The Wall Street Journal reported that returning US President Donald Trump wants European peacekeepers to deploy to Ukraine after a ceasefire. They also reminded their audience about how he criticized the Biden Administration’s policy of authorizing Ukraine to use the US’ ATACMS missiles to strike deep inside Russia. This suggests he might rescind this policy and possibly even withdraw those arms from Ukraine if his counterpart Vladimir Putin agrees to his European peacekeeper proposal.

Trump’s proposal for European peacekeepers in Ukraine could reshape European security while offering a compromise between NATO and Russian objectives.

One of Putin’s goals is to demilitarize Ukraine, so he’d be receptive to Trump’s implied willingness to withdraw the ATACMS even though he’d prefer full demilitarization, but he’d also be displeased with the idea of NATO-member troops on the frontlines even if they operate under an EU mandate. Another of his goals is to stop what he considers to be NATO’s expansion to Ukraine so accepting the deployment of such forces there would amount to tacitly admitting that he couldn’t achieve this in full like he planned.

The tradeoff though is that NATO couldn’t achieve its goal of having Ukraine restore its 1991 borders like it sought to do via its members’ military aid to that country since this conflict began, with Russia actually gaining more territory since then and now controlling around 20% of Ukraine. The Russian economy also didn’t collapse through the unprecedented sanctions that they imposed either. Each side could therefore spin the other’s inability to achieve their goals in full as a victory for justifying a compromise with them.

There haven’t been any signals from Russian, Western, or Ukrainian officials suggesting that they’re preparing public opinion for this, however, so it might still be some time before this happens, if at all. In any case, if a ceasefire is reached and all sides agree to the deployment of European peacekeepers as part of it, then questions would arise about who’d participate in this mission, how it would be funded, and what authority its members would have.

To speculate, Poland, Romania, the Baltic States, Germany, France, Italy, and possibly also the UK might take part in this, and they could fund it through the interest from Russia’s seized assets. Their authority might be very limited though since Trump is unlikely to assure them that the US’ interpretation of NATO’s Article 5 would extend to their peacekeepers deployed in Ukraine under a non-NATO mandate. He wants to “Pivot (back) to Asia” and doesn’t want to worry about being dragged into another European war.

The deployment of NATO-member peacekeepers under an EU mandate might lead to Ukraine’s de facto incorporation into the alliance.

Accordingly, it would follow in this scenario that he’d also dissuade them from targeting Russian territory on their own if hostilities resume in Ukraine and their peacekeepers come under fire or worse, though some like Poland could always act unilaterally. Therein lies the greatest risk in his peacekeeper proposal. Poland’s participation would be pivotal, but it might retaliate against Russia in Belarus or Kaliningrad from its territory if its peacekeepers in Ukraine are harmed by Russia.

Everything could easily spiral out of control in that event. Russia would feel pressured to retaliate against NATO territory, and that could serve as the pretext for Poland to request Article 5’s activation, though the US might decline to avoid an escalation and thus risk discrediting the alliance. If the US isn’t confident that it could restrain Poland from unilaterally retaliating in such a way, then it might be best to keep it out of this mission and only request that it logistically facilitate others’ participation instead.

As it stands, the Polish government is reluctant to get involved per Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s and Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski’s latest statements. The first clarified during a press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron that “For the time being, we are not planning such actions (as participating in a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine)”. As for the second, he said that border security is Poland’s top priority but that it would provide logistical assistance to others in Ukraine if need be.

These statements are being made in the run-up to next May’s presidential election, however, so the ruling party might be playing it cool for now to not spook voters away from supporting their candidate, after which they might change their policy if he becomes the next Commander-in-Chief. That’s why it’s premature to count Poland out of this peacekeeping mission since its leaderships’ statements at this sensitive domestic political time shouldn’t automatically be taken at face value.

Poland’s pivotal role in the peacekeeping mission raises risks of escalation, with the potential for conflict spiraling into broader NATO-Russia tensions.

With or without Poland’s participation in this proposal, any implementation of it in practice would revolutionize the European security architecture. The Ukrainian hinterland behind the de facto NATO-protected frontlines would continue to be informally incorporated into the bloc. The security guarantees that Ukraine clinched throughout the course of this year with the US, the UK, Poland, and Germany, the four most important members in this context, institutionalize their existing military support for Ukraine.

Everything that they’re providing now will become the norm going forward, and while the scale might decrease if a ceasefire is agreed to, these agreements basically mandate that the present wartime level of aid immediately resumes if another conflict erupts. In the interim, November 2023’s proposal for a “military Schengen” aimed at facilitating the movement of arms and equipment throughout NATO would likely be prioritized to assist with this, thus speeding up Ukraine’s de facto incorporation into the bloc.

In parallel, the “European Defence Line” along the Baltic States’ and Poland’s borders with Russia and Belarus (the Polish portion is also known as the “East Shield”) will probably be constructed at an accelerated pace, which could result in a 21st-century Iron Curtain. These military moves might leave Russia with little choice but to formalize its ongoing merger with Belarus through its “Union State” project, leading to Belarus’ borders with NATO essentially becoming Russia’s with all that entails.

Readers should remember that the catalyst for this scenario is any ceasefire that leads to NATO-member peacekeepers deployed along the frontline even if they’re there under a non-NATO mandate. This could set into motion Ukraine’s de facto incorporation into NATO through its security guarantees with the US, the UK, Poland, and Germany, all of which would be bolstered by the progress being made on the “military Schengen” and “European Defence Line” projects, and then Belarus’ formal incorporation into Russia.

A ceasefire with peacekeepers could accelerate projects like the “military Schengen” and the “European Defence Line,” altering the regional security balance.

It’s also of course possible that none of this unfolds either. Russia might not achieve a breakthrough next year so the conflict’s dynamics could remain the same, such a breakthrough might soon come but Trump could decline to “escalate to de-escalate” to save some of Ukraine, or he does precisely that and coerce major concessions from Russia that end the conflict on the West’s terms. Nevertheless, if peacekeepers are indeed introduced, then some or all of what was foreseen could very well come to pass.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.