The Post-Pahalgam military crisis, a plausible escalation following a major terrorist att in Kashmir, would expose the limits of India’s strategy to enforce a ‘new normal’ of punitive retaliation. This doctrine has remained frustratingly unrealized since the 2019 Balakot strikes. Despite India’s growing conventional military superiority, including Rafale jets, S-400 air defense systems, and precision-strike capabilities, its attempts to establish escalation dominance have repeatedly faltered against Pakistan’s robust strategic deterrence framework.

This crisis would reaffirm that raw military power alone cannot rewrite the rules of engagement in South Asia, where nuclear thresholds, asymmetric warfare, and regional alliances continue to shape the outcomes

This crisis would reaffirm that raw military power alone cannot rewrite the rules of engagement in South Asia, where nuclear thresholds, asymmetric warfare, and regional alliances continue to shape the outcomes.Pakistan’s first-use nuclear doctrine ensures that any large-scale Indian conventional retaliation risks uncontrollable escalation. This threshold-based deterrence has effectively checkmated India’s ambitions for a limited war doctrine, forcing New Delhi into a paradox: it possesses the means to inflict significant damage but lacks the political-military space to do so without triggering a catastrophic response. The international community’s reluctance to endorse unilateral Indian strikes further erodes New Delhi’s capacity to legitimize its punitive strategies.

While India’s military modernization has widened the conventional capability gap, Pakistan’s asymmetric responses such as drone swarms, cyberattacks, and nuclear signaling neutralize this advantage

Regionally, the crisis highlighted the enduring stability of Pakistan’s strategic deterrence, supported by China’s diplomatic cover and military assistance (including JF-10 Block III fighters and drone technology). While India’s military modernization has widened the conventional capability gap, Pakistan’s asymmetric responses such as drone swarms, cyberattacks, and nuclear signaling neutralize this advantage. The result is a permanent state of managed crises, where neither side can impose a decisive outcome without risking mutual devastation.

The recurring military face-off episodes between India and Pakistan, particularly since the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot episode, offer critical lessons about deterrence dynamics, escalation control, and the unresolved challenges of South Asia’s strategic stability. These confrontations reveal why neither conventional superiority nor nuclear posturing has allowed either side to decisively alter the status quo.

India’s 2019 Balakot airstrike, the first cross-border air attack since 1971, was meant to establish a new norm of punitive retaliation against Pakistan-based terror groups. However, Pakistan’s swift counterstrike (Operation Swift Retort) demonstrated that escalation dominance remains elusive. Limited conventional strikes do not guarantee political victory when the adversary retains escalation options.

Pakistan’s ‘full-spectrum deterrence’ has effectively capped India’s conventional military options. Pakistan’s strategic capability remains the guarantor of its security against a full-scale war. Even if India’s military is stronger on paper, the risk of nuclear escalation compels restraint. The 2019 crisis confirmed that no Indian government can wage a sustained conventional war without triggering Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. This dynamic perpetuates a stalemate where neither side can declare success without mutual destruction.

Pakistan’s reliance on proxy warfare (e.g., Kashmir militancy) and emerging technologies (armed drones, cyberattacks) allows it to challenge India without direct large-scale conflict.  For India, this means military modernization alone is insufficient; it must also invest in counter-drone systems, cyber defenses, and intelligence penetration of militant networks.

Both states are deeply sensitive to global opinion, particularly from the US, China, and Gulf states. In 2019, US and Saudi role contributed to return the captured Indian pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman and practiced restraint. This suggests that external mediation (formal or informal) remains a critical factor in de-escalation. However, India’s claiming alignment with the West and Pakistan’s reliance on China add new complexities to crisis diplomacy.

The 2019 dogfight over Kashmir nearly spiraled out of control due to miscommunication, fog of war, and political posturing

The 2019 dogfight over Kashmir nearly spiraled out of control due to miscommunication, fog of war, and political posturing. A single downed aircraft or accidental strike on a high-value target could have triggered uncontrolled escalation. This underscores the peril of brinkmanship in a nuclearized region where crisis protocols are weak and trust is non-existent.

Hypothetically, the way out and opportunities for confidence-building and engagement to bridge misperceptions and reduce the risk of future escalation remain. In the aftermath of the India-Pakistan Pahalgam incident, several opportunities exist for confidence-building and engagement to bridge misperceptions and reduce escalation risks. First, backchannel diplomatic talks facilitated by neutral mediators like the UAE or Saudi Arabia could help clarify red lines and de-escalate tensions discreetly, building on past successes. Second, reinforcing existing military confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as the 2021 ceasefire agreement, enhanced hotline communications, and AI-driven early warning systems, could prevent unintended clashes. Third, reviving limited trade and humanitarian initiatives, such as cross-LoC travel or joint disaster response drills in Kashmir, could foster interdependence and soften public hostility. Fourth, collaborative efforts to counter misinformation through joint fact-checking platforms or veteran dialogues could mitigate nationalist rhetoric and build trust.

Establishing long-term mechanisms like Risk Reduction Centres (RRCs) for real-time crisis communication, modelled after Cold War-era systems, could institutionalize de-escalation

Finally, establishing long-term mechanisms like Risk Reduction Centres (RRCs) for real-time crisis communication, modelled after Cold War-era systems, could institutionalize de-escalation. While challenges like political resistance and proxy violence persist, incremental steps prioritizing humanitarian CBMs and third-party mediation offer a pragmatic path toward stability.

The lesson of Post-Pahalgam, like Balakot before it, is that South Asia’s strategic stability rests on fragile deterrence, not military dominance. Until both nations move beyond brinkmanship and short-term coercion. Otherwise, the India-Pakistan conflict template remains trapped in a loop:

Provocation (terror attack) → Indian retaliation (airstrikes)→ Pakistani counterstrike → Global pressure forces de-escalation → Temporary Ceasefire-Crisis Management.

Both nations must develop better crisis communication or risk learning the hardest lesson of all: that even a ‘limited’ war in South Asia may have no limits at all

Until India and Pakistan initiate the establishment of communication platforms, the cycle will continue. The key takeaway, the military power alone cannot resolve this rivalry; only a combination of coercive diplomacy, internal stability, and economic deterrence might someday break the deadlock. This crisis is not cooling down as cleanly as 2019. With more drones, hypersonic missiles, and AI-driven warfare entering the equation, the risks of miscalculation are higher than ever. Both nations must develop better crisis communication or risk learning the hardest lesson of all: that even a ‘limited’ war in South Asia may have no limits at all.

India’s failed bid to establish a new norm of punitive retaliation reflects not just Pakistan’s deterrence success, but also the structural constraints of South Asia’s strategic ecosystem

Ultimately, the Post-Pahalgam crisis underscored a sobering reality: India’s failed bid to establish a new norm of punitive retaliation reflects not just Pakistan’s deterrence success, but also the structural constraints of South Asia’s strategic ecosystem. Until India can either undermine Pakistan’s nuclear threshold or secure irreversible international isolation for Islamabad, the region will remain trapped in a cycle of low-intensity provocations and contained confrontations, a stalemate where military power, no matter how advanced, cannot break the enduring logic of mutual deterrence.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.