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Taliban and the Crisis in Afghanistan

By
Dr. Usman
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2

In 2021, the Afghan Taliban took back control of Afghanistan after fighting a rebellion for twenty years. The Taliban reformed and began regaining territory less than 10 years after the American-led invasion that overthrew the previous regime in 2001. In line with a 2020 peace agreement with the Taliban, they staged a swift assault as the US started to evacuate its last forces from Afghanistan.

Even though they promised to preserve the rights of women and communities of religious and racial minorities, the Taliban have enforced a strict interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban have failed to provide Afghans with sufficient food supplies and economic possibilities as they have evolved from an insurgent organization to a functioning administration.

Numerous instances of human rights violations have been documented by the UN mission in Afghanistan. Because the Taliban scared off journalists and put limits on press freedom, more than 200 news outlets had to close. Activists and protesters have been tracked and forcefully disappeared, and their government has ruthlessly suppressed protests. They also reinstated the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which was previously in place, and enforced laws against actions judged to be contrary to Islam. They instructed judges to apply their version of sharia in November 2022; in the following weeks, authorities resumed public hangings and floggings.

Women's rights have been undermined. Due to restrictions put in place by the Taliban, girls are not allowed to go to high school, and women are not allowed to go to college or teach there. The group banned women from working for local and international voluntary groups in December 2022.

Women’s rights have been undermined. Due to restrictions put in place by the Taliban, girls are not allowed to go to high school, and women are not allowed to go to college or teach there. The group banned women from working for local and international voluntary groups in December 2022. According to estimates from the UN Development Program (UNDP), limiting women’s employment might cost Afghanistan’s GDP up to 5%. Amnesty International reports a substantial increase in the number of women jailed for defying discriminatory rules, such as those requiring women to cover their whole bodies while in public and to only appear with male chaperones. In addition, there are now more child marriages.

The UNDP says that the Taliban’s rule has also taken away the gains that Afghans made in their living conditions in the 20 years after the US invasion. In a study from October 2022, the organization claimed that practically all Afghans were living in poverty. Since the takeover, the economy has contracted by up to 30%, and there have been an estimated 700,000 job losses. More than 90% of individuals are impacted by food insecurity. The problem is getting worse because several countries and international groups have stopped giving aid, which is vital to the economy and public health.

The violence has also increased along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, which has always supported the Taliban. Its commonly believed Tehrik-e-Taliban, a terrorist organization commonly referred to as the Pakistani (faux Taliban), have gained strength after the Taliban's ascent to power.

International observers are nonetheless worried that the Taliban pose a danger to national and international security through their funding of terrorist groups, especially Al-Qaeda. Taliban leadership might convert Afghanistan into a haven for terrorists who could launch attacks against the US and its allies, despite Taliban pledges that the country’s territory wouldn’t be used against the security of any other country. The violence has also increased along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, which has always supported the Taliban. Its commonly believed Tehrik-e-Taliban, a terrorist organization commonly referred to as the Pakistani (faux Taliban), have gained strength after the Taliban’s ascent to power. The organization broke off a cease-fire with the Pakistani government in 2022 and began carrying out assaults throughout the nation. Officials from Pakistan have charged the Afghan Taliban with giving the extremists a safe harbor in their country. For many years, the Afghan government relied on help from a number of countries; according to 2019 World Bank research, contributions from foreign partners funded 75% of the government’s public expenditures. Many of these countries stopped off aid when the Taliban took control, fueling concerns about potential future economic turmoil.

Taliban Leadership

Nevertheless, aid rose in 2022 as donors sent more than $2.6 billion. The US has donated more than $1.1 billion in help since the coup. However, according to UN authorities, the pledges fell short of the nation’s humanitarian requirements. Many Western countries, most notably the US, shut down their diplomatic posts in Afghanistan when the Taliban took power. Diplomatic relations and recognition have been withheld from the Taliban regime, which refers to Afghanistan as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Diplomatic relations and recognition have been withheld from the Taliban regime, which refers to Afghanistan as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The UN General Assembly has also postponed a decision on who would indefinitely represent Afghanistan at the UN.

The UN General Assembly has also postponed a decision on who would indefinitely represent Afghanistan at the UN. The Taliban are now being investigated by the International Criminal Court for suspected atrocities, including crimes against humanity, committed against Afghans.

Strategic Realignment in Middle East and US Priorities

By
Asad Malik
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0

Changing global strategic environment, in the aftermath of recent developments, has left serious concerns for developing as well as developed states. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has added fuel to the fire and created severe global food crisis. With regards to China, there is an unfortunate tendency in US strategic circles to compartmentalize by geography as China watchers look at Beijing, but for too long ignored its inroads in Africa and Americas. Russia specialists watch Kremlin but ignore Moscow’s inroads far beyond Russia’s borders.

Similarly, Middle East may have been the focus of US strategy for past quarter-century, but both US State Department and Pentagon divide it between EU, near Eastern and African bureaus. So, it is with recent Middle East peace moves. What is happening in Arab-Israeli peace is historic, and no amount of partisanship in Washington can credibly detract from it. But as momentous as slow collapse of Arab-Israeli conflict and strategic reorientation within Middle East is, its impact on South Asia will also be momentous.

At the same time, strategic pundits in New Delhi increasingly embraces the new order. There can be no mistaking importance of strategic realignment in Middle East. The decision first by UAE and next Bahrain to normalize their ties with Israel formalize a détente that has been years in the making. All indications are that KSA could be next, which is possible but not in near future.

For greater so-called regional political, economic and strategic integration, Arab capitals are recognizing Israel because they want to enhance their outreach. Iran is a major reason for change. From its foundation, Iran has brought Israel’s genocidal eradication as core policy. While Iran’s post-revolutionary policy toward Gulf Arab states has been more nuanced, Iranian government’s willingness to export revolution throughout Middle East and incite unrest in Bahrain, Kuwait, and KSA had led Gulf states to view Iranian regime through the prism of fundamental challenge particularly in the region.

Arab States that recognize Israel

KSA has been suffering from direct attacks, emanating from Yemen, launched by Iranian backed proxies. Sudan, which once pledged firm rejection of negotiations with let alone recognition of Israel now seeks to join moderate camp. Iraq, once home to the most radical Palestinian factions, may not have peace with Israel on its agenda, but no longer seeks to obstruct it either. Likewise, Middle East realignment may also reverberate through South Asia, albeit not in entirely positive ways.

Moreover, Israel and India have already broken the ice, notwithstanding India’s substantial economic ties to Iran. However, Saudi pivot toward the peace bloc is causing Pakistan to move the other directions as well and to seek comfort. Islamabad will have to act promptly in order to accomplish its political, economic and strategic objectives. It cannot ignore its bonding with Gulf allies, who are the life support of Pakistan’s economy. Policy makers in Islamabad will have to maintain balanced diplomacy keeping in view Pakistan’s strong bonding with Tehran and Doha.

Zalmay Khalilzad and the top US general in Afghanistan met with the Taliban negotiating team in Doha, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar

US State Department and Pentagon must recognize the importance of Pakistan’s shifting alliances. The Trump-era peace deal with Afghan Taliban has been empowering radical Islamists (TTP/ ISKP) to further and formalizes their de facto safe-haven. Countries that prioritize ideology above both peace and their economic development tend to spiral downward into ever more radical postures as they seek to distract from their own failings. It seems strange to consider, but gradually KSA has been quickly becoming a moderating force in region

Still, the ideological divergences and conflicts of interest both are likely to continue to cause tension among Arab states. Despite reconciliation, rich Arabian organization GCC is still far from being an effective regional organization. It is acting like defensive alliance rather than being an offensive one. It has failed to show its strategic pivot at global fronts despite having massive economic opportunities for rest of the world. The described normalization processes and rapprochements reflect the power shifts of the last decade. They can be explained by countries’ changing assessments of regional security situation, shared threat perceptions and converging interests especially of Gulf States and Israel.

Likewise, US government can rebalance America’s policy in Middle East through diplomacy, economic statecraft, and security cooperation while shifting away from direct military action. Even with the revival of the nuclear deal, it is unlikely that US or its security partners will be able to reach a viable grand bargain with Iran any time soon. Only with time and generational change in Iran’s political leadership will actual, sustainable rapprochement prove possible.

Lastly, the Abraham Accords and Arab-Israeli strategic partnership, which was concluded through mediation of Trump administration, were diplomatic achievements that broke the inertia of regional conflict even though they did not address Palestinian issue as a priority. As a result, Biden administration will keep US embassy in Jerusalem instead of Tel Aviv and should be prepared to endure Palestinian criticism.

Abraham Accords – Bahraini foreign minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu American president Donald Trump Emirati foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan

In addition, US Middle East policy faces several ongoing obstacles, including Russia’s increasing regional influence, the rise of China, and the intensification of proxy civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. The strengthening of anti-US solidarity between Russia, Iran, and China will also be a serious challenge.

China and South Asia: China’s Impact on Strategic Regions

By
Ambassador Masood Khalid
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0


As the world finds itself at the cusp of a new Cold War, China’s interest in South Asia and Pakistan-China relations is a subject of greater scrutiny. South Asia is of immense strategic significance for China in the context of its “neighbourhood diplomacy”. China has had historical linkages through religion, culture and trade with South Asia. Being home to nearly 25% of the world’s population, a civilisational melting pot, a regional tri-junction, resource-rich and dynamic yet poor, and last but not the least, nuclearized and turmoil-ridden, South Asia presents numerous challenges as well as opportunities for China. Its stability is inextricably linked to China’s own stability. Since the region is least integrated economically, China offers herself to be a partner in South Asia’s regional outreach and development. Moreover, in the evolving geo-political dynamics, South Asia is fast emerging as a sub-region of the larger Indo-Pacific theatre where the US-China rivalry is in full play.

South Asia is of immense strategic significance for China in the context of its "neighbourhood diplomacy". A civilisational melting pot, a regional tri-junction, resource-rich and dynamic and nuclearized and turmoil-ridden, South Asia presents numerous challenges as well as opportunities for China. Its stability is inextricably linked to China's own stability.

An important postulate of China’s Foreign Policy is a “peaceful neighbourhood”. China believes that it cannot insulate itself from the fire in its neighbourhood. Turmoil in the region means annulling the economic gains of the last few decades made by China. While China is in no position to prevent turmoil in South Asia, it certainly can work to encourage interlocking cooperative arrangements with regional countries as stakeholders. BRI is premised on this rationale.

Pakistan was amongst the first countries to join BRI. Its principal offshoot, CPEC, has now entered into its second phase, with a much larger canvass of bilateral cooperation. China is opening up its western regions in close proximity to Pakistan, offering a unique opportunity to leverage its geographic location, through enhanced trade and investment benefitting both South Asia and the wider region. Through CPEC, Pakistan can optimise its potential to serve as a regional trade and energy hub and overcome its infrastructure and development deficit. Being equal stakeholders in CPEC, both Pakistan and China attach high importance to its successful implementation.

It is unfortunate that CPEC has become a victim of US-China rivalry and is being made deliberately controversial to drive a wedge in China-Pakistan relations. CPEC is essentially an economic partnership project with no sinister designs as borne out by the good intentions of its extension to Afghanistan, basically to help the war-ravaged country to stand on its own feet. While India’s hostility to CPEC is rooted in its deep animosity towards Pakistan, the US stance is not comprehensible especially as several countries wish to join the initiative. Pakistan has been approached by key Central Asian countries to allow them access to the ports in Pakistan for their overseas trade. Being landlocked, these countries see CPEC as a silver lining and a window to advance their economic and business interests. And they look to China as a logical partner with the capacity to deliver in this endeavour.

While Southwest Asia appears gearing up to explore new avenues of cooperation, South Asian peace and progress have remained a hostage to India’s ambition to be a policeman of the region. India’s disputes with its neighbours and its frenzied arms acquisitions are destabilizing the region. Riding on the crest of the US embrace as a net security provider, India has abandoned its pretence of being non-partisan or independent in its foreign policy choices. Its association with QUAD, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), foundational and logistic agreements with the USA, security arrangements with littoral states of the Indian Ocean and its extra-regional power projection through active participation in anti-China military and naval exercises, should put to rest any notions about its much trumpeted” strategic ambiguity”.

Riding on the crest of the US embrace as a net security provider, India has abandoned its pretence of being non-partisan or independent in its foreign policy choices. Its association with QUAD, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), foundational and logistic agreements with the USA.
Chinese President Xi Jing Ping and QUAD member leaders
QUAD member leaders

In its quest to dominate the region, India has made SAARC dysfunctional, created a dangerous border standoff with China and muzzled Kashmiri’s voice by annexing the Jammu and Kashmir territory in complete disregard of its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. The dialogue with Pakistan is stalled. By opposing CPEC, it is, in fact, depriving Afghanistan and other interested countries of its fruits.

Ironically, despite being important trade partners, China’s relations with India suffer from deep mistrust. While an uneasy calm prevails on the Pakistan-India border after a ceasefire agreement in 2021, the same could not be said about the India-China border. As recent events have shown, skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces could lead to a major clash, especially in view of reported reinforcements on the border.   Some analysts hold the view that BJP led government can also attempt a strike on Pakistan before it holds elections in 2024 to bolster its electoral support. While that would be a serious miscalculation on India’s part, the cascading effect of perpetual tensions in relations between India and China or India and Pakistan, on the security and stability of South Asia, should not be discounted.  US decision to array India vis a vis China has severely undermined security equilibrium in the region. This conflict-prone syndrome has the potential for a wider regional conflagration.

Pakistan’s position is precarious. Pakistan cannot insulate itself from the impact of major power competition nor can it afford to stay away from positive momentum towards regional economic integration. Historically, Pakistan has maintained close relations with the US, notwithstanding highs and lows in the relationship. Its relations with China have throughout been steady and time-tested. Pakistan wishes to pursue the two relationships based on their respective strengths. The trajectory of each relationship is differently grounded on the principles of mutual benefit and bilateralism. Pakistan does not wish to be part of any bloc politics. However, it will have to navigate its diplomacy skilfully as it faces a triangular conflictual situation: US-China; China-India, and India- Pakistan.

Given the past history, Pakistan and China feel confident in their relationship. Imperatives of regional peace and security and congruence of interests drive Pakistan-China relations. In the changing international environment, this relationship is a bright spot and a constant in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. The level of bilateral cooperation is deep and substantive. China has shown the understanding, capacity and will to help Pakistan. Despite domestic and global changes, the Pakistan-China friendship has displayed remarkable poise. The trust enshrining this relationship is manifest in their mutual support for each other’s core issues. There is no cause for conflict in this relationship, only potential for its future growth as both sides have a convergence of views on key issues. This mutual support is not driven only by geo-political considerations but also by their shared perspective on upholding the principles of the UN Charter and international law, multilateralism and justice in inter-state relations. Both oppose hegemony, unilateralism and a zero-sum approach. This relationship is not against any country. The core principles of mutual trust, mutual respect and non-interference define this relationship. It would not have sustained so long, were it based on expediency. Both Pakistan and China desire that all regional countries, big or small, should be equal stakeholders in South Asia’s peace and development.

China is helping Pakistan with its economic stability. Its assistance in the military sphere is not to unleash an arms race but to enable Pakistan to have a credible defence capability in a dangerously asymmetric security environment. China believes that a strong Pakistan is a guarantee of regional peace and stability and a bulwark against terrorism and extremism. CPEC is also aimed at facilitating Pakistan’s journey on the road of self-reliance through the injection of capital and technology. Being a large country, Pakistan’s significance in South Asian strategic calculus is duly recognised by China.

Since China has invested heavily in BRI and CPEC, it is rightly concerned over the spike in terrorist activities in Pakistan and attacks on its assets, orchestrated by BLA, TTP, ISIS and ETIM. It is also concerned with the fluidity of the situation in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban assumed power in Kabul, China has remained actively engaged with them and offered economic assistance. China has urged the Taliban to show flexibility on the question of girls’ education and respect for international norms. It has also emphasised the need for a broad-based inclusive dispensation in Afghanistan. For a substantial increase in its economic commitment, China has sought guarantees from the Taliban that Afghan territory will not be used for terrorism against its neighbours. China has urged the USA to de-freeze Afghanistan’s monetary assets.

China's role in the reconstruction of the Afghan war-ravaged economy and Pakistan's role as a facilitator of logistic support. China's offer of investing in Afghanistan's mineral and energy sectors could be a transformational factor.
Wang Yi is a Chinese senior Diplomat and Politician on Afghanistan Post US exit

China’s role in the reconstruction of the Afghan war-ravaged economy and Pakistan’s role as a facilitator of logistic support through Gwadar and Karachi ports for its supply of machinery and equipment are complimentary. China’s offer of investing in Afghanistan’s mineral and energy sectors and in road and railway development could be a transformational factor in turning around its economy and connecting her in the region. China is aware that inimical forces are working to derail its sponsored projects in Afghanistan. The country’s descent into chaos is a nightmarish scenario for Afghanistan’s neighbours including China, which fears a spillover of terrorism and extremist tendencies in its Xinjiang region, which is a crucial node for BRI’s connectivity with Eurasia. China is, therefore, keen to evolve a regional consensus for stabilising Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and China agree that peace in Afghanistan is indispensable for BRI’s success. Strategic communication and enhanced coordination between Pakistan and China on the evolving situation is extremely important. There are indications of attempts being made to destabilize Afghanistan, Pakistan and China simultaneously by some foreign powers
using proxies.

As close strategic partners and neighbours, Pakistan and China face the prospects of growing instability and turbulence in their periphery. If the security situation becomes precarious, both countries need to ensure that their relationship remains a strong deterrent against forces seeking to undermine it. The fallout of a sharpened competition between China and the US in this region could be quite adverse. It is imperative that regional countries do not drag extra-regional powers into their disputes. While Pakistan and China seek an improvement in their relations with India, their policy is at variance with regional trends to foster connectivity and cooperation. It would not be wise to stop the wheel of progress. China’s rise is a reality. It would be more prudent to coexist with this reality than counter it. For most countries, China is a bigger trading partner than the US, so they would not like to choose sides. Even US allies would not like to choose between China and USA. As Fareed Zakaria cautioned in an article in Foreign Affairs, the China challenge is being exaggerated and the consequences of not getting it right could be huge for the United States. Whereas US in its bid to counter China is expanding its presence in the Asian Pacific Region by employing the strategy of US Forward Defence Ring policy.

Pakistan considers China to be a voice of reason and restraint in international affairs.  It is the common choice of Pakistan and China to develop a partnership that serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and contributes constructively to the peace and stability of South Asia. US in its bid to counter China is expanding its presence in the Asian Pacific Region by employing the strategy of US Forward Defence Ring policy.

Pakistan considers China to be a voice of reason and restraint in international affairs. It is the common choice of Pakistan and China to develop a partnership that serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and contributes constructively to the peace and stability of South Asia. On its part, Pakistan needs to address Chinese concerns over the security of its assets and personnel in Pakistan, settle the outstanding payments to Chinese IPPs, facilitate the repatriation of profits of Chinese companies, eliminate red tapism blocking Chinese investments and fast-track the development of SEZs to attract Chinese businesses to invest. Given the fragility of our economic conditions, setting up of export-based joint ventures with China, development of agriculture development and demonstration zones, IT and Science Parks, participation in Chinese exhibitions and expos, business-to-business interaction and youth exchanges should be matters of priority. Chinese involvement is necessary in countering negativity about CPEC, which is no doubt a catalyst for our economic development but not a panacea for all our economic ills. But it is a rare window of opportunity which should not be missed.

India’s Final Showdown with China: An Epic or a Tragedy?

By
Asim Bakhshi
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5

Readers of Indian and Chinese mythology cannot miss the striking contrast between respective cultural outlooks of civilizational attitudes to armed conflict. Take, for instance, the case of the epic poem Mahabharata and its Chinese counterpart, Romance of the Three Kingdoms. The central idea of both stories is a struggle for power and control, narrated through a central conflict between rival factions. In the Mahabharata, the conflict is between the Pandavas and the Kauravas, two branches of the same family fighting for control of the Kuru kingdom. In the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, the conflict is between the different kingdoms vying for control of China during the end of the Han dynasty and the beginning of the Three Kingdoms period. Both stories also feature complex political maneuvering and strategic planning as characters try to gain an advantage over their rivals. Characters in both stories use alliances, betrayals, and other forms of political manipulation to gain the upper hand.

But these common elements are merely the cutting ingredients that leave the first mark on the palate. Deep down under these layered epics, there are contrasting civilizational psychologies at interplay. The key difference here is the political and strategic context. While Mahabartha is more of a microcosmic tale, focusing on the moral and ethical implications of the actions of the characters, Romance of the Three Kingdoms displays a macrocosmic grandeur with a tinge of pragmatic and instrumental utilitarianism, with a focus on practical and tactical aspects of the actions of the characters. Additionally, the Mahabharata is more of a family feud, whereas the Romance of the Three Kingdoms is more about the struggle for power between different territories, with the involvement of many different kingdoms and their respective rulers.

This subtle contrast sets the stage for delving into the capturing prologue of Pravin Sawhney’s recent book on the final showdown between India and China. A quite pessimistic but seemingly realistic take on the strategic state of affairs in Indian politico-military enterprise, Sawhney builds a fictional war scenario in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China launches a multi-pronged cyber attack on India in February 2024, achieves full spectrum superiority in communication and air jamming, and deploys humanoid armies to assault Indian soldiers. The war lasts for just a week and results in China gaining control of Ladakh, North Sikkim, and the northern border of Arunachal. Pakistan Army also joins in with the PAF attacking LoC, and it successfully pushes it further at many points. Interestingly, while the Pandavas and the Kauravas of Mahabharata demonstrate a deep understanding of the situation and the complexly interwoven forces at play, develop plans for how to gain the upper hand in the conflict, and make decisions about when and how to engage in battle, the modern day war pandits of Modi’s India find themselves clueless in the face of a massive cyber attack. While the mythological characters of the epic use different strategies, such as diplomacy, deception, and psychological warfare, to gain an advantage over their opponents, the war room in the prime minister’s office wonders: why is this happening, and how can a weapon that doesn’t hurt physically be dangerous?

Sawhney, who is a retired army officer and a prolific writer on various aspects of security as well Sino-Indian conflict, argues from the onset that the Indian army will lose any future war with China, not because it is not prepared but because it is prepared for a wrong war. While Modi’s government has restricted military strategy to perception management, China is well ahead in achieving excellence in the cognitive domain. As to answer the key question of why China would want such a conflict, Sawhney answers that it will draw ten advantages out of it, including humbling India in the region and getting the first mover advantage in AI technologies-backed war against the USA. Interestingly, in such a conflict, Pakistan will also take the Siachen glacier.

The book comprises four parts, beginning with a review of the cooperative security model of China where it is taking the belt and road initiative to revive a sort of middle kingdom. China’s Sputnik movement, in this regard, was AlphaGo beating Lee Sedol. This was the time of strategic revelation that AI is the ultimate future, and within months of Sedol’s defeat, China July 2017 released its super-ambitious New Generation AI Development Plan. Google’s CEO at that time, Eric Schmidt, said that by 2020 they will catch up with the USA, by 2025, they will be better than the USA, and by 2030, they will dominate global industries of AI. The first part of the book also speaks about two security architectures and how 5G networks are part of this AI initiative.

Book two is a sustained indulgence in self-reflection, especially in terms of threats to India and how the Indian military is politicized beyond recovery. It cites the incident when PAF launched Operation Swift Retort in response to the 26th Feb 2019 air bombing on Balakot and how India couldn’t respond back due to its limited air capability and not having a political will to assert. The most interesting part for the military strategist with a technological hat is a lengthy take on the future of war in general and how technology is modernizing warfare. This includes human command and robotic control, autonomous weapon systems, the invisible war with cyber social operations, and advances in missile systems, drones, and nuclear capabilities. The most important part here is how AI would come out as an integrating force to serve as a nerve center for netcentric and intelligent decision-making.

An underlining factor is that the data being the backbone of training these AI-driven systems must be operationally meaningful with real-time battlefield intelligence, or otherwise, the algorithms will either overfit or prove simply useless due to garbage-in garbage-out scenarios. China, while initially training its battlefield AI systems on laboratory-grade data and simulations, is also improving the robustness and efficiency of its models through adversarial and reinforcement learning drawn from realistic data coming from actual operational exercises on the ground. Sawhney quotes first-hand experiences of how India is nowhere near this kind of thinking in its AI development.

The last part of the book speculates on India’s final showdown with China. Sawhney incisively captures the tragedy of Indian military planning by noting that these strategists do not have a sense of history or the future. Completely turning the process of war appreciation on its head, these Indian strategists work backward by setting the premise that the Indian military will beset the Chinese or the Pakistani military in any future armed conflict. They then build how this miracle will be achieved. Sawhney quotes here a brainstorming session by former Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa where it was said that war between India and China will be intense but limited in time and space, will be fought in the physical domains of air and land only, and will take place as force-on-force engagement. In this context, the Indian strategic commanders have absolutely no clue how mission tables of the AI-controlled, autonomous weapon systems with the Internet of Military Things (IoMT) backbone may be responded to or at least be considered doctrinally as a viable factor.

Thus, in the alternate — but quite realistic and plausible — universe of Sawhney, much like the Romance of Three Kingdoms, PLA will move suddenly and hit hard across all combat zones. Its cyberwar will bring civilian life to a standstill, achieving delays and disruption to the Indian Air Force (IAF). China will activate malware viruses in military supply chains and autonomous weapon systems, as well as snap communications among various headquarters.

Sawhney’s book is a must-read, not only for Indian but Pakistani military strategists, because it shows how the classical concept of cognitive superiority is being increasingly reduced to technology and being redefined. It is now a realm where technology and artificial intelligence hold a powerful sway, wielding their influence over the very thoughts and decisions of adversaries. It is a contactless hyperspace where psychological operations and disinformation reign, where cyberattacks seek to disrupt and manipulate the flow of information, and where the ultimate goal is to gain a cognitive advantage over the enemy. The mind is the battlefield, and the weapons are those that can swiftly process vast amounts of data, identify patterns, and exploit vulnerabilities in the enemy’s systems. With the ability to generate and disseminate false information, AI can sow confusion and uncertainty among the enemy ranks, eroding their ability to communicate and make informed decisions. In this cognitive domain, the lines between reality and illusion are blurred, and the power of technology and AI to shape perception and influence the mind is absolute.
Pravin Sawhney almost appears to argue that Indian strategists who should have been composing a new epic — a technologically savvy modern Mahabharata — are instead busy penning a tragedy of equal proportions.

Changing Global Order and New Patterns of Power

By
Dr. Zukun Lyu
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3

We are in an intriguing period right now, with several global political, economic, and social events taking place. The biggest changes in the world’s political and economic power structures are those brought on by the East’s comparative ascent and the West’s comparative fall. These changes have been happening for a while, but lately, they have gained greater attention as new geopolitical alliances become clear. New global and regional powers, including China, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey, are simultaneously rising, posing a threat to the current world order with their own worldviews. The intensification of relations between China and Russia on the international political scene is establishing a precedent for a multipolar world with exclusive spheres of influence.

Many believe China is a different kind of power from the ones we have known over the last century. It is useless to evaluate China’s might by Western standards. It is important to comprehend China’s emergence in its distinctive context.  Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is forming partnerships with its western neighbors and increasing its ties with Russia. Using their own domains of influence, China and Russia oppose the liberal international order that the western alliance supports. At the nexus of South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) nations of Southwest Asia are playing a crucial role. The Southwest Asian area is a potential hub for commerce, transportation, and energy transit, especially for China and Russia. It is also a focal point of geopolitical conflict and influence for the world powers owing to its advantageous position. 

The Southwest Asian area is a potential hub for commerce, transportation, and energy transit, especially for China and Russia. It is also a focal point of geopolitical conflict and influence for the world powers owing to its advantageous position.

The character of the international system is evolving into one with several centers of power. Smaller nations are reevaluating their regional and global responsibilities as a result of the shifting global order. Due to its strategic location at the intersection of Asia, Europe, and Africa, the Southwest Asian area also greatly influences world affairs. Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are among the ten nations that comprise the ECO region. In the past, these nations were essential to commerce along the Old Silk Road, which linked China to the rest of the globe. They had power pacts with important world powers. As a result of the shifting political landscape on the international stage, ECO member states may realign themselves to play their part in influencing the new world order.

As a result of the shifting political landscape on the international stage, ECO member states may realign themselves to play their part in influencing the new world order.

Due to its strategic location, the area, depending on cooperation and economic growth, may either be a regional time bomb for the great powers or serve as a regional pivot for the main political actors. Suppose they are unable to realign themselves in accordance with the changing geopolitical realities of the globe. In that case, their beneficial position as the hub of continental trade flows in energy, products, and ideas may be compromised.

Pakistan has always been at the center of significant regional and global events. Pakistan had to choose carefully during the bipolar period whether to support one of the opposing camps commanded by the US or the Soviet Union. In contrast, a paradigm change is taking place at the start of the twenty-first century. Once again, Pakistan must decide whether to reconsider its place in the changing global system. Pakistan’s strategic location as the hub of connectivity in Southwest Asia makes it important in the newly forming multipolar system. Pakistan is now at the center of the great power rivalry as a result of recent events like border clashes between China and India, NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s growing economic and political influence over its western neighbors, the Ukraine crisis, coupled with trade war and rising hostility between China and the US. The US has often said that it needs good ties with Pakistan to advance its objectives in the area, notably in terms of stabilizing Afghanistan.

Additionally, China recognizes the value of its strategic connections with Pakistan in advancing its regional political and economic objectives. China wants to use BRI to link the Southwest Asian area. The US’s attempts to stay relevant in regional politics and the Sino-Russian nexus have made it more difficult for Pakistan to realign or transition in light of the US’s waning hegemonic dominance and the rising influence of Russia and China in global politics.

China’s BRI Corridors 
China wants to use BRI to link the Southwest Asian area. The US's attempts to stay relevant in regional politics and the Sino-Russian nexus have made it more difficult for Pakistan to realign or transition in light of the US's waning hegemonic dominance and the rising influence of Russia and China in global politics.

The relationship between Pakistan and the US has a long history. The US kept Pakistan as a key ally in the fight against terrorism. Additionally, the US used to offer military support and is now Pakistan’s largest commercial partner. After the withdrawal of NATO soldiers from Afghanistan, the US government still wants Pakistan to play a part in resolving regional conflicts. In order to limit China, the US also agreed to strategic cooperation with India, which has implications for Pakistan’s security. China and Pakistan have traditionally had friendly ties. Both nations have consistently offered each other neutral support in international fora. Beijing has consistently helped Islamabad expand infrastructure for transportation and electricity, and the two countries have worked together on defense projects.

Source: Statista

The signing of CPEC further strengthens the friendship. China hopes to link Pakistan with Central Asian nations via Afghanistan through CPEC. The construction of Gwadar port as part of CPEC will provide the quickest alternative path to China’s energy demands as well as a land connection to Central Asian republics and landlocked Afghanistan. A new era of collaboration has also begun in Pakistan’s ties with Russia.

As was already established, China and Russia have similar geopolitical objectives in the area, and their joint initiatives have improved regional governments’ connectivity. Pakistan lacks energy, and Russia has provided a substitute source to deliver affordable oil. Pakistan seeks Russian funding for the CPEC and other energy development initiatives.

The multipolar international order of the twenty-first century offers Pakistani politicians multiple alternatives. The circumstances provide Pakistan with several options to realign its strategic objectives and play a key role in tying the region together by working with China and Russia. The situation is further difficult since Pakistan may not be able to afford to serve as a theatre of conflict between major nations. Pakistan’s geostrategic realignment with China and Russia might aid in defusing India’s hostile diplomatic stance against Pakistan. In the same vein, CPEC’s infrastructure initiatives have assisted Pakistan in dispelling the notion that its geo-economics options are constrained.

The great powers of the globe are fundamentally altering the current global order, which will have far-reaching effects in the future. The reasons causing this transition, however, are many, and it is crucial for world leaders and policymakers to comprehend them. The current world order is beginning to deteriorate, and there is a clear reconfiguration of rising forces on the international scene. The latest illustration of how violations over the last several decades have damaged interstate behavior is the Western countries’ worsening relationship with Russia over the Ukraine crisis. In addition, China’s growing economy and military might be significant additional forces behind the shift in the global balance of power and the alteration of the geopolitical landscape.

China and Russia are working to set their own rules on the grand international game while resisting the current global order. Because of these developnents, minor but important regional actors might realign their influence with rising political figures. As ECO and BRI partner’s members, southwest Asian governments are turning to China and Russia as options. They no longer want to be a part of the liberal, western-led system that, for a long time, engulfed the area in conflict and instability. However, the developing world order is nearing completion, and Southwest Asian governments may contribute significantly to its creation and implementation.

China – A Friend in Need for Afghans

By
Dr. Sameera Riaz
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6

After the US lead NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and Taliban takeover; China emerged not only as one of many mediators in ending the decades of conflict in Afghanistan but started a diplomatic, political and economic engagement in Afghanistan that paves way for playing vital role in crisis management and peacebuilding in war torn Afghanistan. Beijing always emphasized that the peace process should be Afghan-led and Afghan owned with minimal outside agenda-setting. However, China has adopted facilitator role rather than a mediator role. Chinese approach in Afghanistan can be termed unique as it has friendly relations with all major stakeholder to the conflict and therefore enjoys status of honest broker. Since 2015, China hosted the stakeholders to facilitate the discussion. 

Chinese approach in Afghanistan mainly stems from three key national interest; security, strategy and economy. On security front, China doesn’t want Afghanistan to become a haven for terrorism, strengthening of Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or emergence of Daesh which is more likely case in present situation wherein the international world has distanced itself from Taliban govt due to their strict policies. Hence, leaving the war-torn Afghanistan aloof can be dangerous for Chinese homeland security and might become a challenge of territorial integrity in future. 

Strategically, Afghanistan is located within the Belt and Road Initiative that China is planning to connect countries from India to Iran. The ambitions of China to connect the south Asian countries via railway, energy corridor and other infrastructure projects would remain incomplete without inclusion of Afghanistan. On the other side, inclusion of Afghanistan in the Belt and Road initiative would not only gives China access to Central Asia but would also pave way of economic boom and industrialization in Afghanistan.

Economically, China considers Afghanistan a potential destination for future long-term investment, though it may not seemingly be an incentive for China in present situation, nevertheless, there is no doubt about Afghanistan to become a hub of economic activities if the dream of peace and stability in Afghanistan comes true. The economic interest of China in Afghanistan therefore directly correlates with security and strategic interests. 

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (Left) Deputy Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Wang Yi (Right) Former Chinese Foreign Minister of People’s Republic of China

China maintained state-to-state relations with Kabul since 2001, including military assistance, diplomatic engagement, reconstruction etc. After Taliban takeover, China maintained a working relationship with Taliban Govt as well.  

Beside Chinese unique approach in Afghanistan, the edge to China is also in shape of its cordial relations with the neighboring countries of Afghanistan. Pak-China friendship is indeed exemplary. On Afghanistan, the interests of both countries converge; a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is desire of both. This convergence of interests gives a leverage to China to use Pakistan’s existing influence in Afghanistan to continue engagement of Afghan interim setup. 

China’s comprehensive national power and economic strength coupled with the most popular international public product of China, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gives China another edge as a hope for Afghans who are losing hopes from international community amidst strict measures taken by interim setup of Afghanistan. China treats Afghanistan with sincerity, believing in a relationship that is mutually beneficial for the public of both countries; not like western approach of seeking private interests or a sphere of influence in Afghanistan.

China treats Afghanistan with sincerity, believing in a relationship that is mutually beneficial for the public of both countries; not like western approach of seeking private interests or a sphere of influence in Afghanistan. 

Despite disappointing approach of Afghan Taliban’s interim set up, China continued the humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan to survive, provided 250 million yuan in food, medicine, winter supplies and other assistance to Afghanistan in year 2021. After the earthquake and floods, China immediately provided 50 million yuan in emergency humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. According to Chinese Embassy in Kabul, Beijing has donated 250 million yuan (US $ 37.4 million) of aid to Afghanistan in Jul 2022. 

China and Afghanistan are also deliberating on many other aid projects to benefit the livelihood of the Afghan people.China is also engaging Afghanistan in practical cooperation between the two countries in different fields including trade and economy. For this purpose, China has opened an air corridor to facilitate and expand the imports of agriculture products to the land-locked Afghanistan. China has given duty-free special treatment to 98% of Afghan products, thus helping Afghanistan to increase revenue, enhance capacity for independent development and promote local employment. The people of Afghanistan are in need, they should not be left at the helms of affairs. A total disengagement can never be a solution, but a gradual multifaceted approach would ultimately lead to achieve the desired results. 

The people of Afghanistan are in need, they should not be left at the helms of affairs. A total disengagement can never be a solution, but a gradual multifaceted approach would ultimately lead to achieve the desired results. 

The basic principle of mutual benefit makes Chinese approach unique and acceptable for all as compared to western approach of controlling other nations using economic or political influence. With gradual increasing of practical cooperation, trade, investment and people to people contact, China is destined to become most reliable friend of Afghanistan within a decade. 

The willingness of China to promote BRI initiative to connect with the development strategy of Afghanistan and help Afghanistan in achieving stability, development and economic wellbeing proves China to be a friend of Afghans in need.

Why is it important to allow caretaker setup to continue till October?

By
Murtaza Solangi
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3

Both Punjab Assembly and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assemblies stand dissolved. Imran Khan who warned earlier that he will become more dangerous (Khatre Naak) is trying to prove himself right. Imran thinks his actions will add more instability to the unstable system, that has created a lethal cocktail with looming economic meltdown, left by his government with IMF program suspended by his government that reneged on the commitments they made to the Washington based global lender. Add the new wave of terrorism unleashed by TTP on Pakistan, the situation becomes much more complex. Add legal and constitutional crisis into it, it gets murkier.

The census conducted in 2017 became controversial when many quarters including the MQM raised objections while maintaining that the Karachi census did not reflect the factual position on the ground. After 24th constitutional amendment, 2018 elections were held declaring the 6th population census as “provisional”.

After 2018 elections, the Council of Common Interests (CCI) decided under Imran Khan to hold 7th digital census in the country under pressure from the MQM, despite the fact that 6th census conducted in 2017 is declared “published”, the new digital census is underway. The ECP consequently informed the Supreme Court during the dissolution of the National Assembly by Imran Khan in April, that they will complete the delimitation in October, 2023. Keeping the above into consideration, general elections are not likely to be held under the old census of 2017.

After the dissolution of the assemblies of the PTI led provinces of the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the elections for a five-year term of both the houses are to be held within 90 days as per Clause 2 of Article 224 of the Constitution. However, this seems unlikely till the time of expiry of tenure of the National and Provincial Assemblies in August of 2023 for certain obvious reasons.

Although the constitution allows any assembly to be dissolved by the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister of the concerned provincial assembly but the time of general elections in the country has always been the same since 1997. The gap of two or three days between the National and the provincial assemblies elections was removed primarily because the first phase could affect the results of the latter. After the 18th amendment, the caretaker setup to be brought in by the outgoing chief executive and the leader of the opposition has been made a part of the constitution. The very concept of the neutral caretaker setup was incorporated in the constitution to ensure the free and fair electoral process denying the rivals heading the federal and the provincial government to rig the process to get favourable outcomes.

After the 18th amendment, the caretaker setup to be brought in by the outgoing chief executive and the leader of the opposition has been made a part of the constitution. The very concept of the neutral caretaker setup was incorporated in the constitution to ensure the free and fair electoral process denying the rivals heading the federal and the provincial government to rig the process to get favourable outcomes.

The constitution of Pakistan under article 218 (3) clearly states: “It shall be the duty of the Election Commission constituted in relation to an election to organize and conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against.”

The dissolution has created a situation where it is theoretically possible that the elections for both houses can be conducted under the current federal government with hostile relations with the PTI that has dissolved both the houses, instead of a neutral caretaker setup at the center. Yet all this will negate the real spirit of the constitution since it will give an unfair advantage to the current federal government against the outgoing party, i,e, PTI, which might made hue and cry and resort to agitation, if it loses the election and add more instability to the system. Even if the elections for both houses are conducted, say, by April, the elections for the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies of Sindh and Balochistan will be due after almost three months as their term expires in August.

The elections for the remainder of the houses are likely to take place in October. When the National Assembly elections are held in October, both the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will have duly elected governments instead of the neutral caretaker governments. This creates another problem. If the parties of the current coalition at the centre win the provincial elections of the Punjab and or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, they are most likely to use the provincial set-ups with the might of the police and the district management in their favour to win the National Assembly seats in the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

If the PTI wins the provincial assembly elections in the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, they get duly elected provincial governments for good five years. That means when the elections for the National Assembly are held in October, both the provincial governments of the Punjab get an advantage and can massively rig the elections with the help of the provincial administration. That is against the very spirit of the constitution that introduced the neutral caretaker setup at all places to ensure free and fair elections.

With 79% total voters residing in both provinces, Punjab 58% and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 21% of the total 122.2 million voters, the provincial governments elected barely five months before the election of the National Assembly, gives undue advantage to both provincial governments and upsets the entire scheme of the free and fair elections guaranteed under the constitution and makes the mission of the Election Commission impossible to hold free and fair elections in terms of Article 218(3) since newly elected governments will have an unfair advantage against the federating units of Sindh and Balochistan.

Imran Khan has dissolved these assemblies, not because there was any constitutional crisis in both assemblies. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PTI almost enjoyed 2/3 majority. The sole purpose of depriving the electorate of both the provinces was aimed at pressurizing the federal government to hold early polls. Imran Khan has failed to get early polls through this dissolution but has created not only a constitutional crisis but endangered the fairness of the election of the next National Assembly. The actions of Imran Khan have also made the post 18th amendment, that created neutral caretaker setups to ensure free and fair elections, extremely vulnerable.

It is clear that the upcoming provincial assembly elections will be neither free nor fair if held in April because there will be no caretaker setup at the centre.

It is clear that the upcoming provincial assembly elections will be neither free nor fair if held in April because there will be no caretaker setup at the centre. The governments emerging out of these elections will most likely rig the upcoming National Assembly elections and keeping the above into consideration, the temporary measure to address this crisis is to allow the provincial caretaker setups of the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to continue till October.

It is very much in consonance with the spirit of the constitution that when the tenure of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies of Sindh and Balochistan expires in August and the caretaker setups are created there as well, we allow the elections of all assemblies to be held on the same day as they have been held since 1997.The Election Commission must create a one-time exception for this anomaly to ensure free and fair elections and protect the federation at a time of great economic and political instability gone worse due to the rising terrorism specially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and the rest of the country. The only constitutional body responsible for holding the free and fair elections is the Election Commission of Pakistan, empowered under article 218 of the constitution, hence the higher judiciary must support rather than create any hindrance to the constitutional body to avoid any more crises in the country.

After the general elections are held, a constitutional amendment is very much needed to plug the hole of this constitutional conundrum. In any case, the course suggested by the author will be in consonance with the spirit of the constitution till the anomalies pointed out above are resolved once for all by making suitable amendments in the constitution.

Can we preserve the art of war?

By
Asim Bakhshi
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4
Robot dogs join US Air Force exercise giving a glimpse at the potential battlefield of the future. (source: CNN)

In nine different stories published in the 1940s, the inimitable science fiction author Isaac Asimov explored the ethical implications of technology by way of imagining a world increasingly inhabited by humanoid autonomous systems. All these stories chart different threads of a singular narrative where a reporter interviews a ‘robopsychologist’. All these stories somehow converge on the issue of ethical programming, with Asimov’s one or more laws of robotics at the center. In one of the stories set around 2019, the robot refuses to follow human order but still does the ‘right’ thing. In another one spun in 2021, a robot is left with a programming error and finds himself in an infinite loop of withholding versus yielding the information.

Kenneth Payne’s recent book exploring the complex interplay of AI and military strategic thinking is a clever wordplay on Asimov’s anthology I, Robot. Payne, being a political psychologist, has been deeply interested in studying the evolution of strategic thinking within the context of warfare. I, Warbot echoes Arthur C. Clarke’s classic maxim that all sufficiently advanced technologies have always been indistinguishable from magic. In this regard, while AI is no exception, warfare theorists as well as AI practitioners must try to mark brittle skills where AI might end up being worse than a toddler.

But while having an interesting theoretical dimension, the problem is not just theoretical. Autonomous weapons systems are a reality and algorithmically driven disruptive technologies are extending boundaries of control in subtle ways. In this context, while we have always been stating unambiguously what we expect out of autonomous weapons, isn’t it time to reflect upon ways where they might behave in unexpected ways?

This takes us back to Asimov’s fictional world where a robot must be designed to follow three laws. One, it may not injure a human being through action or inaction. Two, it must obey human orders unless in conflict with the first law. Three, it must protect itself unless in conflict with both the first and second laws.

However, while these laws might fancy a fictional web of stories, would they provide a rational viewpoint of guiding actual war machines which are built upon layers and layers of arguably inexplicable autonomous computing? Violence, after all, is a distinguishing feature of war and if future Warbots – the lethal robotic machines – are being designed and programmed to kill accurately and relentlessly, how can they incorporate an essential constraint of inefficiency without creating irresolvable paradoxes?

To attempt an answer, Payne offers three laws of Warbots as an opening gambit. Firstly, a warbot should only kill those the owner wants it to and exercise violence in a humanistic way. Secondly, it must understand the owner’s intentions and exercise creativity. Thirdly, it should protect the humans on the owner’s side at all costs including the sacrifice of their life — at the same time, this protection should not be at the expense of the mission.

This gambit is no less than a semantic master stroke. Among other things, it immediately implies that AI portrayed in film and art is human-like while not being human. The media too cannot break free of science-fictional templates. These media indulgences tell us more about ourselves rather than robots. These are unrealistic expectations of AI which are merely on-screen manipulations and fall quite short of the domain of actual possibilities in autonomous computing. Launching from this critical opening gambit, the rest of the book aims to chart this domain of possibilities.

Since Payne is primarily a political psychologist, a recurring thread in the book is that the minds of the Warbots – the neural connectivity so to speak – will be quite different from the humans. As AI practitioners, we may immediately refer to the fact how that state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms are diverging from classical neural networks. Military tacticians, on the other hand, may refer to the psychological insights of strategic theorists. Carl von Clausewitz, for instance, argued that war is an intense emotional business where ‘passionate hatred’ motivates the belligerents. The commander is an idealized ‘genius’ who makes the right decisions with limited information. While conceding with humility, theorists like Clausewitz felt no qualms in accepting that they were in dark about the complexities of the human mind. Nevertheless, they could state one fact emphatically: the human brain doesn’t work like a machine.

Thus any decision-making technology, if transformed into artificially intelligent warfare, will yield unexpected results. Historical blueprints for creating Warbots are nonexistent. It’s all about working backward from what we want them to achieve. The question boils down to this: what kind of weapons are required by the armed forces? More specifically, what kind of drivers shape these requirements in the first place?

Reducing the first question to functional context disregards the most important paradigm which is cultural. This includes societal attitudes to war and how different strategic cultures rationalize violence as a means to an end. The other question relates to design, i.e. the engineering philosophy as well as the craft. Would we be able to say that Warbots are clever machines? Of course, these are far ahead of humans in terms of computing power, optimized decision-making agency in an extremely constrained environment, and agility of convergence, but would they be considered as ‘clever’ and ‘intuitively informed’ as humans? Isn’t it possible that autonomous problem-solving is being misunderstood here with intelligence?

Payne argues at length about how cyber security is being increasingly entangled with AI. To mitigate risks, organizations like DARPA regularly launch grand challenges for AI to automatically find vulnerabilities in code. While these challenges stop here due to ethical concerns, what stops attempts at the next obvious tactical maneuver which is turning defense into an attack by hacking the hacker? These competitions provide insights into new conundrums related to problems of attribution within the context of cyber warfare. If we cannot possibly know who has attacked us, how can we possibly launch a counter-offense without inviting chaos?

DARPA has officially announced last year that they are evaluating potential uses of jetpacks in the military. (photo credits: autorevolution)

The situations become further complex when attempts like DeepMind increasingly imitate Asimov’s fictional universe, the terrain where Warbots design other Warbots. The new deep learning algorithms dive into particular environmental constraints and look for features serving as foundations for other reinforcement learning algorithms. This is a meta-learning frontier, where an autonomous agent tries to learn what other autonomous learners need to learn.

This is no surprise that the goal of DARPA’s AI Next program is to build autonomous computers that can reason and think in context and function more as colleagues than as tools. The subtle distinction between exploratory creativity and a transformational or collaborative one is hard to miss. Whether it is AlphaZero beating Gary Kasparov, the AlphaGo beating Lee Sedol, or the AI engine winning multi-player no-limit poker game, all are examples of learning by exploratory creativity at its best. Transformation creativity, however, is a true genius. Machines, in this sense, are excellent in ‘thinking’ but can they truly ‘create’? It is only possible if they can ‘understand’. Payne’s book not only raises a key strategic concern, but it is also timely as well, and equally likely to indulge both military professionals as well as practicing scientists.

As engineers, we are well familiar with the ways control systems fail and overshoot the bounds of stability. We are also aware of strategic analogs of unstable systems, for instance, Clausewitz’s constraints such as ‘fog-of-war’ and ‘friction’ leading to failure. Can we pursue research in directions where both concerns are combined to achieve semi-autonomous, artificially intelligent agents collaborating with humans and bound by our specific moral constraints? Only time will answer this question since boundaries between fact and fiction are already blurred. The real challenge lies in the preservation of the art of war while augmenting the science of it.

Doctrine, Policy and Strategy

By
Saad Masood
-
0

By now it is a cliché to say that these are trying and difficult circumstances; they have been for quite some time and nothing on the horizon suggests that they will change anytime soon. For a developing country such as Pakistan – things are doubly tough! Particularly when it comes to foreign policy challenges. Thus, Pakistan’s instruments of foreign policy need to be at par with the best if they have to be successful in 2022 and beyond. Consider.

Foreign policy is the cornerstone of any country’s peaceful existence in the international comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception!

Janne Haaland Matláry, a Norwegian political scientist writes that there are generally two types of instruments available to address foreign policy challenges. One, soft tools which include typically cooperative, mostly non-coercive and characteristically traditional aspects of foreign policy. Two, hard tools whereby comprising coercive and hard-line actions in the interest of shaping favourable foreign policy outcomes.

For Pakistan – just like any other country – soft tools must be the primary instruments for achieving foreign policy objectives. First, the art of diplomacy. While Pakistan needs to have a balanced relationship with the US, it still needs to find other avenues of similar alignment with China and Russia. Regionally – it needs to keep on engaging with Afghanistan at least in light of the humanitarian support if nothing else and seek further reproachment with Iran while keeping Saudi friendship at an even keel. Although not readily possible perhaps, but Pakistan should be able and willing to stretch an olive branch to India as and when a favourable regime presents itself. Meanwhile, further efforts to cement relationships with Turkey and Malaysia should be afoot. This is indeed a tall order but foreign policy manoeuvres are nothing but a tight-rope and need to leverage the spirit of cooperation, persuasion and co-optation to further its agenda. Second, the vagaries of propaganda. It is an open secret that marketing is a massive part of the foreign policy initiative. Pakistan will need to continue to plead its case – that of being a moderate and sensible nation – more vociferously and at as many forums as possible. It may not be easy keeping recent incidents of extremist ideology in mind but unfortunately, they are a reality, like in so many other countries. Think what you may of Imran Khan, but he is better than almost all his predecessors to further Pakistan’s cause in chambers such as the UN and OIC. The eloquence of Shah Mahmood Qureshi – Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister – is legendary even if his competence and consistency may not be. Social media, another battleground for propaganda wars, will need additional focus as narratives and trends are won and lost in this arena of 5th generation warfare.

Think what you may of Imran Khan but he is better than almost all his predecessors to further Pakistan’s cause in chambers such as the UN and OIC.

Third, the largesse of economy. These measures are highly crucial but highly abstract. They are generally two-fold. One, increasing the inherent strength of the economy – ensuring trade deficit and current account deficit is narrowed and finally eliminated. Two, economic measures against other nations to push foreign policy objectives through. For Pakistan, the first is important and doable but the second not so much because it is mostly meant for high performing economies which run surplus trade and current accounts and have the ability to penalise nations who don’t tow their favoured narratives. One thing Pakistan can do is improve the first to make the second a possibility! And in the process escape the clutches of international monetary structures such as the IMF and World Bank, which incidentally are one of the instruments of American foreign policy!

Along the way, Pakistan will need to bank on hard tools, which generally come in three flavours. First, the existence of military and the nuclear deterrence. In a region that is relatively hostile – not to say that the world at large isn’t – Pakistan will need to continue to maintain this deterrence. Unfortunately for a developing country it is easier said than done because of budgetary limitations. Maybe the need in 2022 and afterwards will be to maintain a balance between spending i.e. spend smarter not bigger! Second, the threat of sanctions – in one form or the other. While this is a good instrument to be used by developed countries, for Pakistan it only has limited efficacy and only where it may be possible. Specifically, some lightweight sanctions in trade and military knowledge transfer – and that too towards countries that may not be too relevant in the global calculus. Therefore, this too – just like the soft tool of economic measures – will take time and consequently should be made part of the next five- or ten-year plan. Third, the option of tit-for-tat retaliation. Although for a developing country such as Pakistan imposing sanctions may not be a feasible option but like-mannered retaliation at the diplomatic front is still viable. In the absence of other alternatives this becomes extremely crucial and can manifest in responding in kind in diplomatic rows, withdrawing of Pakistan foreign office dignitaries where needed and ejecting foreign diplomats to signal policy displeasure. It is true that this is a meek choice at best but still better than nothing until Pakistan can develop leverage in the foreign policy instruments of economic measures and sanctions.

Pakistan’s instruments of foreign policy need to be at par with the best if they have to be successful

Foreign policy is the cornerstone of any country’s peaceful existence in the international comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception! While occasionally it may seem that the deck is stacked against it, there is no reason not to endeavour a logical mix of foreign instruments – comprising of soft tools and hard tools – to ensure that foreign policy provides a well-deserved pay-off even in this tough and dynamic international climate. After all, “do the best you can until you know better, then when you know better, do better”!

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