine national cohesion. The absurdity reached new heights with online campaigns urging people to divorce spouses serving in the military—a grotesque attempt to widen societal divisions and fracture the social fabric of Pakistan.

PTI’s propaganda campaigns target the military and exploit domestic grievances to fracture national unity and delegitimise state institutions.

What makes this even more ironic is that PTI itself was once the product of military patronage, elevated to power through a carefully managed hybrid regime. Today, the same institution finds itself under relentless attack from its former protégé, with PTI’s propaganda machine churning out narratives aimed at eroding public trust in the military.

This duplicity underscores the party’s opportunism and readiness to weaponise any issue for political gain. That is the reason that I always point out that their fight with the establishment is not for civilian supremacy. Their agenda focuses on eliminating the current Army chief, Asim Munir, and bringing back Imran Khan for whatever it takes and costs.

Yet, the state’s response to this propaganda onslaught remains disappointingly reactive when PTI and their parliamentarians like Shandana Gulzar openly accused the military of killing their protestors without showing any proof. While necessary, the government’s press conferences and rebuttals are insufficient to counter the scale and sophistication of PTI’s disinformation campaigns.

The government’s inability to decisively address these challenges has not only emboldened PTI but also left Pakistan vulnerable to internal and external exploitation. Even today, as schools and colleges remain shut amid fears of unrest, the state remains under significant pressure—a stark reminder of the high stakes involved.

Therefore, Pakistan’s current leadership—both civilian and military—urgently needs to adopt a more initiative-taking and unified approach to combating this disinformation epidemic. Slowing down the internet or banning social media apps is not the solution; the authorities must actively engage with international actors to rebut the propaganda and share the facts.

This includes leveraging digital tools to counter fake news, enacting legal reforms to hold propagandists accountable, and fostering greater transparency to rebuild public trust. The state must also recognise that PTI’s tactics are not merely a political nuisance; they are a continuous calculated assault on Pakistan’s democratic fabric and institutional integrity.

The state must counter disinformation with transparency, digital tools, and international engagement to protect Pakistan’s democratic fabric.

Ali Amin Gandapur, the PTI’s chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, openly threatened to arm their supporters against the state yesterday, a reminder of the extremist path PTI is willing to tread. Such threats cannot be taken lightly, particularly in a region as volatile as Pakistan, where history has repeatedly shown how militancy and lawlessness can spiral out of control.

One cannot ignore the haunting parallel with Syria, where a small faction of 20,000 rebels managed to topple Assad’s regime. PTI’s failed attempt in November to demonstrate similar tactics in Pakistan under the guise of civil disobedience and protests is a stark warning of the lengths they are willing to go to destabilise the country.

Central Europe’s Green Transition

By
Hadiqa Batool
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0
Green Transition

As a student of international relations observe, the tension between regions and global policy goals is a good angle to analyze how sustainability transitions happen. It is evident that the region has incapacitated its geopolitical and socio-economic barriers and emerged as one of the key players in defining the sustainability goals of the EU. The region’s strategy of achieving the Green Deal exhibits how the eastern part of the continent envisions the political relations and maneuverers of other countries with an eye to the national economy and international cooperation.

Central Europe’s Green Deal strategy envisions climate neutrality by 2050, focusing on reducing GHG emissions, renewable energy, and circular economies.

The region’s strategy of achieving the Green Deal shows how the eastern part of the continent envisions the political relations and maneuverers of other countries with an eye to the national economy and international cooperation. The policy envisions Europe reaching climate neutrality by 2050, including with specific focus on tackling GHG emissions across the region, increasing renewable energy, and expanding circular economies. Central Europe comprising Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic is well positioned to move towards this transition because of its domestic consumption of fossil fuels particularly coal, and its industrial history which has previously slowed the uptake of many of these resources.

Recently, however, they are in a better position to lead regions Russia’s overall climate approach such as directing policymaking on the EU green deal for instance, Poland, as one of the largest coal miners deeps today.

The political sphere of Central Europe determines the manner the region deals with sustainability. In Central Europe, the populist governments of Poland and Hungary for example have been in conflict with EU institutions on issues of rule of law thus complicating climate cooperation. However, even when there is political friction, these countries are aware of the economic opportunities and the strategic importance of integrating into EU green forward policies.

Hungary, although critical of some EU policies, has implemented European Union renewable energy projects and green technologies. The Hungarian government has aggressively been pursuing investments in solar energy to achieve emission targets set by the European Union and enhance its energy independence. Similarly, Slovakia has been using the European Union’s funds to update its energy system infrastructure which shows that the political will can also be driven by economics in terms of achieving the sustainability agenda.

The pursuit of sustainability in Central Europe goes beyond the requirements of the EU, there are also local coalitions. The Visegrad Group (V4)—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic provides this environmental cooperation framework that allows these countries to pool and coordinate their positions as well as negotiate with the EU as a single bloc. While the V4 frequently gives precedence to other objectives such as economic growth and energy security

Central European countries are working together to join forces with the V4 Innovation Challenge in order to help develop clean energy and sustainable agriculture practices. The easy access to numerous resources set Central Europe to become an international leader in economics while meeting green requirements across the European Union.

The Visegrad Group enables Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic to collaborate on sustainability goals and negotiate as a bloc.

The green movement throughout Central Europe has taken steps but they still face many difficulties in assuring successful incorporation with the EU goals. Growing economic imbalance between western and eastern regions tarnishes the dependency on fossil fuels and the green goals. Furthermore, the lack of political unity within the V4 does not help consolidate efforts to combat climate change.

Green projects are largely funded by foreign investment which is a critical problem as it poses a risk to their sustainability in the long run. Investments targeted towards climate-related initiatives faced economic restrictions which were addressed through the use of the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility. Global political corruption and incompetence around developing nations would hinder growth which calls for the need for more accountability measures to be set in place.

Transitioning will serve as the basis for Central Europe shifting the balance of its diplomatic relations with the European Union and Conserving the climate in other countries across the globe. By promoting sustainability, the area strengthens its soft power in the EU, establishing itself as a credible advocate for climate action. Furthermore, Central Europe’s successful implementation of green policies may motivate other coal-dependent regions throughout the world to take similar steps.

Central Europe also acts as a link between Western Europe and adjacent non-EU nations. Its dedication to sustainability may boost ties with Eastern European countries and the Western Balkans, promoting regional stability and collaboration. Sharing expertise in renewable energy and sustainable agriculture, for example, might strengthen partnerships with nations such as Ukraine and Serbia, contributing to greater geopolitical stability overall.

To optimize its participation in the EU’s green transition, Central Europe must solve domestic issues while capitalizing on its strategic location within the bloc. Priorities include accelerating the coal phase-out, diversifying energy sources, and encouraging public-private collaborations in green technologies. Improving political ties with Western Europe is also essential.

Political tensions in Central Europe complicate climate cooperation, but economic incentives drive renewable energy investments and green technologies.

Central Europe can get the financial and technical support it requires for its sustainability journey by working constructively with EU institutions and aligning with the goals of the Green Deal. At the same time, the region should continue to advocate for equitable transitions that take into account its specific economic and social circumstances.

Central Europe’s green transition is a microcosm of the larger difficulties and opportunities confronting the EU’s sustainability goal. As an IR student, I see this change as a demonstration of the intricate interplay between regional politics, economic imperatives, and global environmental goals. Central Europe’s capacity to negotiate these dynamics will not only influence the success of the EU Green Deal but will also set a precedent for worldwide collaboration in combating climate change.

By balancing national interests with collective action, Central Europe can lead the EU’s green transition, fostering innovation and resilience in the face of global challenges. This shift is not only necessary for the environment but also for Europe’s long-term stability and prosperity.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Pakistan-China Joint Security Force

By
Arshad Mehmood
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0
Pakistan-China

Pakistan and China have agreed to establish a joint security force to protect Chinese engineers working on CPEC projects in Pakistan. 

This decision follows China’s proposal in response to the growing incidents of separatist attacks targeting Chinese nationals deployed in Pakistan.

In this regard, the Federal Interior Ministry informed the National Assembly Standing Committee for Development and Planning that the formation of a joint security company proposed by China is underway in the context of attacks on Chinese citizens working on various projects in Pakistan.

Over the past four years, there have been 14 attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, resulting in 20 deaths and 34 injuries.

In addition, the report submitted by the Interior Ministry in the meeting of the National Assembly Standing Committee chaired by legislator Abdul Qadir Gilani presented details related to attacks on Chinese citizens and security.

The report revealed that over the past four years, there have been 14 attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, leading to 20 deaths and 34 injuries. Additionally, eight Pakistanis were killed, and 25 were injured in these incidents.

Sindh recorded the highest number of attacks, with eight out of the 14 incidents since 2021. Two attacks occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and four in Baluchistan.

The report also highlighted that Chinese nationals in northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit face significant risks, while extremist groups active in southern and northern Balochistan pose further threats.

The report stated that “hostile intelligence agencies are behind the planning and funding of attacks on Chinese citizens, with the Baloch Liberation Army and Islamic State Khorasan being particularly active against Chinese nationals.”

“Hostile intelligence agencies” are behind attacks, with groups like the Baloch Liberation Army and ISIS-K targeting Chinese citizens.

The report highlighted that the Ministry of Interior is implementing measures to enhance the security of Chinese nationals in Pakistan. “A high-level core group has been established by the ministry, and Chinese citizens working in remote areas are being transported via helicopters,” it stated.

It further mentioned that key projects, including Mohmand, Dasu, and Diamer, have been protected by the army, while work on the joint security company proposed by China is nearing completion.

Official claims that ” the Chinese government has engaged three private security firms—Dewey Security Frontier Service Group, China Overseas Security Group, and Huaxin Zhongshan Security Service—to oversee the protection of Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

Staffed by retired officers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), these firms will play a pivotal role in coordinating security measures for critical projects, including CPEC infrastructure initiatives and the strategically significant Gwadar Port.

Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi recently stated that there is solid evidence of Afghan soil being used to plan attacks on Chinese nationals.

“We urge Afghanistan to take decisive action against these terrorists—either prosecute them locally or hand them over to us,” he said. The minister emphasized that the government is fully aware of the forces attempting to undermine Pakistan’s relations with China.

China has engaged private security firms, staffed by ex-PLA officers, to oversee safety measures for its citizens in Pakistan.

He added that these elements are exploiting the vulnerabilities of Afghanistan’s interim government, which has allowed such activities to persist.

Recent attacks on Chinese nationals in Balochistan and Sindh have underscored the growing challenges to Pakistan’s security landscape, particularly in regions where separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) operate.

These groups have increasingly targeted Chinese personnel and infrastructure, citing opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its associated projects.

The BLA and similar outfits argue that the economic benefits of these projects bypass local communities, exacerbating their grievances.

Attacks, such as the suicide bombing near the Confucius Institute in Karachi in April 2022, highlight a deliberate strategy to disrupt Sino-Pak relations and bring international attention to their cause.

Islamabad frequently blames Delhi for supporting these separatist groups by funding and training them, further straining the already tense relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The resurgence of separatist violence poses significant risks to Pakistan’s economic stability and international relations.

The Chinese government has expressed growing concerns over the safety of its citizens and investments, pressing Islamabad to strengthen security measures.

While Pakistan has deployed special security forces to protect CPEC infrastructure and personnel, the effectiveness of these measures is increasingly under scrutiny.

Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi accused terrorists of exploiting Afghan vulnerabilities and urged Kabul to act decisively.

The attacks also reveal deeper socio-political issues, including long-standing marginalization and underdevelopment in Balochistan and Sindh, which separatist groups exploit to fuel their narratives.

Addressing these root causes, alongside bolstering counter-terrorism efforts and resolving regional tensions, is critical to ensuring both regional security and the continuation of vital economic projects.

The establishment of a joint security force would not only enhance the security of Chinese engineers and workers but also strengthen bilateral ties by demonstrating Pakistan’s commitment to protecting its strategic partner.

Moreover, this initiative has broader implications for regional security and stability, as it aims to counteract militant threats that undermine development efforts and disrupt peace in South Asia.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

The Fall of Damascus: A Prelude to Chaos or the Dawn of Change?

By
Husnain Haider
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0
Syria

The recent fall of Syria’s autocratic leader Bashar al-Assad has been a subject of widespread speculation in the contemporary global forum. While the people of the Fertile Crescent are overwhelmed with joy and are eager to welcome a new government, international experts and social scientists tend to explore the legitimacy of this newly established government brought by groups that led the rebel movements, specifically the Turkey-backed Hayat-Tahir Al-Sham (HTS) that previously owed allegiance to Al-Qaeda and its controversial leader Abu-Mohammad Al-Jolani.

HTS, a rebel group with a controversial history, leads Syria’s new government, raising questions about its legitimacy and intentions.

The first and foremost ambiguity arises when we notice a bizarre coincidence between the announcement of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and the sudden offensive launched by the rebel groups in Northern Aleppo. These operations gained momentum progressively, and almost imperceptibly, the world witnessed how within 11 days the rebels took over Damascus, with Assad fleeing the country.

Although The Assad regime wasn’t pristine, his authoritarian rule spoke for itself when thousands of political prisoners were released from the notorious Sednayya prison. However, the support Assad rendered to the Axis of Resistance and the Palestinian cause due to Syria’s strategic location was partially unrivaled.

With the Assad regime in power, it provided integral logistical support to Hamas and the Palestinian factions and also ensured itself as an integral linchpin between Iran and Hezbollah. Leveraging it as a land bridge Iran was able to assist Hezbollah in transitioning to a formidable military force against Israel.

Allegations of Israeli-Turkish backing for HTS fuel concerns about regional geopolitical strategies and sectarian divides.

The assiduity of the decades-long established axis was seen in jeopardy when reports of Israeli coordination came up behind the vastly expanding rebel operations, where Israel claimed it had direct contact with the rebel groups in Syria, including HTS. Was this a strategy to trigger sectarian strife between the Sunni-led rebel groups, and Shia Militias that Iran has backed for the better part of 4 decades?

This query was further strengthened when in December 2024, preceding the fall of Damascus a CNN interview with Jolani was broadcast, where he labeled his allegiance to extremist Islamic organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda as a phase of his life, while still having a $10 Million bounty on his head on account of the war crimes he committed in early days of ISIS.

Hence, let me ask the million-dollar question. Is the HTS a liberal reincarnation of ISIS and Al Qaeda? If so, you would have to laud the pragmatism of the United States and its Military Industrial Complex. Assad was truly the Queen of the Middle East’s Chess. Whether the oncoming new HTS established government is Zionist-backed is a separate question, but how it serves Uncle Sam’s interest is a point to be pondered.

The way Russia was defeated in the Middle East after the decades-long backing of the Assad regime truly depicts the tacticity of the United States’ strategy in the Middle East. Although the Russian Airforce was seen in full swing in the initial stages of the offensive, their strategies gradually came to a standstill when the Syrian Army retreated and bloodlessly withdrew from cities such as Homs and Hama, which signaled the Army was not willing to fight. This further emulsified the weight of the offensive coming from Rebels.

The return of Syrian refugees depends on the government’s ability to foster stability, economic growth, and minority inclusion.

The Syrian Civil War succeeding the Arab Spring of 2011, triggered a mass exodus of Syrians into the neighboring countries and caused a significant demographic shift in majorly populated areas. If the Syrian refugees choose to return home, how will the Islamic government, lay the foundation of an economically stable Syria? Will the funds rendered by the United States and other major powers create an environment of Peacebuilding?

Syria is home to a significant diversity of various sects and religions, including the Druze, Christians, Alawites, and many more. How will the Islamist government ensure the minority’s security?

In light of recent events, Israel’s recent invasion almost immediately after the fall of the Assad regime in the Quentiera region seems to be a move that is premeditated, and that seeks to serve their messianic vision of ‘Greater Israel.’ If the HTS was established with the backing of an Israel-Turkey Alliance, then it raises significant questions about the legitimacy of the government and its main ambitions.

Is the fall of Assad a new beginning for the Syrian People or is the worst yet to come?

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

SOEs Driving China’s Global Renewable Energy Leadership

By
Mahnoor Inayat
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0
SOEs

Confucianism views the preservation and care for the environment as paramount for human development and Taoism centers on man and nature in harmony as the foundation of societal wellness. Traditional Chinese culture has long believed in the sustainability of ‘coexistence and cooperation’ with nature, and these philosophies are necessary to those coherent ideas.

Such concepts are especially pertinent in the modern environmental context than ever before. China, increasingly drawing on this cultural mindset, emerged as a global leader, with an investment in renewable energy of more than US$758 Billion higher than the combined investment in renewable energy of the US, Germany, and Japan.

State‐owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private corporations are the key power players in transitioning from a traditional economy to a green economy while the primary objective is to transform towards sustainable development.

China’s SOEs lead renewable energy advancements, contributing significantly to solar and wind capacity globally.

In the early 1980s, the Lubuge Hydropower Plant in Yunnan Province, China’s first World Bank-supported project, was a turning point. Together, they set the stage for China to quickly match what has long been recognized as the most rapidly growing major hydropower development in the world. Hydropower remained the most prominent renewable energy sector for over forty years but since then its preferential development has been shifted to new renewable energy on which China mainly concentrated on solar PV and wind energy.

For instance, the wind and solar energy industries in China have developed over the last decade and have been growing at a faster rate. Currently, the country has achieved 129 GW of installed capacity of wind energy and it is also having 43 GW of solar energy installed capacity by the year 2015. For wind energy alone, capacity addition for the year 2015 was 33GW and for solar energy, the addition was 15 GW, according to NEA (2016a, 2016b).

Currently, SEEs and private companies are pressing ahead of China to renewable energy accomplishment. The promotion of industrial development is mainly driven by state affiliates through concessional bidding, feed-in tariffs, and innovation subsidies, which category has its theoretical foundation on the developmental state model. This collaboration has put Chinese public and private enterprises to global leadership in solar panel and wind turbine manufacturing and grabbed a considerable part of the international markets. This synergy is as important because it underscores how SOEs can be the engine of both Chinese industrial development and climate efforts.

Dual Role of SOEs in China’s Climate Initiatives

In the national settings of China, SOEs undertake multiple roles. As a direct management institution of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, oversees  97 central SOEs and nearly 460000 branches and sub-enterprises throughout the country are the work under it.

In most cases they are involved in conventional power (coal, oil, and natural gas), energy-intensive industries such as steel, iron, and cement transport and infrastructure, and also in commercial and finance. Listed Chinese 97 central state-owned corporations contributed 66% of the total Chinese Gross Domestic Product and actualized 31 % of entire tax collections by utilization of the budgeted average share of 20% by these 97 central state-owned corporations in the 2021 budget.

The remaining thousands of SOEs were owned by province and local governments. At the national level, besides being important for the China economy and covering a large number of industries SOEs remain the main governmental policy executers by altogether heights.

In China, SOEs are big energy producers, big energy users, and big CO2 emitters. The largest power generators include Huaneng Power International, a thermal power giant (in the fifth spot), which emits 317 million metric tons a year which is about the same as what the UK produces in a year.

Aggressive carbon neutrality goals mandate SOEs to reduce emissions by 18% by 2025 and achieve neutrality by 2060.

Likewise, China State Grid and China Southern Power Grid, the two state-owned companies controlling Chinese power transmission and distribution in the territory, account for around 49.6 percent of Chinese CO2 emissions. Four of the largest sources of coal-related SOEs, producing 4.61 billion tons of equivalent CO2 per annum, make a crucial political counterweight to dramatic climate action and coal phase-out in China.

Quite unexpectedly though to all stakeholders CSEs remain by far the most significant investors and developers of RE, especially at the deployment level. In 2020 83% of PV projects in the large-scale grid-connected PV power projects in China have been contributed by the solar PV SOEs. In the present scenario, they account for one-third of new wind capacity that is grid-connected. Indeed, China’s Development Bank, or the CDB was in support of renewable energies and channeled over 200 RMB when the 2010s started.

SOEs as Pioneers in Advancing China’s Carbon Neutrality Goals

SOEs play an important role as strategic supporters of China’s realization of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality. But new investment areas for foreign investment and state-owned enterprises in essentially the key sectors for China’s long-term goal of net zero carbon in the future include green finance, renewables, energy efficiency, electrification, hydrogen, and many others.

China recently through a remarkable announcement in September 2020 that CO2 emissions will peak before 2030 and become net zero emissions before 2060. The Guidance on Promoting High-Quality SASAC issued the Guidance on Promoting High-quality Development of Central SOEs in November 2021, which defines the SOEs’ demonstrative and leading role. SOEs are mandated to reduce CO2 emissions per ton of output value by 18 percent against 2020 levels by 2025, and 65 percent against 2005 levels by 2030.

Specifically, in this paper, the direct activities stimulated by the priorities of the central government towards carbon neutrality of SOEs are considered. This year, the State Grid Corporation of China became the first SOE to publicly declare it’s going fully green by announcing its carbon neutrality target and laying out this year’s reduction target for carbon emission as well as its green investment plan followed by Petro China and China Development Bank.

Currently, all 97 fundamental SOEs have defined peaking points mainly, out of which 92 are according to the country’s goal of reaching the maximum level of carbon emission by 2030, Amid are stricter, SASAC said, adding that 20 out of the 97 have clear roads for achieving carbon neutrality by 2060.

SOEs drive green finance, with billions invested in clean energy projects and bonds supporting hydro and wind power.

In its bid to be carbon neutral and drive the green transformation, SOGP is ramping up its spending on low-carbon technology and schemes. China Huaneng Group has been dedicating more than 70% of annual expenses to support clean energy projects every year since 2010.

Some major state-owned enterprises are also actively developing projects in fields such as carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS), smart grids, ultra-high voltage (UHV) grids, hydrogen energy, and new energy automobiles.

For instance, China Telecom has come up with an advanced AI-based energy-saving technology for cooling deployed in a Beijing data center that has been reducing the output of CO2 by up to 3,740 tons per annum.

SOEs are also directly engaged in green finance through their direct investment Department of Public Sequel Journal Indices 102. As at March 2021 Sinopec, State Power Investment Corporation China Energy, and Huaneng Group released bonds worth 11.1 billion RMB with 90 % fund for clean energy including hydro and wind power projects.

Even later in December 2021, China Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) and China Life Asset Management jointly formed an 8 billion RMB clean energy fund hoping to finance 75 renewable energy projects.

It then holds CEOs in SOEs accountable if they do not achieve the carbon reduction targets and chastises the CEOs who failed to perform in this regard. Providing false statistics about CO2 emissions might result in a tough appraisal at the annual evaluation for executives. Consequently, SOEs are beginning to develop both monitoring and evaluation procedures that will report to SASAC.

The regulation of China’s renewable energy sector was replaced by a dynamic process between multiple entities. The roles of state-owned utility corporations, private investors, and indeed major manufacturers are now important in policymaking. It is a tightly interconnected policy network involving multiple bureaucratic and industrial interests that compete and collaborate, and whose interactions driven by complex inter- and intra-state power dynamics inform renewable energy policies beyond state control.

Collaboration with private and foreign investors enhances innovation, market reach, and the renewable energy ecosystem in China.

State-owned firms helped propel China’s rise as the world’s leader in the production of renewable energy in this manner. Aggressive carbon reduction goals and supporting innovation and industrial growth is attained by China through the leverage of private and foreign investor involvement in large-scale renewables programs. We are both significant investors as well as critically important players in the energy revolution.

SOEs have made important contributions to the development of sustainable energy infrastructure, including wind and solar plants, through policies that promote carbon peaking and neutrality. SOEs have gained money, upgraded technology, and increased their market reach through collaboration with private and foreign investors, propelling them to the forefront of renewable energy manufacturing worldwide.

However, issues such as increased openness, regulatory risk, and geopolitical tensions persist. Despite these challenges, the ability of SOEs to use their scale and resources in the renewable energy sector places them as essential actors in China’s energy future.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Syria After Assad: Challenges for Gulf Stability

By
Waqas Abdullah
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0
Assad & Syria

The removal of Assad from power will of course be a significant step in the changing of Syrian society, but the future may be as fragmented as its present years of warfare. The internal divisions of the country and the exterior counter forces make it a enormity for unity of any kind. New leadership will have great challenges within a highly polarized context where no political actor can claim absolute sovereignty.

The fall of Assad will challenge Gulf states to balance involvement in Syria’s reconstruction with avoiding deeper regional instability.

This shattered structure has emerged with such crucial questions of governance: will it be a transitional government as the international accords have intended; or will local regional warlords and extraneous influences determine the shape of the state? The post-Assad Syria will not only be a challenge for the Syrians but for the rest of the Middle Eastern and specifically for the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The GCC countries, although located far from Syria’s borders, have not been less involved in the Syrian conflict.

Specifically, Qatar has supported one part of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia has backed the other part, and, finally, the UAE has issued calls for recognizing the Assad regime in recent times. The collapse of the regime will leave the Gulf states grappling with several dilemmas: Should they interact with the emergent leadership in Syria, aware that this interaction may lead to new instability, or should they stay away from the country, to avoid getting involved in another long-standing conflict? They are exercised to affect the stability of the region in the long run.

The consequences of the conflict are not limited to Syria as they affect all the states of the Gulf. The collapse of the Assad regime will therefore be followed by a decline in Iranian influence that has been using Syria as a base to project power in the Levant region. Although this may allow the Gulf states to level the playing field in the region it also brings uncertainty. That pressure is likely to be especially acute without Assad: Tehran could increase its efforts to continue backing its influence in Syria through proxy forces, thus provoking more tensions with Gulf states.

Furthermore, the Syrian situation might provoke the emergence of security vices that could give the role to extreme powers thus becoming a threat to the entire Gulf area especially since its countries depend on internal stability to guarantee economic progress and political consolidation. Besides, economic considerations are also expected to emerge more actively.

Tehran’s influence in Syria may decline, but proxy conflicts could intensify, raising tensions with Gulf states.

The Gulf states have the money to help rebuild Syria, but will they decide to? If they start investing in the Syrian reconstruction they will inevitably find themselves involved in the Syrian internal conflicts and maybe even face an armed confrontation with other regional players such as Turkey or Russia. On the other hand, failure to assist Syria can open the door for competitors to establish themselves in a strategic region of the Iraqi neighborhood in the Middle East.

Managing all these economic and strategic considerations will be a delicate proposition for the leadership in the Gulf. For the Gulf states, the greatest and most immediate challenge to consider may well be, how can it diplomatically interact with post-Assad Syria. will they go a democratic push for governance that includes all groups or will they embrace authoritarianism and search for a strongman that will put down dissent and bring order.

The decision will have a long-term bearing on the influence of the Gulf states in the entirety of the region. Backing democrats could help dissipate intellectually the model of authoritarianism linked to the gulf monarchies but it could prove counter-productive if it fuels instability.

On the other hand, supporting autocratic sentiments might act against the reformist’s goals within any given region and demoralize the youthful population across the Arab world.

Already daunting internal problems in Syria come hand in hand with the local interest of regional players including Turkey and Iraq. For instance, Turkey might not leave northern Syria due to the emergence of the Kurdish-dominated autonomous region. As is the case in Iraq, internal factions can pose a huge threat to the nation, and this perception might make Iraq nose-dive on any confusion in Syria.

The Gulf states face a strategic dilemma: whether to back democratic governance or authoritarian stability in post-Assad Syria.

These dynamics will, of course, add further pressure on the Gulf states for them to help the other players in the region as a mediator/intermediary. They also have to ensure that Syria’s future leadership is capable of dealing with international concerns of extremism making a comeback.

If the emerging government cannot conduct security in the country, the Gulf states most especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE could witness conflicts being exported back to them.

Further cooperation will be pared since Syria cannot tolerate turning into a center for radicalization. However, pursuing such initiatives demands a level of unity among regional actors a phenomenon that has been notably demonstrated to be exceptionally hard to achieve in the context of the Middle East.

The crossroad for Syria and the repercussions on the Gulf region security situation remains questionable. To this end, the GCC states will need to consider whether their engagement will address or worsen the risks of change in Syria.

Syria’s internal instability risks exporting extremism to neighboring Gulf countries, emphasizing the need for proactive engagement.

The question then arises if they can do so without aggravating the existing fault lines in an already unstable area. As the international community looks towards the post-Assad transition in Syria, it is a region-wide question how gulf states will approach this future hoping that their policies will not only define the future of Syria but also their relative status as regional powers.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Librarianship in the 21st Century: Reflecting on the Past, Shaping the Future

By
Abid Hussain
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0
Librarianship

Librarianship finds itself in a state of crisis in the present century.  Its stereotyping as a custodian of books, controller of books, shushing people, sensible shoes, big glasses, and outdated dresses were few a cunning ruse developed in different countries.  Some argue that librarianship is a declining profession with a low societal image.

Librarianship is transforming globally into roles like digital literacy specialists and data librarians, embracing new technology-driven paradigms.

Particularly with the advent of advanced technology, it was felt that librarians would lose their jobs because technology is an alternative tool to the library.  In many countries, librarianship falls under the social sciences group; in some countries, it has been considered the sub-discipline of management science.

In developing countries, the profession is declining for many reasons, like financial constraints, heavy cuts in library budgets, and ineffective leadership skills of librarians, etc. Some non-professionals have been adjusted in libraries. Unlike in developing countries, librarianship in advanced countries like the USA, Germany, the UK, and Russia got immense recognition.

Librarianship in advanced countries emerged with new names like “the information providers, digital literacy specialist, data librarian, data specialist, digital librarian, and electronic librarian, etc.

Unlike in the past, people in advanced countries regarded librarianship as a New Breed Librarian, anarchist librarian, underground librarian, Belly Dancing librarian, street librarian, etc.  Such kind of controversies have badly declined this profession.  Some argue that librarians have been too slow to embrace the paradigm shift in information from analog to digital, to this end it has become the reason for the death of librarianships, still, in most countries, particularly in developing countries, librarians fear that ICT would replace the status of books which can badly affect the value of librarianship.

Librarians face stereotypes and undervaluation, yet their unique expertise in meeting information needs remains indispensable.

Many academic institutions have a sharp competition between IT and library staff which affects this profession as a declining one.   We know that IT Staff mostly deals with library websites and technical issues like hardware and software; however, it is the librarians who know how to fulfill the information needs of their patron in academics.

In today’s era of information technology, librarians do not rely only on the degree of librarianship but also get additional certificates and diplomas in IT domains.  It is said that whoever abreast themselves with the latest technology will have enormous reputations in their institutions.

Every discipline has a body of theoretical knowledge, similarly, librarianship has a body of theoretical knowledge at college and university levels, studies by research, exchanged amongst educators, and communication between professionals in the field; It has been declared as a recognized discipline that can be taught at BS, Master, M. Phil and PhD levels.

Each discipline has its core values, similarly, The Australian Library and Information Association (ALIA) has defined some core values for librarianship, these are services to the community, freedom of access to information, intellectual freedom, democracy, equity of access to information, respect for diversity, commitment to reformation literacy and lifelong learning, respect for copyright and intellectual property etc.

Advanced technology like AI, Blockchain, and Virtual Reality has reshaped librarianship into a modern, dual-service profession.

The core value of a professional is set out by the professionals’ associations through which a practitioner becomes registered and accredited within their profession. Most of its schools in Western and other developed countries are accredited by the American Library Association.  It is not easy to pinpoint library schools worldwide; however, still, it has been argued that there are more than 500 library and information Science programs globally.

As per the website of ALA, more than 60 schools are accredited within the US and Canada.  As each discipline has its theoretical body of knowledge, librarianship has become a vibrant discipline in social and management science globally.  It has an up-to-date course curriculum, published literature, conference proceedings, overarching theories, various philosophical positions, and discourse on the internet which make them a prominent discipline.

Many believe that advanced technology like AI, Blockchain technology, RFID, Virtual Reality, and Mobile technology has positively transformed librarianship from a traditional setup to a modern profession.  Now, librarians are considered information providers on two fronts, i.e. traditional and digital services.

The blurred boundaries surrounding the profession of librarianship and the changing nature of information acquisition are some factors that negatively devalue librarianship.  Many librarians proclaim that librarians do not get the same respect from their clientele in organizations as other professions; that’s why all we are asking for is respect.  Some literature in the past denotes that librarians have been deprived of recognition in most institutions.

Mostly, librarians have never been engaged in administrative affairs, editorial work, and curriculum development processes.  Such negative images in the organization have left a black spot on the value of librarianship. A person can become a librarian by completing all required academic courses, meeting the credit hour requirements, conducting research, and successfully finishing research projects.

This comprehensive training prepares individuals for diverse roles in library and information science.  Organizations need to treat librarians with the same respect and standards as other professionals, such respect can motivate them to contribute more effectively to achieving organizational goals.

Respect and recognition for librarians are essential for their full contribution to organizational and societal goals.

To build a positive reputation, librarians should focus on being welcoming to patrons, refrain from negative criticism of their profession, promote the value of librarianship, and continually upgrade their skills by staying updated with new technologies. Some scholars like Alan Bundy in 2001 argued that to sustain its value, librarians need to rediscover themselves.

Librarians have the potential to elevate their profession through government policies and initiatives focused on the information economy and knowledge-driven nations. In the 21st century, technology views data as a valuable commodity, and it is librarians who can effectively leverage this data to enhance its value.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Territorial Re-organization in Pakistan

By
Haider Mustehsan
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0
Librarianship

Political systems only work when they are carefully crafted to suit the reality. The 18th Amendment was a landmark feature in the history of political developments in Pakistan. Its goal was to reform the federal structure by shifting power from the center to the provinces. It had previously solved many issues related to the history of provincial autonomy and power sharing. Thus, this step led the governance structure toward decentralization.

The 18th Amendment aimed to decentralize power but has not extended effectively to local governments, creating governance gaps.

Yet the road towards a strong federal structure and participative democracy continues to be very challenging, more so for intra-provincial tensions and the ever-increasing demand for new provinces. The British author Samuel Smiles once opined that mere political reform isn’t the answer to cure the manifold evils that afflict society. It requires social reform, domestic reform, an individual reform. These can only manifest once systems are created to foster such change.

A key accomplishment of the amendment was the redrawing of power lines, allowing the provinces to take charge of their affairs. Yet the much-talked-about decentralization has not been extended to local governments in the provinces. Provincial authorities have always been working to undermine the local government systems in Punjab, Sindh, and KP.

In these provinces’ authority is being centralized and local bodies are being prevented from addressing grassroots issues. This negation to empower local governments contradicts the intent of the amendment, therefore creating governance gaps and fueling tensions amongst dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups within provinces.

Intra-provincial disparities can be particularly seen in Sindh, where the rural-urban divide—rooted in ethnic and political identities—continues to widen. Rural areas are dominated by Sindhi-speaking populations whereas urban centers like Karachi are dominated by Urdu-speaking communities. This interplay of issues has led to conflicts over resource distribution and administrative control that has in turn deepened mistrust and propagated grievances.

Intra-provincial disparities, such as Sindh’s rural-urban divide, fuel tensions and demands for separate provinces.

The call for new provinces has emerged as one important result of the 18th Amendment. Political parties such as PPP, PML-N, and PTI, have commonly employed the issue to create electoral leverage thereby perpetuating it in political debate. These demands have yet to result in authentic administrative action and have left the affected communities frustrated and distrusting of political statements.

The call for a South Punjab province is in itself an expression of deep-rooted grievances regarding underdevelopment and lack of representation. Because it is a predominantly Seraiki-speaking area – South Punjab has felt excluded from equal distribution of resources and influence in politics, and hence in Sindhi voices demanding that the province be divided into separate administrative units for urban centers like Karachi and Hyderabad have grown.

The argument has been that it would improve governance and alleviate urban challenges. However, the proposal is prickly because it touches upon ethnic and political divides. While Urdu-speaking urban communities feel that it is a way of addressing the issue of marginalization the rural Sindhi-speaking populations view it as a threat to Sindh’s unity and cultural identity. This is because they feel that the urban center doesn’t represent their interests.

As for the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, things have been made even more complex after the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas into a single territory, as it has also opened up demands for greater autonomy or even separate provincial status for certain areas.

Governance challenges and underdevelopment in the merged districts have brought into sharp focus the problems of integrating diverse ethnic and regional identities within existing frameworks. This illuminated the plight of the Hazara community which has been marginalized for a long time and faces systemic challenges.

Political parties instrumentalize the demand for new provinces as electoral rhetoric, delaying meaningful administrative reforms.

It makes the call for a Hazara Province louder as it underscores broader demands for greater representation and self-governance in a region marked by ethnic diversity and historical grievances.

The instrumentalization of this notion by the various political parties has further complicated the situation. All three parties have at different times supported the formation of new provinces but for reasons that are electoral and not for the sake of development or tangible change. This has then led to an important issue being watered down into mere political rhetoric.

However, despite these problems, the changing political scene offers a chance to translate the demand for new provinces into a serious policy agenda or at least more than a campaign slogan. This is only possible if political parties set aside their partisan interests and carry out a genuine debate concerning the core issues at hand. The intention must be focused on the larger goal of federalism, inclusiveness, and equitable development.

To have a long-term success of the 18th Amendment, addressing its unintended consequences is indispensable. Strengthening the local government and bringing out a balanced federal-provincial-local level power arrangement needs to be implemented. Ownership of the various diverse communities needs to be created. Governance should respond to the needs of those people and communities.

Demand for new provinces while contentious should be tread with care and responsibility as it would offer policymakers the opportunity to improve governance and representation. It is not a cause of national disintegration but a challenge to include all stakeholders from ethnic groups, political parties, and civil society in open and transparent procedures.

A balanced federal-provincial-local power arrangement is essential for the 18th Amendment’s long-term success.

By giving more importance to long-term country interests over short-term political payoffs, Pakistan can strengthen its federal structure, and then develop a culture for democratic accountability. As such. the 18th Amendment is a transformative moment in Pakistan’s journey toward federalism and democracy.

Intra-provincial conflicts, the marginalization of local governments, and the demand for new provinces must be addressed to ensure its enduring success. Building on these foundations of the amendment, Pakistan can further come nearer to realizing its vision for a truly federal and democratic state by adopting a more inclusive and equitable governance approach.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

How Assad Lost Arab And Gulf Support?

By
Ahmed Quraishi
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0
Assad

The fall of the Assads and the Ba’ath party in Syria is a seminal moment that outweighs the collapse of Saddam’s rule in Iraq, Gaddafi’s in Libya, and Mubarak’s in Egypt. Syria is the original birthplace of the Arab socialist and nationalist revolutionary politics that popularized the Baathist slogan, ‘One Arab Nation With An Eternal Message’.

Syria under the Assads popularized radical Arab nationalism, creating lasting tensions with Gulf Arab states.

The revolutionary rhetoric under the Assads directly clashed with the Egyptians and the Jordanians who shared the Arab nationalist credentials but with a tinge of moderation and avoided the kneejerk anti-Western disposition of the Syrians. Even the Ba’athists in Iraq compromised a little, opening to the West when prudent and improving ties with moderate Arab countries. But not the Assads. And nowhere did this hardline Syrian Arab nationalism and socialism under the Assads collide more than with the Gulf Arabs. And this probably is the entanglement that eventually hurt the Assads the most.

This is why, despite recent Gulf attempts to rehabilitate Bashar Assad, there is a distinct collective sigh of relief among Gulf Arabs, where the end of the Assads is seen as the final defeat of extreme Arab nationalist and populist politics and the triumph of the Gulf Arab model of moderate policies and worldview.

The Assad-Gulf history is dark. The intelligence files of Gulf Arab states are likely filled with stacks of paperwork on Syrian attempts to overthrow Arab ruling families and create social unrest. Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have been in Hafez Assad’s crosshairs up until 1990 [Imad Mughniyeh, the chief Hezbollah suspect in the assassination attempt on the Emir of Kuwait in 1985 was hiding in Damascus until his mysterious death in a car explosion in 2008].

The last decade of Hafez Assad’s life before his death in 2000 saw improvement in ties with the Gulf due to the shared loathing for Saddam’s Iraq. By then, Gulf states had established strong military alliances with the West and no longer felt threatened by the Syrian pan-Arabist ideology.

The Assads’ alignment with Iran’s Khomeinist agenda isolated Syria from the Arab mainstream.

The 1990s also saw a shift in the Arab world, where the power center began to slowly transition from the large populist Arab states to the smaller, calmer, and more moderate Gulf Arabs.

But for as long as Hafez lived, his name was enough to evoke fear across the Arab region. He retained an aura of invincibility even as Syria lagged economically and militarily. That ended when Bashar took over in 2000. In the twenty-four years that followed, Syria was a shadow of its former self, unable to influence Arab politics and culture the way it used to.

The Assad regime had already distanced itself from the Arab mainstream with its radical Arab populist nationalism, but it made a further misstep by entangling itself with Shia jihadism, driven by Iran’s Khomeinist agenda—just as the Arab world was beginning to curb Sunni jihadism.

A moderate Arab consensus had developed by the end of the 2010s that Islamist radicalism and extremism of all hues need to be contained or eliminated for Arab states and societies to restore stability, achieve economic prosperity, and join the global civilization as positive contributors and not as negative rejectionists and isolationists at war with the rest of the world.

A new Arab consensus emerged to curb Islamist radicalism and extreme Arab nationalism by the 2010s.

For this purpose, a narrative emerged in states such as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE that called for ridding Arab societies of both Islamism and radical leftist Arab nationalism. And there was a growing realization that the future of the Arab region was threatened not by Israel, as radical Arabists and Islamists insisted for decades, but by the threat of the convergence of Extreme Sunni Islam and Extreme Shia Islam, with groups such as the Ikhwanists (Hamas) and Khomeinists (Hezbollah) becoming allies [Ikhwanist comes from the Arabic word for Muslim Brotherhood movement, ‘Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen’; Khomeinist refers to the political group of ruling clerics in Iran after 1979 who are aligned to Imam Khomeini’s worldview. The term helps distinguish ruling Iranian clergy from mainstream Shia Muslims of Iran and the Muslim world who may not share Khomeinist ideas, policies, and loyalties.].

Assad might have survived had he expedited his clean break from Iran, which apparently started in recent months but remained painfully slow and launched some form of political process to reconcile with his nation. Starting in 2021, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Kuwait, and Oman launched a process of cautiously rehabilitating Assad [minus Qatar, which maintained a staunchly anti-Assad view, more aligned with Turkey’s].

The other Gulf states believed curbing Sunni and Shia jihadism was more important than fighting Assad and were also concerned by non-Arab states slicing up Syrian territories and using them as a springboard to destabilize the region.

Gulf Arabs cautiously rehabilitated Assad, but geopolitical shifts and Israel’s actions reshaped Syria’s power dynamics.

Cairo had been laying the groundwork to formally restore the Assad regime’s seat in the Arab League, and Riyadh had even invited Assad to a joint Arab-Islamic summit just last month. Things seemed to be looking up for Assad. But Israel’s decisive strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian militias created a vacuum in Syria—one quickly filled by opposition groups backed by Turkey and the West. The rest, as they say, is history.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Crucible of Taxes and Slump of Economy

By
Advocate Amina Noor
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0
Economy

To balance the equation of nature, the world adopted the ideology of laws which later propelled the taxation schemes for the sake of the state’s revenue. The concept of taxation is not novel rather it could be traced back to 1776 with a different identity ‘Barter’ who would exchange goods instead of money, Adam smith introduced the concept in his book ‘The wealth of Nation’.

In Athens taxes were usually imposed during wars only known as ‘Eisphora’ During the Roman Empire all erratic taxes were imposed such as the window tax which illustrated property tax based on its winds and the outlandish beard tax imposed by Peter the Great, ruler of Russia from 1682 until 1725.

Pakistan’s Income Tax Ordinance 2001 governs taxation, with significant exemptions for agriculture and NGOs, ensuring fairness in the system.

History utters how the British imposed sugar taxes and Stamp Act after defeating France in a seven-year war in 1763 AD to pay down a debt approaching £140,000,000 Jizyah is an Islamic tax described in the Quran as a tax that is imposed on a certain erring faction from among the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab; non-Muslim groups such as Christians and Jews recognized in the Quran as possessing a divine scripture) who violate their own religious and ethical principles (9:29) in return of it non-Muslims were granted protection.

If Muslim authorities were unable to defend the dhimmis(the protected people) in the event of an attack, the former were required to return the jizyah to the latter. though in the era of Umar ibn al-Khattab the jizyah was levied on non-Muslim Arab tribes in lieu of military service, Performance of military service earned an exemption. An income tax was first enacted in Mauritius in 1932 (Ordinance 21 of 1932, the Income Tax Ordinance), which came into force on 1 July 1934.

History has paved the way for precautionary measures any territory has ever took for the sake of the revenue of the state. I have seen many people misinterpreting Filer with an obligation of paying taxes even if they hardly make ends meet, in lieu it’s the opposite, becoming a filer wouldn’t oblige a person to taxes unless the yearly income of salary person exceeds 6 lakh in the bank accounts.

The Income Tax Act 1922 was the souvenir of British raj to both India and Pakistan, In Pakistan the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 was promulgated on 13 September 2001 and became effective from 1 July 2002. The government has announced a stunning Rs1.761 trillion in new revenue measures for the next fiscal year, which, a deeper examination reveals, may contribute to another bout of inflation in the country.

Pakistan tax laws are implemented under Income Tax Ordinance,2001 Section 41 to Section 55 deals with the exemption from the tax clauses which indicate that a farmer unless and until making a yearly income over 12 lahks is not eligible for tax which shows that taxes are not the cruel laws of sovereign similarly all public welfare NGOs are not compelled to pay taxes but they are bound to show their income source and I guess that’s a right of state to know if it’s providing them with a gateway of life as well an identity, a nationality.

Pakistan’s debt stands at Rs. 62.881 trillion, with IMF bailout agreements shaping the country’s economic reforms.

Under section 74 of the Income Tax Ordinance, the 2001 tax year is a period of twelve months starting from July 1st of each year to the 30th of June although the crucial month for filing a return or keeping a status active in the taxpayer list, is usually from 1st July to 30th September if other than first-time filer people who always file their return in these months, they won’t have to pay the ATL (active taxpayer list) Challan which is of a fixed amount 1000.

Gifts, Inherited property, and foreign sources of income are exempt from taxes. The amount of withholding tax is refundable also it plays an essential role in the direct revenue of the state and on second thought it can be called advance tax. With recent amendments, it differs from 0.6 percent to 0.9 percent for non-filers and filers respectively on cash withdrawals and deposits. The government has increased the withholding tax on services and contracts by 1 percentage point, expected collection of Rs1.5 billion per month simultaneously.

Pakistan is estimated to be in debt for about Rs. 62.881 trillion which is 74.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Pakistan. Pakistan went to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) 23 times, for bailouts but in the current phase IMF seems kind of annoyed by Pakistan and its economic breakdown every time along with the loan there’s an agreement that is more like instructions from the IMF which is why historical transactions imply that IMF engagements significantly shape Pakistan’s economic reform agenda.

IMF staff and Pakistan have come to an agreement under Pakistan’s Stand By Arrangement, following the approval from the IMF Executive Board.       If approved, Pakistan will be able to access SDR 828 million (approximately US$1.1 billion). Specifically, the government is committed to reaching the fiscal year 2024 primary balance target of PRs 401 billion (0.4 percent of GDP), by expanding the tax base and ensuring that power and gas tariffs are adjusted promptly to cover the costs.

The government aims to collect Rs12.97 trillion in revenue for FY25, a 40% increase over FY24.

Taxes are the savings of the citizens under the regime of their country of residence, later which are meant to be used for the well-being of those citizens. As per the FBR press release During the FY 2023-24 tax year Pakistan has collected 9306 billion in taxes which is believed to be 30 percent more as compared to last year. Although the FBR collection of taxes was falling short of its Rs1.554 trillion target by Rs98 billion.

In July, Pakistan reached a Staff-Level Agreement (SLA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $7 billion 37-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF), aimed at stabilizing the country’s economy. Looking ahead, the government has set an ambitious revenue collection target of Rs12.97 trillion for FY25, a 40% increase over the target for FY24.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

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