The dynamics of the Tran border water in South Asia are intricately linked to regional geopolitics, especially those affecting China, India, and Pakistan. The Indus, Brahmaputra, and Sutlej are among the Circum-Himalayan river systems that rise in China’s controlled Tibetan Plateau, pass through India, and flows into Pakistan. Comprehensive water-sharing agreements between these countries are noticeably lacking, despite the vital relevance of these shared water resources.
India, the middle riparian state, and China, the upper riparian state, do not have a formal water-sharing treaty
India, the middle riparian state, and China, the upper riparian state, do not have a formal water-sharing treaty; instead, they communicate hydrological data through Memorandums of Understanding. This disparity breeds mistrust, particularly when China begins large-scale dam construction projects on rivers such as the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Zangbo), which worries India about possible disturbances to ecological balance and water flow.
The relationship between India and Pakistan is even more complex. Once praised as a brilliant example of water diplomacy, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 has been put in abeyance by India in the wake of the Pahalgam terrorist assault in April 2025. Tensions have increased as a result of this suspension because Pakistan sees any interruption in water flow as an act of war. Regarding the upper and lower riparian equations, India and Pakistan are embroiled in a geopolitical rivalry and a great lot of animosity over Kashmir conflict.
The Indus River is a very critical area for Pakistan’s national security apparatus. India has theoretical control over the timing and flow of the rivers because it is an upper riparian country. Pakistan has always seen the Indus River through a security perspective. During bilateral tensions, India has threatened to stop or redirect water flows, increasingly using it as a coercive tool. (Like the Uri incident in 2016). The withdrawal of surplus water from the Salal and Baglihar dams and India’s unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty in reaction to increased tensions after the Pahalgam incident serve as clear examples.
The geopolitical irony here is that India might unwittingly create a precedent for China to follow if it uses water as a weapon against Pakistan
The geopolitical irony here is that India might unwittingly create a precedent for China to follow if it uses water as a weapon against Pakistan. By altering Brahmaputra flows during political or military confrontations, China, India’s upper riparian, might replicate India’s coercive actions. India’s forceful downstream strategy runs the risk of causing a reciprocal upstream reaction, further undermining its own long-term water security. The Brahmaputra River, which supplies India’s hydropower (44% of its potential) and freshwater needs (30% of its total resources), is largely controlled by China. Moreover, rivers that start in Chinese territory provide about half of India’s water.
It is significant to remember that China, India, and Pakistan are all water-stressed nations. India was ranked number 24 on the World Population Review’s list of countries with water stress (2023), followed by Pakistan at number 31 and China at number 52. Only 2,093 cubic meters of freshwater per person, or a fifth of the global average, are found in China. In contrast, it is anticipated that India’s already low annual water availability per capita—1,486 cubic meters in 2021—will drop to 1,367 cubic meters by 2031. Given Pakistan’s current water condition, “water stressed” to “water scarce” is the new reality. The 1,000 cubic meter water scarcity threshold is not fulfilled by Pakistan’s yearly water supply per person.
Water scarcity is a severe issue for China, India, and Pakistan, with direct implications for their food supply, agriculture, energy production, and economic stability. This shortage has intensified strategic conflicts between upstream and downstream nations in the absence of comprehensive water-sharing agreements.
India faces a complex water-sharing conundrum as a result of its geopolitical and geographic middle ground
India has a geopolitically precarious status since it is the middle riparian. It is located upstream from Pakistan, a lower riparian enemy with whom it has a very tense and militarized relationship, and downstream from China, an upper riparian state with whom it has little hydrological cooperation. India faces a complex water-sharing conundrum as a result of its geopolitical and geographic middle ground.
The recent four-day military standoff between India and Pakistan has further compounded an already precarious situation
The entire regional hydrological infrastructure is in chaos as a result of the current suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan and the lack of a water-sharing agreement between China and India. India’s lack of confidence and cooperative frameworks with both China and Pakistan seriously impairs its ability to manage equitable outflows downstream while ensuring dependable water inputs from upstream as a middle riparian.
The recent four-day military standoff between India and Pakistan has further compounded an already precarious situation. Pakistan reportedly used a variety of Chinese-made weaponry during the exchange, which tactically and symbolically strengthened the expanding security relationship between China and Pakistan.
Water is now intertwined in larger security and alliance dynamics, and the water-sharing conundrum is no longer bilateral but rather a triplex strategic challenge involving all three governments.
Its hostile attitude toward its neighbors in the upper and lower riparian zones limits its capacity to support or negotiate new arrangements
India’s water diplomacy key corridor is currently getting smaller. Its hostile attitude toward its neighbors in the upper and lower riparian zones limits its capacity to support or negotiate new arrangements. Hydrological openness is difficult due to the lack of confidence with China, particularly when it comes to large-scale projects like the Brahmaputra “super dam.” However, it is also unlikely that the Indus Waters Treaty would be restored very soon due to the worsening relations with Pakistan.
India has two options for resolving this impasse:
- Escalatory Posture:Maintain the use of water as a strategic weapon against Pakistan while balancing the area and modernizing the military to counter China’s upstream dominance. However, this increases the likelihood of flashpoints and runs the risk of making water a hardened security issue.
- Diplomatic Realignment:Launch a fresh regional water discussion with an emphasis on data exchange, early warning systems, and ecological sustainability, maybe under a multilateral or track-II framework. Even in the face of wider political conflicts, this path necessitates de-securitizing water discourse and restoring a minimal level of confidence.
India’s future water security cannot be ensured by compulsion or unilateralism in the face of population growth, climate change, and the depletion of freshwater resources. In order to prevent water from being the catalyst for the next regional crisis, it must recognize its precarious position as middle riparian and shift toward flexible, collaborative approaches.
