This year marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of perhaps the most fundamental study in political science of the Cold War. We are talking about “The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition” by the famous author John Pocock, which was published first in 1975.

This study is well known by the Kremlin team, which actively practices the application of its key thesis. One of them, which is directly related to the current situation around the war in Ukraine and the broader agenda of relations between the United States and its opponents, including Russia, is given below:

‘Since the ‘innovator’ is, by his own actions, moving into a delegitimised context where fortune rules and human behaviour cannot be relied upon, he is obliged not to look too far ahead and to act on the spot – and, in this sense, to innovate. Therefore, action in a very precise sense is a virtue: when the world is destabilised and the unexpected is a constant threat, to act – to do things that are not contained in the structures of legitimacy – is to shape fortune.’

Trump’s return signals a revival of isolationist, protectionist policies that prioritize short-term populism over long-term global stability.

The ‘actions’ and ‘delegitimised context’ are the Kremlin’s actions in Crimea, the South-East in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. All of this is contrary to international law, i.e. delegitimized. The Kremlin relies on fortune. For it, ‘innovation’ is another act of violation of international law, and the action associated with it, such as war, is a virtue. Also, the Kremlin itself has admitted that it played the role of ‘innovator’ during the conflict in Syria during the second decade of this century. It is likely that the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was also a game of ‘innovator’, but broken plans and a long war have significantly limited the Kremlin’s innovator’s room for maneuver.

How to counteract an ‘innovator’ in geopolitics? Most importantly, how to overcome such an ‘innovator’? By becoming an ‘innovator’ yourself. This is Trump’s model of behavior. There is a need to disorient him. Actions and decisions should be constant, unexpected, and fast, isolating the sources of information for making such decisions. In other words, the world is now witnessing a kind of geopolitical battle between two ‘innovators’ – Trump and Putin – where the former has the initiative.

In fact, the ‘innovator’ is used to provoking chaos, plunging his opponents into it, causing them defeat, and solving the problem in the end. It works when done quickly. Very quickly. That is exactly what Trump is going to do. This is a kind of approach to peace enforcement. Here, speed plays a key role.

Successful passage of the Machiavellian Moment implies that the ‘innovator’ has mastered a kind of irrational art of dealing with the exceptional, the random, the unpredictable when one should abandon all hope of subordinating the course of events to the rule of law. This resembles the deliberate provocation of chaos and its subsequent ordering on terms that are as close as possible to the interests of the country represented by the ‘innovator’.

The imposition of hefty tariffs on key U.S. trading partners may trigger a trade war with far-reaching global economic consequences.

‘Machiavelli’s Moment, as a fundamental study, already has a sufficient number of interpretations in the form of more modern works, such as “The New Prince: Machiavelli Updated for the Twenty-First Century” by Dick Morris or “The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World” by Jonathan Powell.

What is the main topic of the Machiavelli Moment? It is about ‘the role of active citizenship and its virtues in the evolution of Western European political thought’. Pocock’s ideas are still relevant today because from time to time, countries evolutionarily experience their ‘Machiavellian moment’ – ‘the time when a young republic faces a crisis of its proclaimed values and institutions’. That is, it is a clash between virtue on the one hand and fortune and vice on the other.

Virtues should be shaped by active citizenship, but in the absence of it, the leader gets the opportunity to shape virtues, calling any of his actions virtuous, such as geopolitical pressure, disregard for obligations, and norms of behavior, which in some cases can culminate in war or dictatorship. To this end, political leaders resort to the tactics of the ‘innovator’ to gain political and, as it turns out, even geopolitical influence.

Machiavellianism is a kind of behavioral model for politicians that allows them to disregard moral norms and use brute force to achieve their political goals. Thus, the world is now witnessing the dominance of Machiavellianism in the formation of a new world order. We should not forget that we are talking about a multipolar world with a whole cohort of political leaders who are inclined to innovate in order to gain influence. The moral imperative of geopolitics has been put in a drawer. For now. So, what should be the outcome of Trump’s Machiavellian moment in order to bring order to the war in Ukraine and ultimately achieve sustainable peace?

In November 2023, Foreign Affairs published an article by Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan on a possible scenario for ending the war in Ukraine. Trump likely adopted the main theses of these two well-known foreign policy experts. What did Haas and Kupchan predict?

‘The time has come for Washington to lead the effort to formulate a new policy that sets achievable goals and aligns means and ends.’

Ukraine must adopt a cautious, hedging strategy to navigate turbulent geopolitical dynamics under Trump 2.0.

Wasn’t Biden’s lack of a strategy for ending the war the obvious Achilles’ heel of his policy? ‘The United States should begin consultations with Ukraine and its European partners on a strategy that centers on Ukraine’s readiness to negotiate a ceasefire with Russia while simultaneously shifting its military emphasis from offense to defense.

Kyiv will not give up on restoring its territorial integrity or holding Russia economically and legally accountable for its aggression, but recognises that its immediate priorities must shift from trying to liberate more territory to defending and rebuilding the more than 80 per cent of the country still under its control.’

Aren’t these theses now being used by Trump in his policy to end the war in Ukraine? ‘It is possible that the prospects for a mutually agreed ceasefire and further negotiations on territory will improve significantly after the 2024 US presidential election.’

Haas and Kupchan looked at it like water: That’s exactly what happened.

‘If the United States is committed to continued transatlantic solidarity and further efforts to ensure Ukraine’s security and sovereignty, Putin will have little reason to believe that time is on his side. But the US elections are still a year away, and they could lead to an outcome that would put Ukraine in a difficult position.’

And so it happened: 2024 was a difficult year for Ukraine, and the Kremlin took advantage of Biden’s strategic indecision. ‘Neither Washington nor Kyiv should take that risk. The United States needs to work with Ukraine now to move to a new strategy that reflects military and political realities. To do otherwise would be to recklessly risk Ukraine’s future.’

‘Ukraine’s friends in the West can and should sweeten what could be a bitter pill for Ukrainians. The United States and individual NATO members (the coalition of friends of Ukraine) should commit not only to long-term economic and military assistance but also to guaranteeing Ukraine’s independence. This commitment could be modeled on Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which provides for immediate consultations when the ‘territorial integrity, political independence or security’ of an Ally is threatened.

Structural reforms and increased private sector engagement are crucial for Ukraine to overcome its reliance on IMF support and achieve sustainable growth.

The European Union, which has recently announced its intention to start accession talks with Kyiv, should accelerate the timetable for Ukraine’s membership and offer it a special facilitated deal with the EU during the transition period. Western allies should also make clear that most sanctions against Russia will remain in place until Russian troops leave Ukraine and that they will help Ukraine restore its territorial integrity at the negotiating table.’

Here, Haas and Kupchan remind Europe of the contribution it can make to the long-term security of Ukraine and the region: Admit Ukraine to the EU on an expedited basis. So, Europe, this is the geopolitical moment you should not miss!

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.