The confrontation between Iran and Israel has a tangled past and deep roots. Geographic locations of the parties, ideological differences, and regional strategic goals all complicate the elements causing this conflict. This conflict has resurfaced; the fight has become hotter; Israel’s deliberate and targeted attacks have essentially closed all avenues of peace.

Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus as well as the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh right in Tehran damaged Iran’s prestige, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty. The most crucial question among all this upheaval is: how likely Iran will respond? Is Iran about to start a world war? Regarding Israel’s conduct, how will Iran react?

Iran is likely to balance prudence with retribution through proxy conflicts and strategic military moves.

One conceivable reprisal from Iran for Israel’s activities is the murder of a well-known official from Israel. This approach serves as a direct sort of reaction and helps Iran to target at the core of Israel’s leadership. Showing to the world, its allies, and its people that Iran can target at the center of Israel’s leadership and delivering a strong deterrent message about its might and influence would be the key goals for Tehran.

Stated differently, Iran is striving to both extract punishment and show its power. Still, the probability of this decision is meager. Given Iran’s limited operational capacity inside Israel, a targeted death would logistically be challenging. On the other hand, Israel is prepared to manage such threats because of its strong security system and support from vital friends. These problems taken together reduce the likelihood that this alternative will be used effectively.

Iran may also potentially turn to diplomatic and non-punitive responses to the breach of its sovereignty. It may present Israel in a bad light, implying that the Israeli leadership is aggressive, violates international law, and seeks to raise local hostilities. Iran may make this more than simply a bilateral dispute by publicly criticizing Israel’s activities as against international law.

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran marked a significant escalation in the Iran-Israel conflict.

Iran can attempt to criticize Israel’s activities and exert pressure by employing diplomatic channels and international venues such as the United Nations. It may also seek remedy via international courts. These actions might help Iran improve its image in the world and simultaneously question Israel’s reputation both internationally and in popular opinion around the globe.

Another rather likely scenario is the start of large-scale and bloody proxy conflicts against Israel.  Iran would begin here by giving Hamas far greater resources — including money, weapons, intelligence, and political support — along with other elements. The fact that Yahya Sinwar replaced Haniyeh shows unequivocally the plan. Sinwar is close to Iran and well-known for advocating a military solution to the crisis. This decision amply reveals Iran’s involvement in it, in keeping with its objective of intensifying conflict with Israel.

Iran’s network of proxy groups spans the Middle East including Hezbollah in Lebanon and other militias in Syria and Iraq. Usually, these groups agree with Iran’s stance. Iran is anticipated to increase its support for these proxy groups and start additional operations against Israel’s interests as payback for previous actions. This may show up as more hacking, more missile strikes, or border instability directed toward Israel.

Iran may seek diplomatic channels to criticize Israel, portraying it as a violator of international law.

Iran wants to use this approach to divert Israel’s military resources, worsen its security posture, and indirectly pressure the Jewish state at little cost. This strategy targets Israel’s conventional military might by means of regional alliances, therefore complementing Iran’s wider theory of asymmetric warfare.

Another option Iran has for revenge against Israel is large military attacks with less effect. For these high-profile operations—which would more likely be a show of power than a declaration of war—missile strikes, naval maneuvers in vital waterways, general military maneuvers in disputed areas, or even a limited direct attack are all options. Iran would be demonstrating to the world that it can defend its interests without resorting to war by this type of attack. By doing this, it intends to raise national morale at home and show Iran’s strategic depth and agility to regional and worldwide audiences.

From the offered options, Iran looks to respond to Israel; yet, it is rather unlikely that it would go to war with Israel.  Iran is fully aware of the fact that a full-scale battle would not serve its current geopolitical situation. It will, therefore, strike a compromise between the requirement of moderation in its strategic calculations and the demand of retribution.

Proxy conflicts remain Iran’s primary means of exerting pressure without direct war.

Iranian authorities claim this is an attempt to retain Iran’s deterrent weapons and make the battle localized rather than worldwide. Given Israel’s latest actions, Iran will most certainly use a multipronged approach. In such case, the most practical plan would probably combine low-intensity, few-death huge missile attacks with proxy battles. Iran may restore its dignity and national pride using extensive low-intensity missile strikes, even if it is displaying its strength without significantly raising the conflict.

Through proxy conflicts to apply indirect pressure on Israel, Iran may avoid the risks and costs of direct armed engagement with Israel. Proxy battles are considered to be the main means by which Iran exacts its revenge as they let Iran impose pressure without really going to war. Using strategic military moves and proxy battles, Iran aims to balance prudence with retribution.