Pakistan, like all other developing countries, finds itself at a crossroads of unpredictability. It is not a subjective unpredictability but rather the anxiety that is being stoked in all foreign capitals, particularly those of U.S. allies and partners. This “unpredictability” is what the new U.S. President Donald Trump, a businessman, not a statesman by profession, is trying to establish as a capstone of his presidential decision-making style, with the wider aim of getting an upper hand in his bilateral engagements, particularly with China, Russia, and America’s allies, which, in Trump’s view, need to share the burden of collective security.
Trump’s approach to foreign policy is rooted in transaction, leverage, and brinkmanship rather than responsible statesmanship.
For a researcher, the first choice would be to go by classical International Relations methods to dissect a leader or his henchmen’s traits: Presidential Code and leadership trait analysis. This analysis permits meaningful typification and has implications for the foreign policymaking process when the decision unit is predominant.
Donald J. Trump is one anomaly. Not that he is the only one—many countries across the globe had leaders jumping in from outside the political status quo—but it’s the United States that we are talking about, where predictability shores up the very hegemony that Washington aims to maintain. Trump is not a career politician who would have sat on Senate committees, chaired special commissions, or served as secretary before ascending to the White House. His unorthodox character is further emphasized by his business mindset—after all, Trump is fundamentally a bargainer, a buyer, and a seller. A safe bet would be that his policies in the policymaking process would not be different either.
An interesting book might provide the cues researchers and journalists trying to make sense of Trump’s decision-making model , a book Trump sanctioned to be authored on his life and his dealings, by himself. The book “Trump: The Art of the Deal,” written by Trump and Tony Schwartz, was published in 1987, back when Trump was a renowned entrepreneur. It provides the first detailed account of his working style offering a glimpse into his transactional mindset .
In the book, Trump outlines his deal-making methodology, characterized by using maximum leverage in securing a favorable deal. Trump proceeds to discuss his tendency to break away from tradition, explaining his mindset behind the Grand Hyatt Hotel deal. In every chapter, Trump has tried to offer an explanation of the rationale behind his business moves. Trump does not hesitate to criticize government departments and bureaucracies that hindered billion-dollar deals. Throughout the book, two major themes remain consistent across the chapters: his disdain for political and bureaucratic overreach and his belief in successful branding, risk-taking, and breaking with tradition.
Pakistan finds itself in the same dilemma as any country in Asia would—to not put all apples in one basket while addressing its security and economic needs, which, in turn, requires cordiality with the big powers of this era: the U.S., the EU, and China. The transactional relation I refer to in the preceding lines hints at the coming of a more bargain-based order that will define how political actors engage in an era of great power contestation. Where ties would be exclusively maintained based on what one can offer.
Pakistan must transition beyond Cold War binaries and redefine its global relevance in economic and strategic terms.
The question arises: Isn’t that how International Relations plays out, realist to its core? Where national interests would trump, and now we have “the Trump” who claims to seek national interest through “America First.” The answer is yes and no. The bloc politics at play post-WW2 actually gave breathing space to the majority of Third World countries. Big powers exerted influence to woo them with incentives, often very generous for those countries.
With the passage of time and the advent of the third wave of globalization, developing world economies took off, creating not only sites for offshore manufacturing but also consumer bases, as well as witnessing unforeseen immigration to Western states, which, in a cyclical manner, benefited the countries of origin through remittances and economic linkages . Today, Asia is the most competitive and lucrative market, largely because Western demographics are in decline. Any guesses about where the next “Great Game” is being played?
Pakistani policymakers, especially its aging political class , have viewed geopolitics through rigid binaries. Policymakers here fail to catch up with the rapidly transitioning regional and global order that requires a robust policymaking process that would enable them to jockey around the global power play to extract their own interests.
This is what we see taking place in East Asia, the Middle East, and South America. The transactional order Trump will bring will be characterized by stringent conditions, not the generosity the West could afford in the 90s. The businessman he is, invokes a sort of brinkmanship rather than responsible statesmanship, where he would stage dramatic confrontations to get a better “deal” in his dealings. For the businessman he is, it is all about profits and losses—nothing for universalistic crusades or countering emerging threats unless they morph into existential dangers (or convenient distractions) for American security.
Pakistan must gear up for an assertive Washington that, if not confronting China directly, will surely go after what the U.S. would deem as China’s “allies.” There should be no caveats over who might be the “casualty” when alphas lock horns. Again, developing countries will bear the brunt as security competition intensifies—not just between great powers but also middle powers jostling to exert themselves in their own regions, triggering benign fault lines and a return to classical security dilemmas.
A transactional world order demands that Pakistan adopt a transactional approach—offering value in global economic and security affairs.
Non-hegemonic states that looked to hegemons as security guarantors now find themselves on their own, Pakistan in particular, which faces a rapidly changing— or rather dismal—regional security outlook, all the while walking the tightrope to balance its ties with both the U.S. and China.
For starters, Trump’s era will be a continuation of the cold shoulder due to bipartisan cozying up to India, an increasingly Sinophobic ruling class, and a conservative mode of policymaking (characteristic of the Grand Old Party). Pakistan, which has engaged in security cooperation, should expect this cold shoulder to continue unless a matter of security significance arises, giving Pakistan an opportunity to regain relevance (to the U.S.). That, too, seems complex now that there is the China factor, as well as the India factor, which Pakistan feels the most uneasy about.
What can Islamabad do? Firstly, its policy pundits need to start thinking like a businessman would (extract profits, diminish losses, and avoid needless risks). Secondly, they must come to terms with the “unpredictability” that will be the high watermark of Trump’s engagement. Third, a transactional order requires, well, transactions (something to give of such importance that it adds to your geopolitical weight).
For the upcoming years, as South Asia faces geopolitical turbulence with India and the U.S. growing closer, Pakistan must move beyond the Cold War mindset and transition not just to a multipolar but a zero-polar world in the coming decades.
With U.S.-India ties growing stronger, Pakistan must rethink its diplomatic strategy to navigate shifting power dynamics in South Asia.
Simply put, Pakistan must define its relevance in economic terms. It must provide the world with what it needs—whether that be food, skilled labor, offshore investment opportunities, or most importantly, predictability. On security, Pakistan must play a more proactive role, even considering overseas engagements to protect its allies’ interests—alliances that, in turn, recognize Pakistan’s strategic significance. A transactional world order demands a transactional approach. Pakistan must either adapt or risk irrelevance. The choice is clear.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
