Pakistan–India relations have been marked by recurring conflicts, particularly centered around the unresolved Kashmir dispute, which has been a core issue since the partition of the Sub-Continent in 1947. The 1948 and 1965 wars over Kashmir, the 1971 fall of Dhaka, and events like the Brass-tacks military exercises in 1986–87, the Kargil conflict in 1999, and the 2001–02 military standoff all exacerbated distrust between the two nations. These events not only militarized their bilateral relations but also entrenched deep strategic and psychological suspicions. Pakistan’s perception of India as a hegemonic power and India’s accusations over Pakistan’s reliance on asymmetric warfare complicated efforts at normalization of ties.
More recent crises, such as the Pulwama attack in 2019, further demonstrated the fragility of peace efforts. Despite periods of dialogue, such as the Lahore Declaration, the sustained CBMs have been consistently derailed by crises, often stemming from historical military tussles. The long-standing issue of Kashmir continues to block meaningful progress in peacebuilding, making the relationship vulnerable to frequent confrontations. As a result, mistrust and strategic rivalry have made it difficult to establish lasting mechanisms for dialogue and conflict resolution between the nuclear-armed neighbors.
The possibility of reaching a peaceful resolution to this conflict emerged in 1999 when the then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, came to Lahore
The major hurdle in developing credible Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in South Asia is the absence of communication between the politico-military elites of Pakistan and India, which has promoted more distrust between both nuclear-armed neighbors and is a major obstacle to an effective crisis management framework. However, after the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, both South Asian rivals rethought their strategy. While the history of Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs dates back to the early 1990s when both the states agreed upon the principle of not attacking each other’s nuclear facilities, as well as the sharing of information on the civil nuclear facilities. As far as the longstanding flashpoint—the Kashmir dispute—is concerned, the possibility of reaching a peaceful resolution to this conflict emerged in 1999 when the then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, came to Lahore by bus and entered the country through Wagah Border along with his influential delegate including celebrities, politicians, and bureaucrats. The main highlight of this historic event was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), commonly known as the Lahore MoU.
The most recent incident of the Indian BrahMos missile misfiring into Pakistan highlighted the fragility of such CBMs in the hostile period
This particular document became the pinnacle of bilateral CBMs that comprehensively covered many aspects, but the most prominent among them was the nuclear information sharing, such as the pre-notification of the flight-testing of ballistic missiles—a delivery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead—in order to minimize the risk of an accidental war in the post-nuclearization era. But the most recent incident of the Indian BrahMos missile misfiring into Pakistan highlighted the fragility of such CBMs in the hostile period. However, the Indian officials questioned the technical aspects of the 2005 MoU, as according to them, since BrahMos is a cruise missile, the existing Lahore MoU and the 2005 Pre-Notification of Ballistic Missile do not cover the following category.
Despite the efforts by the politico-military establishment of both states with regard to nuclear CBMs, the procedural mechanism lacks an institutional framework for the effective implementation of any such CBMs. Similar sorts of discrepancies have been identified with the Lahore Declaration MoU signed in 1999. The effectiveness of the Lahore MoU has consequently been minimized with the passage of time due to the absence of an institutional body for the operationalization of the agreed CBMs.
The Pulwama–Balakot crisis of 2019 is considered the most critical security phase between the nuclear-armed neighbors in the post-nuclear weapons acquisition period
In the absence of proactive CBMs between India and Pakistan, the most recent two incidents have increased the risk of unintended escalation of nuclear war; the first is the Pulwama-Balakot crisis in 2019, the other one is the firing of the Brahmos cruise missile which landed in the crowded Mian Channu district of the Punjab province of Pakistan. The Pulwama–Balakot crisis of 2019 is considered the most critical security phase between the nuclear-armed neighbors in the post-nuclear weapons acquisition period. The strategic signaling was timely as the Pakistani PM Imran Khan convened the National Command Authority (NCA) meeting to convey to the adversary that Pakistan is prepared and so are its nuclear forces for any military aggression by India, but it refrains from escalating the crisis situation into the total war scenario.
In March 2022, Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (R), former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), firmly disputed India’s claim that the missile was launched due to technical or human error
Whereas, the BrahMos missile incident situation suddenly threatened Pakistan’s sovereignty, and it was questioned how it could easily be termed as an accident. In March 2022, Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (R), former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), firmly disputed India’s claim that the missile was launched due to technical or human error. He asserted that such an event could not have occurred without authorization from the highest political levels and thorough operational planning, thereby implying that the launch was deliberate rather than accidental.
The BrahMos is a cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, with maneuverable capability, and if it could be perceived as actually a nuclear-tipped missile, the replication could have been devastating
Gen. Kidwai’s statement reflected broader concerns about India’s strategic decision-making and raised questions regarding the control and use of its military capabilities. The BrahMos is a cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, with maneuverable capability, and if it could be perceived as actually a nuclear-tipped missile, the replication could have been devastating, which might have escalated the situation into a nuclear Armageddon.
“If either country believed that India could potentially conduct a decapitating or significant first strike against Pakistan, a serious crisis could potentially go nuclear with little warning. Additionally, India’s MIRVs might prompt Indian decision-makers to try and pre-emptively disarm Pakistan in a crisis.”
The threat, on the other hand, posed by the MIRV technology in the region differs with respect to states and their capabilities. The evolving scenario unveils that the Indian acquisition of MIRV would be highly destabilizing for the deterrence stability regime in the regional theatre of South Asia. The MIRV technology is closely integrated with the preemptive first-strike counterforce targeting strategy of India against Pakistan in a crisis situation. As the U.S. expert Hans Christensen argued that “If either country believed that India could potentially conduct a decapitating or significant first strike against Pakistan, a serious crisis could potentially go nuclear with little warning. Additionally, India’s MIRVs might prompt Indian decision-makers to try and pre-emptively disarm Pakistan in a crisis.” Such a development is quite hazardous for the delicate strategic stability of South Asia.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
