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China – A Friend in Need for Afghans

By
Dr. Sameera Riaz
-
6

After the US lead NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and Taliban takeover; China emerged not only as one of many mediators in ending the decades of conflict in Afghanistan but started a diplomatic, political and economic engagement in Afghanistan that paves way for playing vital role in crisis management and peacebuilding in war torn Afghanistan. Beijing always emphasized that the peace process should be Afghan-led and Afghan owned with minimal outside agenda-setting. However, China has adopted facilitator role rather than a mediator role. Chinese approach in Afghanistan can be termed unique as it has friendly relations with all major stakeholder to the conflict and therefore enjoys status of honest broker. Since 2015, China hosted the stakeholders to facilitate the discussion. 

Chinese approach in Afghanistan mainly stems from three key national interest; security, strategy and economy. On security front, China doesn’t want Afghanistan to become a haven for terrorism, strengthening of Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or emergence of Daesh which is more likely case in present situation wherein the international world has distanced itself from Taliban govt due to their strict policies. Hence, leaving the war-torn Afghanistan aloof can be dangerous for Chinese homeland security and might become a challenge of territorial integrity in future. 

Strategically, Afghanistan is located within the Belt and Road Initiative that China is planning to connect countries from India to Iran. The ambitions of China to connect the south Asian countries via railway, energy corridor and other infrastructure projects would remain incomplete without inclusion of Afghanistan. On the other side, inclusion of Afghanistan in the Belt and Road initiative would not only gives China access to Central Asia but would also pave way of economic boom and industrialization in Afghanistan.

Economically, China considers Afghanistan a potential destination for future long-term investment, though it may not seemingly be an incentive for China in present situation, nevertheless, there is no doubt about Afghanistan to become a hub of economic activities if the dream of peace and stability in Afghanistan comes true. The economic interest of China in Afghanistan therefore directly correlates with security and strategic interests. 

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (Left) Deputy Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Wang Yi (Right) Former Chinese Foreign Minister of People’s Republic of China

China maintained state-to-state relations with Kabul since 2001, including military assistance, diplomatic engagement, reconstruction etc. After Taliban takeover, China maintained a working relationship with Taliban Govt as well.  

Beside Chinese unique approach in Afghanistan, the edge to China is also in shape of its cordial relations with the neighboring countries of Afghanistan. Pak-China friendship is indeed exemplary. On Afghanistan, the interests of both countries converge; a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is desire of both. This convergence of interests gives a leverage to China to use Pakistan’s existing influence in Afghanistan to continue engagement of Afghan interim setup. 

China’s comprehensive national power and economic strength coupled with the most popular international public product of China, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gives China another edge as a hope for Afghans who are losing hopes from international community amidst strict measures taken by interim setup of Afghanistan. China treats Afghanistan with sincerity, believing in a relationship that is mutually beneficial for the public of both countries; not like western approach of seeking private interests or a sphere of influence in Afghanistan.

China treats Afghanistan with sincerity, believing in a relationship that is mutually beneficial for the public of both countries; not like western approach of seeking private interests or a sphere of influence in Afghanistan. 

Despite disappointing approach of Afghan Taliban’s interim set up, China continued the humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan to survive, provided 250 million yuan in food, medicine, winter supplies and other assistance to Afghanistan in year 2021. After the earthquake and floods, China immediately provided 50 million yuan in emergency humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. According to Chinese Embassy in Kabul, Beijing has donated 250 million yuan (US $ 37.4 million) of aid to Afghanistan in Jul 2022. 

China and Afghanistan are also deliberating on many other aid projects to benefit the livelihood of the Afghan people.China is also engaging Afghanistan in practical cooperation between the two countries in different fields including trade and economy. For this purpose, China has opened an air corridor to facilitate and expand the imports of agriculture products to the land-locked Afghanistan. China has given duty-free special treatment to 98% of Afghan products, thus helping Afghanistan to increase revenue, enhance capacity for independent development and promote local employment. The people of Afghanistan are in need, they should not be left at the helms of affairs. A total disengagement can never be a solution, but a gradual multifaceted approach would ultimately lead to achieve the desired results. 

The people of Afghanistan are in need, they should not be left at the helms of affairs. A total disengagement can never be a solution, but a gradual multifaceted approach would ultimately lead to achieve the desired results. 

The basic principle of mutual benefit makes Chinese approach unique and acceptable for all as compared to western approach of controlling other nations using economic or political influence. With gradual increasing of practical cooperation, trade, investment and people to people contact, China is destined to become most reliable friend of Afghanistan within a decade. 

The willingness of China to promote BRI initiative to connect with the development strategy of Afghanistan and help Afghanistan in achieving stability, development and economic wellbeing proves China to be a friend of Afghans in need.

Why is it important to allow caretaker setup to continue till October?

By
Murtaza Solangi
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3

Both Punjab Assembly and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa assemblies stand dissolved. Imran Khan who warned earlier that he will become more dangerous (Khatre Naak) is trying to prove himself right. Imran thinks his actions will add more instability to the unstable system, that has created a lethal cocktail with looming economic meltdown, left by his government with IMF program suspended by his government that reneged on the commitments they made to the Washington based global lender. Add the new wave of terrorism unleashed by TTP on Pakistan, the situation becomes much more complex. Add legal and constitutional crisis into it, it gets murkier.

The census conducted in 2017 became controversial when many quarters including the MQM raised objections while maintaining that the Karachi census did not reflect the factual position on the ground. After 24th constitutional amendment, 2018 elections were held declaring the 6th population census as “provisional”.

After 2018 elections, the Council of Common Interests (CCI) decided under Imran Khan to hold 7th digital census in the country under pressure from the MQM, despite the fact that 6th census conducted in 2017 is declared “published”, the new digital census is underway. The ECP consequently informed the Supreme Court during the dissolution of the National Assembly by Imran Khan in April, that they will complete the delimitation in October, 2023. Keeping the above into consideration, general elections are not likely to be held under the old census of 2017.

After the dissolution of the assemblies of the PTI led provinces of the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the elections for a five-year term of both the houses are to be held within 90 days as per Clause 2 of Article 224 of the Constitution. However, this seems unlikely till the time of expiry of tenure of the National and Provincial Assemblies in August of 2023 for certain obvious reasons.

Although the constitution allows any assembly to be dissolved by the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister of the concerned provincial assembly but the time of general elections in the country has always been the same since 1997. The gap of two or three days between the National and the provincial assemblies elections was removed primarily because the first phase could affect the results of the latter. After the 18th amendment, the caretaker setup to be brought in by the outgoing chief executive and the leader of the opposition has been made a part of the constitution. The very concept of the neutral caretaker setup was incorporated in the constitution to ensure the free and fair electoral process denying the rivals heading the federal and the provincial government to rig the process to get favourable outcomes.

After the 18th amendment, the caretaker setup to be brought in by the outgoing chief executive and the leader of the opposition has been made a part of the constitution. The very concept of the neutral caretaker setup was incorporated in the constitution to ensure the free and fair electoral process denying the rivals heading the federal and the provincial government to rig the process to get favourable outcomes.

The constitution of Pakistan under article 218 (3) clearly states: “It shall be the duty of the Election Commission constituted in relation to an election to organize and conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against.”

The dissolution has created a situation where it is theoretically possible that the elections for both houses can be conducted under the current federal government with hostile relations with the PTI that has dissolved both the houses, instead of a neutral caretaker setup at the center. Yet all this will negate the real spirit of the constitution since it will give an unfair advantage to the current federal government against the outgoing party, i,e, PTI, which might made hue and cry and resort to agitation, if it loses the election and add more instability to the system. Even if the elections for both houses are conducted, say, by April, the elections for the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies of Sindh and Balochistan will be due after almost three months as their term expires in August.

The elections for the remainder of the houses are likely to take place in October. When the National Assembly elections are held in October, both the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will have duly elected governments instead of the neutral caretaker governments. This creates another problem. If the parties of the current coalition at the centre win the provincial elections of the Punjab and or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, they are most likely to use the provincial set-ups with the might of the police and the district management in their favour to win the National Assembly seats in the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

If the PTI wins the provincial assembly elections in the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, they get duly elected provincial governments for good five years. That means when the elections for the National Assembly are held in October, both the provincial governments of the Punjab get an advantage and can massively rig the elections with the help of the provincial administration. That is against the very spirit of the constitution that introduced the neutral caretaker setup at all places to ensure free and fair elections.

With 79% total voters residing in both provinces, Punjab 58% and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 21% of the total 122.2 million voters, the provincial governments elected barely five months before the election of the National Assembly, gives undue advantage to both provincial governments and upsets the entire scheme of the free and fair elections guaranteed under the constitution and makes the mission of the Election Commission impossible to hold free and fair elections in terms of Article 218(3) since newly elected governments will have an unfair advantage against the federating units of Sindh and Balochistan.

Imran Khan has dissolved these assemblies, not because there was any constitutional crisis in both assemblies. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PTI almost enjoyed 2/3 majority. The sole purpose of depriving the electorate of both the provinces was aimed at pressurizing the federal government to hold early polls. Imran Khan has failed to get early polls through this dissolution but has created not only a constitutional crisis but endangered the fairness of the election of the next National Assembly. The actions of Imran Khan have also made the post 18th amendment, that created neutral caretaker setups to ensure free and fair elections, extremely vulnerable.

It is clear that the upcoming provincial assembly elections will be neither free nor fair if held in April because there will be no caretaker setup at the centre.

It is clear that the upcoming provincial assembly elections will be neither free nor fair if held in April because there will be no caretaker setup at the centre. The governments emerging out of these elections will most likely rig the upcoming National Assembly elections and keeping the above into consideration, the temporary measure to address this crisis is to allow the provincial caretaker setups of the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to continue till October.

It is very much in consonance with the spirit of the constitution that when the tenure of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies of Sindh and Balochistan expires in August and the caretaker setups are created there as well, we allow the elections of all assemblies to be held on the same day as they have been held since 1997.The Election Commission must create a one-time exception for this anomaly to ensure free and fair elections and protect the federation at a time of great economic and political instability gone worse due to the rising terrorism specially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and the rest of the country. The only constitutional body responsible for holding the free and fair elections is the Election Commission of Pakistan, empowered under article 218 of the constitution, hence the higher judiciary must support rather than create any hindrance to the constitutional body to avoid any more crises in the country.

After the general elections are held, a constitutional amendment is very much needed to plug the hole of this constitutional conundrum. In any case, the course suggested by the author will be in consonance with the spirit of the constitution till the anomalies pointed out above are resolved once for all by making suitable amendments in the constitution.

Can we preserve the art of war?

By
Asim Bakhshi
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4
Robot dogs join US Air Force exercise giving a glimpse at the potential battlefield of the future. (source: CNN)

In nine different stories published in the 1940s, the inimitable science fiction author Isaac Asimov explored the ethical implications of technology by way of imagining a world increasingly inhabited by humanoid autonomous systems. All these stories chart different threads of a singular narrative where a reporter interviews a ‘robopsychologist’. All these stories somehow converge on the issue of ethical programming, with Asimov’s one or more laws of robotics at the center. In one of the stories set around 2019, the robot refuses to follow human order but still does the ‘right’ thing. In another one spun in 2021, a robot is left with a programming error and finds himself in an infinite loop of withholding versus yielding the information.

Kenneth Payne’s recent book exploring the complex interplay of AI and military strategic thinking is a clever wordplay on Asimov’s anthology I, Robot. Payne, being a political psychologist, has been deeply interested in studying the evolution of strategic thinking within the context of warfare. I, Warbot echoes Arthur C. Clarke’s classic maxim that all sufficiently advanced technologies have always been indistinguishable from magic. In this regard, while AI is no exception, warfare theorists as well as AI practitioners must try to mark brittle skills where AI might end up being worse than a toddler.

But while having an interesting theoretical dimension, the problem is not just theoretical. Autonomous weapons systems are a reality and algorithmically driven disruptive technologies are extending boundaries of control in subtle ways. In this context, while we have always been stating unambiguously what we expect out of autonomous weapons, isn’t it time to reflect upon ways where they might behave in unexpected ways?

This takes us back to Asimov’s fictional world where a robot must be designed to follow three laws. One, it may not injure a human being through action or inaction. Two, it must obey human orders unless in conflict with the first law. Three, it must protect itself unless in conflict with both the first and second laws.

However, while these laws might fancy a fictional web of stories, would they provide a rational viewpoint of guiding actual war machines which are built upon layers and layers of arguably inexplicable autonomous computing? Violence, after all, is a distinguishing feature of war and if future Warbots – the lethal robotic machines – are being designed and programmed to kill accurately and relentlessly, how can they incorporate an essential constraint of inefficiency without creating irresolvable paradoxes?

To attempt an answer, Payne offers three laws of Warbots as an opening gambit. Firstly, a warbot should only kill those the owner wants it to and exercise violence in a humanistic way. Secondly, it must understand the owner’s intentions and exercise creativity. Thirdly, it should protect the humans on the owner’s side at all costs including the sacrifice of their life — at the same time, this protection should not be at the expense of the mission.

This gambit is no less than a semantic master stroke. Among other things, it immediately implies that AI portrayed in film and art is human-like while not being human. The media too cannot break free of science-fictional templates. These media indulgences tell us more about ourselves rather than robots. These are unrealistic expectations of AI which are merely on-screen manipulations and fall quite short of the domain of actual possibilities in autonomous computing. Launching from this critical opening gambit, the rest of the book aims to chart this domain of possibilities.

Since Payne is primarily a political psychologist, a recurring thread in the book is that the minds of the Warbots – the neural connectivity so to speak – will be quite different from the humans. As AI practitioners, we may immediately refer to the fact how that state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms are diverging from classical neural networks. Military tacticians, on the other hand, may refer to the psychological insights of strategic theorists. Carl von Clausewitz, for instance, argued that war is an intense emotional business where ‘passionate hatred’ motivates the belligerents. The commander is an idealized ‘genius’ who makes the right decisions with limited information. While conceding with humility, theorists like Clausewitz felt no qualms in accepting that they were in dark about the complexities of the human mind. Nevertheless, they could state one fact emphatically: the human brain doesn’t work like a machine.

Thus any decision-making technology, if transformed into artificially intelligent warfare, will yield unexpected results. Historical blueprints for creating Warbots are nonexistent. It’s all about working backward from what we want them to achieve. The question boils down to this: what kind of weapons are required by the armed forces? More specifically, what kind of drivers shape these requirements in the first place?

Reducing the first question to functional context disregards the most important paradigm which is cultural. This includes societal attitudes to war and how different strategic cultures rationalize violence as a means to an end. The other question relates to design, i.e. the engineering philosophy as well as the craft. Would we be able to say that Warbots are clever machines? Of course, these are far ahead of humans in terms of computing power, optimized decision-making agency in an extremely constrained environment, and agility of convergence, but would they be considered as ‘clever’ and ‘intuitively informed’ as humans? Isn’t it possible that autonomous problem-solving is being misunderstood here with intelligence?

Payne argues at length about how cyber security is being increasingly entangled with AI. To mitigate risks, organizations like DARPA regularly launch grand challenges for AI to automatically find vulnerabilities in code. While these challenges stop here due to ethical concerns, what stops attempts at the next obvious tactical maneuver which is turning defense into an attack by hacking the hacker? These competitions provide insights into new conundrums related to problems of attribution within the context of cyber warfare. If we cannot possibly know who has attacked us, how can we possibly launch a counter-offense without inviting chaos?

DARPA has officially announced last year that they are evaluating potential uses of jetpacks in the military. (photo credits: autorevolution)

The situations become further complex when attempts like DeepMind increasingly imitate Asimov’s fictional universe, the terrain where Warbots design other Warbots. The new deep learning algorithms dive into particular environmental constraints and look for features serving as foundations for other reinforcement learning algorithms. This is a meta-learning frontier, where an autonomous agent tries to learn what other autonomous learners need to learn.

This is no surprise that the goal of DARPA’s AI Next program is to build autonomous computers that can reason and think in context and function more as colleagues than as tools. The subtle distinction between exploratory creativity and a transformational or collaborative one is hard to miss. Whether it is AlphaZero beating Gary Kasparov, the AlphaGo beating Lee Sedol, or the AI engine winning multi-player no-limit poker game, all are examples of learning by exploratory creativity at its best. Transformation creativity, however, is a true genius. Machines, in this sense, are excellent in ‘thinking’ but can they truly ‘create’? It is only possible if they can ‘understand’. Payne’s book not only raises a key strategic concern, but it is also timely as well, and equally likely to indulge both military professionals as well as practicing scientists.

As engineers, we are well familiar with the ways control systems fail and overshoot the bounds of stability. We are also aware of strategic analogs of unstable systems, for instance, Clausewitz’s constraints such as ‘fog-of-war’ and ‘friction’ leading to failure. Can we pursue research in directions where both concerns are combined to achieve semi-autonomous, artificially intelligent agents collaborating with humans and bound by our specific moral constraints? Only time will answer this question since boundaries between fact and fiction are already blurred. The real challenge lies in the preservation of the art of war while augmenting the science of it.

Doctrine, Policy and Strategy

By
Saad Masood
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0

By now it is a cliché to say that these are trying and difficult circumstances; they have been for quite some time and nothing on the horizon suggests that they will change anytime soon. For a developing country such as Pakistan – things are doubly tough! Particularly when it comes to foreign policy challenges. Thus, Pakistan’s instruments of foreign policy need to be at par with the best if they have to be successful in 2022 and beyond. Consider.

Foreign policy is the cornerstone of any country’s peaceful existence in the international comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception!

Janne Haaland Matláry, a Norwegian political scientist writes that there are generally two types of instruments available to address foreign policy challenges. One, soft tools which include typically cooperative, mostly non-coercive and characteristically traditional aspects of foreign policy. Two, hard tools whereby comprising coercive and hard-line actions in the interest of shaping favourable foreign policy outcomes.

For Pakistan – just like any other country – soft tools must be the primary instruments for achieving foreign policy objectives. First, the art of diplomacy. While Pakistan needs to have a balanced relationship with the US, it still needs to find other avenues of similar alignment with China and Russia. Regionally – it needs to keep on engaging with Afghanistan at least in light of the humanitarian support if nothing else and seek further reproachment with Iran while keeping Saudi friendship at an even keel. Although not readily possible perhaps, but Pakistan should be able and willing to stretch an olive branch to India as and when a favourable regime presents itself. Meanwhile, further efforts to cement relationships with Turkey and Malaysia should be afoot. This is indeed a tall order but foreign policy manoeuvres are nothing but a tight-rope and need to leverage the spirit of cooperation, persuasion and co-optation to further its agenda. Second, the vagaries of propaganda. It is an open secret that marketing is a massive part of the foreign policy initiative. Pakistan will need to continue to plead its case – that of being a moderate and sensible nation – more vociferously and at as many forums as possible. It may not be easy keeping recent incidents of extremist ideology in mind but unfortunately, they are a reality, like in so many other countries. Think what you may of Imran Khan, but he is better than almost all his predecessors to further Pakistan’s cause in chambers such as the UN and OIC. The eloquence of Shah Mahmood Qureshi – Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister – is legendary even if his competence and consistency may not be. Social media, another battleground for propaganda wars, will need additional focus as narratives and trends are won and lost in this arena of 5th generation warfare.

Think what you may of Imran Khan but he is better than almost all his predecessors to further Pakistan’s cause in chambers such as the UN and OIC.

Third, the largesse of economy. These measures are highly crucial but highly abstract. They are generally two-fold. One, increasing the inherent strength of the economy – ensuring trade deficit and current account deficit is narrowed and finally eliminated. Two, economic measures against other nations to push foreign policy objectives through. For Pakistan, the first is important and doable but the second not so much because it is mostly meant for high performing economies which run surplus trade and current accounts and have the ability to penalise nations who don’t tow their favoured narratives. One thing Pakistan can do is improve the first to make the second a possibility! And in the process escape the clutches of international monetary structures such as the IMF and World Bank, which incidentally are one of the instruments of American foreign policy!

Along the way, Pakistan will need to bank on hard tools, which generally come in three flavours. First, the existence of military and the nuclear deterrence. In a region that is relatively hostile – not to say that the world at large isn’t – Pakistan will need to continue to maintain this deterrence. Unfortunately for a developing country it is easier said than done because of budgetary limitations. Maybe the need in 2022 and afterwards will be to maintain a balance between spending i.e. spend smarter not bigger! Second, the threat of sanctions – in one form or the other. While this is a good instrument to be used by developed countries, for Pakistan it only has limited efficacy and only where it may be possible. Specifically, some lightweight sanctions in trade and military knowledge transfer – and that too towards countries that may not be too relevant in the global calculus. Therefore, this too – just like the soft tool of economic measures – will take time and consequently should be made part of the next five- or ten-year plan. Third, the option of tit-for-tat retaliation. Although for a developing country such as Pakistan imposing sanctions may not be a feasible option but like-mannered retaliation at the diplomatic front is still viable. In the absence of other alternatives this becomes extremely crucial and can manifest in responding in kind in diplomatic rows, withdrawing of Pakistan foreign office dignitaries where needed and ejecting foreign diplomats to signal policy displeasure. It is true that this is a meek choice at best but still better than nothing until Pakistan can develop leverage in the foreign policy instruments of economic measures and sanctions.

Pakistan’s instruments of foreign policy need to be at par with the best if they have to be successful

Foreign policy is the cornerstone of any country’s peaceful existence in the international comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception! While occasionally it may seem that the deck is stacked against it, there is no reason not to endeavour a logical mix of foreign instruments – comprising of soft tools and hard tools – to ensure that foreign policy provides a well-deserved pay-off even in this tough and dynamic international climate. After all, “do the best you can until you know better, then when you know better, do better”!

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