In recent years, East Asia has witnessed profound and formidable changes that have significantly transformed the regional order and created the highest level of uncertainty in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. Many trends in East Asia, such as the consolidation of nation-states and the growth of economic interdependence and regional cooperation, support a more robust “partial order.”
East Asia is experiencing its most interesting yet most difficult period since the end of the Cold War.
However, geo-political issues, especially China’s ambitions and inter-Korean relations remain significant question marks, intensified by uncertainty about the US motives in the region. As East Asia becomes the focus of the United States’ global strategy, the regional order subsequently evolved from the post-Cold War era to a new era. While much attention has been given to questions about the global implications of the US-China relationship, it is the regional order of East Asia that presents the most significant challenge.
China, while challenging both regional institutions and norms, has proposed many initiatives that will have a significant impact on the regional order in East Asia, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is slated to fund various infrastructure projects across the region. The United States under President Donald Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and appears to be ready to re-examine some of the long-standing core pillars of U.S. foreign policy.
Japan is proactively adjusting its foreign and defense policies, including laying out five new principles for diplomacy and expanding their application to its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Russia has become more active in regional affairs, pursuing a closer relationship with China and paying more attention to ASEAN. Finally, India is quickly shifting from a Look East to an Act East policy.
Given all these competing ideas and proposals, East Asia is experiencing its most interesting yet most difficult period since the end of the Cold War. All countries, within and outside the region, have been forced to rethink and recalculate their policy choices, amplifying the desire to form a new regional order to effectively manage these rapid and complex changes.
Given the outsize impact of US-China competition on East Asian countries, even slightly improved bilateral ties would bode well in the near term. Nonetheless, new risks and political arrangements ensure that the region will continue to be characterized by great-power rivalry and many flashpoints.
The US-China confrontation is no longer theoretical but a defining force shaping the region’s future.
When it comes to East Asia’s future regional order, one needs to understand the region with respect to its contemporary dynamics. The first and foremost question that needs to be deliberated is whether East Asia really accept China’s rise? As China’s economy and national power grows, American and East Asian countries have expressed again and again that they welcome a peaceful, prosperous China but issues like the East China Sea and the South China Sea territorial sovereignty disputes are the manifestations through which US and some East Asian countries demonstrate that they aren’t truly comfortable with a rising China and perhaps never will be.
Having said that, it is equally daunting to forecast as to how long America can successfully hold on to her hegemonic control so as to delay the onset of a new, alternative, post-American order. Unlike the era of European dominance characterized by frequent, violent and transient power transitions, the process of a hegemonic shift away from the US could be much slower in pace and more complex in nature perhaps also be a much elongated one, replete with mutual suspicion due to differing values, norms, and systems, constant contentions for rule-making rubrics.
Second, what would the post-American order look like if it should ever materialize? With America’s “return to Asia”, “pivot to Asia”, or “rebalancing”, East Asia has become the principal stage for Sino-American strategic competition. Now, as far as Asia is concerned, US–China confrontation is no longer a theoretical ploy. If the future international order is indeed going to be Asian Centric, then what sort of specific mix will it entail? And most importantly, can the US be creatively amalgamated into a new international order that consists of both the West and the “rest”?
This will also largely concern with the question of what fundamentally constitutes Asia for this very understanding, whether this Asia will be a single entity or are there several geopolitical Asia(s) more than Confucian-socialist China because how these transition dynamics will play itself out in Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as between continental and maritime Asia, are crucial points to watch.
Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, what is the future of China? Like Napoleon Bonaparte said, “When China woke from its slumbers, it would astonish the world”. It appears to be what is happening now. There is no doubt that the Chinese, too, are as much astonished by their own remarkable successes. The world is totally amazed at the swift scaling of China across the board, not only economically but also culturally and even militarily, but as much China is integrating with the world it still holds its traditional inward looking, Sino-centric values close to its heart which may not be completely replaced by the modern conception in near future.
China’s economic and military rise challenges the existing US-led regional order, prompting nations to hedge their strategies.
Economically, Sino-American competitions are being increasingly structured between the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China-centered FTA networks (i.e., RCEP) and Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTA-AP). In military terms, too, a spiral mode of competition is apparent. In terms of norms and values, the competition between the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus goes unabated, as China’s soft-power offensive is no longer merely reactive but has increasingly become proactive. Hence, East Asia, constituting both America’s vital interest and China’s core interest, is invariably a key region of contention between the two titans.
If there is a single word that best encapsulates the strategic landscape of East Asia today, it would be uncertainty. Of course, US–China relations are not simply anchored only on conflictual dynamics; they are also based on close cooperation, though selectively. While a few nations (most notably North Korea and Cambodia) have been bandwagoning with China, changes are on the way even with these nations, most notably Myanmar.
On the other hand, the “Balancers,” i.e., those that do not welcome the rise of China and instead are highly concerned about it like Japan, India and Australia have stepped up their act of checking on China, particularly since 2010. A predominant majority of East Asian nations, however, has opted for hedging—i.e., seeking to maintain good relations with both Washington and Beijing, thereby maximizing economic gains from China and, at the same time, sustaining security protection from the US just in case of the emergence of an assertive/aggressive China.
The uncertainty in East Asia underscores the need for strategic recalibration among regional and global powers.
One needs to understand that US–China cooperation is but a necessary condition for coping with some of the key global problems, though important ones, we still need the rest’s active support, implementation, and contributions for managing urgent problems both effectively and persuasively. Without the active participation of the rest, the future is more likely to become a distorted bigemony again, a scenario that the international community may not necessarily prefer to have in the long run.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
