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India’s Foreign Policy Transformation: From Look East to Act East

By
Muhammad Ali Baig
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0

Introduction

India’s Look East Policy was an important transformation in its foreign policy which was envisaged by the Government of India in 1991 under the Premiership of P. V. Narasimha Rao. This was the time when the Cold war ended, and the Soviet Union collapsed. The world witnessed a new type of international order in which apparently the United States (U.S.) emerged as the sole superpower. At that time, the Indian leadership conceived the need to find new international partners, as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) was disintegrated, the resultant 15 states were witnessing an internal struggle for power – a little short of a civil war, and their respective economies were in tatters. Also, the Indian policymakers were in a constant state of uncertainty vis-à-vis its Western neighbor i.e., Pakistan. The aforementioned geopolitical reasons were the driving force behind the conception of the Look East Policy.

The dynamism of International Relations somehow drove New Delhi to adopt a shift in its foreign policy and started looking toward its Eastern neighbors. The chief focus of the Look East policy was to shift the country’s trading focus from the Western neighbors to the South-East Asian nations. Later, in 2003, the scope of India’s Look East Policy was expanded and included East Asian nations such as China, Japan, and Korea. Trade and investment relations remained the most important elements.

This policy remained the same till the formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2014 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi who upgraded the Look East Policy to the Act East Policy. The Act East Policy was introduced at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. PM Modi proposed that India’s economy was comparatively strong, and its global profile was higher than it was in the decades before.

Modi gave a new push to strengthen economic, strategic, and diplomatic relations with states that share common concerns with India on China’s growing economic and military strength and its implications for the growing regional order.

Impact of China on India’s Transformation

The border clashes between India and China in the Galwan Valley and the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an indefinite number of Chinese soldiers resulted in a state of crisis between both countries. Relations between Delhi and Beijing had barely been friendly prior to the event, with territorial disagreements over the Himalayan regions of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh contaminating the ties between the world’s most crowded states.

Beyond Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, China appears to also grow increasingly self-confident on its Himalayan border, which pitches President Xi Jinping’s territorial desires against those of PM Modi’s progressively nationalist India. With both countries having access to nuclear weapons, the clashes in the Galwan Valley in mishmash with the 2017 Doklam Deadlock between China and India in Bhutan support the Indo-Sino rivalry as one of the most crucial political conflicts, not just in Asia but the world as a whole.

Until the conclusion of the Cold War, Indian economic policy was focused on a protectionist doctrine that highlighted state intervention and a generally high grade of central planning in both micro- and macro-economic terms. The protection for local consumers and products were ensured through high tax and tariffs on imports and exports, and in that way established the consumption of domestic products but limited India’s incorporation into global supply chains and financial markets.

India’s position of economic isolation began to be pulled to pieces following the end of the Cold War, especially through the 1991 liberalization reforms introduced by PM Rao.

Rao’s reforms pursued to address the bigger economic hardships India had begun to encounter in the 1980s as New Delhi had nearly failed to pay on its external debt by the end of the decade. Rao’s liberalization program was calculated to attract investment into India and open up the Indian market to global financial streams by reducing tariffs and State-monopolies, in that way making the Indian consumer market with its more than one billion members a highly attractive target for foreign direct investment.

Efforts of Narendra Modi

The prime minister of India shifted the geostrategic posture of India in the Indo-Pacific and reformulated New Delhi’s approach to one that is more strategically assertive, according to a European think tank. In 2018, Prime Minister Modi encouraged a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region as one of the key goals of the AEP. The free navigability of international watercourses is a key point of the AEP as it connects New Delhi’s aims to that of other actors in the region like Australia, Japan, and the U.S.

The Act East Policy has extended the operational scope of India’s earlier Look East Policy beyond one that is purely focused on economics to one that incorporates matters of security in the Indo-Pacific region. This links the AEP as geostrategy to other regional geostrategies, resulting in a merging of security aims and subsequently emerging security cooperation,” the EFSAS said in its commentary.

Objectives of Look East Policy

  1. To promote regional Integration
  2. To restart political contacts with the ASEAN member countries
  3. To increase economic linkage with Southeast Asia through an increase in trade, investments, science and technology, tourism; and
  4. To promote defense links with many countries of this region to strengthen political understanding.
  5. Reform and Liberalization
  6. To have immense economic growth.
  7. Under the Look East policy, India for the first time sees the region as a gateway to East Asia and links the North-Eastern region with Southeast Asia through a network of pipelines, road, rail, and air connectivity.

Objectives of Act East Policy

  1. To encourage an economic, cultural, and strategic relationship with nations in the Asia-Pacific region through constant engagement at regional, bilateral, and multilateral stages.
  2. To increase the communication of the North-Eastern states of India’s Eastern neighbors through corporeal connectivity, infrastructure expansion, and development of trade, etc.
  3. To determine the replacements of India’s traditional business associates and more focus will be on the Asia-Pacific states alongside the Southeast Asian nations.
  4. To contain China by curbing its increasing influence in the ASEAN region. Trade between India and ASEAN increased up to $71.6 billion in 2016-17 from $2 billion in the early ’90s. On the other hand, trade between China and ASEAN stood at $452.31 billion in 2016.
  5. Many experts are of the view that under the Act East Policy, the government of India is relying on the 4 C’s (Culture, Connectivity, Commerce, and Capacity Building) to develop better relations with the ASEAN member countries and others in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

There were several reasons for the adoption of the Look East Policy by the Indian government in 1991. During the early 1990s both the domestic and international environment forced India to look for an alternative and therefore New Delhi’s foreign policy took a turn and started looking towards its east for gaining its economic development. Further in 2014, the NDA government under the Prime Minister ship of Narendra Modi realized the need for an active role of India through its active participation in developing economic, cultural, strategic, and defense cooperation with South-East Asian countries and beyond.

One of the major causes for the adoption of the Act East Policy is to counter China by reducing its influence in South-East Asia. The Act East Policy is just a modern form of the Look East Policy of India. Under this Act, the East Policy government of India has now been taking several steps to develop the North-Eastern states as it is under the LEP and is regarded as the gateway to South-East Asia. One of the significant differences between the Look East and the Act East is that under the Act East Policy, the government of India has provided much focus on infrastructure development in the regional power of South Asia northeast to ensure its physical connectivity with East Asia. Besides under this policy, the Indian government has been looking to establish defense cooperation with its Eastern neighbors mainly to ensure its security threat from China.

China’s Middle East Policy

By
Ammar Hassan Sajjad
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As a consequence of the Chinese brokered talks in Beijing, Saudi Arabia and Iran have announced to reopen of embassies after 7 years of formal diplomatic boycott. Both sides which are also considered regional arch-rivals have agreed to reactivate the 2001 cooperation Accord. Recently, the Saudi finance minister has also stated that the kingdom can quickly start investments in Iran.

There are positive developments that have the potential to ameliorate regional dynamics and also improve China’s perception of the Middle East.

This, however, is not the first instance where China’s diplomatic contributions have been crucial in reducing regional quagmires. China has emerged, perhaps, as the only extra-regional power that shares conducive relations with all major Middle Eastern states. China also played a constructive role during the JCPOA episode when it urged Tehran to make compromises in the P5+1 negotiations and, in turn, assured the latter of large-scale investments. The JCPOA, although no longer in place, was a great leap forward given the fact that dialogue and negotiations have never been common between the US and Iran. Recently, President Xi Jinping also reassured his Iranian counterpart Ebrahim Raisi of China’s eagerness to resume the nuclear deal and settle Iran’s nuclear issue. Besides diplomacy, China has also been crucial to the infrastructural development of the Middle East.

China, under the Belt and Road Initiative, enacted the 1+2+3 cooperation strategy which reflected the East-Asian power’s constructive intent in the region. Sino-Persian Gulf trade volume also sky-rocketed to $197 Billion in 2017, as a result. China is the largest foreign investor in Iran and more than 100 Chinese companies are registered in the country. Also, as aforementioned, China’s cooperation is not limited to any specific Middle Eastern state rather, on his 2016 visit to Saudi Arabia, President Xi remotely started a $10 billion oil refinery on the Red Sea coast, jointly owned by Sinopec and Aramco.

Earlier, in 2004, Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Company (FREP) was established as a joint venture between Sinopec (50 percent shares), ARAMCO (25 percent shares), and ExxonMobil (25 percent shares). In 2008, the Tianjin Petrochemical industry was also established which was jointly owned by Sinopec and SABIC. Similarly, China Railway Engineering was awarded the contract, worth $1.8 billion, to construct a high-speed railway connecting the holy city of Mecca to Medina, in 2009. On his visit to the Kingdom for the China-Arab Summit in 2022, Xi Jinping signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia.

China has developed stronger ties with multiple Middle Eastern states and has signed comprehensive strategic partnerships with Qatar, Oman, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, Egypt, etc. Such partnerships tend to provide, much-needed, economic security to the regional states in an, otherwise, unconducive security environment. The Chinese National Pipeline Company (CNPC) built the 424 km long Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline, in 2012, from Abu Dhabi to the Gulf of Oman which has an estimated capacity of carrying 75 million tons of Oil. It is also expected that after the completion of BRI, the Middle East will experience a 37.87% increase in trade flows to Europe and Central Asia. Moreover, China’s humanitarian assistance has helped alleviate the suffering of millions of people affected by crises in the region.

Such steps are highly rewarding for a war-torn region like the Middle East and can be termed as one major reason why so many regional states appear eager to cooperate with China. Evidence of this is the recent (Jan 10) visit of Foreign Ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, and the Secretary General of the GCC  to Jiangsu, the major purpose of which was to deepen ties with China. China’s growing influence in the Middle East which is a result of the country’s consistent regional policies does appear like a tilt towards the East. However, this must not be taken by States such as the US, with politico-strategic interests in the region, as a challenge to their influence.

China’s growing influence in the Middle East which is a result of the country’s consistent regional policies does appear like a tilt towards the East.

The Middle East has already suffered a great deal due to international rivalries and proxy wars. The region has continually been a battleground for international powers for decades. As a result, not only natives but the world, as a whole, has suffered from terrorism. Middle Eastern states such as Syria are considered to be breeding grounds for terrorism, narcotics, and menaces of such nature. It is, thus, important for Global powers to seize the opportunity and collaborate in order to transform the Middle East into a stable, peaceful region as failure to do so would be counter-productive and only exacerbate the regional and international situation.

Global politics over the last century

By
Info Desk
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A timeline of global political events

Resettlement of Afghan Sikhs to Kabul and India’s Double Game in Afghanistan

By
Furqan khan
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Ever since Afghanistan plunged into crisis following the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, India has been weighing options to restore its influence in Kabul. Since June 2022, India has reopened its embassy in Kabul, extended heaps of humanitarian assistance, developmental projects are resuming, and military training is on the cards. While India has been nudging the Taliban to revive its lost influence in Kabul, the latest card in the endeavor is the resettlement of Sikh/Hindu minorities in the Karte Parwan neighborhood.

Apparently, India attempts to paint a humanitarian picture of the resettlement of the Afghan Sikhs in Kabul; however, a more subtle motive is restoring its ability to promote the anti-Pakistan narrative in Afghanistan.

After the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, India evacuated hundreds of Sikhs and Hindus to New Delhi, despite security assurances from the Taliban regime. Now, as New Delhi is warming up to the Afghan government, it plans to send the Afghan Sikhs back to the Karte Parwan neighborhood in Kabul, with a potential pretext for the revival of sabotage activities of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), especially against Pakistan. This is because Karte Parwan is not only a hub for Afghan minorities, especially Sikhs and Hindus, but also the zone of Indian influence operations, and the closest neighborhood to Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul. Previously, Karte Parwan has been at the forefront of terrorist attacks from the Islamic State of Khurasan Province (ISKP), especially against the Sikh minorities, the Taliban fighters, and Pakistan. On June 18, 2022, the Gurdwara Karte Parwan came under attack, before a similar attack was launched on Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul in December, which suggests the destabilizing nexus between India and the ISKP.

While the Afghan Sikhs may fear persecution under the Taliban regime, many have preferred Canada, the United States, and other Western countries over India for migration, as the latter is no longer seen as haven for minorities. India’s poor record of human rights violations has only gotten worse under the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, with grave concerns expressed by American Senators and European Union. Fearing the worsening fate of the Afghan Sikhs in India, on August 30 last year, the Sikh Coalition, a group of Sikh rights organizations, in a letter to the Biden administration described India as “no more home” for the Sikh community under the BJP government. Adding to the miseries of Afghan Sikhs in India are the declining living conditions and lack of socioeconomic opportunities for the Sikh community; thus, many have been using New Delhi only as a transition point to Western countries.

At this juncture, when the Taliban regime is consolidating its power at home and diplomatic relations abroad, India intends to benefit from the politico-security disorder by planting their malign influence operations against Pakistan. The meteoric rise in the ISKP attacks in major Afghan cities including Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar-i-Sharif, especially on the Sikh Gurdwaras, is in tandem with India’s attempts to malign Pakistan on the pretext of terrorism. Before even the Taliban took over, the ISKP was established against the Afghan Taliban by foreign intelligence agencies including India’s RAW to advance their nefarious designs using Afghan soil. Raffaello Pantucci, Senior Associate Fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), states in his article for the Foreign Policy Magazine, that, “Indians and the Central Asians are the new face of the Islamic State”, with many of the ISKP terrorists have been linked back to their terror safe havens in Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. India, together with the previous Afghan intelligence agencies, has aided terrorist groups including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in cross-border terrorism in Pakistan.

In the guise of Afghanistan’s largest donor, New Delhi has become the region’s biggest spoiler of peace by abetting terrorism, and supporting groups like the ISKP and the TTP in their attacks against minorities, the Taliban regime, and Pakistan.

Although India’s overtures to the Taliban regime suggest general trends of rapprochement, the former is more interested in using the Afghan territory for its malicious activities, especially against Pakistan. In this double game, India is using humanitarian assistance as a pretext to revive its influence operations to the detriment of the Emirate’s reputation as a responsible state. Therefore, at a time when gaining international diplomatic support is a supreme priority for the Taliban regime, India’s attempts to foster Ethno-religious violence and abetting terrorism on Afghan soil threaten the Taliban’s security and political interests. Above all, this could further dent the Taliban’s image as a failed government, making international recognition far from reality shortly.

Military Activities in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs): Degradation of Marine Environment

By
Momina Imran
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Exclusive Economic Zones of states, generally extending 200 nautical miles beyond the territorial seas, are zones of shared rights and responsibilities; this implies that the coastal states do have the primary rights to the living and non-living natural resources in this zone, meanwhile the foreign states are given the right of freedom of navigation and overflight through these zones, thus inhibiting the coastal states’ total sovereignty on this zone.

When it comes to military activities and their impacts on the EEZs, it wasn’t an important or consequential issue earlier. In recent times, the military activities of states and foreign militaries in EEZs have become an important issue to be highlighted.

The accelerating globalization, an exaggerated increase in world trade, a drastic increase in the quantity and quality of navies around the world and the technological advancements of different navies are some of the factors that have been responsible for increasing the number and scale of military activities of different states in the exclusive economic zones. This increased military activity of different navies has produced drastic and noticeable impacts on the marine environment as well.[1]

Considering this increase in military activities in EEZs, another important point of contention also exists in the international arena. The legality of military activities of foreign navies in the EEZs of states is also perceived differently by different states, owing to the conflict in their perceived interests. Some states, mainly US and UK, perceive it as a legal activity to conduct military activities in the EEZ of any state, in the light of the principle of freedom of navigation. Whereas, many states, particularly India and Pakistan, strictly prohibit any sort of foreign military in their respective exclusive economic zones. This ambiguity is a result of the lack of a comprehensive explanation by UNCLOS regarding the legality of military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones; giving states an opportunity to perceive it as their convenience.[2]

Many states in the indo-pacific region, particularly India and Pakistan, have imposed unusual restrictions on different lawful military activities in their EEZs; the demand of prior notice to conduct military activities, denial of the right to collect military marine data, prohibition of surveillance and reconnaissance operations and application of domestic environmental laws are some of the measures that India and Pakistan have taken in order to restrict military activities of each other in their EEZs. Out of these measures, the most important and prevalent step taken by Pakistan and India, and other like-minded states in Indo-Pacific, is that of applying domestic environmental laws. States protest against any sort of military activities in their EEZ by stating their concern about marine environmental degradation.[3]

Considering this context of military operations, in this article, we will analyze the military activities of India and Pakistan in their own as well as each other’s EEZs, followed by the impact of these activities on the marine environment.

In recent times, both India and Pakistan have advanced significantly in terms of their naval power. The scale of naval activities has drastically increased in the last two decades, particularly that of India (considering their crucial interests in the Indian Ocean). Pakistan, owing to this vicious cycle of an arms race has also followed the suit. When it comes to the military activities in each other’s exclusive economic zones, Pakistan and India have been opposing the stance of UNCLOS. In this context, both countries have mutually agreed on a formal arrangement of avoiding operating in each other’s EEZs and informing the governments prior to the activity, if such a need arises.[4] To some extent, this formal arrangement has saved both states from clashing with each other militarily in their EEZs. However, there have been occasional attempts to illegally initiate reconnaissance operations in each other’s EEZs, particularly from the Indian side. From 2016 to 2021, three attempts by Indian submarines to enter Pakistan EEZ were detected and blocked by Pakistan Navy.[5] There haven’t been such recorded attempts by the Pakistani navy, mainly because of their policy of restraint and their simultaneous two-decade-long involvement on the western border which makes it difficult for them to initiate such adventures on another front alongside.

The military activities of India and Pakistan in their exclusive economic zones and naval exercises carried out by both states are of prime importance.

These naval exercises by both states are of huge significance, particularly that of India. India’s MILAN biennial military naval exercise in its Andaman and Nicobar command is one of the most significant and large-scale naval exercises. Pakistan’s AMAN multilateral naval exercise in the Arabian sea is also of huge significance. Other than these naval exercises, both navies are also involved in small-scale operations for protecting their exclusive economic zones and territorial waters against non-traditional threats like piracy, smuggling, and other illegal activities. Furthermore, both navies are also constantly involved in conducting surveillance operations to guard their territorial waters.

These activities of Indian and Pakistani navies in their own as well as each other’s EEZs have proved to be of huge significance strategically. However, more than their strategic impact, their influence on the marine environment is a major concern in the contemporary era.[6] The SONAR used by both naval forces has detrimental effects on marine life. Even low and mid-frequency systems use high-intensity sound waves to get sonic images of the ocean environment; this helps in detecting and tracking submarines, torpedoes, and other underwater threats. Pakistan’s YAKAMOS Hull-Mounted Sonar System is mostly used for this purpose, as well as to detect mines during field passages. The sound waves produced by these systems eventually impact the big marine animals; marine mammals mostly rely on echolocation for their foraging, reproduction, communication, and predator detection and the use of sonar technologies threatens their survival. Furthermore, explosive detonations, mechanical and propeller noises, gun discharges, and live fires demonstrated during naval exercises are the biggest contributor to noise pollution in the marine environment, thus impacting their survival. Hal Whitehead, a whale researcher at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia stated that “the effects of the sounds on marine mammals could range from deafening, through hearing loss, to disturbances in feeding or socializing, to long-term psychological effects.”[7] Other than a threat to marine mammals, oil spillage by naval ships, either accidental or intentional, is a huge menace for marine mammals as well as marine plants. Degradation of marine plants eventually impacts the oceanic composition, eventually impacting the marine mammals as well as the plants.[8]

Considering these detrimental effects of military exercises of both states in their EEZs, it is necessary to generate awareness as well as to create mechanisms for controlling and regulating these negative effects on the marine environment. Fortunately, awareness is being spread about the degradation of the marine environment due to the actions of commercial activities at sea; illegal fishing, oil spillage, illegal discharges of wastes by commercial entities, etc. Simultaneously, just as the international bodies are being asked to address the ambiguous discrepancies in UNCLOS regarding the military activities in EEZs, the international bodies must address the impact of military activities on the marine environment as well. Considering natural resources as a global common, it is the responsibility of both India and Pakistan to develop effective strategies and mechanisms to address this specific issue.

End Notes:

[1] Pedrozo, Raul. “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus.” International Law Studies, (2014).

[2] Melchiorre, Tiziana, and Tomas Plėta. “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones; A Contentious Issue of the International Law of Sea.” Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues, (2011).

[3] Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. “Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone.” International Law Studies, (2021).

[4] Khan, Shaharyar , and Muchkund Dubey Dubey. “Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Advance Notice of Military Exercises.” stimson.org. May 5, 2011. https://doi.org/https://www.stimson.org/2011/agreement-between-india-and-pakistan-on-the-advance-notice-of-military3/.

[5] Hashim, Asad. “‘Detected and blocked’ Indian submarine incursion: Pakistan army.” Al Jazeera. December 10, 2021. https://doi.org/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/19/pakistan-army-claims-detected-blocked-india-submarine-incursion.

[6] Arif, Abdullah A., and Ershadul Karim. “Marine Pollution and The South Asian Coastal States: A Legal Appraisal.” MqJICEL Journal, (2013).

[7] DeMarco, Ronald Dr., and John Quinn Commander. “The Impact of War and Military Operations other than War on the Marine Environment: Policy Making on the Frontiers of Knowledge.” International Law Studies Volume 69.

[8] Michael J. Lawrence, Holly L.J. Stemberger, Aaron J. Zolderdo, Daniel P. Struthers, and Steven J. Cooke. The effects of modern war and military activities on biodiversity and the environment. Environmental Reviews. 23(4): 443-460. https://doi.org/10.1139/er-2015-0039

Featuring the Nuclearization of South Korea and Japan

By
Yusra Azam
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0

The United States deterrence capability would certainly increase with the redeployment of its Practically, states with low power capabilities ally themselves with major powers to balance a threat. Sometimes, this security umbrella is provided by the major powers they, or the smaller states ask for it. Japan and South Korea, in the East Asian security complex, are currently under the US nuclear umbrella, which means they rely on the US for their security against threats emerging from the evolving regional order. The arrangement has been in place for decades and has been a cornerstone of US alliances with Japan and South Korea. In the post-World War II era, Yoshida Doctrine spurred US security aegis as Japan wanted to focus more on its economy. In 1967, PM Sato also established nuclear principles as “no possession, introduction or production”. It restricted Japan to produce its nuclear capabilities and the US to shift any nuclear device to its bases in the country. Relatively, the Extended Deterrence Strategy that assures that the US will use specific military assets including nuclear weapons against threats to South Korea backs the US’s commitments to South Korea’s security.

Japan and South Korea, in the East Asian security complex, are currently under the US nuclear umbrella, which means they rely on the US for their security against threats emerging from the evolving regional order.

However, there have been reports; Japan and South Korea are beginning to consider developing their nuclear weapons in response to China and North Korea’s growing military power. Some members of the international community fear that this could start a regional arms race and may have destabilizing effects on the region.

The possible reasons for the nuclearization of Japan and South Korea are complex and multifaceted, but some of the main factors driving the debate include the following:

  1. North Korea has been developing its nuclear weapons program for several years and has conducted several missile tests, raising concerns about its intentions and potential threat to the region. Both Japan and South Korea are within range of North Korean missiles, and could therefore feel particularly vulnerable to a potential attack. The possibility of nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea is forcing Japan and South Korea to consider nuclearization to enhance their security.
  2. China’s military expansion and aggression in the region have raised some concerns in Japan and South Korea about the possibility of a future confrontation with China. The Chinese government also has territorial claims in the South China Sea, which are also claimed by other countries, including Japan and South Korea. Thus, the possibility of a confrontation with China may force Japan and South Korea to consider nuclearization as a means of enhancing their deterrence capabilities.

The US has been a key ally of both Japan and South Korea and has provided both countries with a nuclear umbrella. However, there are concerns about the credibility of the US security commitment, particularly under the current US administration.

East Asian policymakers and the public have good reason to believe that the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia will deter the United States from taking direct military action against nuclear-armed states like Russia to prevent nuclear war.

It is well known that US President Joe Biden ruled out the use of US armed forces in the initial phase of a Russian invasion in 2022. He has repeatedly pledged not to send US troops to Ukraine. Thus, Japan and South Korea are considering nuclearization as a means of increasing their security and reducing their dependence on the United States. There may also be domestic political considerations driving the debate around the nuclearization of South Korea. There is a long debate in Japan about the country’s pacifist constitution and reliance on the US for security. There is growing debate in South Korea about the country’s military capabilities and its ability to defend itself in the face of potential threats.

Implications for China:

If Japan and South Korea acquire nuclear weapons, it will create a new nuclear balance in the region, with the possibility of a nuclear arms race. This could increase tensions and instability in the region, and China could increase its nuclear arsenal in response. Nuclearization in South Korea and Japan could weaken China’s strategic edge and regional influence.

A nuclear-armed Japan and South Korea would weaken China’s regional power and might prompt a more aggressive response from China, which is attempting to expand its influence in the region.

China might see a direct danger to its security from Japan and South Korea going nuclear. This might cause China to adopt a more combative and aggressive attitude, which might eventually result in a military conflict. The development of nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea would have a significant impact on China’s regional power and strategic considerations, as well as raise regional tensions and instability.

Implications for the South China Sea:

The development of nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea may result in a rise in militarization and resource rivalry in the South China Sea, which could spark conflicts and can further destabilize the area. International politics in the South China Sea region may be impacted by Japan and South Korea going nuclear. The region’s smaller countries have already accused China of bullying, and the creation of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan could make matters more difficult diplomatically. Other nations in the region, like Vietnam and the Philippines, might be compelled to choose a position, which could result in a more polarized regional situation.

Implications for the US:

The nuclearization of South Korea and Japan would diplomatically weaken ties between the US and both states. Since the United States has long promoted nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the development of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea would be viewed as a failure of American foreign policy. Security-wise, the nuclearization of South Korea and Japan could lead to an uptick in regional tensions and a new arms race. This would increase the probability of a nuclear conflict and directly risk the security of the United States and its allies. Furthermore, the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia may raise the possibility of nuclear terrorism, which would be of great concern to the US.

Tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but would also increase tensions with China and North Korea and increase the chance of a nuclear exchange on the Korean Peninsula. Further destabilizing the area and weakening global non-proliferation efforts could be nuclear sharing agreements or South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons capability.

Conclusion:

It is the ultimate goal of any state to make itself secure in any given situation by relying less on other states and depending on itself more, Japan and South Korea are also doing the same thing. The development of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea would have profound and far-reaching effects on regional and global security, diplomacy, military tactics, economic ties, and non-proliferation programs. These developments would require the USA to reconsider its defense and foreign policy tactics in the region and might result in an uptick in hostilities between the US and China and Russia. Additionally, it might cause an arms race in the region, which will develop more unrest and a direct security danger to China as well. If Japan and South Korea go nuclear then it surely will boost the arms race in the region including the South China Sea.

Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA): An Overview

By
Dr. Ugur Turan
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Undoubtedly, Asia is on its way to becoming the fastest-developing continent in the world. Projected new trade routes, efforts to develop a sustainable system, and the significance of green transformation in the face of rising energy, food, and security demands. All of these are issues that deeply concern Member States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), from North Asia to the Indian Ocean and from East Asia to the Aegean Sea. However, how realistic are the ambitious carbon-neutral plans countries aim for in line with their green transformation goals? At this point, with its five dimensions, CICA offers confidence-building measures, dialogue, connectivity, synergy, and best practices for its Member States to achieve their goals.

At the Sixth CICA Summit, among the common issues highlighted by the distinguished Heads of State or Government and high-level representatives were combating climate change and the significance of CICA’s environmental dimension for future cooperation. Why is the environmental dimension so significant for the future of the CICA region?

The CICA environmental dimension has three priority areas: sustainable development, environment protection, and natural disaster management. Each priority area has its coordinator and co-coordinator.

For instance, Thailand is the coordinator for sustainable development, Mongolia is the coordinator for environment protection, where Bangladesh and China are co-coordinators, Iran is the coordinator for natural disaster management, and Bangladesh is a co-coordinator.

According to the updated CICA Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the Member States have specified the priorities for cooperation in environmental areas for the implementation of the CICA CBMs, such as sharing information on best practices concerning national policies on environmental protection and sustainable development, exchanging information on natural and industrial disasters in the countries, which, in their view, may affect their neighbors. In addition, seminars, workshops, conferences, and training are held within the priority areas of the CICA environmental dimension. In general, the topics coordinating and co-coordinating countries cover are green transformation, sustainable development, low-carbon developments, waste management, carbon markets, natural disasters, and circular economy.

Recent history has shown that Asia is exposed to various climatic events and natural disasters. CICA Member States were affected by sweltering weather conditions, drought floods in 2022, as well as earthquakes in early 2023. For example, Pakistan has had a challenging year because of floods. According to the World Bank, at least 7 million people were displaced and over 1,700 people died as a result of this disaster. The cost of floods in Pakistan is around 30 billion dollars.

Moreover, the World Health Organization reports that over 7.1 million Bangladeshis were displaced by climate change in 2022. China, India, Thailand, and the Middle East also had difficulties due to climate change last year. Recently, the world has experienced a devastating sequence of earthquakes in Türkiye. After the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the economic damage of climate crisis and natural disasters has been taken into account, and the question of how fragile countries are for the future has come to the fore.

CICA covers a broad geography, therefore observing various environmental characteristics. Member States are taking multiple actions to ensure sustainable development and environmental protection.

The major environmental problems in Asia include desertification, climate change, lack of water resources, deforestation, earthquakes, and forest fires. Indeed, there are environmentally vulnerable CICA countries. Among the most vulnerable Member States, according to University of Notre Dame’s Vulnerability index score of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), are Afghanistan in the 168th and Bangladesh in the 154th place. Pakistan ranks 147th, Cambodia is in 133rd place, and India ranks 132nd. The index evaluates a nation’s vulnerability, sensitivity, and capacity for climate change adaptation. There are 177 nations on the scale, and those with high rankings, close to zero, have great climate change resilience. Highest-ranking CICA Member States include Israel in the 14th place, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Türkiye sharing the 28th place followed by Kazakhstan in the 33rd place, the UAE in the 40th, and Qatar in the 44th.

The negative economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has brought countries closer to producing new solutions. Although developed and developing countries have different agendas, governments are shifting their economic targets to efficient systems aligned with sustainable development goals. Green transformation is one of the most prominent examples of this. Countries that aim to decarbonize their economies are investing more in green technology, fields such as carbon capture, mitigation and adaptation, circular economy, and water management. Diversifying energy sources is one of the essential steps in energy security.

UN Climate Change Conferences are significant to raise awareness and act together against extreme environmental events the world has been facing in recent years. For example, Egypt, a CICA Member State, hosted COP27 in 2022. Among the results drawn here was that nations decided for the first time to set up funds to pay developing countries for “loss and damage” caused by climate-related disasters. Moreover, it was important that China and the USA, the countries with the highest carbon emissions, decided to engage in climate diplomacy at COP27. Furthermore, COP28 will take place in the United Arab Emirates, another CICA Member State. From this point of view, it is a fact that the environmental theme becomes increasingly relevant in Asia.

The initiative of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to hold a High-level Conference in 2024 in Astana to identify environmental challenges among the CICA members was one of the major outcomes of the Sixth CICA Summit. Thanks to this meeting, the CICA region, and the entire world will benefit from the potential establishment of the CICA Council for Environmental Cooperation.

Indeed, it will be in the interest of the CICA Member States to hold the 2024 High-level Environmental Conference, where best practices can be shared among the CICA countries and a sustainable mutual dialogue is likely to be ensured. As a result, the CICA environmental dimension is expected to progress rapidly among other CBMs.

The 2024 High-level Environmental Conference is at the forefront of priority initiatives for the CICA Kazakh Chairmanship. Kazakhstan’s goal of being carbon neutral by 2060 sets an example for other countries in the region. As part of the preparations for the Conference, in early 2023, CICA Secretary General Ambassador Kairat Sarybay met with Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Kazakhstan Zulfiya Suleimenova.

The Secretary-General stated that the CICA Member States were extensively introducing green technologies, pursuing the ambitious goal of achieving carbon neutrality. In addition, within the scope of the preparations for the Conference on the environment, which is of utmost importance for the CICA Member States, the sides agreed to arrange a series of expert meetings of the CICA Member States to develop goals and objectives for the Conference.

There is no doubt that CICA is an evolving international organization, and the CICA environmental dimension is developing its capabilities. With the dialogue and support of CICA Member States, the interest in environmental topics is increasing gradually in line with the region’s sustainable development goals.

Lebanon’s Economic Challenges: The Root Causes

By
Habiba Ali
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Once known as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, Lebanon has faced an adverse economic crisis last year. The Lebanese economy has been struggling since late 2019 in an economic meltdown described by the World Bank as the “top 10, possibly top three most severe economic collapses worldwide since the 1850s”. This socioeconomic humanitarian crisis is driven by the Lebanese pound devaluation, inflation, limited access to foreign exchange, decreased foreign remittances, increased unemployment, and business closures. Every eight in ten persons are lacking even the basic life necessities.

This economic mess has its roots deep in the political system, economic policies, and history. The article will investigate and discuss the reasons behind the unrelenting economic crisis.

Sectarian Political System:

Lebanon is a multi-faith country having 18 different religious communities. According to Statistics Lebanon, 67.6 percent of the total population is comprised of Muslims. Out of which, 31.9 percent are Sunni Muslims and 31 percent are Shia Muslims. On the other hand, 32.4 percent of the population consists of Christians. Under the Lebanese National Pact, the prime minister will always be a Sunni Muslim, the president a Maronite Christian, and the speaker of the National Assembly a Shiʿi Muslim. The proposed amendments to the Ṭāʾif Accord transferred much of the presidential powers to a cabinet divided equally between Muslims and Christians. Apparently, this structure seems to be an effort to ensure equal representation in government but practically failed as the system has many shortcomings.
In reality, it was merely a division of power betwixt the elites of the time rather than a system focused to ensure good governance of a nation-state. Interestingly, the Sunni leadership got Saudi Arabia’s support and on the other hand, Iran supported Shia leadership which further makes the sectarian political system weak.
Furthermore, it resulted in a corrupt, fragile, patronage-based system, where instead of merit influential men distribute government jobs to receive loyalty and favor from employees. Existing divisions are further rooted in the system, which encourages the competition between sects for high positions in government departments.
According to the UN report, “Political leadership is completely out of touch with reality, including with the desperation they’ve created by destroying people’s lives. Lebanon is also one of the most unequal countries in the world, yet leadership seems unaware of this at best and comfortable with it at worst.”

Political Crisis:

Many social scientists have named the relationship between political instability and the economy a two-way relationship. Same in the case of Lebanon, it has been witnessed that the economic crisis is closely related to its political crisis.

In 2019, the planned taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and VoIP calls on applications such as WhatsApp brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets which made then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri submit his resignation. This uprising is known as October Revolution. In Aug 2020, the government had to face the public’s anger and outrage after the worst Beirut explosion. They believed that the tragic blast was proof of the government’s laziness and mismanagement. Consequently, then Prime Minister Hassan Diab decided to resign from his post. Najib Mikati is the current PM, who took charge on 10 September 2021. He took office 13 months after Diab resigned. In the meantime, Lebanon was under a caretaker government. Mikati one of the country’s richest men became Prime Minister for the third time. The resignations after every economic mess signify that no leader is having the capacity to take the country out of the crisis. Moreover, in this way they do not want to be held responsible and accountable for the financial instability.

Banking system

In the eyes of the Lebanese people, the alliance between the country’s ruling elite and the banking industry is the primary cause of the crisis.
The Lebanese pound was fixed to the dollar in the late 1990s. A fixed exchange rate of 1500 pounds to 1 dollar was used. The issue was that the economy of Lebanon was not robust enough to support the value. The government and banks were able to prop up the currency for a very long time in order to keep that peg. However, remittances that were protected from the global financial crisis in 2008 began to decline in 2011. This was a result of the Arab Spring escalating tensions in the rest of west Asia and war in neighboring Syria. The devastating war forced the Lebanese government to take in more than a million refugees, placing an enormous burden on the country’s resources. In addition, a significant portion of Lebanese banking loans and assets were destroyed. Prior to the financial crisis, Lebanon’s central bank Banque du Liban adopted a “financial engineering” operation in 2016. This turned out to be one of the main causes of Lebanon’s economic downfall. To draw foreign investors, finance government spending, and maintain the peg, the BDL literally invented FX reserves blacked by excessively high-interest rates.

Amendments in the Bank Secrecy Law

Lebanon banks were known for their remarkable secrecy laws. Consequently, it attracted large sums of money from dictators and corrupt officials from all over the globe, especially Middle East. Even in the 2019 October Revolution, the protesters demanded the restoration of stolen public funds from the corrupt ruling elite. In the original bill passed in 2020, banking secrecy could have been lifted to investigate “all financial crimes,” but parliament decided to remove that language thus restricting the law’s scope. As per a state-run National News Agency, this step has opened the door of investigation on current and former officials such as Cabinet ministers, civil servants, and legislators. IMF officials issued a letter to Lebanese officials stating that the law marked “a substantial reform … but few key deficiencies remain.” These amendments affected the amount of trust the Lebanese banks once had and thus lowered the money deposits.

The COVID-19 outbreak

Citizens’ rights have been compromised as a result of the financial crisis brought on by the pandemic since they cannot obtain the fundamental essentials of life, such as food, clothes, healthcare, and shelter.
In May 2020, the Lebanese government began talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the height of the pandemic, asking the latter for around $10 billion of financial assistance to overcome the crisis. Both parties also discussed a plan to rescue the Lebanese economy from the crisis, but the talks were delayed as politicians could not agree on the precise extent of the financial losses. This economic crisis proved to be a destabilizing factor for the healthcare system responding to COVID-19.

Despite the alarming increase in COVID-19 cases, the government decided not to impose a lockdown during Christmas and New Year holidays. As a result, there was a sharp increase in positive tests which surged to almost 6000 cases by mid-January 2021. Additionally, the primary healthcare centers’ resources have been depleted by the diversion of government funds, compromising the maintenance of their basic services. Even the hospitals had no emergency risk management plans for crises like epidemics. The devastation caused by the pandemic further worsened the already crumbling economy.

Beirut Explosion:

A horrific explosion on August 4, 2020, in the Beirut Port, ripped through the capital, leaving 218 people dead, 7,000 injured, and 300,000 displaced. Furthermore, with damaging 77,000 apartments and causing an estimated $3.8-4.6bn material damage, it is considered one of the worst non-nuclear explosions ever recorded.

Beyond the port, the blast destroyed houses, hospitals, schools, streets, and many businesses came to an end. This led to an economic loss estimated between $2.9 bn and $3.5 bn. The port which handles 60% of the country’s imports has for a long time been a crucial link in Lebanon’s supply chain of products and goods.  This incident also contributed to the collapse of the Lebanese pound.

It has been analyzed that the country’s sectarian political system formed the basis of majority instabilities. Furthermore, events such as the Covid-19 pandemic break out and the Beirut explosion intensified the drastic economic and political situation of the country. Furthermore, it has been found there is a strong two-way relationship between economic and political crises in Lebanon. All the above-discussed factors gave rise to poverty and inflation in the country. To improve the economic situation, Lebanon needs to enhance transparency and accountability by working on anti-corruption and anti-money frameworks. Moreover, it needs to establish a reliable and fair monetary and exchange rate system.

Pakistan and CARs: A Growing Partnership

By
manager
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Pakistan’s longstanding relationship with Central Asian Republics (CARs) has spanned over three decades, characterized by cordial diplomatic relations founded upon strong historical, religious, cultural, and geographical ties. Recognizing the independence of these Republics in the early 90s, Pakistan has held deep-seated regard for its diplomatic ties with the Central Asian region, including mutual economic, energy, and security cooperation. The bonds between Pakistan and the CARs have proven to be a source of stability in the region and an essential element in shaping the foreign policy of both parties. Over the past three decades, the relations have grown to the highest level and brought forward the strengthened cooperation in areas of connectivity and prosperity.

The Central Asian Republic encompasses Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and  Turkmenistan where we also include Azerbaijan as an important regional ally in boasting boasts abundant reserves of energy and natural resources, providing Pakistan with immense opportunities for trade and commerce. The majority of the population in these countries is Muslim, sharing a common history, identity, heritage, and religion with the people of Pakistan. Furthermore, the region lies closer to Pakistan. It is partially linked through the Wakhan Corridor in the Pamir and Karakoram mountain ranges, further cementing the deep connections between Pakistan and the CARs. These geographic and cultural similarities have led to a natural partnership, strengthening mutual ties and cooperation in various fields.

Pakistan’s unwavering commitment to strengthening its ties with the CARs since 1991 has been hindered by various challenges. The instability in neighboring Afghanistan and the subsequent onset of the Global War on Terror have limited Pakistan’s diplomatic options.

Moreover, the scourge of extremism and terrorism has posed a persistent threat to the region’s people, making it difficult for Pakistan to diversify its diplomatic outreach. However, the CARs’ membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has presented numerous opportunities for increased cooperation. The SCO has been instrumental in promoting regional stability and enhancing economic, cultural, and security ties between Pakistan and the CARs, helping to pave the way for deeper collaboration in the future. Despite the challenges, Pakistan’s commitment to strengthening its relations with the CARs has remained steadfast, believing that cooperation between these nations will yield significant benefits for the entire region.

Over the past three decades, the close interaction and increasing cooperation between Pakistan and the CARs have opened up a plethora of opportunities for both parties. The partnerships have facilitated high-level visits, and bilateral and multilateral discussions based on mutual trust, and shared benefits, allowing both sides to explore and leverage each other’s strengths. The areas of cooperation have spanned across various sectors, including the economy, energy, defense, and diplomacy. With the passage of time, the nature of this cooperation has evolved and become more strategic in response to the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. The deepening of ties between Pakistan and the CARs is a testament to the mutual benefits of sustained engagement and cooperation, presenting a promising future for both parties and beyond.

The announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013 marked a turning point in regional cooperation mechanisms between Pakistan and the CARs. The signing of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2015, as the pilot project of the BRI, further cemented the relationship between the two parties. This landmark initiative has led to development of critical infrastructure, including highways, railways, and ports, which has significantly enhanced regional connectivity and trade. Additionally, Pakistan’s full membership in the SCO in 2019 injected new vigor into the relationship between the two regions, providing a platform for deeper engagement and collaboration in diverse fields, including security, culture, and economic cooperation. These regional cooperation mechanisms have facilitated sustained engagement and laid the foundation for greater cooperation between Pakistan and the CARs, enabling both parties to leverage their strengths and enhance mutual benefits.

In addition to Europe and the Middle East, Pakistan’s relationship with the CARs has garnered significant interest in recent years, primarily due to the region’s vast energy resources and emerging business markets. However, the CARs’ landlocked status has limited their ability to access blue waters for international trade, making Pakistan a crucial transit corridor for the region through the CPEC. Pakistan has a strategic interest in becoming a significant trading partner for the CARs and is committed to treating all states in the region equally. The development of CPEC has facilitated the creation of infrastructure for the CARs to access international markets through the deep-sea port of Gwadar, enhancing regional connectivity and economic development. By leveraging its strategic location, Pakistan is well-positioned to emerge as a hub of regional trade and investment, providing significant benefits for CARs and beyond.

The economic dimension of the relationship between Pakistan and the CARs remains a primary driver of cooperation. As per the data published by the State Bank of Pakistan for the Financial Year 2022, Pakistan holds a net trade surplus of $42.19 million with the CARs. The first quarter of 2022 saw a 29% increase in Pakistan’s exports to the region. However, these disparities in trade flows should be seen as something other than a cause for concern, as they are primarily influenced by differences in economic structures, market demand, and geographical distance. With a strong focus on improving regional connectivity and enhancing economic cooperation through initiatives such as the CPEC, Pakistan and the CARs are well-positioned to expand their trade and investment ties in the coming years.

The statistics related to economic relations between Pakistan and the CARs present a positive image of the region, which can be further improved. It is important to view the trade potential with the CARs in the context of the shift from geo-strategy to geo-economy under Pakistan’s National Security Policy of 2022. Pakistan’s position as a valuable trading partner in the region is underscored by its positive trade intensity, with exports of cereals, oil, and pharmaceuticals, and imports of iron, steel, and cotton. As Pakistan and the CARs work towards strengthening their economic cooperation, there is immense potential for further growth and expansion of trade ties.

Energy cooperation is a crucial aspect of regional collaboration, and Pakistan has a keen interest in the energy-rich resources of Central Asia. The CASA-1000 power project is a prime example of the close partnership between Pakistan and Central Asian countries in the energy sector. The project aims to transmit hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan by the end of 2024. Additionally, the TAPI gas pipeline project involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India seeks to enhance energy cooperation. Still, its future is still being determined due to the prevailing security situation in Afghanistan and India’s lack of interest. Despite these challenges, Pakistan remains committed to exploring opportunities for energy cooperation with Central Asian countries.

In the past 30 years, the relationship between Pakistan and the CARs has evolved into a mutually beneficial partnership with positive outcomes. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) provide a significant boost to regional connectivity, and both Pakistan and the CARs are committed to linking CPEC with Central Asia. However, Afghanistan presents a challenge to this plan, as it holds the key to transregional connectivity. Despite this, efforts by Uzbekistan and Pakistan to promote peace and security in Afghanistan are often underappreciated. The Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif Railway line, which runs across the Uzbek-Afghan border, has been agreed to be extended up to Peshawar in Pakistan via Kabul. Once completed, the Trans-Afghan railway line will significantly reduce transit time from 30 days to just a few days between Central Asia and Pakistan.

Energy resources are another crucial component of regional cooperation between Pakistan and the CARs. Central Asia is rich in energy resources, while Pakistan lacks cheaper energy resources and remains interested in the energy reserves of Central Asia. The Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) power project and the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) gas pipeline are both examples of successful cooperation in the region. However, the future of TAPI remains uncertain due to the security situation in Afghanistan and India’s lack of interest.

Security cooperation is also an essential aspect of regional cooperation between Pakistan and the CARs. The CARs and Pakistan have previously engaged in security cooperation under the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, the recent security situation in Afghanistan has raised concerns, and all neighbors of Afghanistan, including Pakistan and the CARs, have held multiple rounds of talks to find avenues of cooperation on border management, spill over of terrorists, and security of trade routes. All parties see peace in Afghanistan as a precursor to durable peace and stability across the region.

As the CARs and Pakistan enter into their fourth decade of diplomatic relations, the pattern of close cooperation is achieving new heights. The new decade is the decade of completing multiple mega projects, including CASA-1000 and the Trans-Afghan railway, which will connect Central Asia and Pakistan via Afghanistan. Under its National Security Policy 2022, Pakistan is expanding its economic outreach into the region and is targeting a trade volume of $1 billion with a surplus in the new decade. There is huge untapped potential to increase cooperation in areas of energy, economy, connectivity, and security, and it is expected that the partnership between Pakistan and the CARs will continue to flourish in the years to come.

Iran-Saudi Arabia Rapprochement: A Temporary Détente?

By
Dr Hamid Iqbal
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In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, at right, shakes hands with Saudi national security adviser Musaad bin Mohammed al-Aiban, at left, as Wang Yi, China's most senior diplomat, looks on, at center, for a photo during a closed meeting held in Beijing, Saturday, March 11, 2023. Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed Friday to reestablish diplomatic relations and reopen embassies after seven years of tensions. The major diplomatic breakthrough negotiated with China lowers the chance of armed conflict between the Mideast rivals, both directly and in proxy conflicts around the region. (Luo Xiaoguang/Xinhua via AP)

The former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1859–1865) once stated that, “in international relations, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests”. This rationality of state actors’ trigger relations in the field of politics, security/strategic, economic, and at the socio-culture domain. Since then, leaders around the world have invoked it not only to justify their policies both at domestic and international level but also to take actions, whatever deem necessary to peruse their national interests broadly defined in terms of power/security maximization (mostly) on one hand, and economic progress and stability, on the other hand. For example, Great Britain (the colonizer) and the US (the colonized) who were once enemies are now the closest and trustworthy allies. The former, even supported the later when the rest of the world denied all kind of support during the Iraq War of 2003. In this backdrop the ongoing Saudi-Iran rapprochement which the Chinese government facilitated and mediated to bring the two arch regional rivals to commence a new journey and forget the thorny past strained in blood and hostility. Different scholars around the world have responded differently based on their personal experiences of the world of politics. To some, this will marshal regional stability and dilute the existing power competition and proxy wars while others believe it as the ‘beginning of the end’ in itself due to historic rivalry of the two regional rival powers.

The decision taken by both to resume diplomatic relations seems somewhat encouragement for both states in particular and the regional level at large rooted in procuring national interests. In the pretext of Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s (MBS) ‘vision of 2030’, Riyadh objective is the modernization and diversification of the country’s economy away from hydrocarbons. To achieve the desired objective Saudi needs oil drilling, its transportation and sales without disrupting which necessitates to lower the regional rivalry with Iran. This will also bring foreign direct investment in the country. In addition, the monarchy, who has already depleted its resources at the regional level fighting proxy’ wars against the arch rival, can be saved and diversified somewhere to boast its economy. At this regard patch-up with Iran is very rational decision what the realists follow to believe that is making friends and disbanding enemies if it serve the national interests of a state. The new chapter between Saudi-Iran might result in ending the continued violence and instability in Yemen in particular and in Arab Peninsula in general, which are more of geopolitical nature than religious.

This will also help MBS to come out of greater influence of the United States which had created many thorns in the relationship between Riyadh and Washington. Biden’s government has weaponized human rights against Saudi especially, the Jamal Khashoggi murder and the human rights violation inside Saudi and Yemen, that had jolted the MBS led regime with its constant threat of reprimand. American buying of Saudi oil, the dominant export commodity of the oil rich kingdom combined with an anti-Iran narrative had sustained the otherwise thorny relations.

The change comes in light of MBS, reimagining Middle East approach where in his aim to transform the Middle East comes in light of making it the next Europe. In this regard, Saudi led-alliance normalization of its relations with Israel and its explicit recognition was the first step.

This rapprochement comes at a time when Iran is passing through tough time facing domestic, regional and international pressure. Domestically, Iran faces the ‘off and on’ masses protest due to unconstitutional killing of individuals, unemployment and the price hike of the daily commodities. Regionally, Iran is worried about the volatile situation in Afghanistan on one side, and the regional contestation against Saudi led-alliance and the mounting pressure from the Israel on the other side. While internationally, Iran is under constant sanctions from the US, UN and its affiliated bodies and Europe also. Only China and Russia are believed as friend in need who the US pressure to resume economic and military relations.

The ongoing regional rapprochement reaches at a time where the US and Israel is openly accusing the Iranian nuclear program that it is just shy of ‘weapon-grade’ enrichment of 90 percent, a central cause of concern for both the US and Israel. By fending off relations with Riyadh, Tehran can assume it as an opportunity to divert its energy into more constructive engagement internally to address the Iranian grievances. Regionally, Tehran probably will allow for greater defense related stability and increase in its energy options with regard to both Saudi Arabia and China. In addition, Tehran might gamble that Saudi will be less motivated to joint US-Israel actions against them where Riyadh is expected to continue cooperation with Israel and US in military and intelligence domain. Lastly, Iran’s interest apart from energy would lay in getting political and diplomatic support from the Saudi Kingdom with regards to key issues in the ME such as Iran’s relations against Israel and offsetting American political, diplomatic support to Israel. This positive gesture from both might lead to further economic and commercial cooperation between the two arch rivals of the ME and in resolution of the outstanding unresolved conflict of interests.

As for as China’s approach to world politics is founded in “Strategic-Partnership Diplomacy” which is based on pursuance of its national interest and establishing bilateral relations rather than choosing sides and balancing against a third party. This policy enables Beijing to increase its influence in Gulf region without intimidating the other; a policy that no other power has achieved yet. China’s breakthrough diplomatic victory in the ME, would ensure the smooth flow of energy to its industry that has been disrupted due to proxy wars and the US presence in the region. Chinese grand strategy is not to involve in security issues. Therefore, it is not becoming a guarantor. It is more concerned with energy needs and wants a cordial working relation with both. The Geopolitical shift is evident in the case when Iran declares not to support his proxies in KSA proximity.

Last, but not the least, scholars believe that the Chinese intrusion in the ME region is its own fault. The US practically abandoned the region since its withdrawal from Syria that resulted in power vacuum and was filed by the Chinese. Though the US was helpful in finalizing the ‘Abraham Accord’ but failed to practically provide what the its allies were looking for. Though the US has welcomed the détente between the regional rivals. But still believe what John Kirby said that “As far as Chinese influence there, or in Africa or in Latin America, it’s not like we have blinders on. We certainly watch China as they try to gain influence and footholds elsewhere around the world in their own selfish interests”.

To conclude, it had to happen one day. Both countries are acting pragmatically. As far as the role of china and the US is concerned, there is a lot of exaggeration I would say. Day before the normalization signing, Saudis had requested the US to help it in its defence and civil nuclear program. The US is and would remain a dominant actor in Middle East. China is just procuring its economic interest. Neither it has the resolve nor the capacity to replace the US. It has more to lose if the region remains unstable as we saw Houthis’ missiles hitting Saudi oil facilities impacted the whole world including China in recent past. As far as the situation around is concerned, I believe that the sectarian motivated proxy wars have been the principal thorn of contestation between the two countries. Their resolution and its fallout in terms of overall development for the region will depend upon the commitment of the two bitter rivals to this rapprochement. The episode can be marked as what happened decades ago between the US and China, although no other comparison can be drawn, but just rapprochement between two rivals. If we view how the relations have transpired over decades, it is evident that it is a temporary detent thing….ME security and geostrategic structure is way too complex and hostile variably to settle for quick peace between two rivals for which we need to understand the ‘Intra-Civilizational Clash’ between Riyadh and Tehran.

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