The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting nuclear disarmament, and encouraging peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. As of my last update in September 2021, the NPT has 191 state parties.

The NPT is based on a three-pillar framework such as, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist others in acquiring them. The second talks about nuclear-weapon states commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. And third mainly talks about all parties have the right to access and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, under the condition of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

One of the primary criticisms of the NPT is the distinction it makes between nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). The five recognized nuclear-weapon states, known as the NPT’s “P5,” are the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. These states are acknowledged as nuclear powers and are allowed to possess nuclear weapons under the treaty.

Some critics argue that the NPT perpetuates a discriminatory structure, as it does not recognize the other countries that have developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty. For example, India, Pakistan, and North Korea conducted nuclear tests and possess nuclear weapons but are not recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.

There have been discussions about the need to address this issue and consider how to incorporate the other nuclear-armed states into the NPT framework. These discussions typically revolve around two main approaches thither on encouraging non-NPT nuclear-armed states to join the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states and commit to disarmament in exchange for benefits and security assurances from the international community. Another approach suggests expanding the P5 category to include other nuclear-armed states. This would involve recognizing these states as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, subject to the same obligations as the current P5, including commitments to disarmament and transparency.

The NPT does not specifically address the possibility of expanding the P5 to include additional nuclear-armed states that are not party to the treaty. The P5 is an informal group that emerged from the recognition of the five nuclear-armed states at the time of the treaty’s negotiation and entry into force. Any changes or amendments to the NPT, including the potential expansion of the P5, would require consensus among the NPT member states and could be discussed during the NPT Review Conferences held every five years. However, it’s important to note that as of my last update in 2021, no formal steps had been taken to alter the P5 composition within the NPT framework.

The lack of formal steps to alter the P5 composition within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework can be attributed to several reasons and hurdles which delay such amendments.

The issue of altering the P5 composition is politically sensitive and complex. The current P5 members (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) hold significant global influence and are established nuclear powers with long-standing nuclear arsenals. Any attempt to alter the P5 composition could involve contentious negotiations and potential resistance from the existing P5 members. Also, the NPT’s Article VI calls for nuclear-weapon states to engage in negotiations for nuclear disarmament. However, progress on nuclear disarmament has been slow, and some of the P5 members have shown reluctance to engage in comprehensive disarmament measures. This lack of substantial progress in disarmament makes discussions about expanding the P5 more complex, as it raises questions about the commitment of nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

The NPT’s primary objective is non-proliferation, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new states. Altering the P5 composition to include additional nuclear-armed states outside the treaty could raise concerns about the possible legitimization of nuclear weapons possession by countries that have not adhered to the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations. Any changes to the NPT, including the P5 composition, would require consensus among the treaty’s 191 member states. Achieving such consensus on a complex issue like P5 expansion may prove challenging, given the diverse interests and perspectives of NPT member states.

The NPT review conferences and discussions often prioritize addressing the current challenges related to non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among the existing NPT members. These discussions may take precedence over considering changes to the P5 composition.

However, addressing this issue is not straightforward and would require careful diplomacy and consensus-building among all parties involved. The NPT review conferences, which take place every five years, offer a forum for member states to discuss and negotiate potential amendments or improvements to the treaty. It is essential to strike a balance between promoting non-proliferation efforts and encouraging nuclear disarmament while respecting the legitimate security concerns of all nations. Ultimately, any changes to the NPT’s framework would require broad international consensus and political will. As global circumstances evolve, the NPT and its provisions may be subject to review and adaptation, ensuring its continued relevance in addressing nuclear proliferation challenges in the 21st century.