A global order characterized by multiplexity entails a diverse array of state and non-state actors actively influencing the norms of governance according to their distinct cultural perspectives. In stark contrast, a hegemonic world order is marked by the dominance of a single power that propagates a uniform narrative.
China’s ambitious pursuit of hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia, faces a formidable hurdle due to its unsophisticated and unsubtle approach to international relations.
Beijing’s diplomatic, economic, and military initiatives over the past ten years and beyond have undeniably increased China’s influence throughout Asia. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s relations with Russia, as well as those with developing nations of Central Asia, India, Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Japan, have reached an all-time high. This expansion of Beijing’s influence and Asia’s response to Chinese initiatives are inescapable in the long run. Undoubtedly, China is the dominant nation in continental Asia, and it has a thriving economy that, while competing with those of other Asian nations, also drives overall economic growth.
However, to ostensibly stop China from becoming a regional hegemon, the United States and its Asian allies seek to maintain a delicate balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. They worry that Beijing will gradually persuade its neighbors to turn away from the United States, accept Chinese preeminence, and abide by Beijing’s preferences in key foreign policy decisions. Thus, a dominant power wielding its power in this way makes itself less vulnerable to blockades and other forms of coercion while also gaining the respect of weaker states within its sphere of influence, even in the absence of direct rule. The lack of local threats makes it easier for the regional hegemon, should the need or desire arise, to project power into other global domains.
Despite being a key component of hegemonic ordering, China’s increased economic and financial power in South Asia has not yet resulted in the creation of a regional structure that is in line with its own security, economic and ideological interests.
In particular, India has surpassed China in both size and proportion of young people due to its rapidly growing economy and population. Significant increases in defense spending show that many of China’s neighboring countries are actively engaged in vigorous balance efforts. In addition to the United States, other nations, such as Australia, India, and Japan, are working together. These countries will probably respond with even more resolute measures as their worries about Chinese hegemony grow.
Despite that, South Asia has historically rarely been a focus of American efforts to establish global hegemony. However, under Xi’s leadership, China has increasingly manipulated its role as a regional benefactor, showing a tendency to use force and take sides, particularly in relation to India’s territorial disputes with its neighboring states. The goal of China’s engagement policy is to maintain its strategic advantage over maritime communication routes. This strategy has forced the region into a precarious balance in which economic cooperation and strategic implications must be carefully navigated. The region has shown assertiveness on a few issues and has chosen to co-opt each other’s interests despite China’s materially inferior capabilities.
Due to its lack of cultural legitimacy as a superpower and its preference for extensive economic activism, China’s pretended win-win scenario for Asia as a whole has been called into question. As they interact with the prevailing norms at various levels of state and society, as well as state and non-state actors, the sectors that support China’s aspirations for hegemonic dominance are constantly contested, opposed, renegotiated, and reproduced.
China’s rise has unquestionably been imperative to maintain global economic growth, with its market playing an important role.
In a world where our omnipotence in all fields is no longer absolute, Americans will face difficult adaptation challenges. We can adapt to change, though, because we have a flexible and resilient nature. Both the United States and China will continue to pursue their respective national interests as they see fit. In summary, since multiple countries, not just the US or China will participate in power sharing, the future world will likely be more complex than the past and will be characterized by increased “democratization.” There will be numerous opportunities for nations with reliable ties to both Beijing and Washington to control their level of involvement in international affairs. There shall be no dominant force and there shall be no such thing as a “G-2”.