Pakistan’s internal security landscape has deteriorated significantly in recent months, particularly in the Waziristan region, now divided into North, Upper, and Lower Waziristan, and across the broader southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa belt. A marked resurgence of Pakistani Taliban factions has been observed, with their presence exceeding prior intelligence estimates. This concentration of militants has led to frequent confrontations with state security forces, placing local civilian populations at growing risk.

Pakistani Taliban’s resurgence in Waziristan surpasses prior intelligence estimates, escalating civilian risks.

The intensification of the conflict has coincided with increased use of drones by both Pakistani security forces and militant factions. These engagements have resulted in civilian casualties, including children, further deepening the humanitarian cost of the conflict. The situation has reignited fears among local communities of another large-scale military operation by the Pakistani state. Historical precedent suggests that such operations, while sometimes tactically effective, often produce long-term socio-economic consequences for local populations, including forced displacement, property destruction, and disruption of livelihoods.

While the Pakistani government currently relies on targeted, intelligence-driven operations, the growing entrenchment of militant actors may necessitate a shift toward comprehensive military action. However, any such shift must be carefully evaluated against the backdrop of prior campaigns such as Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009). Although these operations succeeded in dislodging militants, they failed to achieve sustainable peace, primarily due to insufficient investment in post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. Local populations, frequently displaced and underserved, now express skepticism toward renewed military campaigns, viewing them as punitive and ineffective.

Complicating the strategic landscape is the absence of peace deals or non-aggression pacts that were previously in place with certain factions. During earlier operations, arrangements with groups like the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction and the Taliban in Wana helped isolate the TTP. At present, the Pakistani Taliban maintain a widespread presence across all three districts of Waziristan, which heightens the risk of a multi-front conflict if the state undertakes another offensive. Militants can now more easily reinforce one another across district lines, nullifying the benefits of localized action.

The structural cohesion of the TTP has also improved since its fragmentation in the aftermath of leadership losses in 2013. Under Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, the group has demonstrated greater strategic discipline, secured safe havens in Afghanistan, expanded recruitment and propaganda operations, and diversified its financial base. These developments position the TTP as a formidable adversary should another large-scale military operation be initiated.

Past military operations lacked sufficient post-conflict reconstruction, fueling local skepticism toward renewed offensives.

Further undermining counterterrorism efforts is the erosion of trust between local populations and the state. This is rooted in a historical pattern of neglect, where post-operation phases lack adequate investment in civilian infrastructure and governance. Local communities increasingly perceive state interventions as superficial or extractive, exacerbating alienation and weakening support for security initiatives. The perception that national leadership prioritizes urban centers such as Punjab and Karachi over the peripheries of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa compounds this sense of marginalization.

The emergence of a new jihadist coalition, the Ittehadul Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), has added a layer of complexity to the conflict. Formed in April 2025, the alliance includes the Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction, Lashkar-e-Islam, and Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan. Since its inception, the IMP has launched a series of coordinated attacks on police and paramilitary targets in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, utilizing advanced tactics and weapons, including drones. The group’s propaganda apparatus, modeled closely on Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), signals both strategic alignment and technological adaptation.

The IMP’s operations suggest the potential for its evolution into an insurgent force comparable to the TTP in strength and reach. Recruitment, battlefield coordination, and media sophistication are all markers of its expanding capacity. One particularly concerning trend is the shift in tactics: instead of infiltrating the security establishment as in previous years, the TTP and its affiliates now focus on demoralization. Targeted attacks on off-duty personnel, particularly from the Frontier Corps and police, are becoming increasingly common, with militants threatening personnel to abandon their posts or face lethal consequences.

This tactic draws from the playbook of the Afghan Taliban’s insurgency against NATO-backed Afghan forces, illustrating cross-border ideological and operational influence. Given that many FC personnel hail from areas with active TTP presence, they remain particularly vulnerable while on leave or in transit.

New jihadist coalition IMP employs advanced tactics, signaling growing insurgent capabilities.

The broader regional dynamics further complicate Pakistan’s security response. There is growing concern that local communities, disillusioned by the state’s repeated failures, may begin to view Taliban groups as viable alternatives to government institutions. A similar dynamic was observable in Afghanistan prior to the collapse of the Ghani administration, where widespread governance failures and security vacuums led to increased public sympathy for the Taliban.

Ironically, the Afghan Taliban, despite limited resources, have demonstrated greater internal coherence and success in curbing threats such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the National Resistance Front (NRF). In contrast, Pakistan, despite possessing a vast security infrastructure, internationally recognized intelligence capabilities, and extensive experience in counterinsurgency, continues to struggle with domestic militancy. This discrepancy raises critical questions about the strategic direction, institutional coordination, and political will behind Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy.

One illustrative comparison is in force size: Pakistan’s Frontier Corps alone comprises approximately 170,000 personnel, exceeding the total estimated strength of the Afghan Taliban’s forces. Despite this, Pakistan remains unable to decisively neutralize threats within its own borders. This points to fundamental structural, strategic, and governance deficiencies that require urgent attention.

Restoring the confidence of local populations will be pivotal to any sustainable counterterrorism strategy. Public trust can be revitalized through demonstrably effective operations that avoid civilian harm and through consistent investment in local infrastructure, governance, and rehabilitation. The example of national unity during the Pakistan-India aerial confrontation illustrates how effective military performance can galvanize public support. A similar momentum must be cultivated in the internal security domain through transparent, accountable, and community-inclusive operations.

Restoring public trust through civilian protection and inclusive governance is essential for lasting security.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s gravest security threat is not external but internal. Persistent militancy has inflicted profound human, economic, and social costs on the country. Unless addressed through a comprehensive strategy that combines military efficacy, post-conflict development, and inclusive governance, the situation is likely to worsen. Pakistan must shift from a reactive, fragmented approach to a long-term, multidimensional policy framework if it hopes to secure lasting peace and stability.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.