The Taliban-run Afghan Interim Government (AIG) remains in denial regarding the presence of terrorist organizations sheltering and operating from Afghanistan. The latest UN Security Council report by the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaeda endorses Pakistan’s concerns that Afghan soil and finances are being used to support terrorists from TTP, ISKP, ETIM, and other groups.

The UNSC report reveals that the Taliban is providing logistical and financial support to terrorist groups like TTP and ISKP.

The report details AQ and TTP leaders being sheltered in Afghanistan, stating, “The Taliban continued to provide TTP with logistical and operational space and financial support, with one Member State noting that the family of Noor Wali Masoud received a monthly payment of 3 million Afghanis (roughly $43,000).

TTP established new training center in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika (Barmal) Provinces while enhancing recruitment within TTP cadres, including from the Afghan Taliban.” It further asserts that Afghan authorities facilitate not only shelter but also financial management for TTP terrorists.

The report acknowledges that between July and December last year, TTP conducted 600 attacks, many launched from Afghan territory. Recently, the son of a Deputy Governor of an Afghan province was killed in a firefight in Pakistan’s erstwhile tribal area as part of a TTP group attacking security forces. Similar incidents have occurred over the past three years, with TTP formations active in KP province and Afghan Taliban elements participating in attacks on security forces and civilians.

The report highlights that terrorist attacks in the region by AQ and ISKP have been planned and executed by leadership based in Afghanistan, alluding to attacks in Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia originating from Afghan territory. However, Taliban authorities flatly deny the presence of these terrorist groups operating in the region.

The question arises: why do the Taliban persist in denying the presence of terrorist organizations? A plausible explanation is the embarrassment associated with harboring terrorists. For instance, under the Doha Agreement, the Taliban were bound not to shelter AQ members, yet the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in central Kabul exposed their duplicity. Astonishingly, Taliban officials protested Pakistan’s role in allowing the American drone strike that eliminated Zawahiri, seemingly unaware of member states’ obligations under UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Afghan authorities are implicated in facilitating terrorist operations despite official denials from the Taliban.

The Taliban may have seized power in Kabul after the US-NATO withdrawal, but they remain bound by international obligations. They are required to apprehend AQ and ISKP operatives under UNSC resolutions, regardless of ideological alignment. Many Taliban leaders are still listed under the 1988 sanctions list, and their failure to be arrested or prosecuted does not absolve them of the charges levelled under various UNSC resolutions. Moreover, the UN Security Council resolutions against them remain active until officially revoked.

Secondly, no UN member state has recognized the Taliban regime, primarily due to IAG’s restrictions on girls’ education and women’s employment. The global community, including OIC member states, has condemned these actions as un-Islamic, warning that such policies tarnish Islam’s global image. The continued presence of terrorists within Afghanistan only strengthens the reluctance of states to engage with the Taliban regime.

Thirdly, from Pakistan’s perspective, the IAG’s non-cooperative stance on TTP activities could further escalate tensions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Taliban must not assume that they can prop up the TTP against Pakistan without consequences. Regionally, Afghanistan’s neighbors and Russia are aware of Pakistan’s concerns, and alienating Islamabad will only deepen Afghanistan’s isolation.

As Pakistan holds a seat on the UN Security Council until December 2026, it can play a role in stabilizing Afghanistan and the region. A series of bilateral, regional, and international measures are necessary to address terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. Steps that can be taken in response to the UN Security Council report include:

1. A UNSC delegation should visit Afghanistan to engage with Taliban authorities and emphasize the importance of Security Council decisions for global peace. If necessary, UNAMA could conduct training courses for Taliban officials on implementing UNSC resolutions.
2. Bilaterally, Pakistan can assist IAG officials in understanding international bodies and their responsibilities. Pakistan could also facilitate training for Afghan diplomats at its Foreign Service Academy to promote awareness of international law and treaty obligations.
3. Regionally, the Moscow Format and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can aid Afghanistan in counter-terrorism efforts. The SCO’s Counter-Terrorism Centre in Tashkent could support Afghanistan in combating ISKP and other terrorist groups that have benefited from Taliban leniency.

This report validates Pakistan’s long-standing concerns about terrorism emanating from Afghan territory.

However, these measures may prove ineffective if the Taliban persists in denying the presence of TTP, ISKP, and other groups. The Afghan theocratic order must recognize that it does not exist in isolation. The Taliban authorities still have an opportunity to rectify the situation.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.