To pursue his agenda of making America great again, Trump, during his first term re-prioritized American foreign policy around great power competition by reinvigorating alliances, focusing upon China and Russia, and strengthening protectionism – a move away from the traditional US values-based foreign policy.

What will be his foreign policy priorities in the second term and whether there would be a disconnect from Biden’s foreign policy approach, specifically when dealing with other great powers? Are we going to see a drastic change, as is generally perceived by the commentators, or would it be business as usual?

Trump, being a pragmatist, is cautiously weighing his options against China, balancing tariffs and sanctions while reinforcing US global influence.

During the first week in the White House President Trump has issued a number of executive orders to withdraw from climate agreements and the World Health Organisation, a crackdown on illegal ‘aliens’, designating Ansar Allah – known as Houthis – a foreign terrorist organization, and freezing foreign aid till the time of evaluation whether the aid is helping the American interests or not.

He also made effective use of threats to impose tariffs on states refusing to accept alien flights and proclaimed to acquire Greenland and take back the Panama Canal. He has halted economic aid to Ukraine and several other states, including Pakistan, planning to coerce allies whom he thinks are free-riding the US and typical of his style, unlike his predecessor who tried to follow a values-based US foreign policy, intends to run it in a transactional manner.

These are important issues that would have repercussions at the global level, yet we find a ‘thin yet strong’ bipartisan consensus in the United States about several policies at systemic and sub-systemic levels. Cosmetic changes and differences would weigh heavy in the discourse, yet a major shift in policies designed for great power relations would remain elusive at best.

The US competition with China is one example. Trump in his first tenure brought great power competition back to the forefront while de-prioritizing issues related to terrorism, human rights, and democracy promotion. He designated China as a revisionist power intending to challenge the status quo and the US’ preponderant position in the international system. He intensified the trade war and imposed substantial tariffs on Chinese imports.

Biden administration not only continued Trump’s policy but further enhanced the tariffs on $ 18 billion of imports from China. The second Trump administration intends to keep the trend intact by increasing the tariffs on imports. Soon after taking office, he issued directives to see whether China fulfilled its obligations of the 2020 trade deal which required it to buy $200 billion of American products – which China could not have complied with because of Covid restrictions. But Trump would use this deal and China’s non-compliance as leverage to get a fair deal favoring American interests.

Despite his rhetoric, Trump significantly strengthened NATO during his first term and is expected to continue this trajectory in his second.

Similarly, Trump heightened the chip war with China in his first term. Biden upped the ante by signing the CHIPS and Science Act and introducing export controls in 2022 to limit the supply of high-tech equipment to China to keep a check on its capacity to develop advanced semiconductors. The second Trump administration is better equipped with data to challenge China in the semiconductor industry which is based on a complex global supply chain. It is exploring the option of imposing ‘component tariffs’ to deal with supply chain complexities.

For example, a semiconductor made in Taiwan might be using components made in China. But the US tariffs apply to Taiwan products, and not China’s. By way of component tariffs, the Trump administration would be in a position to specifically target China in the semiconductor industry. The underlying theme is very much evident: there would be little change in Trump’s foreign policy towards China and their competition would further increase.

But Trump, being a pragmatist, this time is moving very cautiously when dealing with China, weighing his options of enhancing tariffs or sanctioning Chinese individuals and entities. He was the one who imposed sanctions on Huawei, which were made further stringent by Biden. But this time, he delayed sanctioning TikTok in the United States for 75 days, depicting his cautious approach.

US policy towards the Asia Pacific is another example of continuity and change. Trump administration strengthened sub-systemic alliances to counter a rising China. QUAD, originally established as the ‘Tsunami Core Group’ in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, transformed into a group of four states – US, Australia, India, and Japan – having concerns about a rising China.

Trump’s transactional approach will likely lead to selective engagements, prioritizing economic benefits over multilateral commitments.

Its activities were frozen by 2008 only to be reinvigorated during the Trump administration in 2017. Since then, the Biden administration strengthened this mini-lateral arrangement, and Trump in his second term is expected to solidify such alliances against China in the Indo-Pacific.

Similarly, Trump is expected to ramp up other mini-lateral arrangements such as AUKUS (Australia, UK, and US) and I2U2 (Israel, India, USA, UAE) and intends to align those with his Asia Pacific vision. His policy towards India is a peculiar example that would see little change as this is something that the United States has remained committed to pursuing since the 1990s.

Another issue under discussion is Trump’s dealing with Nato. Trump threatened the very existence of Nato by claiming that it has gone obsolete. Rhetoric aside, during his first term Nato expanded and added two new members and because of his pressure tactics, several of its members increased their defence spending to meet the goal of 2% of their GDP. Biden continued the policy, and in his term, two more members were added to the alliance.

Moreover, Biden, like Trump, was successful in convincing the members to increase their defence budgets. At the start of Trump’s first term, only 4 Nato members were spending around 2% of their GDP on defence. By the time Biden took over, the number had increased to 9. When Trump entered the White House for the second time, this number increased to 23.

Though the threats emanating from Russia could be one major cause of this increase, it was Trump who started pushing Nato members ‘forcefully’ to increase their defense spending – something that previous Presidents since Kennedy have been trying to do with little success.  Rhetoric aside, Trump, in his second term, is expected to continue the policy of strengthening NATO with a focus on addressing multifaceted challenges facing Europe and beyond – another continuation of the US foreign policy at the systemic and sub-systemic level.

US policy towards Russia is a contentious issue where we may see a little change. But once again, rhetoric aside, the US under the first Trump term imposed more than 15 sanctions on Russia in response to different issues ranging from election interference, cyber attacks, the Ukraine crisis, and human rights violations. The policy continued during the Biden administration and the layers of sanctions increased manifold, this time more stringent because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Though Trump has developed this image that he feels comfortable dealing with Putin, something which could translate on the ground to several positive outcomes, yet belief that he would drastically change the US foreign policy toward Russia is yet to be seen. Russia has remained and will remain a major competitor of the United States during the Trump administration.

While stylistic changes in US foreign policy are expected, the core dynamics of great power competition will remain largely intact.

All being said, Trump would reprioritize American foreign policy from that of the Biden administration which revolved around multilateralism and engagements on the issues of traditional and non-traditional security. He claims to be a successful businessman who may enhance engagements in parts of the world where, in his view, the US would benefit and would downplay the engagements where transactions would bring more benefits for the recipients. Those will be the areas and arenas that China would most probably be exploiting, such as global environmental engagements and infrastructural development.

In the short and long term, we can expect major stylistic changes in the US foreign policy, but the continuity of substance is something that we expect to see, at least in the great power politics. Moreover, domestic and other issues of low politics are arenas where major transformations in policies are expected to transpire.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.