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US-China Trade War: The Battle To Dominate Chipmaking

By
Chiara Cacco
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0
chip battle

Though the US and European corporations used to dominate worldwide electronics, it may be tough to picture today. The West dominated in new technology and generated the most sophisticated chips worldwide for much of the 20th century. But things had evolved by the 1990s.

Japanese companies had jumped ahead, producing chips cheaper and more powerful than those produced abroad. Fast forward to now, and almost all the world’s chip manufacturing occurs in Asia; the US and Europe both account for less than 10% of the worldwide supply.

Almost all the world’s chip manufacture occurs in Asia; the US and Europe both account for less than 10% of the worldwide supply.

There are benefits and drawbacks, nevertheless, associated with Asia’s digital hegemony. While massive economies of scale have helped to lower prices, governments outside the area are becoming more concerned about industry concentration in this age of decoupling and de-risking. Global leaders are not blind to the hazards of having most of the world’s innovative chips produced in Taiwan, an economy seen as a renegade province by China.

Only heightened these worries are pandemic-era chip shortages and China’s significant increase in domestic semiconductor output. China has been making gains at the cheap end of the market and has for years pushed to enter the chips business.

Driven by geopolitical conflict and supply constraints, governments are increasing semiconductor manufacturing and providing subsidies to encourage top chipmakers to build plants within their borders. Complementing loans, guarantees, and tax credits, the US CHIPS and Science Act pledges $39 billion in grants for chipmakers.

The US CHIPS and Science Act pledges $39 billion in grants for chipmakers.

The European Union has its multibillion-dollar project across the water to increase industrial capability. Rising economies like Saudi Arabia and India also want to break through.

Moving semiconductor supply chains is no mean achievement. Decades of centralizing have solidified Asia’s indisputable center for semiconductor manufacture. For high-end semiconductors, which are crucial for artificial intelligence uses, Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics dominate the market. Leading the market for legacy chips, less modern but very efficient semiconductors used in everything from blenders to autos, are manufacturers in Southeast Asia.

Few nations can gather the means and drive to compete in a time when new high-end chip facilities often cost north of $10 billion. Should any nation recover any market share, it is the United States. America still has major manufacturing capability and chipmaking knowledge.

Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics dominate the market for high-end semiconductors.

It has also been particularly successful in drawing in innovative chipmakers. For instance, TSMC is developing a plant in Arizona hoping to generate next-generation semiconductors in a few years. Most crucially, Washington has been the least shy about devoting the funds needed to bring about it.

Still, even the United States cannot entirely do it by itself. New chipmaking facilities will require imported Asian goods, Japanese and European gear, or both. At least for the foreseeable future, US-made chips will also continue to be imported into Asia for assembly, testing, and packaging. And that just after manufacturing starts: TSMC’s Arizona facility has already experienced many delays.

What then has the industry ahead of it? A complete exodus of chip manufacturers from Asia seems implausible for all the forces altering global supply networks. Western factories under development largely help to diversify production bases and strengthen supply networks against shocks. Still, there is a price involved. Longer supply channels and more redundancy will entail lesser margins and more expenses.

Moving semiconductor supply chains is no mean achievement. Decades of centralizing have solidified Asia’s indisputable center for semiconductor manufacture.

Furthermore, adding to this is separating supplier chains. Supply chains will become increasingly segmented, and prices will rise as nations try to protect vital chipmaking capability and knowledge. Working with partners, the US is limiting the sale of essential technology and chipmaking equipment to China New foreign investment seems to be moving away from the nation.

It is not certain whether these initiatives will be successful. Isolation might force China to boost its own efforts at chip value chain elevation. Eventually, after all, necessity is the mother of innovation. And at an eye-watering $142 billion, estimates by the Washington-based Semiconductor Industry Association show China’s own chips drive surpasses expenditure by Western governments.

23 Years After 9/11: Afghanistan’s Turbulent Path And Pakistan’s Heavy Toll

By
Arshad Mehmood
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9/11 Attacks

Twenty-three years have passed since the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which reshaped the global geopolitical landscape and placed Afghanistan at the center of international conflict.

The attacks, planned and orchestrated by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden from his base in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, prompted the United States to launch a military invasion. The US-led coalition aimed to dismantle terrorist networks and overthrow the Taliban regime, which had provided sanctuary to bin Laden and his followers.

The relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda is particularly troubling for Western governments.

Over two decades later, Afghanistan remains a nation struggling with the consequences of conflict, instability, and the aftershocks of the US war on terror.

The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 marked the beginning of what would become the longest war in US history. The primary objectives of the invasion were to eliminate al Qaeda, capture or kill bin Laden, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist haven.

In the early years of the war, these goals appeared within reach, as coalition forces ousted the Taliban from power and established a new Afghan government. However, the mission evolved into a complex and protracted counterinsurgency effort as the years passed.

The primary objectives of the invasion were to eliminate al Qaeda, capture or kill bin Laden, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist haven.

The Taliban regrouped, launching a violent insurgency that would persist for years. Despite efforts to build Afghan security forces and promote nation-building, the war became increasingly costly in terms of lives and resources.

By 2011, a significant milestone was reached when US Navy SEALs located and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. However, the war in Afghanistan raged on, with little end in sight. The human toll of the conflict was staggering.

More than 3,500 coalition troops, including over 2,400 Americans, lost their lives, while tens of thousands of Afghan civilians were killed in the violence.

The war also displaced millions of people and destroyed much of Afghanistan’s infrastructure, leaving behind a deeply divided and fragmented society.

The country struggled to achieve lasting peace or stability despite the billions of dollars spent on reconstruction efforts.

Also read: Pakistan Whither? Where Do We Go From Here?

In August 2021, nearly 20 years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States completed its military withdrawal from Afghanistan, under the direction of President Joe Biden. The rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the swift return of the Taliban to power stunned the world.

Images of desperate Afghans crowding Kabul’s airport, attempting to flee the country as US troops evacuated, became an enduring symbol of the chaotic end to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

The fall of Kabul marked the end of America’s longest war, but it also raised critical questions about the long-term success of the intervention.

Today, the Taliban once again control the country, and although they had promised a more moderate approach compared to their brutal rule in the 1990s, their governance is marked by widespread repression.

The Taliban’s resurgence after two decades of US military presence has cast doubt on the overall effectiveness of the war effort. While the initial goal of removing the Taliban from power was accomplished in 2001, the group’s return in 2021 underscores the enduring difficulties of establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Today, the Taliban once again control the country, and although they had promised a more moderate approach compared to their brutal rule in the 1990s, their governance is marked by widespread repression. The Taliban have imposed severe restrictions on women’s rights, barred girls from secondary education, and curtailed freedom of expression, drawing widespread condemnation from the international community.

Since the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan has plunged into a deep humanitarian crisis. The collapse of the economy, combined with international sanctions and the suspension of foreign aid, has driven millions of Afghans into extreme poverty.

According to the United Nations, nearly half of Afghanistan’s population, roughly 20 million people, is now facing acute food insecurity. The situation is especially dire for children, many of whom suffer from severe malnutrition due to the lack of food and medical supplies.

Humanitarian organizations have struggled to operate in the country under Taliban rule, further complicating efforts to provide relief to those in need.

The fate of Afghan women and girls is particularly tragic in the post-9/11 era. Under the previous government, Afghan women had made significant strides in education, employment, and civil rights, supported by international aid and advocacy efforts.

The fate of Afghan women and girls is particularly tragic in the post-9/11 era.

However, since the Taliban’s return, these hard-won gains have been systematically erased. The Taliban’s policies, including banning women from working in most public roles and restricting their freedom of movement, have drawn sharp criticism from global human rights organizations.

Female activists who once worked to build a more inclusive and progressive Afghanistan now find themselves in hiding, silenced, or forced into exile. Despite international pressure, the Taliban have remained resolute in its repressive policies, further isolating Afghanistan from the global community.

Another pressing concern is the resurgence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. One of the key justifications for the US invasion in 2001 was to prevent the country from being used as a base for international terrorist networks. While al Qaeda’s presence has been significantly diminished, the threat posed by extremist groups remains.

The United Nations has warned that both al Qaeda and the Islamic State’s Khorasan branch (IS-K) continue to operate in Afghanistan.

The relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda is particularly troubling for Western governments, as credible reports are indicating that the two groups maintain close ties. This is despite the Taliban’s assurances that Afghanistan will not be used for terrorism. Meanwhile, IS-K has launched a series of deadly attacks, targeting Afghan civilians and Taliban fighters alike. The group’s growing presence in Afghanistan poses a serious threat to regional and global security.

One of the most pressing concerns for Pakistan is the Afghan Taliban’s backing of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Afghanistan’s instability has profound implications for the broader region.

Neighboring Pakistan, which has historically played a complex and often controversial role in Afghan affairs, has borne the brunt of the conflict in Afghanistan. As a major non-NATO ally in the U.S.-led war on terror, Pakistan played a pivotal role in providing intelligence, logistics, and military support to the coalition forces.

However, this involvement came at a steep price. Pakistan has lost more than 80,000 lives — both civilians and members of its security forces — over the past two decades due to the rise in terrorism, much of it fueled by cross-border militancy.

The spillover effects of the war in Afghanistan have made Pakistan a battleground for extremist groups, leading to devastating attacks on Pakistani soil. Despite these sacrifices, Pakistan continues to grapple with the consequences of its alliance with the US, as it faces growing internal security challenges and rising incidents of terrorism along its border with Afghanistan.

Also read: Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda Asked For FATA Revival. Imran Said Yes

Despite Pakistan hosting millions of Afghan refugees over the past four decades, the relationship between the two countries remains fraught with tension.

One of the most pressing concerns for Pakistan is the Afghan Taliban’s backing of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a banned militant group responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on Pakistani security forces.

This support has led to a surge in cross-border terrorism, exacerbating Pakistan’s internal security challenges.

While Pakistan has long provided sanctuary to Afghan refugees fleeing conflict, the Afghan Taliban’s tolerance and protection of the TTP have deepened mistrust and strained bilateral relations, complicating efforts to achieve stability in the region.

The withdrawal of US forces and the return of the Taliban have further complicated Pakistan’s security landscape, with cross-border terrorism and militant activities on the rise.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s role in the war on terror has strained its relationships both regionally and internationally.

Domestically, the war has exacerbated political tensions and economic instability. The influx of millions of Afghan refugees has placed a significant burden on Pakistan’s already struggling economy, while terrorist attacks have eroded public confidence in the government’s ability to maintain security.

Regionally, Pakistan’s relationship with the US remains complicated, as the two countries continue to navigate the legacy of their partnership in the war on terror.

The challenges of cross-border terrorism, extremism, and economic uncertainty persist, making it difficult for Pakistan to emerge from the shadow of the war on terror.

Afghanistan’s future is now being shaped by the interests of regional powers such as China, Russia, and Iran. These countries have sought to engage with the Taliban, driven by concerns about stability and the potential for Afghanistan to become a hub for extremism once again. China, in particular, has expressed interest in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and strategic location, while maintaining a cautious approach to dealing with the Taliban regime.

The United States and its Western allies continue to grapple with how to engage with a Taliban-led Afghanistan. Since the Taliban’s takeover, most Western governments have refrained from recognizing the regime, instead opting for diplomatic isolation and the provision of conditional humanitarian aid.

However, this strategy has been criticized for exacerbating the suffering of ordinary Afghans, while allowing other powers to gain influence in the region.

The challenge of how to support the Afghan people without legitimizing the Taliban remains a central dilemma for the international community.

As the world marks 23 years since the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan remains a symbol of the complex and often tragic legacy of international intervention.

The country continues to grapple with violence, poverty, and instability, and its people face an uncertain future under Taliban rule.

While the initial objectives of the US invasion — to defeat al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power—were achieved, the long-term consequences of the war in Afghanistan are deeply troubling.

The country continues to grapple with violence, poverty, and instability, and its people face an uncertain future under Taliban rule.

For many Afghans, the last two decades have been defined by conflict, displacement, and lost opportunities.

As Afghanistan navigates its future, the international community must confront the difficult question of how to engage with a country that remains, 23 years after 9/11, at the heart of global security concerns.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has consistently issued warnings about al-Qaeda’s renewed presence, noting that Afghanistan has once again become a sanctuary for the group. According to UNSC reports, al-Qaeda now operates eight training centers and maintains an arms depot within the country.

Alongside al Qaeda, the UNSC has flagged the growing threat posed by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the IS-K.

Both groups are active in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, raising alarm over potential cross-border attacks that could destabilize neighboring regions.

Partners, Not Allies!

By
Musavir Hameed Barech
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0
Indo-US partnership

Former US President Barack Obama described the United States and Indian partnership as the most important of the 21st century, based on shared values and common interests. However, the relationship is often described as a strategic partnership, not an alliance.

Various factors contributed to the fall of the unnatural partnership between Washington and New Delhi. The most prominent among them was the US officially unveiling the Indian plot to kill a Sikh separatist leader and concerns over the domestic policies of the Modi administration. Similarly, the recent visit of Modi to Moscow further deteriorated Indo-US relations.

Obama described the United States and Indian partnership as the most important of the 21st century.

In retrospect, the United States and India enjoyed friendly relations until the signing of the Soviet-Indo 20-year friendship treaty in 1970. Indian Prime Minister Nehru initially sowed the seeds of amicable ties between the US and India during his visit to the US in 1949. The 1962 conflict between China and India further strengthened US-Indian relations, as the US provided military and logistical support to India.

However, policy elites in India expressed alarm over Pakistan’s move towards joining the bloc of capitalists—led by the West. India understood the seriousness of the situation and, in order to gain benefits from both and safeguard its own national interests, encouraged non-alignment from the US-led capitalist and the Soviet Union-led communist blocs during the early phases of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War resulted in the improvement of Indo-US ties; however, it was not long-lasting due to the Indian experiment of a nuclear explosion in 1998, which led to economic sanctions on India. The turning point in the relationship between India and the US was the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002, which committed both nations to work together to improve their relationship.

India’s perceived hypocritical role in QUAD pushed the rest of the three QUAD countries to form another alliance named SQUAD.

Furthermore, the US, led by Barack Obama, and India, led by Manmohan Singh, struck a civilian nuclear agreement that allowed India to meet its nuclear energy needs even though India had not joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) — a group of forty-eight nuclear supplier countries that seek to propagate the nuclear export for peaceful purposes and discourage nuclear-related export for military purposes.

The interests of the US and India diverge on many fronts. To highlight some, India’s relations with Russia have further strained US-India relations. India’s continuous reluctance to criticize Russia for the invasion of Ukraine and its purchase of Russian oil despite sanctions have badly impacted relations between Washington and New Delhi.

Most recently, Modi, on the eve of his visit to Russia, received the Russian highest award ‘The Order of St Andrew’ from the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, which irritated the US-led Western bloc and resulted in a warning from the US Ambassador to India, Eric Garcetti, to not take the US-India relations for granted.

India’s continuous reluctance to criticize Russia for the invasion of Ukraine… has badly impacted relations between Washington and New Delhi.

Through the abovementioned visit of Modi, Putin tried to refute the impression of long Russian isolation—propagated by the Western bloc. Similarly, strong criticism also came from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who expressed disappointment and called this meetup a blow to the peace effort.

Additionally, the US officially unveiled a plot to assassinate the US-based Sikh separatist leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun and warned the Modi administration about transnational terrorism, highlighting tensions. The unveiling of this incident depicts the unnatural partnership between the US and India. Before this plot, the US also criticized the Indian administration over the allegation by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau regarding the killing of Hardeep Sing Nijjar in September 2023.

On a similar note, the US has repeatedly shown concern over the domestic policies of the Modi administration, such as the arrest of Delhi Chief Minister Aam Admi Party head Arvind Kejriwal just before the general elections and the promulgation of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which discourages Muslims from the subcontinent from becoming permanent citizens of India.

The only factor that pushes both countries to work together is the continuous rise of China’s assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region.

The most celebrated alliance, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in the Asia-Pacific among the US, India, Australia, and Japan, has also seen a plethora of issues in reaching a single decision to respond robustly to rivals like Russia and China. Due to India’s close ties with Russia, QUAD countries did not reach a consensus to condemn Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in a joint statement on the eve of the QUAD premiers meeting and in the recent foreign ministers meeting. India’s perceived hypocritical role in QUAD pushed the rest of the three QUAD countries to form another alliance in the broader Asia Pacific named SQUAD, which includes the Philippines.

Despite these issues, both India and the US have only a convergence of interest in terms of dealing with China in the perceived Indo-Pacific region. The continuous rise of China in that region is not only threatening the hegemony of the US, but also India sees this as a threat to its national interest in the region. For this purpose, both countries have signed various military and non-military pacts, which include the Logistic Exchange of Memorandum of Agreements LEMOA, under which both countries can capitalize on the port’s presence in the region, both for military and civilian purposes.

The second of such agreement includes the Communication and Compatibility Security Agreement (COMCASA), under which the US provides India with sophisticated communication technology. Similarly, the last of three defense agreements was signed in 2018 named the Basic Exchange of Communication Agreements (BECA), which meant the sharing of satellite information. Through BECA, India will be able to utilize the presence of four thousand US satellites in space.

Through BECA, India will be able to utilize the presence of four thousand US satellites in space.

The relations between the US and India are characterized by a partnership rather than an alliance. Both have disagreements on various geopolitical issues; however, the only factor that pushes both countries to work together is the continuous rise of China’s assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington and New Delhi are determined to counter the growing assertiveness of China by joining hands together in the Asia-Pacific region.

Pakistan Whither? Where Do We Go From Here?

By
Murtaza Solangi
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0
Taliban

News Analysis

 

Beleaguered boys of PTI led by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur set new precedents on Sunday, September 8, in their Islamabad rally. They verbally attacked all institutions of national power, including media, and threatened to create anarchy if their party was not facilitated to get into power and the criminal cases against Imran Khan and others were not withdrawn.

The next day when the journalists protested against the chief minister’s verbal assaults, the new PTI leadership led by Chairman Barrister Gohar and Omar Ayub tendered an unconditional apology to journalists over his remarks. However, hours after this apology, Imran, the incarcerated PTI leader, expressed full support to the abusive, abrasive, obnoxious and irresponsible attitude of the chief minister, and declared Omar Ayub and Barrister Gohar as cowards, saying there should be no place for them in his party. When the pressure further mounted, Imran Khan, known for his flip flops, made a mild criticism on Gandapur only related to his attacks on media, but supported him on other counts.

Amid this scenario, the PTI MNAs were hauled up from the vicinity of the parliament with some reportedly picked up from its premises.

Appeasement of the terrorists is part of the bone marrow of Imran Khan’s PTI, who genuinely earned the title of Taliban Khan.

While the police and other law enforcement agencies deny arresting PTI MNAs from the premises of the parliament, Speaker Ayaz Sadiq has taken a strong exception to the incident after a protest not only from the PTI but also from the treasury benches, especially the PPP. While the speaker is conducting an inquiry, has suspended some of the National Assembly security staff, and reprimanded Islamabad Police and the local administration, the ripple effects of these arrests are still reverberating.

Also read: Address The Bullies Before They Become Frankensteins

As this was happening, a new drama of the disappearance and incommunicado of Gandapur in Islamabad unfolded. The reports suggested that the chief minister was called in Islamabad for a meeting and given a tough window dressing after his verbal attacks. For good eight-nine hours, he was in an information black hole. After his reappearance, he spoke in Peshawar where he not only threatened the federal government but also intimidated the security establishment. This time around, he put the entire blame of the deteriorating security situation in the province on the military establishment and unilaterally vowed to engage Afghan Taliban to address the problem in his province.

The only purpose of this bravado seems to pressurize the security establishment and the federal government to seek favors to spare Imran Khan from the possible military trial and conviction in 190-million-pound kickback case. Given the hostile attitude of his party, there is no chance that the establishment and the federal government will buckle in. The talks with Afghan Taliban by a provincial government is seen as a red rag and already blasted by Defense Minister Khawaja Asif. Even in most confederal states, the foreign relations remain a central government domain. No federal republic has surrendered foreign affairs to any federating unit ever.

Negotiating with a hostile foreign power that provides safe sanctuaries as well as operational and logistical support to the terrorists killing our soldiers and civilians is an outright declaration of war against the federal government.

Negotiating with a hostile foreign power that provides safe sanctuaries as well as operational and logistical support to the terrorists killing our soldiers and civilians is an outright declaration of war against the federal government. Appeasement of the terrorists is part of the bone marrow of Imran Khan’s PTI, who genuinely earned the title of Taliban Khan. The terrorism spike is clearly visible after the concessions given to the TTP as a result of the negotiations conducted under Imran-Faiz nexus, rehabilitating thousands of terrorists and release of hundreds of others along with financial compensation. The hostile interim government of Afghan Taliban has recently conducted attacks on Pakistani military checkpoints posts as well.

Also read: Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda Asked For FATA Revival. Imran Said Yes

Given the grave security situation, any negotiations by a weak and vulnerable provincial government with an aggressive and hostile foreign power and a terrorist outfit supported by it will only embolden the terrorists and will be tantamount to surrendering territory to them. The past experience of negotiations by the Pakistani state too has clearly proved that it has only helped the terrorists. The fundamental motive behind the negotiations with terrorists at this point seems more of a new pressure tactic by Imran Khan to get relief in the possible military trial and 190-million-pound case.

While Governor’s rule in the province can’t be ruled out due to the security situation getting out of the provincial administration’s control, its period with two extensions can’t be extended beyond six months under the constitutional scheme after the 18th Amendment.

The biggest problem, however, will remain the isolation of the federal authorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as no political party in the province currently supports them. The federal authorities need to engage with other parties including the ANP, PTM and JUI-F besides strengthening the provincial administrative setup. Defeating terrorists and taking the winds out of the sails of the overaggressive PTI won’t be possible without ending this isolation, the federal authorities face today in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Pakistan Interest Rate Down By 2%

By
Info Desk
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Pakistan Rupee

KARACHI – The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) on Thursday slashed the interest rates by 2%, a move which was expected given a marked decrease in inflation.

It means the key policy rate now stands at 17.5% against the previous level of 19.5%, after Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decided to go for another rate cut by 200 basis points.

The reasons mentioned by the central bank are decline in oil and food prices as well as delaying the planned energy tariff hikes.

“Both headline and core inflation fell sharply over the past two months. The pace of this disinflation has somewhat exceeded the Committee’s earlier expectations, mainly due to the delay in the implementation of planned increases in administered energy prices and favorable movement in global oil and food prices.”

The latest rate cut is the third in a row as Pakistan has been witnessing a constant decline in inflation during the past months. Last year saw the SBP hiking rates to 22%, a record high in the country’s history.

Earlier, the consumer price index (CPI) in August rose 9.6% year-on-year, marking a 34 month-low.

The decision is expected to boost large-scale manufacturing and other business activities which will also produce employment opportunities at a time when the people have been hit hard by shrinking purchasing power.

“The MPC noted the following key developments since its last meeting that have implications for the macroeconomic outlook,” reads a statement issued by the central bank.

First, global oil prices have fallen sharply, though they remain volatile. Second, SBP’s FX reserves are around $9.5 billion as of September 6, despite weak official FX inflows and continued debt repayments.”

“Third, secondary market yields of government securities have declined noticeably since the last MPC meeting,” it added.

“Fourth, inflation expectations and confidence of businesses have improved in the latest pulse surveys, while those of consumers have worsened slightly. Lastly, the FBR tax collection during July-August 2024 was lower than the target.”

The Case for Enhanced Trade with Turkiye

By
Dr. Nhien Tran
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0
Turkey

The centennial of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Japan falls in August. Turkiye’s commerce with East Asia practically meant trading with Japan as it started opening its economy in the 1980s and 1990s. But early in the 2000s, something very different happened. China deposed Japan as Turkiye’s top Asian trade partner. Soon South Korea drove Japan down to third place. Turkiye’s trade imbalance against China alone accounts for 37% of the nation’s overall deficit.

The structural shift corresponds with the collapse of Japanese high-tech companies in worldwide markets and the emergence of its rivals from China and South Korea. Two decades ago, the issue was that Japanese companies, creating some of the greatest technology and finest hi-tech items, were content to manufacture mostly for the domestic market. Although they are more closely linked to global markets now, Chinese and South Korean companies have become leaders.

But early in the 2000s, something very different happened. China deposed Japan as Turkiye’s top Asian trade partner.

China sees Turkiye as a geostrategic center in its Belt and Road Initiative. Hence, it is entering a new chapter in its ties. Political factors drive some of the Chinese investments in Turkiye as well. The first foreign-invested car manufacturing in Turkiye since a closed Honda Motor facility opened in 1997, BYD said it would establish a $1 billion EV plant there.

The newly-proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Turkey provide a case in point. Starting in 2014, official discussions were stopped in 2019 without an agreement reached. The primary challenges are Turkiye’s desire for agricultural commodities export concessions and Japan’s refusal to provide access to its farm industry.

Turkiye is concerned about these things as well. Signed in 2014, the FTA with South Korea just served to increase the significant trade imbalance; the promised FDI to Turkiye did not come to pass. The Japanese side also argues that Japanese FDI will balance off Turkiye’s losses, particularly from Japan’s very vibrant small and medium-sized businesses some of which are generating world-class technology. From the Turkish side, such pledges make one dubious.

Turkey’s trade imbalance against China alone accounts for 37% of the nation’s overall deficit.

While monetary policy uncertainty is a challenge, Turkiye’s very delicate economy is suffering from great inflation and currency rate volatility. Turkiye must raise its macro balances. Conversely, since an FTA will increase Japanese exports, Japan will gain from it. Giving Turkiye some concessions will not damage Japan. More importantly, Japan will inspire Turkish companies to turn their faces away from Japan and gain their confidence.

Japan’s current economic negotiations with Turkiye are not headed in the intended line. Though there hasn’t been much activity since Japan failed in 2018 to negotiate a deal in Turkiye’s first-ever nuclear power plant project, which could have been the first nuclear power project for Japan in the post-Fukushima era, Japanese investments in Turkiye usually concentrated on major infrastructure projects. Apart from technological and financial factors, declining ties between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the United States may be attributed to the impact of Washington’s foreign policies on Japanese companies.

Notwithstanding the obstacles, popular opinion of Japan in Turkiye has always been favorable; Turkish people practically have sentimental ties to Japan no matter what. Still, this might be the reason Japanese politicians undervalue relations with Turkiye.

Japanese FDI will balance off Turkiye’s losses, particularly from Japan’s very vibrant small and medium-sized businesses.

One might see a fascinating parallel between Turkiye’s ties with the European Union and those of Japan towards it. Turkiye made one error in discussions with the EU when it treated the nations already backing the country lightly. The golden rule of strategic influence-making is that you must satisfy people who support you if you want not to lose them. Regarding Turkiye, which they see as a bird in the hand, Japanese officials appear to be making a similar error in their approach.

In Turkiye’s commercial contacts with Asia, the tide has already swung against Japan. It is time for Japanese officials to choose the course of the direction they want the relations to go. The centennial of the relations will provide both parties with sufficient inspiration to rethink this. This is a call to wake up.

Though this year is significant, the Japanese prime minister does not have any scheduled trips to Turkiye. Fumio Kishida is occupied attempting to guarantee his place as party leader in the next Liberal Democratic Party presidential contest. Strong leadership is required with a vision wherein Turkiye’s position is that of a partner rather than a Japanese subsidiary. There is a deglobalizing of the international economy and fragmentation in progress. Japan would gain economically from bettering ties with a big rising economy like Turkiye.

Charting a New Economic Course for Pakistan

By
Dr. Ghulam Mujaddid
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0
Moody's

Following a protracted break, Pakistan’s economic situation seems to be rather promising. For example, Moody’s late August followed Fitch in raising the nation’s sovereign rating from Caa3 to Caa2, changing the perspective from stable to positive.

This rare ray of hope points to rising global faith in Pakistan’s capacity to solve its financial problems and provide the foundation for a stable economy. Moody’s improvement comes shortly before the anticipated acceptance of a $7 billion extended financial facility by the IMF. This is seen by analysts as evidence that once again Pakistan’s fiscal management is starting to be trusted by world organizations.

Moody’s late August followed Fitch in raising the sovereign rating of the nation from Caa3 to Caa2, changing the perspective from stable to positive.

The improvement has already had noticeable results; the currency has strengthened, amply demonstrating that foreign exchange availability still defines Pakistan’s key economic problems. Moody’s rebuilt confidence has also helped the stock market.

Moody’s recognition of Pakistan’s lower default risk is tempered, however, by the sober fact that interest payments would devour over half of government income over the next two to three years.

Nevertheless, Moody’s observation that the possibility of default has decreased rather than disappeared helps to moderate hysterical analogies to Sri Lanka’s current economic catastrophe. This improvement, according to some experts, puts Pakistan in a better position to rejoin foreign capital markets on more reasonable terms. The possible issuing of Eurobonds and “panda bonds” at reasonable rates might reduce borrowing costs, relieve debt-servicing pressure, and provide the much-needed fiscal space for economic recovery.

Although the anticipated IMF loan approval would provide some comfort, this won’t set off another wave of improvements. The respite in borrowing rates from international markets comes with a sour aftertaste for the typical Pakistani taxpayer: increased borrowing always results in more debt, and that load rests firmly on the taxpayer’s shoulders.

Interest payments would devour over half of government income over the next two to three years.

When a rating improvement reflected a strong economy rather than a dire need for improved borrowing conditions, which would be the real indicator of economic health. Like Fitch, Moody’s has highlighted the residual questions about Pakistan’s capacity to carry out required reforms.

The warning is justified especially given the coalition government headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, established after the February elections. With a weak political mandate, the administration may find it difficult to carry out policies meant to increase taxes without sparking social disturbance. This unstable scenario might cause delays in or possibly the cancellation of important financial assistance from bilateral and multilateral partners.

Such hazards increase the uncertainty of investments Pakistan deals with. Possible delays in the execution of reform might compromise financial assistance from bilateral and multilateral partners, therefore increasing investment risks.

Pakistan has been locked in a vicious circle of debt for decades; its foreign debt currently amounts to a shockingly $130 billion. Add to the problem the increasing circular debt and capacity payments. Circular debt has skyrocketed to 2.636 trillion rupees, according to the Power Division of the Ministry of Energy, while capacity payments for the fiscal year 2024–25 are expected to reach 2.8 trillion rupees—above the military budget for the country. Driven by growing power prices, these payments are severely taxing Pakistanis’ daily lives as well as the country’s economy.

Foreign debt currently amounts to a shocking $130 billion.

A growth model fueled in proportional measure by consumption aggravates Pakistan’s economic problems even further. This model causes significant import increases as economic development starts up, hence widening the trade imbalance of the nation. Pakistan’s exports in 2024, despite strict government controls, were $30.65 billion while imports were $54.71 billion, therefore generating a trade imbalance of $24.06 billion.

Pakistan’s economic stability will remain unstable as long as the government battles to combine sustainable development with the demands of growing debt. Without major structural changes, the nation runs the danger of continuing the cycle of borrowing and economic instability, thus depriving little hope for the near future.

Pakistan’s economy is under great pressure while the government is stepping up initiatives to cover the retail and wholesale sectors with the tax network. As part of the agreed-upon changes with the IMF, this project has spurred extensive merchants’ demonstrations and strikes. Driven by the urgent necessity to raise the poor tax-to-GDP ratio to below 8.5%, the government’s determination seems strong despite opposition.

Circular debt has skyrocketed to 2.636 trillion rupees.

With a weak political mandate, the administration cannot afford to stray from the IMF’s recommended reforms, especially regarding measures of income-raising. Maintaining timely IMF evaluations, releasing necessary finance from external partners, and strengthening Pakistan’s foreign currency reserves depend on following these measures.

Pakistan’s economy still mostly depends on outside help even if it has achieved notable progress over the last year. This emphasizes how dangerous the road ahead is and how one mistake might compromise the delicate development so far attained.

Harsh Nicaragua Social Media Law And Australia Planning Ban On Use by Children

By
Info Desk
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0
Social Media

MANAGUA/CANBERRA – Nicaragua has introduced a law that will allow the government to imprison those spreading “alarm” or “fear” in the society – a move that has been criticized the opposition for being designed to silence the critics.

On the other hand, Australia may become the first country in the world to ban children from using social media, as it is now widely believed and proven by researches that that platforms like Instagram and TikTok are negatively affecting their physical and mental health.

In Managua, the parliament, dominated by the supporters of strongman Daniel Ortega passed the law that outlines prison sentences of up to five years and fines.

For publications that are considered to promote discrimination, hate or violence, or those that endanger social and economic stability, the penalty can be up to 10 years.

‘POLICY OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION’

The latest legislation updated the cybercrime law introduced in 2020, which has led to the arrest of many government opponents who have been accused of propagating “fake news” or disinformation.

In its reaction, the opposition media in exile dubbed the move as “gag law”. The critics say would, in effect, ensure total control over social media networks.

They say it is an extension of Ortega’s “transnational repression”, a policy which is described as silencing those individuals who live outside their country of origin through stifling dissent and violating international human rights and the laws of host countries.

WHO IS ORTEGA?

Ortega became the leader of Nicaragua first as a junta head in 1979, after fighting as a guerrilla in the Sandinista movement that toppled the US-backed Somoza family dictatorship.

He was later elected president in 1985.

Beaten in elections in 1990, he returned to power in 2007 and has since quashed presidential term limits and seized control of all branches of the state.

CHILDREN TO BE BANNED

Earlier this week, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his government will launch an age verification trial in the coming months ahead of the introduction of legislation to enforce a ban.

Albanese said his center-left Labor Party government is considering a minimum age of between 14 and 16 to use social media platforms like TikTok and Instagram.

“Parents want their kids off their phones and on the footy field. So do I,” Albanese told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. “We are taking this action because enough is enough.”

Meanwhile, even the center-right Liberal Party has previously expressed support for banning social media for those under 16 years old.

THE GREAT DEBATE

It is a fact that dictatorships and authoritarian states do not digest their rivals. They always control the media. Previously, it was just mainstream media, but the arrival of social media has added another dimension.

However, even the leaders developed countries in the West are now listing propaganda as the greatest threat to democracy. This comes at a time when billionaires like Elon Musk are promoting the far right on their social media platforms and openly siding with the authoritarian elements such as Donald Trump.

No doubt the idea of liberal democracy needs to be adjusted according to latest technological developments that have unleashed unprecedented economic and social changes.

Also read: Preserve democracy, no room for political violence: Biden

There are other issues like health too as suggested by the Australian government, which have been causing social distress in the society across the globe, pushing the young people towards criminal and extremist elements.

However, defining the balancing act remains a huge challenge amid a scenario where the far-right groups around the world are using free speech – the basic tenant of democracy – as a right to come into power for curbing the very democratic ideals.

Middle East On The Brink

By
Arshad Mehmood
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0
Middle East

The conflict between Hamas and Israel has been ongoing for years, with sporadic bouts of violence and tensions. However, the ongoing escalation has raised grave concerns that it could spiral into a larger regional conflict.

The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran has further complicated the situation, as it is believed to be a retaliatory act by Israel. This has heightened tensions between Iran, a major supporter of Hamas, and Israel, which sees Iran as a regional threat.

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran represents a seismic shift in the dynamics of the Hamas-Israel war.

The Middle East is already a volatile region with various ongoing conflicts and proxy wars, and this recent development has the potential to ignite a larger-scale regional conflict involving other countries and factions.

The international community is closely watching the situation and urging both sides to exercise restraint and engage in peaceful dialogue to prevent further escalation.

The volatile mix of local grievances, international alliances, and historical tensions is threatening to engulf the entire region, raising fears of a broader war involving multiple states and non-state actors.

The current conflict between Hamas and Israel erupted in response to heightened tensions over Jerusalem and the West Bank, followed by Hamas launching a surprise barrage of rocket attacks against Israeli cities.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) retaliated with widespread airstrikes targeting Hamas strongholds in Gaza, leading to intense urban warfare and a devastating humanitarian crisis. The war has claimed thousands of lives, primarily among Palestinian civilians, and led to the destruction of vital infrastructure, hospitals, and schools in Gaza.

Iran’s strong backing of Hamas, through military and financial support, has been a crucial factor in extending the conflict.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia condemned Israel on Tuesday for targeting a makeshift displacement camp in Mawasi, Gaza. The Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a statement, describing the attack as “another violent assault on unarmed civilians by the Israeli war machine.”

The Kingdom firmly rejected what it referred to as ongoing “Israeli genocide” and urged an immediate ceasefire.

Saudi Arabia held Israeli forces fully responsible for violating international and humanitarian laws, emphasizing the global community’s legal, humanitarian, and moral duty to enforce accountability and halt Israel’s violations. The Kingdom called for activating international mechanisms to end these breaches of international law.

The strike, which hit a crowded tent camp in Gaza early Tuesday, left at least 19 people dead and 60 others wounded, according to Palestinian officials. The attack took place in Mawasi, an area designated by Israel as a humanitarian zone, sheltering displaced civilians from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, which has now entered its second year.

As the conflict enters its most intense phase, the risk of it spilling beyond Israel’s borders is increasing. In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah—an Iranian-backed militant group—has exchanged fire with Israeli forces. At the same time, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq have vowed to join the fight if Hamas faces defeat. The involvement of these groups could open new fronts in the war, threatening to destabilize Lebanon and Iraq, both of which are already facing internal political crises.

Iran’s strong backing of Hamas, through military and financial support, has been a crucial factor in extending the conflict. Tehran sees Hamas as a key proxy in its wider strategy to challenge Israeli hegemony in the region and project its influence across the Middle East. As the war continues, Tehran’s involvement is likely to deepen, increasing the potential for confrontations between Israel and Iran.

Saudi Arabia condemned Israel on Tuesday for targeting a makeshift displacement camp in Mawasi, Gaza.

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran represents a seismic shift in the dynamics of the Hamas-Israel war. Haniyeh, a key figure in Hamas’s political and military strategy, was instrumental in forging strong ties with Tehran. His assassination is widely believed to be a covert operation, possibly conducted by Israel or a foreign intelligence agency, though no party has officially claimed responsibility.

Haniyeh’s killing has sent shockwaves throughout the region. In Gaza, Hamas leaders have vowed revenge, while Iran has condemned the assassination, labeling it an attack on its sovereignty. The loss of Haniyeh is a significant blow to Hamas’s leadership structure, but his death may also galvanize further support for the group’s cause. Iranian-backed militias across the Middle East are reportedly preparing for potential retaliation, targeting Israeli interests in the region.

If Iran retaliates directly or through its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, or Iraq, the conflict could escalate into a full-scale regional war. Hezbollah, already engaged in sporadic skirmishes with Israel along the southern Lebanon border, could launch a sustained offensive, dragging Israel into a multi-front war. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have hinted at a strong response, which could include missile attacks or cyber operations against Israeli or U.S. targets in the region.

The assassination of Haniyeh in Iran not only threatens to escalate the Hamas-Israel conflict but also risks triggering a broader regional war. The Middle East is a delicate geopolitical chessboard where even minor provocations can have far-reaching consequences. A major concern is the role of Iran’s network of allied militias.

In Iraq, groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah have already signaled their willingness to engage in the fight against Israel. The Houthis in Yemen, who have regularly targeted Saudi Arabia with missile strikes, could also join the conflict, attacking Israeli or US assets in the region. These militias form a web of Iranian influence stretching from Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen, all of which could become battlefields if the situation spirals out of control.

The involvement of Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed militant group, could open new fronts in the war, threatening to destabilize Lebanon and Iraq.

The global ramifications of a broader conflict in the Middle East are profound. A war that involves Iran, Israel, and their respective allies would have a catastrophic impact on global energy supplies, as the region is home to some of the world’s largest oil reserves. An escalation in violence could disrupt oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, sending global energy prices skyrocketing and potentially triggering an economic crisis. Moreover, the conflict could exacerbate the refugee crisis in the region, with millions more displaced, straining neighboring countries and prompting international humanitarian responses.

International actors are scrambling to prevent the conflict from expanding. The United States, which has long been an ally of Israel, is urging restraint while simultaneously preparing to bolster Israel’s defense capabilities. Washington has warned Iran against any direct military action, but its leverage over Tehran is limited given the strained relations and recent withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.

Russia and China, which have cultivated relationships with Iran, are calling for de-escalation while seeking to protect their interests in the region. Moscow, which maintains military bases in Syria and has vested interests in keeping the Assad regime in power, is particularly concerned about how an expanded war could jeopardize its foothold in the region.

The United Nations and European Union have issued urgent calls for a ceasefire, stressing the need for diplomatic solutions to the conflict. However, the deeply entrenched animosities between Israel, Hamas, and Iran, coupled with the broader geopolitical rivalries, make a diplomatic resolution seem increasingly unlikely in the short term.

The combination of the ongoing Hamas-Israel war, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, and the involvement of regional powers has created a powder keg in the Middle East. The region is now on the cusp of a much larger conflict that could redraw alliances, shift power dynamics, and create widespread instability.

A war that involves Iran, Israel, and their respective allies would have a catastrophic impact on global energy supplies.

As Iran considers its response and Israel prepares for potential multi-front battles, the world watches anxiously, knowing that the consequences of a full-scale regional war would be devastating not only for the Middle East but for global stability as well.

In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, there is growing apprehension about the possibility of a wider war.

Riyadh is in the midst of sensitive negotiations to normalize relations with Israel, an unprecedented diplomatic move that the escalating conflict could derail.

Saudi and Emirati leaders are now calling for restraint, wary of being dragged into a conflict that could destabilize the entire Arabian Peninsula.

Pakistan-India Super Normalization? Not So Fast

By
Ambassador Abdul Basit
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0
India and Pakistan

Peace activists in both India and Pakistan want their respective governments to resume talks and end the long bilateral deadlock without further procrastination. They strongly feel the present impasse is not only mutually harmful but also affecting the region as a whole. And unless the two largest countries in South Asia join hands, the region would remain stuck in wretchedness. To them, realizing national and regional prosperity has become hostage to seemingly intractable Pakistan-India hostility. They feel disappointed at the general nonchalance in the region towards addressing multiple and multidimensional challenges. In short, they find no justification for the two countries to live in perpetual animosity.

Their pursuit of peace is praiseworthy. But as far as I know, they have yet to come up with workable propositions. Expressing the desire for peace is not enough. It must be backed by building unignorable pressure on Islamabad and New Delhi. And that will happen only if they have a well thought-out, realistic plan of action in hand.

To them, realizing national and regional prosperity has become hostage to seemingly intractable Pakistan-India hostility.

In essence, activists on both sides of the border must understand that issues that continue to bedevil Pakistan-India relations are enormously complex. The fundamental question remains as to how to get the two countries engage in a process that seamlessly segues from conflict management to conflict resolution.

At the same time, is it reasonable to expect peace activists on both sides of the border to defenestrate their historical and national biases? Even if they genuinely believe in their admirable cause and try to be as impartial as possible, they are often snubbed by their fellow citizens and accused of mortgaging their patriotism and national loyalty. Such is the bilateral environment. Ergo, it is not surprising that peace activists have not been able to develop a groundswell of support on either side; traction to their cause remains minuscule at best.

As I look at the present situation, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The two countries have tried almost all possible approaches towards normalizing their relations but to no big avail. India traditionally believed that addressing the difficult disputes such as Jammu and Kashmir would not be possible without first creating a conducive environment through a slew of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in less controversial areas including trade, culture and people-to-people contact. In the past, New Delhi would invariably demur to setting preconditions for negotiations.

Pakistan, however, would approach the bilateral relationship differently. Islamabad would usually hold the view that the Jammu and Kashmir was the core dispute. Once this was settled, normalization would follow on its own, enabling the two countries to also address the peripheral issues. Interestingly, the two countries would often even bicker over whether Jammu and Kashmir is an ‘issue’ or a ‘dispute’ as words are critical in ‘Diplomacy’ as in ‘Law’.

The two countries have tried almost all possible approaches towards normalizing their relations but to no big avail.

The Composite Dialogue framework that was put together in 1997, comprising eight components for talks, was the combination of the two approaches. It was the mechanism for both putting in place CBMs, and finding solutions to core issues related to peace and security including Jammu and Kashmir. The dialogue, however, could not begin as bilateral tensions soared following the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. Par for the course, Pakistan responded with its own nuclear tests. The nuclear genie had finally come out of the bottle in South Asia.

Then, there was the Kargil conflict in the first half of 1999 which created more chasms with mutual distrust touching the nadir. It was the SAARC summit in Pakistan held in January 2004 that provided the opportunity to break the long logjam. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee met on the margins and agreed to give a chance to the Composite Dialogue.

As one looks back, the period between 2004 and 2008 was most peaceful as well as fruitful. Several CBMs were initiated including tourism and trade across the Line of Control (LoC). Dividends were visible as diplomacy was also working on the backchannel mandated to find a mutually palatable solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Peace activists could now relatively easily travel to each other across the border. “Aman ki Asha” (Hope for Peace) became the buzzword. However, India’s prevarication on Kashmir could not sustain the momentum of congeniality for long.

The November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai brought almost everything back to square one. Accusations and counter-accusations vitiated the atmosphere yet again. “Aman ki Asha” did not take much time to dissipate, and the peace activists also sort of went into dormancy. There was some initial cooperation to bring the culprits of the Mumbai attack to justice but there are still some serious roadblocks to conclude the ongoing trial in Pakistan. I know for a fact that earnest cooperation from the Indian side has been lacking and, in my view, New Delhi is not very keen to put a closure to the trial as the Mumbai attack is a convenient talking point to keep hammering Islamabad on terrorism, and avoiding serious talks on Kashmir.

It is time for our Indian friends and peace activists to exert pressure on New Delhi to understand that Jammu and Kashmir is neither an integral part of India nor of Pakistan.

The election of Modi as prime minister did engender some hopes but those too could not last long, for Modi’s agenda was clear from the very beginning that he was not interested in talking to Pakistan on Kashmir. Yet the latter offered itself to be inveigled into believing otherwise. The July and December 2015 joint statements issued in Ufa and Islamabad, respectively were indubitably poorly negotiated statements from our side. Islamabad unilaterally and rather readily conceded too much ground on Kashmir.

The Pathankot attack on January 2, the arrest of Commander Kulbhushan Jhadav in March, the martyr of Burhan Wani in July, Modi’s remarks on Balochistan in August, the Uri attack in September and the cancellation of the scheduled SAARC summit in Islamabad in November made 2016 one of the most difficult years in Pakistan-India relations. As Pakistan’s high commissioner in New Delhi, it was disquieting for me to see the relationship going from bad to worse. Indeed, I was far more worried than the peace activists. In the end, diplomacy is not about fulfilling desires but about achieving policy objectives. This is what puts diplomats and peace activists at odds most of the time.

Even at present I see wide gaps between the two. Indian and Pakistani peace activists have reemerged with the message of “engagement” and “normalization”. The question is how. Should Pakistan accept what India did on August 5, 2019 in clear violation of its commitments to Kashmiris, Pakistan and the international community by illegally annexing the occupied Jammu and Kashmir? My worry is that Islamabad may be tempted to breaking the deadlock on Indian terms yet again.

There is no gainsaying that regional and global challenges from climate change to water crisis do warrant a thaw. But it is also true that effective regional cooperative frameworks cannot be built on rickety foundations of unpredictable and hostile bilateral relations.

It would be a huge diplomatic mistake on the part of Pakistan to revert to the bilateral engagement and negotiations under the Ufa and Islamabad joint statements. In any case, those lopsided documents were never workable, and have become totally irrelevant post-5 August 2019.

I am not doubting for a moment the intentions of peace activists. Nevertheless, they cannot deny the fact that this time the onus is on India to break the deadlock not only for resuming bilateral engagement but also normalizing relations irreversibly by settling the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

It is time for our Indian friends and peace activists to exert pressure on New Delhi to understand that Jammu and Kashmir is neither an integral part of India nor of Pakistan. This is for Kashmiris to decide and please let them decide in an honorable manner. Otherwise, good-neighborly relations between India and Pakistan would continue moving from a stalemate to a stalemate.

Resuming trade, cricketing ties and cultural exchanges are all good stuff but, as a former diplomat, I would be careful to not fall for illusions.

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