No grand design fits all contexts. The Japanese tried to emulate the Germans’ Blitzkrieg and failed terribly in trying to assert dominance. Their failure was rooted in the neglect of strategic, geographical and cultural realities. For military planners, these are not cautionary tales but a warning, demonstrated repeatedly in history that a strategy that thrives in one theatre may wither in another. For 21st-century security and strategic architectures, this lesson is still relevant. However, Indian policymakers hold the conviction that they can replicate Israel’s tactics for their grand designs against Pakistan.

“It has happened in the Middle East. If the Israeli people can do it, we can also do it.”

This assertion that India is implementing the Israeli model through displacement, ethnic cleansing and settlers-colonial projects is being reported in international media. Even the Indian officials, bluntly and shamelessly, claimed that India intends to implement the Israeli model by stating that “It has happened in the Middle East. If the Israeli people can do it, we can also do it.” However, after the Pahalgam incident, more perilously, India adopted an Israel-like menacing tone against Pakistan, a choice that is hazardous for the region and beyond. In an ongoing media trial of Pakistan accusing it of the attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a public address, used a provocative and escalatory tone and stated, “Attackers and conspirators would face retribution beyond their imagination. The pursuit will not end until justice is served and India will hunt them to the ends of the earth”, while insinuating that Pakistan was involved. Even the words seemed lifted straight from Israel’s playbook.

Unlike Israel, such a strategic behaviour from India might only be calibrated through intent alone and devoid of environment, capabilities and alliances, which risks undermining its security

The question arises whether India can emulate the Israeli model successfully vis-à-vis Pakistan? The simple answer is no, because such a strategy goes against historical lessons and established security and strategic rationales. Even if India turns a blind eye towards history. Unlike Israel, such a strategic behaviour from India might only be calibrated through intent alone and devoid of environment, capabilities and alliances, which risks undermining its security.

The structural imbalance in Israel’s favour allows it to implement its aggressive designs with minimal consequences.

Israel operates with impunity because of its weaker neighbours, and with all kinds of support from powerful and trustworthy Western allies. The structural imbalance in Israel’s favour allows it to implement its aggressive designs with minimal consequences. However, India had to operate in a different environment that does not favour Indian designs.  South Asia is a region of consequences. It hosts two nuclear states with a potent conventional military power. War in the region is not an option for rationally driven foreign policy, as it neither reflects Gaza nor the Ukrainian environment. If such a step is taken, it is bound to fail, making India vulnerable to shocks it cannot absorb.

The punctuated equilibrium is still intact and, to a great extent, and is in favour of Pakistan in the air domain and will yield similar outcomes to those in 2019

The second factor is capability; Israel is fighting against unequal actors in terms of military might, while India has to counter a potent conventional military power. In South Asia, India has an advantage of a 1:3 ratio in terms of the quantitative numbers of military personnel and equipment. In terms of budget, they enjoy an even greater advantage with a 1:8 ratio in military budget. However, Pakistan has maintained the punctuated equilibrium, where it has demonstrated the ability to inflict punishment and raise the cost of war to an extent that Indian security managers have realised in the near past that they are attempting to eat more than they can chew. The punctuated equilibrium is still intact and, to a great extent, and is in favour of Pakistan in the air domain and will yield similar outcomes to those in 2019.

India’s partnership with the West appears to be strategic in function but transactional in nature

The third factor is alliances; Israel has reliable partners in the West, but India does not enjoy the same status. Unlike Israel, India’s relations with the West are based on trade-offs and devoid of any strategic component. It’s the US gamble that they are making on India, with the hope that India can contain China, which makes India relevant to their policy. The economic potential of India is another area of interest for the rest of the West. But these two factors alone do not place India and Israel in the same equation. India’s partnership with the West appears to be strategic in function but transactional in nature. It is driven less by long-term objectives and more by self-centric interests of the parties involved in this pragmatic alliance.

With no clear edge in environment, capability and alliances, the question arises whether India will learn a lesson from history or history will teach a lesson to India? I believe that history will teach a lesson to India, as it has turned a blind eye towards it.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.