At the global stage, India projects itself to be a country that promotes democracy and peace – domestically and internationally. However, the reality is different from the projection. Although India has always been a supporter of disarmament, India was simultaneously engaged in the acquisition of nuclear arsenals and long-range missiles, endangering global peace. Similarly, Maya Tudor, in her piece “Why India’s Democracy Is Dying”, explains how India’s democracy is suffering domestically. There is a great contradiction in India’s words and actions.

India’s nuclear ambition is a mix of restraint and militarization.

This betrayal of words shows how India had been playing a strategic game and ended up stretching its nuclear options. India’s nuclear ambition is a mix of restraint and militarization, following a well-planned projection of restraint on the surface and ambitious militarization under the surface. Its nuclear test is a tale of betrayal as India continued working on its nuclear acquisition. India’s doctrine of deterrence and weapon advancement casts doubt on the false perception it shows the globe. This divergence between speech and act raises questions regarding India’s true intentions.

To illustrate, the nuclear program in India started in the late 1940s, with the help of the US and Canada under the label “Atom for Peace”. Nevertheless, India then diverted to different nuclear power plants and performed the first nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran, named “Smiling Buddha”, damaging the International Non-Proliferation Treaty. Subsequently, India has stayed tactically ambiguous and opposed signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) due to its discriminatory nature of legalizing the nuclear monopoly of five countries while excluding others. This stance remains a crucial element of India’s disarmament diplomacy.

While carefully examining the dates, one can see a contradiction in India’s act and speech. India has been inconsistent with its nuclear policies since the start of its nuclear program. At the time they were developing a nuclear weapon, then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a treaty banning all nuclear test explosions in 1954. Following the proposal, India conducted its first nuclear test. After this test, in 1978, India again proposed a ban on nuclear weapons testing. Additionally, in 1982, India proposed another program, including a convention on non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, a freeze on the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

India officially declared itself a nuclear-weapon state, shattering its false image of supporting disarmament.

Early in 1996 while speaking to the Conference on Disarmament on 25 January, the Indian representative stressed that India was “committed to working towards a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that will promote the goal of total nuclear disarmament and thereby, the lasting and legitimate security interests of all countries in a nuclear weapon free world, including our own.”  Nevertheless, India then refused to be a signatory to the CTBT. Speaking to the Indian Parliament, former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asserted that “we have stated that the Government of India does not propose to manufacture nuclear weapons. We shall continue our efforts for nuclear disarmament”. Meanwhile, India was marching towards modernization, resulting in a series of nuclear experiments in 1998 at Pokhran-II.

With the tests, India officially declared itself to be a nuclear weapons state, shattering its false image of supporting nuclear disarmament. Although India is known to have endorsed the idea of nuclear disarmament, yet has turned every table for its acquisition. Similarly, India has not just stopped there. It is further expanding its military capabilities at a fast pace. These actions do not suit the state that endorses disarmament. To illustrate, India developed extensive missile technology.

Today, it has a wide range of missiles, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), the Prithvi series, and supersonic cruise missiles, such as the BrahMos. In July 2000, India introduced the Akash Surface to Air Missile (SAM) with a 30 km range. The disturbing aspect of this missile is its nuclear capability, which raises questions regarding the missile’s defensive nature. The Agni series of ballistic missiles, the nuclear-capable fleet of aircraft, deployment of nuclear-powered submarines such as the INS Arihant can be used as an example of such a direction.

Additionally, India is also developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), a hypersonic delivery system, and missile defensive shields. Also, the Indian leadership has given some alarming utterances, indicating a review of the ‘No First Use’ policy. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, in 2019, said that “India has followed strictly the No First Use policy. Future is what future is and it’s based on the situation.” All these developments indicate that India is acting like a two-faced doll, being nice and dolly internationally while being engaged in weapon maximization.

Nuclear exceptionalism granted to India by Western powers undermines non-proliferation norms.

Furthermore, the nuclear exceptionalism in India has been ignored by world powers and even aided them. In 2008, the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal legalized the nuclear program of India without its participation in the NPT, violating international non-proliferation standards. The fact that India is now increasingly taking on a strategic alliance with Western powers, especially as a counterbalance to China, has placed a shield around India regarding its nuclear record.

Even though India showcases a loud voice on disarmament, it has the opposite performance regarding weapon modernization and strategic ambiguity. India should match its ideals and its nuclear posture towards the world. It should stop further growth and restore disarmament negotiations on nuclear weapons. Otherwise, it carries the risk that the rhetoric-reality gap would grow further and with serious consequences on regional as well as global stability.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.