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Middle East: Ashes Of Influence

By
Ameer Abdullah Khan
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Middle East Lebanon

Clausewitzian wisdom, “War is the continuation of policy by other means,” best describes Israel’s strategy in the ongoing war in the Middle East. Over the past year, Israel has been able to transform not only the modern battlefields but also the region’s geopolitical landscape. This transformation has occurred amid immense destruction and an unprecedented human cost, amounting to genocide. However, despite the widespread condemnation and internal political divisions, Israel has achieved a tactical victory which can primarily be attributed to the indecisiveness on the part of its primary opponent Iran. The ashes of Iranian influence now cloud the region’s bleak geopolitical horizon.

Looking back at the previous year, one can infer that Israel’s actions were not mere resentful retaliation to the October 7 attacks by Hamas. The decimation of Gaza and the violation of international laws was part of a calculated strategy to reshape regional politics in its favor. Over the years, Israel continuously crossed the redlines set by Iran, which, instead of giving decisive response, merely relied on rhetoric and hollow mantra of dreadful revenge. In April 2024, Iran served a practical response, however, it was so weak and ineffective that it exposed the limitations of Tehran’s Middle East strategy. The recent Iranian attack, also caused little damage and came too late to have any impact.

On the other hand, Hassan Nasrullah’s assassination was the latest in a series of losses inflicted by Israel on its adversaries. Over the past few months, top officials of Iran’s allied groups, including more than a dozen Hezbollah leaders, have been systematically eliminated. Similarly, nearly the entire leadership of Hamas has been killed, including its two chiefs, Ismael Haniyeh, who was assassinated on Iranian soil and Yahya Sinwar.

Israel has also targeted and killed several IRGC senior commanders, including Abbas Nilfroushan. At the same time, the effectiveness of Israel’s operations and the deep penetration of its intelligence network have fueled speculation about the circumstances surrounding the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash.

Israel’s series of successful assassinations raises a fundamental question: Can Iran still justify its position as a regional power if it cannot protect its allies? In the ruthless arena of geopolitics, a state’s power is measured not only by its military strength but also by its capacity to safeguard its partners and allies. In this context, reports of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei being moved to a secure location, before his reappearance to lead a Friday prayer in Tehran were ironic symbols of Iran’s waning power. Thucydides’ dictum, “the powerful must do what they can and the weaker suffer what they should”, resonates painfully in this context.

As the US presidential election approaches, Israel has accelerated its military campaign. It has successfully attacked targets in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iran. Hezbollah’s communication system has been dismantled, and a costly ground offensive to establish a buffer along the Lebanese border has commenced. With Hamas and Hezbollah paralyzed, and Iran lacking a formidable air force or missile defense system to defend itself against a likely Israeli attack targeting its leadership, industrial complexes, and petrochemical sites, the only option for Iran, in the event of an Israeli counterattack, would be further escalation. Considering the high cost of escalation for Iran in such a scenario, Israel’s position in the region appears stronger than ever.

Also read: The Effectiveness Of Israel’s Sabotage Operations

Beyond technological superiority, the lack of military and economic support, in contrast to the aid Israel receives from the West, Iran’s isolation also played an important role in its weak response. No Arab state has supported Iran, and the Houthis lack the strength to fight meaningfully, aside from disrupting maritime routes in the Red Sea. Without strong allies, direct ground access to Israel, or a formidable air force, Iran’s status as a regional heavyweight now looks hollow.

At the same time, Iran’s ideological role as the leader of resistance against Israel is under dark clouds. Although the recent strikes on Israel may send a strong signal to Iranian allies and sympathizers, the loss of influence on the ground will not be easily regained. If these strikes had occurred immediately after Haniyeh’s assassination and before Hezbollah’s setbacks, the outcome might have been significantly different.

Through a combination of superior military strategy, technological dominance, and Western backing, Israel has so far dictated the terms of the conflict. Iran and its regional partners, despite their rhetoric, have been relegated to the weaker side, suffering the consequences of inaction. Israel’s tactical victory has shifted the balance of power in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. As the dust settles, Israel will likely consolidate its position, while Iran struggles to regain its fragmented influence. Meanwhile, resistance to Israel’s illegal and inhumane actions will continue at a lower-intensity by smaller regional groups.

Iran-Israel Conflict: Nuclear Standoff and Energy Rivalry

By
Mohammad Taha Ali
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Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT:

The Israeli government recently held a meeting to discuss the possibility of launching an attack on Iran. While no decision has been made, officials clarified that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has the authority to order an attack at any time, with the cabinet notified by phone. However, the outcome of the conflict won’t be determined by which side inflicts more destruction, but by who can endure a prolonged war.

When comparing the two countries, Iran holds significant advantages in both population and geography. Iran’s population is nearly 100 times that of Israel, and its landmass is 75 times larger. Iran faces no existential threats from its neighbors, while Israel is surrounded by nations that either harbor hostility or remain quiet, thanks in part to billions of dollars in American support. In this context, Israel has initiated a war of attrition against Iran.

Iran’s resilience was demonstrated during its eight-year war with Iraq, which started shortly after the 1979 revolution. Despite being under-resourced and isolated, Iran managed to prevent Iraq from achieving its objectives. Iraq, backed by both Arab states and the West, was unable to reclaim its claimed territories. Though the war ended in a stalemate, it showed that Iran could endure a prolonged conflict, even with limited resources.

For Israel to achieve complete victory, it would need to target five critical Iranian sites to prevent the country from becoming a nuclear power in the future. Such a strategy could potentially lead to another revolution in Iran, opening the door for Western powers to install a regime more aligned with their interests.

ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC TARGETS AND IRANIAN DEFENSES:

The first critical target for Israel would be Iran’s nuclear facility in Fordow, the most advanced nuclear site in the country. The facility, located outside Qom, is constructed 300 feet beneath solid mountains, making it difficult to destroy. Israel’s current arsenal, including 5,000-pound American bunker-buster bombs, is insufficient to penetrate such depths. To neutralize Fordow, Israel would need the US military’s GBU-57, a deep-penetration guided bomb. However, the US has not transferred this weapon to any country, including Israel. Tel Aviv hopes a future administration under former president Donald Trump might be more willing to provide the necessary assistance.

The second critical site is the Natanz enrichment plant, Iran’s vast uranium enrichment facility. Destroying Natanz would set Iran’s nuclear program back significantly. Other key targets include the Nuclear Technology Center in Isfahan, the Arak heavy water reactor, and the Parchin military complex. While these sites are not as deeply buried as Fordow, they are heavily defended. Iran’s air defense systems include Russia’s S-300, the domestically developed Bavar-373, and the mobile Raad system, all of which provide a reasonably effective defense network. Behind these defenses, Iran retains a strong counter-attack capability, further complicating any potential Israeli strike.

ISRAEL’S VULNERABILITIES AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS:

Israel has two main options for neutralizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions: cyberattacks or conventional military strikes, with the latter likely requiring U.S. assistance. However, Iran has identified four potential Israeli targets for retaliation. Israel’s biggest vulnerability lies in its reliance on natural gas, which powers 70% of its electricity. Gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields in the Mediterranean Sea is crucial for the country’s energy needs. These fields, protected by Israeli and American naval forces, would be prime targets for Iran.

Other potential Iranian targets include Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, a critical hub for Israel’s aviation industry; Israel’s gas export infrastructure in Haifa, which supports exports to Jordan and Egypt; and Israel’s nuclear and military facilities in the Negev Desert, which hold strategic significance.

IRAN’S STRATEGIC PATIENCE VS. ISRAEL’S TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY: 

The enduring factor in this conflict is the ability to sustain a long-term war. Iran has a slight edge over Israel due to its larger population and size. However, Israel’s technological superiority and espionage capabilities far surpass Iran’s. If Iran engages in a protracted conflict, even launching a few missiles daily, it could disrupt Israeli life significantly. The cost to Israel, both financially and psychologically, would be immense.

Meanwhile, the leadership in both Iran and Israel show no signs of seeking peace. The Arab nations, while seeking to prevent an escalation, understand that without resolving the Palestinian issue, they cannot normalize relations with Israel or prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.

Two factors have delayed an Israeli attack on Iran: first, the Arab countries have pressured the US to prevent an Israeli strike that could threaten regional stability and their own economic security. Second, logistical challenges such as refueling aircraft have complicated Israel’s ability to strike Iranian targets. Israel has sought permission from Azerbaijan to use its airbases for refueling, but Azerbaijan has refused.

The region appears to be edging closer to conflict, with global economic consequences looming. If war breaks out, disruptions in oil supplies could destabilize international markets, reshaping geopolitical alliances and impacting the global economy for years to come.

Conflict Escalation and Risk Reduction between Nuclear Rivals

By
Dr. Zafar Khan
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Nuclear Weapons

The contemporary world with nine states having nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems is becoming more dangerous than the Cold War period between the US and the Soviet Union. There is a consistent drive for both conventional and nuclear force modernization including that of the acquisition of emerging technologies – speed, remote sensing, quantum computing, precision guided munitions, lethal autonomous weapons and many more – by the leading powers.

The Ukraine-Russia war, the power struggle between the US and China in the South and the East China Seas, the 2017 Chinese and Indian conflict in Doklam, the Balakot incident between India and Pakistan in 2019, the misfiring of India’s BrahMos missile in Pakistan in March 2022, and the increasing escalatory tension in the Middle East due to Israel-Gaza war dragging Iran and the US into conflict are some of dangerous episodes that is risking the conflict escalation from military to a nuclear level.

Many countries without nuclear weapons are worried about their security and ultimate survival. Some of them even question the US security guarantees both in Europe and the East Asian region.

The world continues to be in flux. Many countries without nuclear weapons are worried about their security and ultimate survival. Some of them even question the US security guarantees both in Europe and the East Asian region. Will any state sacrifice its capital by guaranteeing the security of others’ capitals?

Just as the US and the Soviet Union came very close to use nuclear weapons against each other during the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, the risk of conflict escalation both during the peace and crisis time is potentially increasing by miscalculation, temptation for preemptive strikes, power struggle, and escalation dominance between the rivals. Therefore, the strategic environment of the contemporary world is becoming more complex, nasty and brutish.

From Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and Robert Jervis to the more contemporary scholars, all agree with the central argument on conflict escalation that any serious conflict between the potential rivals can escalate from the lower to the higher rung of the ladder. To put it more seriously, the Herman Kahn 44 rungs of the ladder can even quickly be bypassed into just a few rungs before the miscalculation for nuclear use between the rivals.

Although there are lots of incidents that occurred between the nuclear rivals during the peace time, it is important to mention a few of these that could have created potential risk of escalation from military to nuclear level. 1) the Goldsboro incident, North Carolina of 1961 when the US bomber B-52 carrying two hydrogen bombs crashed, 2) The NORAND incident of 1979 creating a technical glitch in one of the computers, sending off false alarms to the US Strategic Air Command as if the Soviet Union had launched SLBM nuclear strikes, and 3) the North Dakota incident in 2007 where the US accidently mounted six nuclear weapons on the strategic bomber B-52 that flew for 36 in the air. An American professor on nuclear studies, Scott D Sagan, argues that “no system to prevent accidents is perfect; incidents of some sort are bound to happen”.

Conflict escalation to a dangerous level may occur when there is a little strategic communication. Rivals do not talk to each other. They tend to increase and modernize their deterrent forces. They get involved in proxies to contain each other. They often come up with nuclear saber rattling. Hotlines are disregarded. Leaders of rival states do not often interact with each other despite the call for invitation. Military and nuclear exercises are carried out without informing the adversary, creating scenarios for mistrust and miscalculation. They become irrational actors while demonstrating the absence of strategic patience and restraint. Today, one may closely observe these ingredients in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East region. South Asia is no exception to this.

Conflict escalation to a dangerous level may occur when there is a little strategic communication.

Unlike other nuclear flash points, South Asia may become more dangerous for a conflict escalation. As mentioned, the South Asian region has already experienced many wars, border skirmishes and more recently the Balakot incident and the misfiring of India’s BrahMos missile into Pakistan.

It is India that has been disregarding the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between the two states, ignoring the hotline mechanism in the event of crisis, developing a temptation for preemptive strikes, misfiring missiles for testing the resolve of Pakistan, modernizing and increasing its conventional and nuclear forces, considering shifts in is military and nuclear doctrinal postures, and potentially dragging Pakistan into a dangerous arms race that Pakistan may not desire.

There is no sign that India will put restraint on its deterrence force modernization. It keeps its own regional aspirations. Following up the Kautilyan aspirations, New Delhi calls the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean. Recently, it has rejected the Japanese call for NATO type security guarantee in Asia. New Delhi follows an Act East policy. Interestingly, it has an increasing strategic partnership with the US, but at the same time it acquires S-400 and develops hypersonic BrahMos with Russia. India also buys Rafale aircrafts from France.

More interestingly, on the one hand, India retains strategic partnership with Israel by acquiring new technologies especially developing its ballistic missile defense system, but at the same time it holds geopolitical relations with the Iranians. Yet, it continues to hold better relations with the perceived rivals of Iran in the Middle Eastern region.

Following up the Kautilyan aspirations, New Delhi calls the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean.

Such geopolitical and deterrent force development favoring India creates a security dilemma thereby decreasing the security of Pakistan. Pakistan in turn will have two options: One, it may go for parity, which may become expensive that Pakistan cannot. Two, to retain strategic balance to potentially deter its adversary that Pakistan must.

In the absence of strategic balance in South Asia, the risk of escalation between Pakistan and India increases. That being noted, strategic balance contributes to the broader strategic stability in South Asia, which in turn reduces the risk of escalation. In addition to retaining strategic balance, there can be a number of CBMs and nuclear CBMs between India and Pakistan to reduce the risk of escalation.

However, the good news is that nuclear deterrence is in place in South Asia despite the dangers of escalation. Both sides have not fought direct wars since the arrival of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan and India exchange the list of nuclear installations and facilities on the first January of every year since the ratification of this agreement in 1991. This agreement says that the South Asian rivals would not attack each other’s nuclear facilities.

Both the rivals have been practicing nuclear moratorium. However, if India tests again, Pakistan may have an option to follow suit.  Since 2005, both sides had an agreement that they would notify each other in advance before carrying out missile tests. Unfortunately, India did not immediately notify after misfiring its missile in March 2022. India rejected Pakistan’s proposal in the early 1970s for creating the South Asian Nuclear Free Zone. Also, it declined the creation of the strategic restraint regime Pakistan proposed in 1998.

The contemporary challenges to nuclear deterrence for all nuclear-weapon states – safety and security of nuclear-related materials, terrorism, the threat of the use of chemical/biological weapons, cyber, and sophisticated emerging technologies – may undermine the very essence of nuclear deterrence if not totally make nuclear weapons irrelevant in terms of war prevention dynamics.

Managing and/or preventing these challenges may require different types of counter strategies without potentially risking entangled escalation. Along with the principles of nuclear deterrence, each of these emerging challenges may require specific countermeasures. In other words, rather than relying merely on the Cold War type strategies, nuclear-weapon states need to confront the contemporary challenges by exercising a different combination of deterrence strategies without getting into a “commitment trap” as part of broader nuclear responsibility.

In the absence of strategic balance in South Asia, the risk of escalation between Pakistan and India rivals increases.

Besides, there is an urgent need for non-traditional imperatives as well such as the development of a crisis management/ crisis prevention institute in South Asia that may contribute towards crisis prevention and crisis management between the South Asian nuclear rivals when it comes to the notion of nuclear responsibility. Such imperatives may include several measures to prevent developing war-fighting strategies, reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, practicing a nuclear moratorium, a mechanism for preventing accidental nuclear war, restricting to the essentials of credible minimum deterrence, and improved means of communication for risk reduction.

The two South Asian rivals should continue to have hotlines, such hotlines may be extended to other layers of leadership as well, ensuring the practice of nuclear CBMs, effective utilization of the third-party role between the acute nuclear rivals, and measures for retaining nuclear balance rather than parity (nuclear superiority).

Of course, the proposed institute may also include the discussion for creating strategic restraint regime, efforts for peaceful uses of nuclear technology, participation in the international discussion on non-proliferation, de-mating nuclear warheads from delivery systems, and undertaking stringent safety and security mechanisms.

More importantly, South Asian security leadership needs to provide advance notice before carrying out nuclear and missile tests, and immediately report any accidental firing of a missile towards each other to prevent retaliatory nuclear strikes. Most if not all these measures can be applicable and doable between the South Asian nuclear rivals to prevent the possibility of accidental war and promote strategic stability.

Iranian Diplomacy: It’s Quiet And Effective

By
Muhammad Hussain Baqeri
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Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi

At its core, diplomacy is the art of bargaining between statesmen and other international actors. This process takes place within the framework of national interests – the driving force behind all diplomatic actions. It’s important to remember that these negotiations occur in an anarchic international environment, where the effectiveness of diplomacy is often tied to the ‘solid construction of internal power’.

During the war, a country’s military and deterrence power is the most critical aspect of building domestic power. And the greater the military power, the greater the possibility of diplomatic bargaining. According to Iranian literature, the stronger the battlefield capabilities, the more effective diplomacy.

The regional diplomacy of the Iranian foreign minister has so far succeeded in removing the shadow of a large-scale regional war from Iran’s head and keeping Israel in the swamp of Gaza and Lebanon.

The practice of diplomacy before, during, and after a crisis is a complex and nuanced process. Each phase has its own distinct rules and requirements. Before the crisis, diplomacy is primarily about deterrence. During the crisis, it shifts to scene management. And after the crisis, it transitions to bargaining. Understanding these phases is crucial for navigating the complexities of international relations.

By Klatzwitz’s theory that “successful negotiation takes place after the war”, the winning side enters into negotiations and bargaining (directly or indirectly) with the aim of political stabilization of the war and the losing side to maintain honor and prestige.

These days, Iran and Israel are on the verge of an uncontrollable direct war. In order to get out of the war of attrition with Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel is trying to make the dimensions of the war regional and international while bringing the United States  and Iran into an active conflict. Iran, however, wisely refuses a direct war and responds to Israel’s threats and assassinations within the framework of deterrence theory. The fundamental question is whether Iran’s deterrence has been effective or not, and by the way, Iran’s action has increased the greed of the Zionists to expand the war.

Also read: Israel’s Deterrence Theory Proves To Be A Failure

The answer to this question will be determined when Israel’s response to the True Promise II operation is carried out.

If Israel’s reaction is merely a showoff, Iran’s deterrence has been effective, and if their response is a large-scale military operation, the deterrence isn’t effective.

What makes deterrence effective is the combined power of battlefield and diplomacy. Battlefields involve military action, and diplomacy conveys the message of action clearly and directly.

Also read: Netanyahu Is Dragging Everyone Into War

Tehran’s activation of diplomacy after the True Promise II operation is aimed at clearly conveying Iran’s message to the United States, Israel and their regional partners. This message probably contained punishment and incentive packages.

From the signs and evidence on the scene, it appears that the Zionists, currently, do not have the will to respond to war, and their response will be a showoff.

If Israel’s response is just symbolic, the battlefield and diplomacy have both won in Iran. Diplomacy has succeeded in turning Iran’s deterrent power in the political arena into a great political victory. Currently, evidence shows that Iran is on the verge of this victory.

Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi’s regional diplomacy is unpretentious and practical. He has succeeded in conveying Iran’s message clearly and transparently to the influential actors in the region to prevent the occurrence of an endless pandemic war.

Diplomacy sometimes has a positive aspect: objective results appear in perspective. However, sometimes it has a divestment side, the results of which are not evident on the surface but actually defuse the crisis.

The regional diplomacy of the Iranian foreign minister has so far succeeded in removing the shadow of a large-scale regional war from Iran’s head and keeping Israel in the swamp of Gaza and Lebanon.

Pakistan and India Engage In A Rare Conversation at SCO Summit

By
Arshad Mehmood
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India External Affairs Minister

ISLAMABAD – In a significant yet discreet diplomatic engagement, Pakistan and India held an extraordinary meeting during the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, a rare interaction amidst the long-standing tensions between the two neighboring nuclear powers.

Reliable sources confirmed, “This interaction, initiated by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, saw Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar having conversation during a luncheon session at the summit.”

Also read: SCO Summit: It’s Time For Indo-Pak Stalled Dialogue To Resume

The dialogue took place against a backdrop of strained ties, with both countries harboring deep-rooted grievances over a range of issues, including the Kashmir dispute, and accusations of supporting cross-border militancy.

The meeting, though not officially pre-scheduled, garnered attention due to its potential implications for the frosty ties between the two countries.

The two South Asian nations have experienced limited diplomatic contact in recent years, with a notable cooling of relations-following India’s revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in August 2019.

According to diplomatic sources, the brief meeting between Dar and Jaishankar was arranged following a request from the Indian side. As a result, Pakistan’s Foreign Office adjusted the seating arrangements to enable the interaction during the SCO summit’s luncheon event. The meeting, though not officially pre-scheduled, garnered attention due to its potential implications for the frosty ties between the two countries.

Sources close to the event revealed that Dar and Jaishankar engaged in a conversation, but the contents of their discussion remain undisclosed. A lack of transparency surrounding the dialogue has fueled speculations in political circles and media about what was discussed, and whether it could mark a shift, however small, in the diplomatic dynamics between Islamabad and New Delhi.

Also read: Unravelling Globalization: Put Your House In Order. Don’t Put All Eggs In One Basket

In this scenario, some analysts view the engagement as a possible opening for dialogue between the two countries, particularly given the recent geopolitical shifts in the region.

The Indian external affairs minister’s request for the meeting could indicate a willingness from New Delhi to explore diplomatic avenues, despite the persistent hostilities.

After attending the SCO summit, Jaishankar returned to India without issuing any statement about his interaction with Dar, leaving many questions unanswered.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office has also refrained from sharing details.

The interaction comes amid a turbulent period in Pakistan-India relations. Since the 2019 Pulwama attack, followed by India’s airstrikes in Balakot, the two countries have maintained a hardline stance against each other. The abrogation of Article 370 by India, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status, further deepened the diplomatic rift, leading to a suspension of trade and downgrading of diplomatic ties.

Diplomatic engagements, such as the one that took place during the SCO summit, are rare and often viewed with cautious optimism by observers.

The SCO summit itself served as a platform for discussions on regional security, economic cooperation, and connectivity. While the summit’s formal agenda did not include a focus on bilateral disputes, the presence of top leaders from Pakistan, India, and other member countries created an environment conducive to informal discussions on the sidelines.

For Pakistan, the summit was an opportunity to demonstrate its active role in regional diplomacy, particularly in promoting connectivity and economic integration. For India, the event provided a chance to engage with its neighbors, including Pakistan, on broader regional issues, even as their bilateral relations remain fraught with challenges.

Despite the diplomatic overture, significant hurdles remain in normalizing the relations between Pakistan and India.

The meeting between Dar and Jaishankar, though brief, is seen as significant in the context of the SCO’s broader goals of promoting dialogue and cooperation among member states. It highlighted the complexities of the regional order, where geopolitical rivalries often intersect with opportunities for collaboration on shared challenges like counter-terrorism and economic growth.

Despite the diplomatic overture, significant hurdles remain in normalizing the relations between Pakistan and India. The core issue of Kashmir remains a major sticking point, with both sides maintaining divergent positions.

Pakistan continues to call for dialogue on the Kashmir issue and insists on adherence to UN resolutions, while India maintains that Jammu and Kashmir is an internal matter and has ruled out talks under what it describes as “cross-border terrorism.”

Furthermore, domestic political dynamics in both Pakistan and India heavily influence their respective foreign policies, with leaders often using nationalist rhetoric to appeal to their domestic audiences.

Also read: Pakistan’s Zero-Sum Strategic Dilemma

This approach tends to prioritize short-term political gains over long-term regional stability. The emphasis on national pride and sovereignty in political discourse in both Islamabad and New Delhi can create an atmosphere where compromise is seen as a weakness, rather than a diplomatic strength.

As a result, the space for genuine dialogue and meaningful engagement between the two nations is significantly constrained, making it difficult to address longstanding issues and build a path toward sustained cooperation.

Experts remain divided on the significance of the meeting between the two foreign ministers. Some believe that the engagement could pave the way for further diplomatic contacts, particularly if regional security dynamics necessitate cooperation. Others, however, view the interaction as a mere diplomatic gesture with limited potential for altering the current trajectory of bilateral ties.

While the immediate outcomes of the SCO summit are unlikely to transform Pakistan-India relations, the meeting between Dar and Jaishankar suggests a recognition of the need for dialogue, even in challenging times. Whether this interaction leads to a broader thaw in relations remains uncertain, but it underscores the ongoing significance of diplomatic engagement in South Asia’s complex geopolitical landscape.

As the SCO summit concluded and the participants departed, the region — and the world — will be watching closely to see if this brief encounter can eventually lead to a more sustained dialogue between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

Imran Khan: The Most Ineligible Graduate Disqualified By Oxford

By
Arsalan Raja
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Imran Khan

The Oxford University is exposed, says a dejected supporter of Imran Khan, after hearing that her leader was not on the list containing 38 names running for the office of varsity chancellor. She goes on to say that the top British educational institution has shown that it is being controlled.

Her assertion is a fact for many others like her who see Imran Khan as a messiah who can’t do any wrong, can undo every “wrong” and can do anything like a magic. His authority isn’t limited by any law or constitution since he is the law and constitution. For them, Imran Khan himself is a miracle – someone born to change everything around him and having the powers that should be used to wipe out all the evil to replace the same with the good.

She also reminds me of a Lahore-based journalist who has somehow shifted to the US. He had said after the 2013 elections that Imran Khan should ensure investment of billions of dollars by the West in the health and education sectors of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Also read: Imagining Oxford in Chaos: The Populist Chancellor

His assertion shows a belief that the entire West is somehow mesmerized by the incarcerated PTI founding chairman’s playboy life. This insult to the developed West in particular and the entire humanity in general is enough to summarize the sordid worldview of PTI followers.

Although former chief justice Saqib Nisar had bestowed on Imran Khan the titles of Sadiq and Amin [Honest and Truthful], the Brits refused to acknowledge the same.

Hence came an attempt to make Imran Khan a global agenda and fit him into the British landscape where his former in-laws could rescue him from his current troubles which are likely to be worsened.

GOOD VS EVIL:

It is the binary of good and evil that bonds them together under the leadership of Imran Khan. Obviously, Imran Khan is the good because he is destined to cleanse Pakistan and at least the Muslim Ummah of all the corrupt elements.

Why this binary? Because Imran Khan, like any other fascist, survives on myths that are inculcated in the minds of his followers. It is the sole basis of their worldview and discourse.

The most urgent need, according to this cult, is to wipe out everyone disagreeing or opposing Imran Khan. And the reasoning behind the desire is that the good must prevail.

And since Imran Khan represents the good, everyone has united against him so that the evil can maintain their stranglehold. The Oxford University is surely the latest addition to the list.

SAQIB NISAR AND HIRED LOBBYISTS ARE OF NO USE:

But why Imran Khan failed at the very first hurdle? His criminal record.

Earlier on Tuesday, Hugh Southey, a King’s Counsel, said, “In my opinion, Imran [Khan] is unlikely to be eligible to be a candidate in light of one of his criminal convictions.”

Was his opinion necessary? Yes. Imran Khan Khan’s candidacy was examined under the Oxford University’s rules and regulations.

It makes me recall the “Project Imran” and the role played by Pakistan’s top court.

Although former chief justice Saqib Nisar had bestowed on Imran Khan the titles of Sadiq and Amin [Honest and Truthful], the Brits refused to acknowledge the same.

It also shows that the recent favorable reporting in the British press also couldn’t influence the varsity. Perhaps only because they don’t want an Imran Khan for themselves. Yes, any Third World country like Pakistan can, and even must in some cases, have one.

One shouldn’t forget what Margaret Thatcher had said while addressing a gathering of Afghan refugees on Oct 8, 1981 during her visit to Pakistan.

“You left your country because you refused to live under a godless communist system which is trying to destroy your religion and your independence. The hearts of the free world are with you — and with those of your countrymen who have stayed behind in Afghanistan.”

One of the best examples of using religion for politics and that too by a leader from the developed West in the lands far away from her home.

Certainly, maintaining culture and social norms in the parts of the world that must be ruled directly or in directly is a top priority for the powerful West. They easily get local allies who benefit from the status quo.

Meanwhile, the failure on the Oxford front follows the opinion repeatedly expressed in influential Israeli press which mentioned Imran Khan as a possible ally.

THE RELIGIOUS OBSCURANTIST:

Kapil Komireddi, in an article published in the top conservative British daily The Telegraph, described Imran Khan as a religious obscurantist, as he argued that the PTI founder is unfit to be the Oxford University chancellor.

“Those who remember Khan as a cricketer or the dim-witted tabloid fodder in 1980s have missed his mutation over the past two decades into a religious obscurantist.”

Komireddi described Imran Khan’s candidacy as “a measure of his contempt for Oxford and the world – intellectual, political, cultural – that created it”.

“His invocation of freighted catchwords like diversity and inclusivity to burnish his pitch is a reminder that this genre of charlatanry has a long and wretched pedigree.”

On the other hand, the Beltway and Grid, an advocacy group, earlier said Imran “Khan’s election would also raise serious ethical concerns for Oxford, particularly regarding his alignment with the university’s values of academic freedom, gender equality, and human rights.”

Everyone knows he is Taliban Khan who not only promotes extremist views but also supports terrorist groups.

DESPERATE FOR JAILBREAK:

Imran Khan has been languishing in Rawalpindi’s Adiala jail and is desperate to get out of it. It’s not just the corruption charges but also the planning and execution of May 9 attacks that make him vulnerable to conviction in the related cases.

At the same time, the court martial proceedings against Lt-Gen (retd) Faiz Hameed – the former ISI chief – mean a link is being established between the two, which can lead to Imran Khan’s military court trial.

Therefore, an organized effort has been visible through the repeated use of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government resources to storm Islamabad and Punjab. These attempts, which didn’t produce the desired results, were aimed at putting pressure on the government and the establishment to get the incarcerated PTI founder out of the prison.

It is very much clear that the Oxford University candidacy was also part of a wider scheme to make the imprisonment of Imran Khan an international issue and garner sympathy. But the plot has backfired, as his views on critical social and political issues as well as actions are now subjected to scrutiny in world press.

Moreover, it is the PTI leadership which now stands divided, as they seem busy in “who is the most loyal servant” contest while also making efforts to protect themselves from any government action and legal consequences.

But the most interesting, or even entertaining part for some, is the way the very cult produced to demonize and attack others is going after the PTI leadership. Why? The failure to get their beloved leader released from the prison. The available PTI leaders are traitors for them.

NOTHING IS WORKING:

Neither the past judgments issued by Pakistan’s top courts nor the organized campaign to target the state institutions while inciting violence launched with the elements sitting outside the country has served the purpose. That’s why all eyes are on Oct 25 so that Chief Justice Faez Isa leaves the office and the top judiciary can be used in a manner similar to the 2016-21 period.

But a determined Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and Shehbaz Sharif-led coalition government have come up with another plot which will make the already filed petitions – as well as those which may come up later – useless. The planned Federal Constitutional Court through the proposed 26th Amendment is certainly against their will and plans.

So, the current sole focus is to make the proposed constitutional changes controversial through a media campaign led by the “YouTuber Corps” and the chosen lawyers.

However, what Pakistan and over 240 million people really need is the accountability of those orchestrating the May 9 botched coup. Otherwise, mobs and terrorist will keep challenging the state at their will.

Will Afghanistan Eliminate Terrorist Groups Within The Country?

By
Dr. Zukun Lyu
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0
Afghanistan

The Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan has recently released a joint statement that has categorically demanded the de facto authorities in Afghanistan to take immediate and verifiable actions with a view toward meeting existing obligations under international law.

And as part of the said responsibilities, it has called upon Afghanistan to eliminate terrorist groups within the country. The consulted states, including several regional players, stressed the need for the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) to avoid any use of Afghan territory for terrorist activities against neighboring countries and other states of the region.

This call for action is not just a suggestion, it is a necessity which Afghan government needs to pay attention to in order to find ways how to better stabilize internal situation and improve it foreign policy internationally.

These countries have kept reasonable politico-security relations with the Taliban, though, their patience is wearing thin due to heightened security threats.

This joint statement is somewhat new phase of the international discussion on the status of Afghanistan. It has a representative support of Russia, Iran, China, and Central Asian States, which have become the direct victims of evolving terror threats emanating from Afghanistan. These countries have kept reasonable politico-security relations with the Taliban, though, their patience is wearing thin due to heightened security threats. Yet, these nations are not shy in demanding that the AIG must take practical actions to dismantle the networks of terrorists at home.

Such advices given by the Moscow Format to the AIG makes a lot of valid timing sense. The AIG, under the custody of the Taliban, has to understand that their failure to adhere to these consultations mean deeper isolation of Afghanistan from the global community.

Afghanistan is reeling through tough economic and social crisis and the lack of attention to demands of the regional powers might shut the doors to cooperation in terms of economic development, diplomacy and assistance. For the Taliban to grasp, the current state of affairs whereby terrorist organizations can have a foothold in Afghanistan is not just security perilous for the entire adjoining region but is inimical to Afghanistan’s growth as well.

Among the issues that currently exist in Afghanistan, there is a problem of appearance of different terrorist groups which include ISIS-K in particular; this group has already done several catastrophic attacks not only in Afghanistan but also in other countries.

The Taliban though have control over most of the country, they are unable to rein in these groups primarily. Other international players, especially Russia, Iran and China see these actors as posing a direct security threat to the region’s stability. For example, the situation in Afghanistan is already causing repercussions in Central Asia: governments of the region are more and more concerned with the infiltration of militants across the borders.

Other international players, especially Russia, Iran and China see these actors as posing a direct security threat to the region’s stability.

At the same time, the Taliban must also respond to its internal problems related to policy, governance, and human rights issues with individual freedoms of the Afghan people and the rights of women and girls, especially the right to education. Taliban that came to power since then have actively restricted women’s rights and freedoms, closed schools to women and limited the activity of women in other spheres under the pretext of religion. These actions have received aggressiveness from other countries and the international world, including Muslim dominated countries asserting to the Taliban, to embrace progressive policies.

In the best interest of the nation of Afghanistan, the AIG needs to ensure that terrorist organizations push their agenda further and make the country a terror central again. The memory of Afghanistan used as a base for the September 11 terrorist attacks has not yet faded from the international political memory.

The international community, especially other world regions, does not want Afghanistan to return to a situation where terrorist groups can act without restraint. The AIG needs to go on the offense and ensure these groups are suppressed; this is to show the world and its willingness to foster peace and security to its people as well as to neighboring states.

Similar to many other countries around, Pakistan, as one of the important actors in the region and an old friend of Afghanistan, has called on the AIG to respect the international practices and aim at achieving the necessary peace and cooperation in the South Asian region. Therefore, stability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan best interest since insecurity and terrorism in Afghanistan always affects the Pakistani territory.

Also read: TTP: An Emerging Global Terror Threat

Islamabad wants the AIG to follow international laws and norms because the stability of Afghanistan is crucial in the region. Therefore, Afghanistan has the honor and duty to respect all its obligations and cooperate with other countries so that the foundation for increased diplomatic activity and economic improvement that is essential for the country’s stability can be laid.

The declaration was made after consultation with regional powers and it is clear for the Afghanistan government that the world is waiting for action to eradicate terrorism.

The AIG should also ensure its behaviors respect its international obligations. Afghanistan cannot afford to be a producer of insecurity and conflict because it will hurt the neighbors and will slow down the development process in Afghanistan as well. The country is still dealing with the effects of a long period of civil war and with such prevailing insecurity the country will definitely be worse off. For this reason, Afghanistan’s leaders must understand the role of investment in the support of peace Rather than contributing to insecurity that poses a great threat to not only relations but also economic advancement.

Summing up, one can define the enhancement of the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan as a defining process for the AIG. The declaration was made after consultation with regional powers and it is clear for the Afghanistan government that the world is waiting for action to eradicate terrorism.

This government led by the Taliban has to seize this opportunity to show to the regional and international community that Afghanistan is safe for investment and its resources can complement that of the region. Otherwise, the nation can face a further isolation, economic difficulties, and conscious instability.

Meanwhile, it may be possible to get the international recognition and help, including genuine economic and political support in the light of concerted attempts at internal reactive as well as proactive governance and security. The decision is now on Afghan’s authority, and the effects of their decisions will determine the fate of Afghanistan and the neighborhood in the coming years.

Pakistan’s Zero-Sum Strategic Dilemma

By
Engineer Khurram Dastgir Khan
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0
Presidents of China and the US

Hosting the SCO summit highlights a strategic dilemma that Pakistan’s fragility is forcing it to face earlier than most, just as it did in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The dilemma is whether Pakistan can avoid the zero-sum game between a superpower and a rising power in grips of Thucydides’ trap.

Many strategic traps await Pakistan where it might be forced to choose between urgent needs and long-term imperatives. To list a few: Ukraine, Israel-Iran war, wider US sanctions on Chinese technology amid ongoing US-China trade war, Taiwan and the South-China Sea, and an India-China war in Ladakh.

Thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, geopolitics has returned with a vengeance.

As the first quarter of the 21st draws to a close, the international milieu is Antonio Gramsci’s observation writ large: “The old world is dying and the new world struggles to be born.” The post-World War II arrangement is no more. Thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, geopolitics has returned with a vengeance.

What one never foresaw happening in one’s lifetime has come to pass: the decline of the United States as a harbinger of modernity, champion of human rights, and simultaneously the possessor of the greatest hard as well as soft power. No more. The United States is exhausted by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, weakened economically by slow growth, challenged technologically, and emasculated diplomatically by poor leadership.

The United States is not in the driving seat in the Middle East and is being edged out in Ukraine, the South China Sea, and in the arena of new technology.

Increasing US domestic production of oil and gas in the last decade has reduced its dependence on as well as its interest in the Middle East. The United States has been unable to impede, let alone stop, Israel’s genocide of nearly 42,000 Palestinian civilians, women and children in Gaza. A truth sits exposed amidst the rubble in Gaza: The United States is not in the driving seat in the Middle East and is being edged out in Ukraine, the South China Sea, and in the arena of new technology.

“Pax Americana is no more,” suggests former senior Chinese official He Yafei. The declining United States faces a China whose rise is fueled, some say, by the inexorable trends of globalization and technological change. “The dominant narrative in China,” writes Elizabeth Economy, “is that the shift in the balance of power is already well underway.”

Globalization and technological change are not the only fuels for rise of China. In its bid for global supremacy, China is wielding its own soft power. It has demonstrated for four decades that economic prosperity can be achieved without democracy and civil rights. This is a model that most elites of the developing world find attractive.

China’s rise is aided by 21st century developments. Social media is a wrecking ball for liberal democracy. The US-inflated scarecrow of terrorism has lost air. Russia’s ground invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — the first such action since the Second World War — has stirred ghosts of the two world wars in the 20th century.

Our long-term interests lie with a rising China, not with the declining United States. Yet the challenge is to avoid the zero-sum game of with us or against us.

Pakistan faces a Gramscian dilemma of its own. Ever since September 1953 — when Gen Ayub Khan offered the US Undersecretary of State that “our army can be your army if you want us”— the principal factor driving Pakistani statecraft has been the need for foreign aid to defend militarily against a hostile India and to prop up recurrent authoritarian regimes. This was as true for support against the Soviet Union in the 1960s as against Al Qaeda in the 2000s.

The foreign policy that emerged has been composed of four strands intertwined: a love-hate alliance with the US, a patron-client relationship with Gulf countries strengthened by a common alliance with the US, a limited friendship with China until 2015, and uneasy relations with Afghanistan and Iran.

The United States ended its latest engagement with Pakistan in 2013 and maintained the façade of an alliance until its departure from Afghanistan in 2021. Despite conferring “major non-NATO ally” status to Pakistan in 2004, the United States failed to provide any substantive, visible support to Pakistan beyond the transaction of Coalition Support Fund in return for two military bases, intelligence cooperation, and provision of ground (GLOC) and air lines of communication (ALOC) by Pakistan for two decades.

The decades-long Pak-China relationship, on the other hand, has been positive, consistent, yet limited until CPEC was signed nine years ago. CPEC deepened a strategic friendship into an economic partnership. Even after CPEC, however, Pakistan’s balance-of-payments crises have kept it tethered to West-based international financial institutions and thereby vulnerable to the influence of a near-hostile United States.

Pakistan thus faces a Gramscian dilemma of its own. It is caught between its historic alliance with the United States and immediate economic interests on one side and, on the other either side, its precipitating long-term strategic interests as the globe fractures along the China versus the West.

What does the government need to do? First of all, learn what not to do.

Pakistan requires complex and skillful statecraft to avoid this binary. Our long-term interests lie with a rising China, not with the declining United States. Yet the challenge is to avoid the zero-sum game of with us or against us. Read India’s playbook. Despite a plethora of defense, strategic, and economic agreements with the United States, designation of “net security provider” in the Indo-Pacific, and membership in the anti-China ‘Quad’, India maintains relations simultaneously with Israel as well as Iran, with Russia as well as the West, and a massive trade deficit with China.

What does the government need to do? First of all, learn what not to do. The list is long: avoid the temptation of megaphone diplomacy; not speak until absolutely necessary; not harangue diplomats; not appoint lackeys to positions demanding proficiency; and not abuse foreign policy as grist for the domestic political mill.

How to walk the non-zero-sum tightrope? Begin with reviewing and analyzing Pakistan’s interests ruthlessly by “fitting foundations to the ground on which they rest” as J L Gaddis recommends. This means deepening the strategic as well as economic relations with China and rebuilding bridges quietly with the US and Europe.

Revamp skillfully, patiently, and discretely our relationships with our benefactors and create relationships with future friends in Africa, South America, and East Asia. Create a dialectic between foreign relations and security. Make a sustained effort to open and connect the region economically. Reinvent the Foreign Office as a 21st organization that carries economic interests, democratic values, and instantaneous global communications as part of its DNA. Last but not the least, provide adequate resources to the diplomats to do their job.

This challenge requires a political and military leadership that can think and conduct statecraft in “time, space, and scale” simultaneously. It is time for Pakistan to raise its capabilities to its foreign policy aspirations, and wield statecraft to safeguard our democracy and bring prosperity to our impoverished people.

Imagining Oxford in Chaos: The Populist Chancellor

By
Dr Shama Junejo
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0
Imran Khan

Imagine a distinguished professor at Oxford University penning a critical piece on the university’s newly-appointed chancellor, Imran Khan, serving a jail sentence in Pakistan. Within hours, the professor is bombarded by online harassment – not from Britain’s academic peers but from Imran Khan’s fervent Pakistani supporters. A digital mob floods social media and university inboxes, outraged at the audacity to criticize their leader. ‘How dare he critique Khan!’ Thousands of emails attack the professor’s academic integrity and personal life.

Imran Khan has repeatedly aligned himself with regressive forces, most notably resettling the TTP from Afghanistan into Pakistan and declaring Osama bin Laden a martyr.

This scenario isn’t far-fetched. During his political career in Pakistan and now as he campaigns for Oxford’s chancellorship, Imran Khan’s supporters have demonstrated the power and peril of unchecked populism. Imran Khan, who is currently incarcerated on corrupt practice charges, has turned his political movement into a global cult, weaponizing social media to silence critics and push his narrative of victimhood. But when we look at the broader picture, one must ask: Can Oxford afford to invite this level of chaos and disruption into its academic environment?

Also read: Imran Khan, Extremism, Social Fragmentation And the Only Alternative

Imran Khan’s candidacy also raises significant concerns about the role of populism in global academia. He has overwhelmingly dominated social media discussions in this race for Oxford’s chancellorship, overshadowing other respected candidates like Sir William Hague, the former Conservative Party leader; Peter Mandelson, a Labour Party heavyweight and former European Commissioner; Elish Angiolini, a prominent Scottish legal figure; and Jan Royall, a senior Labour peer and former Leader of the House of Lords.

His campaign is not about qualifications or a vision for the university; it’s about leveraging populist support to drown out opposition. This is exactly how populist leaders gain control – by overwhelming the discourse, sidelining merit and expertise, and turning public institutions into political battlegrounds.

Imran Khan’s candidacy also raises significant concerns about the role of populism in global academia.

Can Oxford afford to become the next victim of such tactics?

Then there is his chequered past in academia. Imran Khan once served as Chancellor of the University of Bradford from 2005 until 2014, a controversial tenure. Despite holding the post, he regularly missed key university events, including graduation ceremonies. In February 2014, the University of Bradford Union proposed his removal due to his ongoing absences, prompting Imran Khan to announce his resignation, effective November 30, 2014, citing political obligations in Pakistan. However, the reality was far grimmer – his commitment to the role had long been questioned. How can Oxford expect him to fulfil his duties when past performance clearly shows disinterest?

Oxford, an institution of profound academic heritage, has nurtured some of the brightest minds and upheld values of integrity, independent thought, and reasoned debate. Imran Khan, on the other hand, represents the exact opposite. His candidacy is not a reflection of academic excellence but a testament to his populist ambition. And while his followers might see him as a hero, his legacy tells a different story. His populist appeal in Pakistan was built on incendiary rhetoric, divisive tactics, and the undermining of democratic institutions. The problem becomes even clearer when you examine his political history.

Imran Khan has repeatedly aligned himself with regressive forces, most notably resettling the TTP from Afghanistan into Pakistan and declaring Osama bin Laden a martyr in his National Assembly speech. His disturbing remarks in support of the Taliban – calling their oppressive governance a step towards “breaking the shackles of slavery” – speak volumes about his worldview. How can someone with such views be entrusted with leading an institution like Oxford, which stands for freedom of expression, gender equality, and intellectual liberty?

Furthermore, Imran Khan’s views on women’s rights are deeply troubling. He has openly suggested that women’s clothing is a factor in sexual harassment, a regressive stance that has no place in the leadership of an institution that has consistently advocated for women’s education and empowerment. Oxford has been a pioneer in championing gender equality, and electing someone like Imran Khan would send a chilling message about the university’s commitment to these values.

The real danger lies in how his populist movement operates. His supporters do not just support him; they aggressively campaign against anyone who dares criticize him.

Imran Khan’s current legal troubles also make him an unfit candidate for the role. He is in prison in Pakistan, convicted of corrupt practices and misuse of state funds in what has been termed the Toshakhana case, where he was found guilty of profiting from state gifts. His supporters might claim he is the victim of political vendettas, but the legal realities are far less kind. The man is embroiled in controversy and any university that associates itself with him risks being dragged into a political quagmire.

The real danger lies in how his populist movement operates. His supporters do not just support him; they aggressively campaign against anyone who dares criticize him. A recent example in Pakistan saw his followers not just protest but attack state institutions when he was arrested. It’s not hard to imagine the same tactics being applied to Oxford – an online army that descends on any academic or faculty member who questions their chancellor’s integrity. For an institution that thrives on intellectual discourse and debate, the chilling effect of such a phenomenon would be catastrophic.

Therefore, Imran Khan’s bid for Oxford University’s chancellorship is more than just a political stunt – it is a dangerous proposition for one of the world’s most respected academic institutions. His track record of supporting repressive regimes, promoting divisive rhetoric, and undermining democratic and academic institutions makes him unfit for the role. Oxford deserves a chancellor who embodies integrity, intellectual rigor, and a commitment to academic freedom. Imran Khan, with his populist cult following and troubling political history, offers none of these qualities. Instead, his election would only embroil Oxford in controversy, division, and chaos.

People Or Territories: The Question That Ukraine Is Facing

By
Professor Alexander Kostyuk
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0
Ukraine

The beginning of the Cold War, the 1950s, formed the basic rules of the geopolitical game. Any war that directly or indirectly involves countries that possess nuclear weapons must be ended in a timely manner, before a direct military clash between them. That is, the war ends not when the participants have achieved their goal, but when the war has reached the rubicon, which opens a war between nuclear-armed countries.

The Korean War of 1950-1953 is worth mentioning here. At the outbreak of the war, each side aimed for military victory and further unification of Korea under the rule of the South or the North, meaning expansion of the sphere of influence of either the West or the communist USSR and China. During the first year of the war, both sides reached a rubicon in terms of the intensity of conventional warfare, and it was either the use of nuclear weapons, but President Truman did not agree to this, or the search for a political settlement of the war. The political instrument of ending the war was chosen, and it eventually ended in July 1953.

The West wants to leave the issue of the occupied territories to the political process, diplomacy, and time.

At the same time, the war could have ended much earlier, in 1951, but it lasted almost two years because of Truman’s demand that North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war be allowed to choose whether they wanted to return home after the war or not. Eventually, after President Eisenhower took office and Stalin died on March 1, 1953, the US and the USSR quickly reached an understanding and by early spring 1953, the plan to end the war was finally ready, thus preventing an irreversible military escalation between the US and the USSR.

But then the President of South Korea Syngman Rhee stood in the way of ending the war, as he did not agree to end the war without achieving the previously defined goal of unifying Korea under the rule of the pro-Western South and withdrawing Chinese troops from North Korea. The South Korean population resorted to mass demonstrations in June 1953 to prolong the war in order to achieve this goal.

According to Gideon Rose, editor-in-chief of Foreign Affairs, in his book How Wars End, there were thoughts in the corridors of the White House to remove the South Korean president from power so that he would not interfere with peace. In the end, the United States rejected this idea and resorted to peace coercion, among other things, by offering a postwar security instrument to South Korea. Hence, the United States declared its readiness to leave its army in South Korea. Coercion worked, and in July 1953, a truce was established, which, except for occasional border escalations, continues to this day.

President Zelensky cannot rationally insist on continuing the war to restore the country’s territorial integrity.

The war in Ukraine is approaching its third anniversary, which means that it is approaching the Korean War in terms of timing. As early as 2023, the Biden administration began to state quite publicly that the war in Ukraine should not cross the same rubicon as a war between nuclear powers.

Perhaps for the first time, such a statement was made in early July 2023 by White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan when he sharply rejected the idea, voiced increasingly by some Washington strategists, that Biden is overplaying the Russian nuclear threat and deterring NATO from all-in support for Kyiv. The hawks, he said, argue: “This nuclear threat is complete nonsense. Don’t worry about it at all. It’s to be completely discounted.”

Also read: The Moral Imperative Of The Collective West And The Ukraine War

Sullivan rebuffed the no-worry approach: “It is a threat. It is a real threat. It’s one we need to take seriously. And it’s one that does evolve with changing conditions on the ground.”

This was followed by President Biden’s public statement in December 2023, in which the US leader said, “We want to see Ukraine win the war. Winning means Ukraine is a sovereign, independent nation. And it can afford to defend itself today and deter further aggression”. At the same time, Biden did not mention the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the 1991 borders by military means, and Western leaders have consistently stated that they do not recognize Russia’s occupied territories. In other words, the West wants to leave the issue of the occupied territories to the political process, diplomacy, and time.

It is Washington that should show leadership in the West and offer reliable security instruments to Ukraine.

This statement brings us back to the events of 1939-1944, the war between the USSR and Finland, which began with Soviet aggression in late 1939 and lasted intermittently until 1944. The commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, and later the country’s president, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, had a choice: either to continue the war for the sake of the country’s eastern territories or to end it. Continuation of the war could have resulted in the loss of state sovereignty and independence of the country, and the death of a large number of Finns. In this difficult dilemma, Mannerheim chose the lives of his fellow citizens, Finnish state sovereignty and independence. As a result, Finland and the USSR ended the war politically by negotiating and signing an armistice, and Mannerheim became a legendary hero for his military talent, political foresight, and love for the people of Finland.

Also read:  A Leader Without Strategy: Collapse of USSR And Ukraine War

The West does not see it appropriate to seek a military breakthrough by Ukraine in the war, making unequivocal statements about the need for a political settlement. Reason? The West believes that Ukraine, like Finland in 1944, has won by defending its sovereignty and independence. At the same time, the West is clearly trying to force Ukraine to peace, just as it did with South Korea in 1953.

Among the tools used by the West to force Ukraine to peace are the lack of permission for Ukraine to use long-range weapons from the West to strike at Russian territory, the unwillingness of Western countries to provide offensive weapons in the amount necessary for an effective counteroffensive (here it is worth mentioning General Zaluzhny’s analytical article in The Economist of December 2022), Germany’s position on the unwillingness to provide long-range Taurus missiles, and a sharp decrease in the total amount of military assistance to Ukraine starting in the second half of 2023.

The slow movement of Western arms manufacturers to establish joint ventures in Ukraine (a process that is probably politically driven), and the reduction in overall financial assistance to Ukraine, as a result of which Ukraine seeks to compensate for the loss of external revenues by increasing taxes from October 2024), are also these tools. And don’t forget September 30, 2023, when the US $32 billion lend-lease to Ukraine expired, and not a cent of it was allocated to Ukraine.

Can President Zelenskyy rationally insist on continuing the war to restore the country’s territorial integrity in the face of the West’s growing pressure on Ukraine to make peace?

To answer this question, it is worth clarifying under what conditions the restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders would mean the end of the war. This is possible only if tensions within Russia increase, leading to its collapse or a change of government to a democratic one. The West realizes that neither the first nor the second scenario is possible now and will not be possible for many years. It is here that the West, through Biden, emphasizes to the Ukrainian authorities that Ukraine has already won the victory by defending its sovereignty and independence, and it is time for the Ukrainian authorities to make a choice between keeping people in Ukraine and further attempts to return the 1991 territories by military means, realizing that this will still not be the end of the war.

There is an opportunity to reconsider all red lines in relations between the West and Russia, and even in a broader geopolitical context involving China and countries of the Global South,

Biden’s statement in the summer of 2024, that the war in Ukraine had reached its escalation rubicon and that if it was not stopped politically, World War III was a realistic development that the West could not accept. A similar statement was made by Biden’s political opponent, Republican presidential candidate Trump in October 2024 and even before. So, Washington’s political elites are answering the question above: No, President Zelensky cannot rationally insist on continuing the war to restore the country’s territorial integrity. Therefore, coercion of Ukraine to peace will continue to gain momentum until the goal is achieved and the war is over.

What can Zelensky rationally insist on in such a difficult situation?

The experience of South Korea will not work here – the US military will not be in Ukraine either during or after the war. Washington sees no political reason for this step, but it will create a huge pretext for Russia to escalate. It is probably worth remembering the experience of Germany in the 1950s and the dilemma of Chancellor Adenauer: Germany will be united or it will be in NATO.

For Zelenskyy, this dilemma is losing its clear structure and turning into a question to be outlined in the next paragraph. Furthermore, to become united again now within the 1991 borders requires agreement and much greater Western support for continuing the war and expecting Russia to collapse or change to a democratic government in the near future. This is unlikely, if not impossible. In other words, the first part of Chancellor Adenauer’s dilemma is not an option for President Zelensky.

This dilemma of Adenauer is being transformed into Zelensky’s question: Is the West ready to invite Ukraine to NATO or use other instruments to ensure Ukraine’s post-war security and put the country on the path to recovery?

This question has an obvious addressee: the West, namely the United States. It is Washington that should show leadership in the West and offer reliable security instruments to Ukraine. One of these instruments is Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Here, it is worth considering very carefully the options of extending an invitation to Ukraine within the territories under its control. In addition, the so-called East German model with a modification may be an option – extending an invitation to Ukraine within the territories under its control, without deploying NATO troops, but with NATO weapons and using Article 5 of the NATO Charter in relation to these territories under Ukraine’s control. And, of course, those Western countries that signed security agreements with Ukraine in 2023, and there are more than 20 such countries, must properly fulfill their obligations.

This would be the best solution for Russia as well, because, as Henry Kissinger noted in January 2023, Putin, by invading Ukraine in 2022, personally erased his own red line on Ukraine’s NATO membership, which he had announced to the US Ambassador to Russia, William Burns, in 2008. Right now, in the context of the world disorder, there is an opportunity to reconsider all red lines in relations between the West and Russia, and even in a broader geopolitical context involving China and countries of the Global South, and finally correct the geopolitical and security mistakes of the West in the 1990s regarding Ukraine, which should finally get rid of its buffer zone status. It is obviously that an exact moment for the strategic dialogue with all parties involved directly and indirectly has come. Only a world security rubicon is further.

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