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Can we preserve the art of war?

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Robot dogs join US Air Force exercise giving a glimpse at the potential battlefield of the future. (source: CNN)

In nine different stories published in the 1940s, the inimitable science fiction author Isaac Asimov explored the ethical implications of technology by way of imagining a world increasingly inhabited by humanoid autonomous systems. All these stories chart different threads of a singular narrative where a reporter interviews a ‘robopsychologist’. All these stories somehow converge on the issue of ethical programming, with Asimov’s one or more laws of robotics at the center. In one of the stories set around 2019, the robot refuses to follow human order but still does the ‘right’ thing. In another one spun in 2021, a robot is left with a programming error and finds himself in an infinite loop of withholding versus yielding the information.

Kenneth Payne’s recent book exploring the complex interplay of AI and military strategic thinking is a clever wordplay on Asimov’s anthology I, Robot. Payne, being a political psychologist, has been deeply interested in studying the evolution of strategic thinking within the context of warfare. I, Warbot echoes Arthur C. Clarke’s classic maxim that all sufficiently advanced technologies have always been indistinguishable from magic. In this regard, while AI is no exception, warfare theorists as well as AI practitioners must try to mark brittle skills where AI might end up being worse than a toddler.

But while having an interesting theoretical dimension, the problem is not just theoretical. Autonomous weapons systems are a reality and algorithmically driven disruptive technologies are extending boundaries of control in subtle ways. In this context, while we have always been stating unambiguously what we expect out of autonomous weapons, isn’t it time to reflect upon ways where they might behave in unexpected ways?

This takes us back to Asimov’s fictional world where a robot must be designed to follow three laws. One, it may not injure a human being through action or inaction. Two, it must obey human orders unless in conflict with the first law. Three, it must protect itself unless in conflict with both the first and second laws.

However, while these laws might fancy a fictional web of stories, would they provide a rational viewpoint of guiding actual war machines which are built upon layers and layers of arguably inexplicable autonomous computing? Violence, after all, is a distinguishing feature of war and if future Warbots – the lethal robotic machines – are being designed and programmed to kill accurately and relentlessly, how can they incorporate an essential constraint of inefficiency without creating irresolvable paradoxes?

To attempt an answer, Payne offers three laws of Warbots as an opening gambit. Firstly, a warbot should only kill those the owner wants it to and exercise violence in a humanistic way. Secondly, it must understand the owner’s intentions and exercise creativity. Thirdly, it should protect the humans on the owner’s side at all costs including the sacrifice of their life — at the same time, this protection should not be at the expense of the mission.

This gambit is no less than a semantic master stroke. Among other things, it immediately implies that AI portrayed in film and art is human-like while not being human. The media too cannot break free of science-fictional templates. These media indulgences tell us more about ourselves rather than robots. These are unrealistic expectations of AI which are merely on-screen manipulations and fall quite short of the domain of actual possibilities in autonomous computing. Launching from this critical opening gambit, the rest of the book aims to chart this domain of possibilities.

Since Payne is primarily a political psychologist, a recurring thread in the book is that the minds of the Warbots – the neural connectivity so to speak – will be quite different from the humans. As AI practitioners, we may immediately refer to the fact how that state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms are diverging from classical neural networks. Military tacticians, on the other hand, may refer to the psychological insights of strategic theorists. Carl von Clausewitz, for instance, argued that war is an intense emotional business where ‘passionate hatred’ motivates the belligerents. The commander is an idealized ‘genius’ who makes the right decisions with limited information. While conceding with humility, theorists like Clausewitz felt no qualms in accepting that they were in dark about the complexities of the human mind. Nevertheless, they could state one fact emphatically: the human brain doesn’t work like a machine.

Thus any decision-making technology, if transformed into artificially intelligent warfare, will yield unexpected results. Historical blueprints for creating Warbots are nonexistent. It’s all about working backward from what we want them to achieve. The question boils down to this: what kind of weapons are required by the armed forces? More specifically, what kind of drivers shape these requirements in the first place?

Reducing the first question to functional context disregards the most important paradigm which is cultural. This includes societal attitudes to war and how different strategic cultures rationalize violence as a means to an end. The other question relates to design, i.e. the engineering philosophy as well as the craft. Would we be able to say that Warbots are clever machines? Of course, these are far ahead of humans in terms of computing power, optimized decision-making agency in an extremely constrained environment, and agility of convergence, but would they be considered as ‘clever’ and ‘intuitively informed’ as humans? Isn’t it possible that autonomous problem-solving is being misunderstood here with intelligence?

Payne argues at length about how cyber security is being increasingly entangled with AI. To mitigate risks, organizations like DARPA regularly launch grand challenges for AI to automatically find vulnerabilities in code. While these challenges stop here due to ethical concerns, what stops attempts at the next obvious tactical maneuver which is turning defense into an attack by hacking the hacker? These competitions provide insights into new conundrums related to problems of attribution within the context of cyber warfare. If we cannot possibly know who has attacked us, how can we possibly launch a counter-offense without inviting chaos?

DARPA has officially announced last year that they are evaluating potential uses of jetpacks in the military. (photo credits: autorevolution)

The situations become further complex when attempts like DeepMind increasingly imitate Asimov’s fictional universe, the terrain where Warbots design other Warbots. The new deep learning algorithms dive into particular environmental constraints and look for features serving as foundations for other reinforcement learning algorithms. This is a meta-learning frontier, where an autonomous agent tries to learn what other autonomous learners need to learn.

This is no surprise that the goal of DARPA’s AI Next program is to build autonomous computers that can reason and think in context and function more as colleagues than as tools. The subtle distinction between exploratory creativity and a transformational or collaborative one is hard to miss. Whether it is AlphaZero beating Gary Kasparov, the AlphaGo beating Lee Sedol, or the AI engine winning multi-player no-limit poker game, all are examples of learning by exploratory creativity at its best. Transformation creativity, however, is a true genius. Machines, in this sense, are excellent in ‘thinking’ but can they truly ‘create’? It is only possible if they can ‘understand’. Payne’s book not only raises a key strategic concern, but it is also timely as well, and equally likely to indulge both military professionals as well as practicing scientists.

As engineers, we are well familiar with the ways control systems fail and overshoot the bounds of stability. We are also aware of strategic analogs of unstable systems, for instance, Clausewitz’s constraints such as ‘fog-of-war’ and ‘friction’ leading to failure. Can we pursue research in directions where both concerns are combined to achieve semi-autonomous, artificially intelligent agents collaborating with humans and bound by our specific moral constraints? Only time will answer this question since boundaries between fact and fiction are already blurred. The real challenge lies in the preservation of the art of war while augmenting the science of it.

Doctrine, Policy and Strategy

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By now it is a cliché to say that these are trying and difficult circumstances; they have been for quite some time and nothing on the horizon suggests that they will change anytime soon. For a developing country such as Pakistan – things are doubly tough! Particularly when it comes to foreign policy challenges. Thus, Pakistan’s instruments of foreign policy need to be at par with the best if they have to be successful in 2022 and beyond. Consider.

Foreign policy is the cornerstone of any country’s peaceful existence in the international comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception!

Janne Haaland Matláry, a Norwegian political scientist writes that there are generally two types of instruments available to address foreign policy challenges. One, soft tools which include typically cooperative, mostly non-coercive and characteristically traditional aspects of foreign policy. Two, hard tools whereby comprising coercive and hard-line actions in the interest of shaping favourable foreign policy outcomes.

For Pakistan – just like any other country – soft tools must be the primary instruments for achieving foreign policy objectives. First, the art of diplomacy. While Pakistan needs to have a balanced relationship with the US, it still needs to find other avenues of similar alignment with China and Russia. Regionally – it needs to keep on engaging with Afghanistan at least in light of the humanitarian support if nothing else and seek further reproachment with Iran while keeping Saudi friendship at an even keel. Although not readily possible perhaps, but Pakistan should be able and willing to stretch an olive branch to India as and when a favourable regime presents itself. Meanwhile, further efforts to cement relationships with Turkey and Malaysia should be afoot. This is indeed a tall order but foreign policy manoeuvres are nothing but a tight-rope and need to leverage the spirit of cooperation, persuasion and co-optation to further its agenda. Second, the vagaries of propaganda. It is an open secret that marketing is a massive part of the foreign policy initiative. Pakistan will need to continue to plead its case – that of being a moderate and sensible nation – more vociferously and at as many forums as possible. It may not be easy keeping recent incidents of extremist ideology in mind but unfortunately, they are a reality, like in so many other countries. Think what you may of Imran Khan, but he is better than almost all his predecessors to further Pakistan’s cause in chambers such as the UN and OIC. The eloquence of Shah Mahmood Qureshi – Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister – is legendary even if his competence and consistency may not be. Social media, another battleground for propaganda wars, will need additional focus as narratives and trends are won and lost in this arena of 5th generation warfare.

Think what you may of Imran Khan but he is better than almost all his predecessors to further Pakistan’s cause in chambers such as the UN and OIC.

Third, the largesse of economy. These measures are highly crucial but highly abstract. They are generally two-fold. One, increasing the inherent strength of the economy – ensuring trade deficit and current account deficit is narrowed and finally eliminated. Two, economic measures against other nations to push foreign policy objectives through. For Pakistan, the first is important and doable but the second not so much because it is mostly meant for high performing economies which run surplus trade and current accounts and have the ability to penalise nations who don’t tow their favoured narratives. One thing Pakistan can do is improve the first to make the second a possibility! And in the process escape the clutches of international monetary structures such as the IMF and World Bank, which incidentally are one of the instruments of American foreign policy!

Along the way, Pakistan will need to bank on hard tools, which generally come in three flavours. First, the existence of military and the nuclear deterrence. In a region that is relatively hostile – not to say that the world at large isn’t – Pakistan will need to continue to maintain this deterrence. Unfortunately for a developing country it is easier said than done because of budgetary limitations. Maybe the need in 2022 and afterwards will be to maintain a balance between spending i.e. spend smarter not bigger! Second, the threat of sanctions – in one form or the other. While this is a good instrument to be used by developed countries, for Pakistan it only has limited efficacy and only where it may be possible. Specifically, some lightweight sanctions in trade and military knowledge transfer – and that too towards countries that may not be too relevant in the global calculus. Therefore, this too – just like the soft tool of economic measures – will take time and consequently should be made part of the next five- or ten-year plan. Third, the option of tit-for-tat retaliation. Although for a developing country such as Pakistan imposing sanctions may not be a feasible option but like-mannered retaliation at the diplomatic front is still viable. In the absence of other alternatives this becomes extremely crucial and can manifest in responding in kind in diplomatic rows, withdrawing of Pakistan foreign office dignitaries where needed and ejecting foreign diplomats to signal policy displeasure. It is true that this is a meek choice at best but still better than nothing until Pakistan can develop leverage in the foreign policy instruments of economic measures and sanctions.

Pakistan’s instruments of foreign policy need to be at par with the best if they have to be successful

Foreign policy is the cornerstone of any country’s peaceful existence in the international comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception! While occasionally it may seem that the deck is stacked against it, there is no reason not to endeavour a logical mix of foreign instruments – comprising of soft tools and hard tools – to ensure that foreign policy provides a well-deserved pay-off even in this tough and dynamic international climate. After all, “do the best you can until you know better, then when you know better, do better”!