The contemporary world with nine states having nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems is becoming more dangerous than the Cold War period between the US and the Soviet Union. There is a consistent drive for both conventional and nuclear force modernization including that of the acquisition of emerging technologies – speed, remote sensing, quantum computing, precision guided munitions, lethal autonomous weapons and many more – by the leading powers.

The Ukraine-Russia war, the power struggle between the US and China in the South and the East China Seas, the 2017 Chinese and Indian conflict in Doklam, the Balakot incident between India and Pakistan in 2019, the misfiring of India’s BrahMos missile in Pakistan in March 2022, and the increasing escalatory tension in the Middle East due to Israel-Gaza war dragging Iran and the US into conflict are some of dangerous episodes that is risking the conflict escalation from military to a nuclear level.

Many countries without nuclear weapons are worried about their security and ultimate survival. Some of them even question the US security guarantees both in Europe and the East Asian region.

The world continues to be in flux. Many countries without nuclear weapons are worried about their security and ultimate survival. Some of them even question the US security guarantees both in Europe and the East Asian region. Will any state sacrifice its capital by guaranteeing the security of others’ capitals?

Just as the US and the Soviet Union came very close to use nuclear weapons against each other during the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, the risk of conflict escalation both during the peace and crisis time is potentially increasing by miscalculation, temptation for preemptive strikes, power struggle, and escalation dominance between the rivals. Therefore, the strategic environment of the contemporary world is becoming more complex, nasty and brutish.

From Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and Robert Jervis to the more contemporary scholars, all agree with the central argument on conflict escalation that any serious conflict between the potential rivals can escalate from the lower to the higher rung of the ladder. To put it more seriously, the Herman Kahn 44 rungs of the ladder can even quickly be bypassed into just a few rungs before the miscalculation for nuclear use between the rivals.

Although there are lots of incidents that occurred between the nuclear rivals during the peace time, it is important to mention a few of these that could have created potential risk of escalation from military to nuclear level. 1) the Goldsboro incident, North Carolina of 1961 when the US bomber B-52 carrying two hydrogen bombs crashed, 2) The NORAND incident of 1979 creating a technical glitch in one of the computers, sending off false alarms to the US Strategic Air Command as if the Soviet Union had launched SLBM nuclear strikes, and 3) the North Dakota incident in 2007 where the US accidently mounted six nuclear weapons on the strategic bomber B-52 that flew for 36 in the air. An American professor on nuclear studies, Scott D Sagan, argues that “no system to prevent accidents is perfect; incidents of some sort are bound to happen”.

Conflict escalation to a dangerous level may occur when there is a little strategic communication. Rivals do not talk to each other. They tend to increase and modernize their deterrent forces. They get involved in proxies to contain each other. They often come up with nuclear saber rattling. Hotlines are disregarded. Leaders of rival states do not often interact with each other despite the call for invitation. Military and nuclear exercises are carried out without informing the adversary, creating scenarios for mistrust and miscalculation. They become irrational actors while demonstrating the absence of strategic patience and restraint. Today, one may closely observe these ingredients in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East region. South Asia is no exception to this.

Conflict escalation to a dangerous level may occur when there is a little strategic communication.

Unlike other nuclear flash points, South Asia may become more dangerous for a conflict escalation. As mentioned, the South Asian region has already experienced many wars, border skirmishes and more recently the Balakot incident and the misfiring of India’s BrahMos missile into Pakistan.

It is India that has been disregarding the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the two states, ignoring the hotline mechanism in the event of crisis, developing a temptation for preemptive strikes, misfiring missiles for testing the resolve of Pakistan, modernizing and increasing its conventional and nuclear forces, considering shifts in is military and nuclear doctrinal postures, and potentially dragging Pakistan into a dangerous arms race that Pakistan may not desire.

There is no sign that India will put restraint on its deterrence force modernization. It keeps its own regional aspirations. Following up the Kautilyan aspirations, New Delhi calls the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean. Recently, it has rejected the Japanese call for NATO type security guarantee in Asia. New Delhi follows an Act East policy. Interestingly, it has an increasing strategic partnership with the US, but at the same time it acquires S-400 and develops hypersonic BrahMos with Russia. India also buys Rafale aircrafts from France.

More interestingly, on the one hand, India retains strategic partnership with Israel by acquiring new technologies especially developing its ballistic missile defense system, but at the same time it holds geopolitical relations with the Iranians. Yet, it continues to hold better relations with the perceived rivals of Iran in the Middle Eastern region.

Following up the Kautilyan aspirations, New Delhi calls the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean.

Such geopolitical and deterrent force development favoring India creates a security dilemma thereby decreasing the security of Pakistan. Pakistan in turn will have two options: One, it may go for parity, which may become expensive that Pakistan cannot. Two, to retain strategic balance to potentially deter its adversary that Pakistan must.

In the absence of strategic balance in South Asia, the risk of escalation between Pakistan and India increases. That being noted, strategic balance contributes to the broader strategic stability in South Asia, which in turn reduces the risk of escalation. In addition to retaining strategic balance, there can be a number of CBMs and nuclear CBMs between India and Pakistan to reduce the risk of escalation.

However, the good news is that nuclear deterrence is in place in South Asia despite the dangers of escalation. Both sides have not fought direct wars since the arrival of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan and India exchange the list of nuclear installations and facilities on the first January of every year since the ratification of this agreement in 1991. This agreement says that the South Asian rivals would not attack each other’s nuclear facilities.

Both the rivals have been practicing nuclear moratorium. However, if India tests again, Pakistan may have an option to follow suit.  Since 2005, both sides had an agreement that they would notify each other in advance before carrying out missile tests. Unfortunately, India did not immediately notify after misfiring its missile in March 2022. India rejected Pakistan’s proposal in the early 1970s for creating the South Asian Nuclear Free Zone. Also, it declined the creation of the strategic restraint regime Pakistan proposed in 1998.

The contemporary challenges to nuclear deterrence for all nuclear-weapon states – safety and security of nuclear-related materials, terrorism, the threat of the use of chemical/biological weapons, cyber, and sophisticated emerging technologies – may undermine the very essence of nuclear deterrence if not totally make nuclear weapons irrelevant in terms of war prevention dynamics.

Managing and/or preventing these challenges may require different types of counter strategies without potentially risking entangled escalation. Along with the principles of nuclear deterrence, each of these emerging challenges may require specific countermeasures. In other words, rather than relying merely on the Cold War type strategies, nuclear-weapon states need to confront the contemporary challenges by exercising a different combination of deterrence strategies without getting into a “commitment trap” as part of broader nuclear responsibility.

In the absence of strategic balance in South Asia, the risk of escalation between Pakistan and India rivals increases.

Besides, there is an urgent need for non-traditional imperatives as well such as the development of a crisis management/ crisis prevention institute in South Asia that may contribute towards crisis prevention and crisis management between the South Asian nuclear rivals when it comes to the notion of nuclear responsibility. Such imperatives may include several measures to prevent developing war-fighting strategies, reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, practicing a nuclear moratorium, a mechanism for preventing accidental nuclear war, restricting to the essentials of credible minimum deterrence, and improved means of communication for risk reduction.

The two South Asian rivals should continue to have hotlines, such hotlines may be extended to other layers of leadership as well, ensuring the practice of nuclear CBMs, effective utilization of the third-party role between the acute nuclear rivals, and measures for retaining nuclear balance rather than parity (nuclear superiority).

Of course, the proposed institute may also include the discussion for creating strategic restraint regime, efforts for peaceful uses of nuclear technology, participation in the international discussion on non-proliferation, de-mating nuclear warheads from delivery systems, and undertaking stringent safety and security mechanisms.

More importantly, South Asian security leadership needs to provide advance notice before carrying out nuclear and missile tests, and immediately report any accidental firing of a missile towards each other to prevent retaliatory nuclear strikes. Most if not all these measures can be applicable and doable between the South Asian nuclear rivals to prevent the possibility of accidental war and promote strategic stability.