Nuclear weapons have been used many times in the history of geopolitics as a tool to force dissenters to peace. Russian President Putin’s recent statements on nuclear weapons, including the change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine, which has transformed into a more aggressive one, and the strike on Ukraine with the Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, are not accidental at this time. What is the purpose of Putin’s statements and decisions? Let’s consider this in the context of the relevant decisions of Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon.

Putin’s statements on nuclear weapons serve as a form of mass strategic communication aimed at the West.

According to Haldeman, an aide to the president, Nixon deliberately planned to make it clear to Moscow and Hanoi that he was a “madman” capable of any irrational act, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons, to break the deadlock at the negotiating table and end the Vietnam War.

The “madman theory” was first proposed in Haldeman’s memoirs published in 1978. Haldeman recalled: “The Communists feared Nixon more than any other politician in U.S. public life. And Nixon intended to manipulate that fear to end the war. Nixon saw this as an advantage. “They will believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because it’s Nixon,” he said.

And here is the episode of the Korean War. Haldeman wrote about Nixon’s belief that President Eisenhower convinced North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union to end the Korean War in 1953 with a nuclear threat alone. “He saw a parallel in President Eisenhower’s actions to end another war. When Eisenhower arrived at the White House, the Korean War was at an impasse. Eisenhower rushed to break the stalemate. He secretly told the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea if an armistice was not signed immediately. A few weeks later, the Chinese declared an armistice, and the Korean War ended.”

Although it is unclear whether China perceived Eisenhower’s threat of nuclear expansion in this way, Nixon planned to use the same tactics in Vietnam, Haldeman recalls. He expected to use the same principle of threatening to use excessive force. The threat was key, and Nixon coined a phrase for his theory,” Haldeman continues. Nixon reportedly told Haldeman in the summer of 1968: “I call it the madman’s theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I’ve gotten to the point where I can do anything to stop the war.”

What does this theory look like in the context of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s recent statements on nuclear weapons? We will answer this question based on Henry Kissinger’s seminal work on the subject, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy”, written almost 70 years ago.

In this case, the issue is much broader, and Putin is addressing this decision to change the nuclear doctrine to Washington and Brussels. That is, he could strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons at any time from the beginning of the war in 2022.

The change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine poses risks to existing treaties and could create a nuclear security vacuum in Europe.

A change in nuclear doctrine by Russia, a signatory to nuclear treaties, especially The New START with the United States, could affect the further terms of its implementation and create risks of not signing a new treaty after the expiration of the existing one, i.e. in early 2026.

This is a change in the entire nuclear deterrence architecture, or at least a significant reason for it. The content of the existing treaties will need to be substantially adjusted, which could eventually create a nuclear security vacuum in Europe and the world. It is also worth recalling Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which are not mentioned in the treaty, but Trump wanted to amend it with tactical nuclear weapons during his first term. Putin’s move with the doctrine will complicate this process, which will shock Europe, because thousands of tactical nuclear missiles will be on its borders at any time.

What Putin has done with the doctrine is to ask the West whether it wants a nuclear security vacuum or not. For the West, this is a phobic request, so the West is silent in public so as not to push this issue, because Russia’s new doctrine is an irrational act within the theory of the madman, so behind the scenes this issue is a priority for the West, accelerating the process of forcing peace on those who disagree. Washington understood it exactly this way, saying that it would not change its nuclear doctrine to a more aggressive one – even a “limited nuclear war” as the main episode of Kissinger’s work is not needed by both the West and Russia.

Thus, Putin’s decision on the doctrine goes far beyond Ukraine’s security interests, and the West is forced to engage in a direct dialogue with Russia about the war in Ukraine. The dialog is already open, so Russia’s move on the nuclear doctrine two months before Trump’s inauguration is not accidental. Putin did not stop at changing the nuclear doctrine. Recently, in Astana, Putin reiterated the advantages of Russian nuclear weapons and especially praised the new Oreshnik missile.

Nixon’s ‘madman theory’ involved projecting irrationality to compel adversaries to negotiate; Putin appears to be employing a similar tactic.

Such statements have their addressee and purpose and are a form of mass strategic communication. Isn’t it risky to force peace on someone who uses this form of communication? This is the implication of what he is saying. The West has had a difficult dilemma since the Second World War: If peace is to be enforced, then who should be enforced out of the two parties to the conflict, Ukraine or Russia? A nuclear-armed country, or a country that Clinton and Yeltsin collectively (and shamelessly) disarmed thirty years ago?

Putin is not crazy if his statements can frighten the West. But there is one important point here: “Earlier in history, this only worked when the opponents of the speaker actually wanted this effect among their population, in order to prevent the population from supporting further escalation”.

So, Putin’s statements are a complex game and not a game of words at all. This probably indicates that the end of the war is approaching in a political way, as it was done during the above two episodes during the Cold War. Therefore, right now, the West should provide Ukraine with maximum political, military, and financial support to protect Ukraine from repeated aggression from Russia.

In practical terms, in particular, the West should initiate the deployment of a peacekeeping contingent to establish a safe and secure demarcation zone and provide Ukraine with the necessary conventional deterrent weapons, including more air defense, aircraft, and long-range weapons.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.