FABRICATING THE INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION:

October 27, 1947 was the beginning of a long and dangerous dispute between two South Asian countries – Pakistan and India. New Delhi landed its troops in Srinagar on that day based on a claim that Maharaja Hari Singh had signed Instrument of Accession (IOA) on October 26, 1947. However, prominent international historians and various have widely disputed and rejected New Delhi’s primary argument about the Kashmir dispute.

A day earlier on October 25, a rebellion led by Maj Khurshid Anwar and soldiers from the Poonch region overpowered the Maharaja’s army, forcing Hari Singh to flee to Jammu with valuable belongings. Historical evidence, including reports from British officials, indicates that Hari Singh reached Jammu on October 27. This timeline challenges the likelihood of the Maharaja being in a position to sign the IOA on October 26 as claimed by the Indian government.

Alastair Lamb in his book ‘Birth of a Tragedy’ argues that the absence of IOA casts serious doubt on the authenticity of the document.

Furthermore, VP Menon, the Secretary to the Government of India, claimed in his book ‘The Story of the Integration of Indian States’ [pages 399-400] that he along with Mehr Chand Mahajan went Jammu by air on October 26 where Maharajah signed IOA. However, British records and Menon’s own movements in Delhi contradict this claim.

Menon reportedly attended a defense meeting in Delhi on the morning of October 26 and attempted to fly to Jammu that afternoon, only for the flight to be cancelled. By 5:00 pm, he was seen meeting the British High Commissioner in Delhi, making it unlikely he had been to Jammu to witness any signing of IOA on October 26, 1947.

Interestingly, India has consistently denied requests by researchers and historians, including BBC correspondent Andrew Whitehead and British historian Alistair Lamb, to access the original IOA. The document remains classified by India, and the government has cited reasons such as it being “stolen” or “lost”.

Alastair Lamb in his book ‘Birth of a Tragedy’ argues that the absence of IOA casts serious doubt on the authenticity of the document, while suggesting the document may have been fabricated after Indian forces had already entered Kashmir.

ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS:

Since 1948, Jammu and Kashmir has been on the agenda of UN Security Council – just three years after the United Nations was establishment. Since then, 18 resolutions have been passed by the Security Council related to ‘India-Pakistan Question’ out of which several are directly related to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. The two most significant resolutions – 47 of 1948 and 91 of 1951 – call for a free and impartial plebiscite under UN supervision to determine the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

The UN Security Council Resolution of 91 of 1951 and 122 of 1957 clearly state that “holding elections in the dispute state is not equal to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people”.

However, India has consistently rejected to implement these resolutions and tried to impose its will on the Kashmiris through coercive inhuman tactics. Later, New Delhi has tried to complicate the entire situation in its own favor through unilateral actions of August 5, 2019. It has shifted from one goalpost to another. First, New Delhi used to call Jammu and Kashmir dispute a ‘bilateral issue’ and after August 2019, India is trying to convince the world that the issue even doesn’t exit.

Also read: SCO Summit: It’s Time For Indo-Pak Stalled Dialogue To Resume

Recently, the Occupied Jammu and Kashmir has gone through electoral process after a decade. However, the UN Security Council Resolution of 91 of 1951 and 122 of 1957 clearly state that “holding elections in the dispute state is not equal to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people”.

PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR DISPUTE:

Resolution of Jammu and Kashmir dispute has been one of the cornerstones of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Islamabad has attempted to use nearly every internationally accepted method of resolving disputes. It has pursued a number of diplomatic strategies, including a bilateral strategy through the Shimla Agreement. In a similar vein, Pakistan made an unsuccessful attempt to use a third nation as a mediator.

Islamabad’s stance on the dispute is primarily based on strong legal and legitimate arguments.

Islamabad tried to use the “bottom-up approach” under Ziaul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, discussing less complicated political issues like Siachen, Sir Creek, visa regulations, and enhancing people-to-people connectivity in a hope that a supportive atmosphere would force India to settle the Kashmir dispute.

From IK Gujral to Manmohan Singh, Pakistan’s senior military and civilian leaders tried to change India’s stagnant view of Jammu and Kashmir in the 1990s and 2000s by using Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and composite dialogue.

A future roadmap related to Kashmir strategy requires a more robust and proactive approach. Pakistan should take a more non-traditional strategic stance in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Islamabad must develop a long-term strategy for dealing with Jammu and Kashmir.

Also read: The China-Led SCO And Strained Indo-Pak Relations

Four guiding principles should form the basis of Pakistan’s strategy for Occupied Kashmir including development of international partnerships, domestic economic and political consolidation, strategic patience to avoid unilateral concessions for New Delhi, and a whole-of-nation approach.

Similarly, Pakistan will take charge as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2025. Islamabad needs to take full advantage of this role and consistently highlight Indian atrocities at the forum. During this tenure, Pakistan needs to convince the UN Secretary General to appoint his special representative on Jammu and Kashmir.

To conclude, it is safe to claim that after 77 years, shifts in local demographics, legal resolutions by UN Security Council, bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan, indigenous freedom struggle, stringent laws have added layers of complexities in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. However, Islamabad has shown consistent commitment to the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

Islamabad’s stance on the dispute is primarily based on strong legal and legitimate arguments, which has been widely accepted by the international historians, several governments and UN Security Council. Islamabad should convey to the world that no other issue has influenced India–Pakistan relationship more adversely than the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. At the same time, no other issue except Jammu and Kashmir has potential to spiral out of control between nuclear neighbors of South Asia.