In the spring of 2025, Ankara again stepped into the spotlight as a potential broker in the Russia–Ukraine war. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Vladimir Putin on 11 May that Turkey was ready to host peace talks in Istanbul, echoing Russia’s proposal for direct negotiations on 15 May. Shortly before, Putin had publicly offered a summit in Turkey between himself and Ukraine’s Zelenskiy, hoping to negotiate an end to the “bloodbath”.

Turkey now deliberately projects itself as a “bridge” between East and West: a NATO member that backs Ukraine’s territorial integrity, yet has refused to join Western sanctions on Russia

Ukraine’s president cautiously agreed to meet on Turkish soil, writing on social media “I will be waiting for Putin in Turkiye on Thursday. Personally, these developments followed Turkey’s own initiatives to mediate in the conflict (including hosting the first wartime talks in Istanbul in March 2022) and its role in negotiating the Black Sea grain corridor that kept Ukrainian exports flowing. Turkey now deliberately projects itself as a “bridge” between East and West: a NATO member that backs Ukraine’s territorial integrity, yet has refused to join Western sanctions on Russia.

Western officials concede that Ankara’s “balanced policy on Ukraine was welcomed, even admired,” and that the war has made allies realize Turkey’s geopolitical importance

Turkiye has cultivated an image as an honest broker in recent conflicts. It has retained “cordial ties with both Kyiv and Moscow since Russia invaded Ukraine” in 2022, supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty while keeping channels open to Russia. Ankara co-brokered the July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative with the UN, opening Ukrainian ports to shipments after a self-imposed blockade, and in late 2022 President Erdogan held separate calls with both Putin and Zelenskiy to try to expand the deal. A senior Turkish official noted that Turkey “has good ties with both” sides and “has taken a mediating role in the conflict, hosting peace talks and working to bring together the Ukrainian and Russian presidents”. Such balancing has won Erdogan some praise: Western officials concede that Ankara’s “balanced policy on Ukraine was welcomed, even admired,” and that the war has made allies realize Turkey’s geopolitical importance.

Turkey portrays itself as a “power broker able to wield influence economically and diplomatically” — a characterization echoed by neutral observers of Turkey’s rising stature

That trust, however, can be fragile. European diplomats privately caution that domestic policies (such as the 2022 life sentence for philanthropist Osman Kavala) have at times shaken confidence in Ankara’s reliability. But in general, Turkey’s readiness to host high-stakes talks — from Ukraine to Gaza ceasefires — has burnished its reputation as a mediator. Turkey has even offered to shuttle between Israel and Hamas or between India and Pakistan during crises, suggesting that Ankara sees mediation as a role where it can add value. In every case, Ankara couches its efforts in appeal to stability and pragmatism. For instance, Erdogan publicly pressed both Putin and the West to find a path off the battlefield, arguing that without dialogue “massive” sanctions or further escalation would be all that remains. In doing so, Turkey portrays itself as a “power broker able to wield influence economically and diplomatically” — a characterization echoed by neutral observers of Turkey’s rising stature.

Exports of Turkish drones to Ethiopia and Morocco expanded “after their successful use in international conflicts”

Turkiye’s foreign policy now depends not only on diplomacy but on a booming DEFENCE industry. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drone has become emblematic. It gained global fame (and infamy) in Ukraine’s counter-offensives, credited with destroying Russian tanks and artillery. By mid-2024, Baykar CEO Haluk Bayraktar noted that the TB2 had become a “symbol” of Ukrainian resistance. Turkish officials say the drones were built and sold by a private firm, not the state, after Putin angrily “complained to Turkey” about their use by Ukraine.

Indeed, by some counts, Baykar has signed export deals for its TB2 with 30 countries, including Ukraine, Ethiopia, Libya and Azerbaijan. Reuters noted that exports of Turkish drones to Ethiopia and Morocco expanded “after their successful use in international conflicts” , and that drone shipments were being negotiated with new clients. Last year Baykar even announced it would manufacture drones inside Ukraine with a 500-strong plant, underscoring the scale of its role.

Ankara is reported to be finalizing a $1.5 billion helicopter deal with Pakistan

The military sales run deep into Ankara’s diplomacy. Exports of drones (and other arms) to Azerbaijan surged before and during the Karabakh clashes, reflecting “strong defence cooperation” that analysts say “is getting stronger by the day”. In 2020 alone, Turkey’s drone and weapons sales to Azerbaijan spiked six-fold compared to the year before. Last autumn Azerbaijan and Turkiye held joint war games on Azerbaijan’s soil – a clear sign of closeness after the ‘Karabakh victory’ in Baku.

Turkey has also matured into a major global supplier: according to SIPRI, Turkiye’s arms exports have more than doubled since 2018 (making it the 11th-largest exporter worldwide), with the Gulf, Pakistan and Asia as top customers. These deals serve Turkey’s political ties. Ankara is reported to be finalizing a $1.5 billion helicopter deal with Pakistan (an enthusiastic buyer of Turkish military hardware), and it signed its largest-ever export contract in 2024 selling Bayraktar Akinci drones to Saudi Arabia.

Washington has noticed Turkish drones in conflicts from Libya to Iraq. Erdogan dismisses these concerns, emphasizing that Turkey sells weapons to sovereign governments and that it uses those sales to cement partnerships

Meanwhile, Turkish drones have turned up in unexpected places. The Wall Street Journal (citing U.S. officials) reported that Bayraktar TB2s were delivered to Sudan’s military via Egypt amid that country’s civil war. Turkey also rapidly ramped up sales to Ethiopia during its Tigray war, prompting US concerns about civilian harm. More broadly, Washington has noticed Turkish drones in conflicts from Libya to Iraq. Erdogan dismisses these concerns, emphasizing that Turkey sells weapons to sovereign governments and that it uses those sales to cement partnerships.

In effect, Ankara leverages its DEFENCE exports as a strand of “military diplomacy” – helping allies and clients build capability in return for influence and economic ties. As one Turkish official quipped in 2022, when asked about another batch of Russian missiles, “nobody can interfere in terms of what kind of DEFENCE systems we acquire… we are the only ones to make such decisions”. Turkiye’s DEFENCE industry is now a major lever of its foreign policy.

No chapter of Turkish diplomacy is as complex as Syria. Since 2011, Ankara has juggled multiple roles there: it hosts nearly 3.7 million Syrian refugees (by far the world’s largest refugee population); it has sent tens of thousands of troops and allied militias into northern Syria; and it has sat at the negotiating table (often with Russia and Iran) to manage the civil war’s aftermath. These roles sometimes pull Turkey in conflicting directions.

On one hand, Turkey has long opposed the Assad regime. Early in the conflict Ankara supported and armed moderate rebel groups and lobbied for Western military intervention. It launched cross-border incursions (2016’s Euphrates Shield, 2018’s Afrin and 2019’s operations in Idlib and eastern Syria) to push back ISIS and Kurdish militants. Even today, Turkish strikes and patrols continue in parts of Syria that Ankara controls or contests. In March 2025, the Turkish Defence Ministry reported that its “operations against Kurdish militants in northern Syria [were] continuing,” despite a new Damascus-Kurdish agreement and U.S. diplomacy.

Ankara views the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as terrorists linked to the PKK, and it has vowed repeatedly to crush their presence along the border

Ankara views the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as terrorists linked to the PKK, and it has vowed repeatedly to crush their presence along the border. (As Reuter’s notes, Turkey’s actions in Syria stem from its view that “the YPG spearheads the SDF” and are an offshoot of the outlawed PKK – a reality that has long strained U.S.-Turkish relations.) On the other hand, Turkey has quietly shifted toward reconciliation with Syria’s neighbours. After years of hostility, Ankara in late 2022 quietly embraced a Moscow-led process with Russia, Iran and Damascus. In April 2023 the defence and intelligence chiefs of Turkey, Russia, Iran and Syria held “constructive talks” on Syria’s future. Syria’s government declared that these talks reaffirmed the “territorial integrity” of Syria and discussed issues like the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the opening of highways.

In public, Turkish ministers have said Turkey wants to normalize relations with Damascus only after its security concerns are met (specifically, the pullback of Kurdish forces from the border). In private, Ankara’s leadership has even signaled willingness to meet Bashar al-Assad under the right conditions. In January 2023 Erdogan said he might personally sit down with Assad in a trilateral format with Russia “to establish peace and stability in the region”. These shifts reflect Turkey’s calculation that the Syrian war is winding down and that it must have a stake in the settlement – including reshaping refugee returns and border security on Turkish terms.

The refugee issue shows how Turkey’s Syria policy has domestic as well as international dimensions

Meanwhile, hosting so many refugees has become both a humanitarian feat and a political burden. City markets and rural towns across Turkiye bear the visible imprint of nearly 3.7 million Syrians in recent years. Growing segments of Turkish public opinion now push for their return; Erdogan’s government has even erected model villages in northwestern Syria to house up to a million people (though this is contested by Damascus and the UN). Turkey has recently begun quietly facilitating refugee “go-and-see” visits, and tens of thousands of Syrians have voluntarily gone back under new schemes (losing some privileges to re-enter). Whatever one’s view, the refugee issue shows how Turkey’s Syria policy has domestic as well as international dimensions.

Throughout, Turkiye has tried to balance pressures from Russia, Iran, the U.S. and its NATO allies. It now coordinates patrols with Russia in Idlib, consults with Iran on border security, and chastises the U.S. for its Syrian Kurdish alliances. Its ambition is clear: to be seen as a guarantor of stability in post-war Syria, not just another outside player. As one report puts it, Ankara now sees returns of refugees and expanded economic ties (with Damascus) as evidence that it can “wield influence economically and diplomatically” in Syria’s future.

In Asia, Turkiye has deepened ties with fellow Muslim nations. Pakistan has long been Ankara’s closest partner in South Asia. Whenever Islamabad faces crisis with New Delhi, Turkey steps up its support. In early May 2025, after Indian strikes in Pakistani Kashmir brought the neighbours to the brink, Erdogan phoned Pakistan’s prime minister to “convey his solidarity” .

The Turkish presidency praised Pakistan’s “calm and restrained policies” and endorsed its call for an impartial investigation into the militant attack that triggered the conflict

The Turkish presidency praised Pakistan’s “calm and restrained policies” and endorsed its call for an impartial investigation into the militant attack that triggered the conflict. Erdogan said Turkey was ready to use its “diplomatic contacts” to help prevent any escalation into all-out war. He publicly condemned the Indian military action as risking regional stability, even as he noted that “Ankara also maintains cordial ties with India”. In short, Turkey’s strategy is to align firmly with Pakistan’s interests (and shared Islamic identity) while trying to stay on speaking terms with India. Turkey and Pakistan conduct regular military exercises and Defence cooperation, and Ankara has made Kashmir an issue at international forums in sympathy with Pakistan’s position.

“Ankara is very determined in providing Baku with its needs”.

Turkiye’s most fervent ally, however, is Azerbaijan. The two are sometimes called “one nation, two states,” and Turkiye gave overt political and military backing to Baku in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Defence exports jumped accordingly: by one accounting, Turkey sold some $123 million in military equipment to Azerbaijan in Jan–Sept 2020 alone. Last autumn Azerbaijan hosted its first post-war drills with Turkish forces (3,000 troops across two countries). Azerbaijani officials proudly note that Turkish drones spearheaded their campaign, and  analysts observe that “Ankara is very determined in providing Baku with its needs”.

President Erdogan has repeatedly sided with Azerbaijan’s stance – for example, stating publicly that Armenians must pull out of Karabakh. Turkiye’s support has also taken symbolic forms: Turkish lawmakers backed Pakistan on Kashmir, and likewise Turkey consistently backs Azerbaijan in international forums. In return, Baku has done its part by facilitating pipelines (TANAP) and gas sales that help diversify Turkey’s energy supply. The partnership with Azerbaijan is thus both emotional (ethnic and cultural ties) and practical (trade, energy and military cooperation).

Ankara’s scholarship programs bring thousands of African and Asian students to Turkish universities each year, creating alumni networks across developing countries

Turkiye complements its hard-strategy with active soft power around the world. Its international development agency TİKA coordinates construction of schools, hospitals, roads and wells in Asia, Africa and the Balkans. In Somalia and Pakistan – two of the world’s most disaster-prone states – Turkish engineers and aid workers moved in at moments of crisis. Somalis famously nicknamed Turkiye the “Holy Grail” of aid: in 2012, refugees in Mogadishu said Turkish teams did “more in eight months… to shatter the perception that Mogadishu is a no-go zone than the international community has achieved in twenty years”.

Turkey also uses cultural diplomacy: it funds dozens of Yunus Emre Institutes and Maarif Foundation schools abroad to teach Turkish language and culture, and the Diyanet (religious authority) trains and sends imams to build goodwill in the Muslim world. Ankara’s scholarship programs bring thousands of African and Asian students to Turkish universities each year, creating alumni networks across developing countries.

Meanwhile, Turkish popular culture has burst onto global media. Period dramas like Diriliş: Ertuğrul (Resurrection Ertugrul) recounting Ottoman-era exploits have been exported to hundreds of countries and racked up “hundreds of millions of viewers worldwide”. They have helped transform Turkey’s image abroad – scholars call it “Neo-Ottoman Cool.” Turkish soaps and music now fill screens and airwaves in the Middle East, Latin America and parts of Asia. In recent rankings, Turkey is among the top exporters of TV series globally, on par with Western producers.

All these efforts bolster Ankara’s narrative: a proud, modern Muslim democracy. Even in Europe, the Turkish diaspora and its media have given Ankara unofficial influence – for example, Turkish-run schools in the Balkans teach a pro-Ankara history, and Turkish NGOs sponsor cultural festivals in Africa.

Ankara can “play the religious card,” symbolizing Islamic solidarity; its deep pockets and institutions mean that wherever there is upheaval in the developing world, a Turkish charity or construction crew often follows

In sum, Turkiye throws its weight behind friends not only with tanks and treaties but with cash, classrooms and culture. As one analyst notes, Ankara can “play the religious card,” symbolizing Islamic solidarity; its deep pockets and institutions mean that wherever there is upheaval in the developing world, a Turkish charity or construction crew often follows. This soft power makes Turkey a familiar name in many societies from the Balkans to Central Asia, which in turn feeds back into diplomatic trust.

Behind all these initiatives lies Turkiye’s grand strategy of strategic autonomy and multipolar balancing. On energy, for instance, Turkey is scrambling to reduce its import dependence (over 90% of its energy is imported). Its first major domestic gas field (Sakarya in the Black Sea) began producing in 2023 and now supplies roughly 6–7% of the country’s gas needs.

The government is simultaneously reaching out for new fields abroad: state oil firm TPAO struck recent agreements to explore offshore blocks in Bulgaria and Somalia, signed joint bids with Pakistan for its waters, and partnered with Azeri companies to develop Caspian Sea resources. Turkey also finalized deals with Turkmenistan to pipelined gas in 2024. In short, Turkiye is leveraging its geographic bridging of Europe and Asia to pursue oil and gas everywhere from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. It even lobbied (with Russian support) for construction of a gas export hub on Turkish soil to feed Europe via Turkish pipelines. These moves are driven by a desire to become a regional energy hub, not just a consumer.

Politically, Turkey defies simple labels. It is a founding NATO member with Incirlik airbase and thousands of troops in Europe, but Ankara has often annoyed its allies. It quietly helped block Sweden’s NATO bid until the U.S. agreed to deliver F16 jets in 2023, and it slapped sanctions on German lawmakers who recognized Armenian suffering in World War I.

In practice, Turkey walks a middle path: it buys arms from both Washington and Moscow, and it welcomes bribes (or investments) from both Beijing and Berlin

Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles in 2019 (and hints at a second batch) have been particularly controversial; Erdogan’s message was blunt: “In the future, nobody will be able to interfere in terms of what kind of DEFENCE systems we acquire… we are the only ones to make such decisions”. Even so, Turkiye insists it will honor its NATO obligations. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler recently told Reuters that Turkey’s “priority is to fulfil our responsibilities to NATO as an important ally and to strengthen solidarity with our allies. Our focus should be that NATO is prepared, determined and strong.” . He noted approvingly that Turkish accession to the USled alliance “does not prevent [us] from developing relations” with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or BRICS countries. In practice, Turkey walks a middle path: it buys arms from both Washington and Moscow, and it welcomes bribes (or investments) from both Beijing and Berlin.

Turkiye’s renewed interest in Eastern bodies is telling. Since 2020, Ankara has signaled desire to join the Russia-China-led SCO, and even held the rotating chairmanship of the pro-Russian Black Sea Economic Cooperation forum. It enjoys a free trade deal with Pakistan and visa-free travel with Qatar and some Central Asian states, aligning with like-minded “Global South” partners. Yet it remains committed to Western security guarantees. For example, after Turkey approved Sweden’s NATO membership in 2023, Washington immediately approved Ankara’s order of 40 new F-16 fighters – a deal that had been held up for years over S-400 grievances. Turkey has thus managed a sort of hybrid posture: remaining a linchpin of NATO DEFENCE while cultivating strategic options outside it.

In short, Turkiye’s goal is not to be America’s enforcer or Russia’s pawn, but a power that can engage with all great powers on its own terms

This multipolar strategy is especially clear on energy, as noted. Turkiye accepted a US waiver in 2024 to continue paying for Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline, even after US sanctions were imposed on Gazprombank. In return, Ankara pledged to keep Turkey’s gas flows and even extend supplies to Hungary and Slovakia through its routes. In effect, Brussels’ push to decouple from Russia has collided with Ankara’s dealmaking. President Erdogan can thus say with some truth that Turkey keeps Western pipelines running, even as it warms toward Eastern markets. In short, Turkiye’s goal is not to be America’s enforcer or Russia’s pawn, but a power that can engage with all great powers on its own terms.

Taken together, these trends have made Turkiye more than a regional actor. It is striving to be a system-shaping middle power – a country that cannot dictate world affairs, but that aims to tilt outcomes in multiple theaters. By brokering diplomacy (from Ukraine to Gaza), exporting military hardware and deployments (from Bayraktar drones to base access), nurturing alliances (with Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Turkic states), and wielding soft power (aid, mosques, media), Ankara weaves itself into many international equations. Its choices often seem made on calculated pragmatism rather than ideology: it will partner with whoever serves its interests on a given issue, be it Putin, Xi Jinping, or President Trump. Western media often describe this as a “delicate balancing act,” and indeed Turkiye’s leadership argues that its unique position allows it to “prepare for the end of the war” in Ukraine.

Western diplomats now admit Ankara was “alone in having hosted wartime talks between Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers and peace negotiators”

This self-conscious diplomacy is driven by domestic needs as well. Facing economic headwinds and domestic dissent, Turkish leaders have sought prestige abroad to bolster national pride. Erdogan often notes that after years of being sidelined by crises, global powers now come to him to broker deals – from grain exports to ceasefires. “The war has made allies realise Turkey’s geopolitical importance,” one senior official told Reuters, adding that many Western diplomats now admit Ankara was “alone in having hosted wartime talks between Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers and peace negotiators”. To be sure, there are limits: Turkey’s authoritarian turn at home and occasional hubris have alienated some. But for now Ankara plays its cards with skill.

In sum, Turkiye today straddles continents and fault lines. It claims to uphold both Western security and Eastern multipolarism

In sum, Turkiye today straddles continents and fault lines. It claims to uphold both Western security and Eastern multipolarism. It backs Ukraine and Qatar, simultaneously courts Russia and Pakistan. No great power fully trusts it, but none can ignore it either. As one recent dispatch from Istanbul notes, the country has emerged as a broker and balancer “able to wield influence” well beyond its size. Whether one labels this realpolitik or opportunism, the fact is that by mid-2025 Turkey has become a pivotal node in many of the world’s crises. That status – hard-earned through diplomacy, trade, aid and sometimes force – confirms the calculations of those who long ago predicted that if Europe were the West’s “sunset,” then Turkey might just be its “east star.”

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia