“Russia, Its Neighbors, and NATO Enlargement” is the title of a document prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations, authored by Senator Lugar and Victoria Nuland in 1997. This is actually how NATO’s eastward expansion considers the role of Ukraine. A kind of concept of enlargement. Who, why, when… is not what is interesting so much. Section 7 of the document focuses on Ukraine. It is very interesting. Like a stun gun. So, here are the most interesting theses:

“The Alliance declares that the purpose of NATO’s enlargement is to strengthen stability in Europe as a whole, not just in one part of the continent. In this regard, the Task Force has paid considerable attention to the particular challenges and vulnerabilities of the Baltic States and Ukraine, not least because Russia publicly opposes their future membership in NATO and they fear being left in a permanent security vacuum between the Alliance and Russia.”

NATO’s expansion relied on an independent Ukraine as a strategic buffer between Russia and the Alliance.

Thus, even at the beginning of the process of NATO’s eastward expansion, the alliance recognized that Ukraine would be caught in a security vacuum between NATO and Russia, but deliberately expanded.

“The very fact of Ukraine’s independence made NATO’s expansion easier politically and much less costly militarily. Together with the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine gave the West strategic leeway and time to warn in its dealings with Russia, and facilitated the integration of the new democracies in the region into the EU and NATO.”

Thus, Eastern European countries, new members of NATO, should be grateful to Ukraine for acting as a strategic buffer between NATO and Russia, which “made NATO enlargement easier politically and much less costly militarily….If an independent Ukraine were to disappear, the basic assumptions of NATO’s current defense planning could change, as well as the parameters within which current defense arrangements for an enlarged NATO are considered.”

In other words, the strategy of NATO’s eastward enlargement and its success depended on the existence of an independent Ukraine between NATO and Russia, i.e., a strategic buffer. What about Ukraine’s accession to NATO? When was it supposed to happen? When should Europe’s strategic buffer turn into a NATO member?

“While Ukraine is unlikely in the foreseeable future to be fully integrated into major Euro-Atlantic political, economic, or security structures, the success or failure of those structures and Europe’s stability depend in important respects on Ukraine’s democratic and market transition…While Ukraine is unlikely to be fully integrated into major Euro-Atlantic political, economic, or security structures in the foreseeable future, the success or failure of those structures and Europe’s stability depend in important respects on Ukraine’s democratic and market transition.”

They wonder how long the “foreseeable future” is. Is it one generation, i.e., 25 years? What is the name of NATO’s policy toward Ukraine? They called it an Open Door Policy. Taking into account the main theses above, which cannot but shock, dated 1997 and what happened next, let us recall Bucharest 2008, which history has well recorded, this is a policy of “forever open doors,” which does not exclude eternal waiting for an invitation to join NATO.

It is worth noting that Ms. Nuland is one of the biggest hawks in Washington regarding Russia, so her theses mentioned above cannot but be surprising, at least, because they are hawkish opinions! Also, the title is surprising, because a self-contained title for NATO would be different – “NATO Enlargement, Russia and its Neighbors.”

Europe’s dreams of a strategic buffer on the East and NATO enlargement

In 1993, Walker Rune, the German defense minister, stated that “NATO should not only be preserved, but should also expand to the East.” He stated on the eve of Valensa and Havel’s visit to Washington that “Germany should support NATO’s eastward expansion in order to create a ‘strategic buffer’ of stability for Central Europe with the new NATO member states and to reward the people of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for their active support of the German reunification process that ended in 1990.”

Thus, back in the early 1990s, for Europeans from Central and Western Europe, the new NATO members from Eastern Europe were a buffer against Russia, i.e., the territories where NATO would have to meet the enemy. Territories of combat operations, and possibly the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This is the role of the buffer.

Ukraine’s full NATO integration remains unlikely ‘for the foreseeable future,’ leaving it in a prolonged security limbo.

Don’t recent statements by high-ranking officials from Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states indicate that Ukraine is now playing the role of a buffer? At the same time, the war is being waged not only on the territory outside of NATO and the EU, but also without the participation of the armed forces of European countries. Back in 1993, German Defense Minister Walker Roone could not even imagine that a country outside of NATO could be a buffer, which would further increase the size of the overall Eastern European buffer zone in the security interests of Western and Central Europe.

Against this background, how would Ukraine’s ability to join NATO look like if Ukraine were also acting as a buffer zone for Europe outside of NATO? All that was needed was to keep NATO’s doors open to the country, but not to rush with the invitation to join.

Ukraine, this strategic security buffer of Europe, has been keeping Europe and NATO away from Russia for the fourth, or rather, 11th year. With the lives of its citizens, risking its future. Maybe it’s time for NATO to frankly explain the situation regarding Ukraine’s membership in NATO? To be frank, has NATO ever had any real intentions of accepting Ukraine into the alliance since 1991? Without any gimmicks like “always open doors”. Since 1999, there have been 7 waves of NATO’s eastward expansion, i.e., 26 years have passed. Given the phrase “for the foreseeable future” by Lugar and Nuland in 1997, it is time to move on to a decision on Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

At the very least, the Ukrainian people deserve frankness from the West, and if NATO is not ready to finally invite Ukraine to join NATO, and there is no such consensus, then NATO countries, especially those from Europe, are simply obliged to provide Ukraine with effective security guarantees for the 34 years that Ukraine has served as a strategic buffer in Europe, not even 11, but 34.

How does Trump view the issue of Ukraine’s membership in NATO as part of his prioritization strategy?

It is highly recommended to read a recent article in Foreign Affairs that answers this question. Here is its main thesis on this issue: “In Ukraine, the Trump administration is trying to end the war quickly in a way that will allow the United States to withdraw from the continent. European peace plans have tried to engage the United States by proposing, for example, a ceasefire that would be guaranteed by American security forces. But the Trump administration has categorically rejected this prospect. Logically, a U.S. force in Ukraine would be a strategic mistake, as it would drag the United States into a European quagmire, prevent it from pivoting toward Asia, and allow NATO allies to absolve themselves of responsibility…A smaller U.S. presence would make it easier for Europe to de facto recognize Russia’s core interests near its borders, with Ukraine outside of NATO. Compared to a situation in which the EU or, worse, NATO would push eastward, provoking Moscow, this would reduce (if not eliminate) a key source of conflict between Europe and Russia. If European countries allocate the financial and political resources necessary to build a strong defense, they will be able to deter future Russian aggression.”

US strategy under Trump aims to end the war quickly by keeping Ukraine outside NATO but accelerating EU accession.

This raises a frank question: Is Ukraine a strategic buffer for Europe, outside of NATO but part of the EU, or is Ukraine a strategic buffer for Europe, outside of NATO and outside of the EU? Ukraine deserves at least the former. European leaders should accelerate Ukraine’s integration into the EU to prove their resolve toward Ukraine.

Washington’s game against Moscow over the war in Ukraine: Trump’s carrot-and-stick strategy, or how does Washington see the game ending?

Recently, the well-known US expert organization, The Council on Foreign Relations, which has been around for more than 100 years, published an article by its fellow Charles Kupchan, “The Carrot-Stick Approach to Ending the War in Ukraine”, an experienced expert in geopolitics. In his article, he consistently describes Trump’s strategy in the negotiating room with Russia regarding war and peace in Ukraine.

How should it all end for Ukraine? How does Washington see Ukraine’s fate? We are following the strategy consistently. Carrots from Trump to Russia: We are talking about removing the issue of Ukraine’s membership in NATO from the agenda, at least for the foreseeable future (some politicians say about 20 years). In addition, the United States is offering to restore relations. This is already happening. That is, Washington has already offered carrots to Russia.

Trump’s stick: possible US sanctions on Russian oil. Here we are talking about tariffs on those countries that will buy Russian oil, including China and India, in the amount of about 100%, as well as setting the upper limit of the price of Russian oil at a level less than $60 (it may be as low as $40 per barrel). The dynamics of Russia’s GDP are sensitive to the dynamics of oil prices, as the years 2015 and 2020 prove. In addition to sanctions, the Trump administration should provide Ukraine with enough weapons to effectively deter Russia on the battlefield.

Europe must provide Ukraine with effective security guarantees after 34 years of serving as a buffer without full membership.

These carrots and sticks from Trump have already become public knowledge. But there is another element to this strategy – the so-called endgame of the war in Ukraine. That is, how should it end for Ukraine?

Endgame: Ukraine should recover and become a member of the EU.

This is a very important thesis, because it means that Washington will use its political influence on Europe to ensure and possibly speed up Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This is probably a carrot for Ukraine, whose political leadership must accept a situation where, instead of trying to return the territories by military means, the war ends at the demarcation line, there is no recognition, including international recognition, of the occupied territories, and Ukraine joins the EU, realizing its main goal of the last decade – European integration.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.