The collapse of Soviet Union not only redrew the political boundaries in Europe and Central Asia but also transformed the bipolar world into a United States-led unipolar political order. As Washington began to fill the power vacuum and assert its influence across the globe, Moscow was also pushed to rebuild its diminished global stature. Additionally, the eastward expansion of NATO compelled Russia to safeguard its prime interests and devise strategies for countering NATO dominance.
For past two and half decade, Primakov Doctrine (1996) has shaped Russia’s security and foreign policies. Moscow’s adherence to this doctrine, however, has varied depending upon national capabilities. The doctrine can be encapsulated in three points: first, Russia must counter-balance the hegemony of United States and strive for multi-polar world; second, Moscow must undermine NATO’s eastward expansion; and third, Kremlin should retain its influence in the post-Soviet space.
For past two and half decade, Primakov Doctrine (1996) has shaped Russia’s security and foreign policies.
The Primakov doctrine perceives military hard power as a necessary tool of national policy. But with a weakened economy and limited policy options in disposal, Kremlin experimented with new less risky options. Result was Gerasimov Doctrine (2013) – a whole of government approach which summarized soft and hard power across various domains and transcended the barriers between peace and war. Russian interventions in Syria (2014) and Ukraine (2014) reflect successful application of Gerasimov Doctrine. The application of this doctrine in its military posture suggested that Russia carefully calibrated its options to minimize the risks of military confrontation with NATO. However, this hybrid warfare approach is essentially an extension – not a substitute of Russian hard power.
Although hybrid tactics can be used as instrument of risk management when employment of hard power is a precarious and costly endeavor, but the military strength is always present in the background. This suggests that Primakov Doctrine – incorporating the element of traditional hard power, acts as enabler of Gerasimov Doctrine and has been the defining concept of Russian foreign and defense policies.
Ukraine, located at cross-roads of Russia and NATO, has become litmus test for efficiency of Russian doctrinal thought process. In fact, despite initial success, the deepening Ukrainian relations with EU and NATO checkmated the long-term efficiency of Gerasimov Doctrine. A doctrine structured around hybrid warfare lacks the coercion to subdue the adversary.
For Russia, denying Ukrainian membership in NATO turned into a priority national objective. The question Moscow faced was: should Russia pursue higher ambitions by using hard power while taking equivalent risks? Or should it retain a less risky but less coercive approach against Ukraine which can eventually lead to Ukrainian membership in EU or even NATO? Moscow, driven by its notion of conventional superiority over Ukraine, opted for the option of hard power.
Ukraine, located at cross-roads of Russia and NATO, has become litmus test for efficiency of Russian doctrinal thought process.
This decision was also a result of Russian high command’s improved confidence on Russian military prowess considering its satisfactory performance in Syria. Russian air-led intervention in Syria indicated that Moscow has the ability to deploy, sustain and maintain a high operational temperament for air power, along with the required force-protection package for its main operating base.
Russia’s considerable defense industrial complex could upgrade legacy systems and produce modern weapons. This industry kept Russia self-sufficient in majority of defensive requirements and retained a respectable place in global arms industry. As a result, Russian armed forces began to be portrayed by several military circles as potent force with increasing capability and competency. Thus, the Russian offense was a product of thought process assumption that overwhelming military superiority, combined with territorial advantages, will ensure a quick and decisive victory.
This, however, didn’t happen. As Correlli Barnett, a renowned war historian, has aptly said, “No plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Unlike Moscow’s expectation of quick success, the invasion on Ukraine turned out to be a military and economic disaster. Once believed to be amongst the most powerful in the world, the Russian forces proved to be inefficient and incompetent as far as successful conduct of modern warfare is concerned.
Despite overwhelming force superiority, the Russian forces failed to achieve any credible breakthrough in opening days of conflict. Logistical challenges, poor communication, inadequate training, insufficient modern military hardware, limited employment of advance munitions, lack of coordination between ranks, and low moral played major role in degrading Russia’s overall military efficiency.
Moscow, driven by its notion of conventional superiority over Ukraine, opted for option of hard power.
Determined Ukrainian resistance, catalyzed by Western support with arms and intelligence, not only repelled multiple Russia’s offenses, but also launched counter-attacks to retake the captured territories. Interestingly, despite losing initial momentum, Moscow also showcased steadfast commitment to restore and sustain kinetic pressure in the battlefield. Partial mobilization, use of mercenary militia, activation of vast reserves of Soviet hardware, and mass-production of armaments and heavy equipment, are some of the known measures taken by Kremlin to keep Russian military fighting in Ukraine. The conflict, however, has now turned into war of attrition where both Russia and Ukraine are unlikely to secure any conclusive victory through military means.
Russia has employed both hybrid as well as hard power to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence and deny further eastward expansion of NATO. While containing NATO’s expansion in South-Western Europe, Russia ended up causing the military alliance’s expanded influence in Northern Europe. Finland and Sweden, which had historically followed non-alignment policy, opted for NATO membership to achieve collective security umbrella against increasingly assertive Russia.
With hybrid tactics nullified and heavy toll suffered by Russian military, Moscow is unlikely to achieve victory in Ukraine decisive enough to justify its failures. But it still retains nuclear weapons in its disposal as ultimate insurance of independence and sovereignty. Historically, the presence of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons has allowed Moscow to deter NATO at multiple spectrums. The decline of conventional hard power may have undermined Russia’s ability to launch Ukraine style invasion in its neighborhood, but its ability to deter NATO’s conventional superiority through nuclear weapons remains unchallenged.
While containing NATO’s expansion in South-Western Europe, Russia ended up causing the alliance’s extension in Northern Europe.
When viewed from wider lens, Russia-Ukraine war has not only showcased shortcomings of Russian hard prowess but has also exposed US and its allies’ limitations, particularly in prolonged conflict. The United States, while not directly suffering from combat losses, faces the challenge of maintaining global dominance.
With overstretched resources to support war fighting efforts in Russia-Ukraine war and conflict in Middle East, Washington is now struggling to contain rising China’s military might in Indo-Pacific. As the conflict drags on, US and its European allies are finding it increasingly challenging to provide military support and aid to Ukraine. Political shift on both sides of the Atlantic could bring about big changes in allies’ commitments to Kyiv. Washington still wants to establish balance of power in Eastern Europe which is overwhelmingly favorable to NATO, but not at the cost of its efforts for sustaining global hegemony.
Russia-Ukraine war has put into question the efficiency of Moscow’s interplay of hybrid and hard powers. The employment of hybrid tactics under the framework of Gerasimov Doctrine has proven efficient to achieve low-end objective. But against high-end threat, hybrid warfare, despite integrated element of hard-power, falls short to coerce the adversary.
Although hard power has worked effectively as supporting tool for conduct of hybrid warfare, but when traditional employment of kinetic force is taken into account, major shortcomings have essentially hampered the Russian conventional combat potential. Nuclear weapons, representing the highest tier of Russia’s hard power, continue to work effectively to deter NATO’s aggression. But it’s the conventional spectrum of Russia’s hard power which has failed to deliver leading to prolonged conflict with no clear victory in sight.
