Confirming the news of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah’s martyrdom shocked the people of Lebanon, the resistance front, and the world, as Lebanon’s Hezbollah announced the martyrdom of its secretary general in an official statement on September 29.
On Friday, September 27, Benjamin Netanyahu, the criminal prime minister of the Zionist regime, had not yet finished his speech at the United Nations General Assembly when it was announced in Beirut that a series of airstrikes had targeted the headquarters of Hezbollah.
Lebanese public opinion, especially the Shiites and the people of the south, expects Hezbollah’s response to Tel Aviv to be crushing.
According to martyred Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, any violation of the rules of conflict will mean an “endless and unlimited” war.
Now, the question that arises for the people of Lebanon, especially the supporters of Hezbollah, is what goals the Zionist regime seeks to pursue by declaring an official war against Hezbollah and assassinating its secretary general.
WHAT DOES NETANYAHU WANT FROM LEBANON?
Haaretz military analyst Amos Hariel quoted the commander of a division in the Zionist regime’s army as saying, “If they [Hezbollah] are fast enough, we cannot catch them except in Haifa.”
This has been quoted in the context of the existing concerns in the military minds of the Zionist regime about a sudden attack of Hezbollah’s Rizwan Force after the start of the “Al-Aqsa Storm” operation on the morning of October 7.
However, these concerns were beyond Hezbollah’s movements, as the course of conflicts during almost a year of war showed.
At that time, the occupying army was quickly forced to deploy three military divisions in the north.
Also, Netanyahu’s government immediately ordered the evacuation of all residents living within three miles of the Lebanese border and moved them to hotels and other places at the government’s expense.
This decision turned about 60,000 Zionists into a burden on the economy and turned the border area into a security buffer zone inside the Zionist regime for the first time.
In September, Tel Aviv decided to change the equation and shift the weight of the war from Gaza to the Lebanese front. A front that had been prepared for war since 2006.
Daily attacks with guided missiles and mortar shells by Lebanon have destroyed about 70% of all houses in the Zionist settlement of Al Matla alone.
Tel Aviv changed its strategy.
In September, Tel Aviv decided to change the equation and shift the weight of the war from Gaza to the Lebanese front. A front that had been prepared for war since 2006.
Israel successfully delivered precise blows to Hezbollah, which culminated in the bombing of its headquarters.
The target of this attack was Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, several other leaders and cadres of Hezbollah, whose martyrdom will most likely move the war to a more intense stage.
“The coming years will witness the transformation of the northern front into the main military challenge that Israel is facing.”
This statement was not just a personal opinion of a military commander. It was part of the results of a project implemented by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) of the Zionist regime.
Most of the content of this project, titled “Future War in the North: Scenarios, Strategic Options, and Recommendations,” was published in 2021.
Some of its contents were not released due to security concerns and handed over as a confidential appendix to the competent institutions within the military apparatus of the Zionist regime.
This project aimed to evaluate the form of the future war in Lebanon and provide recommendations to policymakers. It drew on the opinions of a group of experts, including former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, former National Security Adviser and Director of Army Planning Giora Eiland, and former Chief of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin.
According to this project, south Lebanon is one of the most dangerous threat circles for the Zionist regime because of its direct proximity to the border, which allows Hezbollah’s Rizwan force to infiltrate and launch a ground attack on population gatherings and military assets in the Galilee.
In addition, various reports say, Hezbollah has more than 150,000 missiles with various ranges, which threaten all the cities in Israel.
Along with Syria, Lebanon is placed in the “first circle” of threats by the Zionist regime’s army, while Iraq is in the “second circle,” and Iran and Yemen are in the “third circle”.
The failure of the “battle between wars” approach in dealing with the threat posed by Hezbollah meant that Israel had to adopt a new one – “campaign between wars”.
The nightmare that Zionist military experts feared was the occurrence of a simultaneous multi-front war in three circles at the same time as Gaza and the West Bank ignited, which they called Iran’s “Ring of Fire”.
The failure of the “battle between wars” approach in dealing with the threat posed by Hezbollah meant that Israel had to adopt a new one – “campaign between wars”.
Reasons? Hezbollah’s presence in Syria and the establishment of a land bridge connecting Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria, which the Zionist regime officially stated in the army’s strategic document published in 2015.
This approach is classified as sub-threshold warfare and was implemented two years after its practical implementation in the field. It aimed at weakening Hezbollah’s capabilities by preventing the transfer of advanced weapons from Tehran to Lebanon and preventing the establishment of any military infrastructure in southern Syria. So, this approach was implemented through airstrikes and artillery barrages, relying on information and precision fires.
However, the new approach, despite its intensity, did not succeed in preventing the strengthening of Hezbollah’s arsenal for about a decade. The number of Hezbollah missiles has quadrupled from about 40,000 in 2006, many of which have been improved through the Precision Missile Project.
Also, Hezbollah started the production of indigenous drones inside Lebanon and, in addition to what it received from Iran, strengthened its forces with air defense systems.
Although these systems were not a significant threat to the advanced warplanes of the Zionist regime, it limited the ability of Israeli drones to fly in the Lebanese skies. According to the United Nations, Hezbollah’s air defense system managed to shoot down five large drones during the current war.
On the other hand, Hezbollah strengthened the presence of its fighters south of the Litani River on the border between Lebanon and Israel, which the Zionist regime considered a violation of Security Council Resolution 1701.
This resolution ended the 2006 war and emphasized the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces to the north of the Litani River and limiting the military presence south of the river to the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL forces.
In this regard, the military planners of the Zionist regime examined several scenarios to deal with Hezbollah and the Lebanese front.
FIRST, LAND MANEUVER TO THE SOUTH OF THE LITANI RIVER:
In early 2019, the occupying army discovered a network of tunnels that extended from southern Lebanon to near the northern borders, allowing the Rizwan Force units to penetrate into occupied Palestine.
Hence, the Zionist regime’s army destroyed these tunnels from the direction of occupied Palestine in an operation called “Northern Shield”. The planners believed that it would be difficult to weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities by using only the air force, and ground operations were also necessary.
Many of them emphasized the necessity of conducting ground maneuvers in the future war in the south of Litani River. A powerful, violent, but short-term maneuver aimed at destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the border region, especially the missile bases and the Rizwan Force’s position.
This operation was carried out after the airstrikes that were carried out based on detailed and precise information. Also, it was recommended to gain essential achievements in the early days of the war in order to break Hezbollah’s will to fight.
At the same time as this ground operation, another maneuver in the Golan Heights, was proposed to eliminate the missile threats of Hezbollah’s allied militias in Syria.
Some voices also emphasized the importance of re-establishing a security buffer zone in southern Lebanon. While Giora Eiland, the former head of the National Security Council, called for the declaration of the Lebanese government as an enemy like Hezbollah and suggested targeting its infrastructure to put pressure on Hezbollah to shorten the duration of the war, other experts believed that the move will not be worth much. The reason they gave was that the Lebanese government does not have much influence on Hezbollah, which takes advantage of the weak capabilities of the government in providing services by filling the gaps and fulfilling the needs of its supporters.
A- Exit Goals and Strategies:
The purpose of war in this scenario is to achieve victory, in the sense that the military achievements turn into political and security successes.
So, this goal will be achieved by imposing the conditions of the Zionist regime for the end of the war and the military defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria after destroying its military capabilities and infrastructure, and creating conditions that make its military reconstruction impossible for a long time. This scenario is based on an exit strategy designed to end the war after inflicting a heavy cost on Hezbollah and the Lebanese government by attacking its infrastructure.
Then, negotiating to end the war with conditions that include the establishment of new rules of the game. It requires the destruction of Hezbollah’s presence south of the Litani River, preventing its presence near the Golan and creating conditions that would make the reconstruction of Hezbollah very difficult or even impossible by blocking the weapons transfer routes from Iran to Lebanon.
Also, only the Lebanese army will be deployed in the south along with UNIFIL forces under the title of “responsibility of the Lebanese government in all Lebanese territories.” For this purpose, strict mechanisms will be used to monitor implementation of the agreement.
However, the Israeli military planners have suggested that all possible options be used to achieve the desired goals before starting the implementation of this scenario. Why? They are afraid of entering into a long war that may wear out its army or fail to defeat Hezbollah.
There is also concerns over a wider regional war in which other actors of the resistance axis, especially from the Syrian front and Iran, will intervene. This situation can lead to a war on several fronts and difficulty controlling the military campaign’s scope and duration.
B- On the Eve Of The Ground Operation In The South Of Litani:
By evaluating the current situation on the Lebanese front, we can see that the Zionist regime army has started to implement part of the preparatory operations for the ground operation since mid-September 2024.
In this operation, Hezbollah’s military chain of command was weakened by carrying out large-scale assassinations. Those who were targeted included Hezbollah operations commander Ibrahim Aqeel and his companions Ibrahim Qubaisi of Rizwan Force and Mohammad Sarwar of the Air and Missile Forces. This operation was carried out after the assassination of Fuad Shekar, the military commander of Hezbollah.
In addition, Hezbollah’s communication network and about 4,000 of its members were targeted by exploding pagers and wireless devices. Also, weapons warehouses and missile platforms have been destroyed in a series of large-scale airstrikes. It ultimately led to the destruction of Hezbollah’s central command headquarters in southern Dahiya, and martyrdom of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah and other leaders.
These rapid and widespread attacks seek to destroy Hezbollah’s operational efficiency and present to two difficult choices to it:
a) Continuation of the war in a situation where extensive losses and heavy blows are inflicted on the leadership and its human and non-human resources.
b) Or withdrawal and acceptance of the ceasefire conditions set by the Zionist regime, which includes the separation of the Lebanese front from Gaza, the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces to the north of the Litani river, and weakening it as much as possible, which ultimately will lead to its disarmament.
SECOND, GROUND OPERATIONS TO BEIRUT:
A number of radical military politicians of the Zionist regime argue that if Hezbollah withdraws from southern Litani, it will soon rebuild its military capabilities with the help of Iran. Also, Hezbollah has created a new communication network and will deploy its forces in the south of Litani again in the future.
This would mean a return to the pre-war situation and the loss of all military gains.
Considering the status quo, Zionist politicians demand the implementation of ground operations in Beirut in order to create a strategic change in the internal situation of Lebanon. This scenario carries with it the risks of starting a comprehensive and long regional war, which requires the military operations of the Zionist regime against the Iraqi groups supporting Hezbollah, the Shiite militias in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The reason is they will not stand by and watch, while the Zionist army is trying to break the power of Hezbollah and recapture Beirut.
Therefore, the main goal of this scenario is the collapse of what is called the “Axis of Resistance” formed by Iran and a change in the power equation in the Middle East.
This issue will ultimately lead to a direct confrontation with Tehran to destroy its nuclear program and prevent the reconstruction of the military capabilities of Iran’s allied groups.
This scenario will most likely turn into a protracted, multi-front war that will require heavy reliance on US military support and the political support that Washington provides to the Zionist regime.
Tel Aviv alone is not capable of such a large-scale war. Neither the number of soldiers and warehouses of ammunition and spare parts nor its economy and social structure allow Israel to engage in a long and brutal war.
Assaf Orion, the former head of the strategy department of Israel’s army, in an article published in the Foreign Affairs said the Zionist regime has not fought on two fronts simultaneously since the October 1973 war.
The war, which lasted less than a month, is in accordance with the traditional security theory of the Zionist regime. It emphasizes the beginning of a short war in the enemy’s land to avoid the disadvantages of limited population and lack of strategic depth and lack of local resources necessary to continue long military campaigns.
Targeting Iran as The Main Prize:
The second scenario – reaching Beirut – does not only seek to achieve the goals pursued in the south Litani maneuver but also includes larger objectives which are designed to change the face and fate of the region.
These goals include the destruction of Hezbollah as the most dangerous military threat to the Zionist regime due to its proximity to Israel’s borders and military capabilities, then targeting the “octopus head” in Tehran as described by the Zionist regime.
Eyal Zamir, a former deputy chief of staff of the Zionist regime and the current director general of the Ministry of Defense, in an in-depth study published in 2022 called for an approach that would force Iran to retreat into its own borders. This is done by targeting IRGC leaders and forces inside and outside Iran, destroying the country’s weapons factories, and creating an American-Zionist-Arab axis to weaken Tehran’s influence in the region.
