An emerging missile race in South Asia is already underway. India is modernizing its strategic forces to counter growing Chinese capabilities and to fulfill its regional and global power aspirations. Under her military modernizing program, India is introducing new missile developments that are destabilizing for the region. Some of these capabilities include hypersonic missiles, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), canisterized missiles, and Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV). These developments signal a shift from Credible Minimum Deterrence to warfighting (first strike). Consequently, Pakistan is compelled to find new options to maintain deterrence equilibrium, leading to an action-reaction missile race.
US has historically played an effective role in the region as a third party mediator in the past. The changing geopolitical realities of the region especially rise of China and India, from the last decade, has led it to revisit his priorities. Current US administration’s policy towards South Asia is clearly unclear for Trump is unpredictable and difficult to decode. But one thing is clear, looking at US’s previous engagement with South Asia: the future of arms control in South Asia is bleak. The reason is that the US’s unabated support to India in technological acquisition in recent years has been yawning the asymmetry gap in nuclear forces and conventional capabilities between Pakistan and India. In South Asia, India holds central position in the Indo-Pacific policy of US and they see India as a bulwark against the Chinese threat.
This will lead Pakistan to seek more cooperation from China to maintain deterrence, and will erode the future of arms control and possible cooperation
Trump in his second term, doesn’t seem to overlook China. Bombing China with unprecedented tariffs, showing conciliation with Putin to break Sino-Russian cooperation are steps taken already of which there is more to come. Next step could be arming China’s neighbouring states as Trump did in his last regime by introducing Indo-pacific policy. If this happens, India will likely take most advantage from it since many faces in his cabinet have already spoken for India at one occasion or more. One example of it is, his Secretary of the State, Marco Rubio. Senator Rubio, last year, introduced a bill in Congress that calls to treat India as close allies, similar to South Korea, Israel, or Japan in technology acquisition. If this happens, this will lead Pakistan to seek more cooperation from China to maintain deterrence, and will erode the future of arms control and possible cooperation.
Not only Trump should consider Pakistan’s anxieties of increasing military imbalance with India but both Pakistan and India should consider resuming strategic restraint talks and go for more confidence-building measures to avoid a new arms race, build trust and circumvent misinterpretation. Here I’ll discuss different aspects of missile development that are already in play and are posing serious threat to strategic stability in South Asia.
The introduction of ballistic missile defense by India in the existing fragile nuclear calculus has created many concerns across the border. India started developing BMD soon after nuclear tests in 1998. At this point, India has made claims of a high interception rate and successful testing of its BMD, which provides high-low coverage from incoming missiles. Alongside indigenous development of BMD, India has signed an agreement to procure 5 squadrons of Russian S-400 systems, of which 3 squadrons are delivered. Out of these three, two squadrons are deployed along Pakistani borders in Punjab and Rajasthan, which contrasts to the Indian justification of developing BMD against Chinese firepower. India also views Pakistan’s “No-no first use” and offensive-defensive strategy as rationale to develop BMD. Even with these claims, the introduction of BMD will further nudge the delicate stability towards a crisis-prone environment.
The effectiveness of BMD in geographic proximity is questionable, but it’s still concerning, accounting for India’s cold start doctrine and its historic struggle for a limited conventional conflict, which is deterred by Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD). In this sense, BMD may generate a false sense of security in Indian policymakers and create temptation for a first strike knowing that the second escalator rung will be neutralized through BMD. BMD will also create a security dilemma for Pakistan, questioning the credibility of its nuclear weapons, which it has held to this day against every challenge created by India.
Pakistan has already tested its MIRV-capable Ababeel ballistic missile with Baber and Ra’ad cruise missiles, ensuring deep strikes, survivability, and penetrating Indian defenses
This will push Pakistan to explore countermeasures by expanding its arsenal vertically and horizontally alike. Pakistan has already tested its MIRV-capable Ababeel ballistic missile with Baber and Ra’ad cruise missiles, ensuring deep strikes, survivability, and penetrating Indian defenses. Pakistan will likely increase the number of missiles to overwhelm BMD in crisis, which will be a challenge to arms control and nuclear minimalism.
India successfully tested scramjet-powered Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicles (HSTDVs) that achieved Mach 6 for 20 seconds. Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is planning to conduct extended tests of HSTDV to achieve speed for 400 seconds. Successful induction of these weapons will challenge deterrence stability since these weapons will drastically reduce the missile delivery time from minutes to seconds against Pakistan. These weapons will be used against counterforce targets, e.g., vessels, military installations, command and control, etc., for their speed and manoeuvrability, which creates assurance of a successful strike without interception. Hypersonic weapons will provide Indian leaders with a power psychosis, which could increase confidence for a first strike.
Agni Prime and Nirbhay are both mated with warheads and can be used instantly in a crisis, reducing the time that could be used for restraint and escalation control
In the initial stages of their missile program, both states relied on liquid propellant missiles to increase ranges. Pakistan’s first missile with medium range, “Ghauri (1500 km)” was a liquid propellant missile. Similarly, India’s first two missiles, Prithvi 1-2, are also liquid propellant. Liquid propellant missiles take more time for operability since they require fuelling before launch. With the sophistication and maturity of their missile programs, solid-fuelled missiles now constitute most of both state’s inventory and test launches: 63% for Pakistan and 35% for India.
Pakistan and India had also maintained recessed deterrence, keeping delivery systems and warheads separate, but now India is moving towards more ready-to-launch systems with the canisterization of its missiles. Agni Prime and Nirbhay are both mated with warheads and can be used instantly in a crisis, reducing the time that could be used for restraint and escalation control. Such Hair Trigger systems incentivize first strike during crises to avoid losing retaliatory capabilities. Increased readiness also signals a shift from deterrence-by-retaliation to a more aggressive stance which is in contrast to India’s CMD.
MIRV missiles, in sum with BMD, increase Indian temptation for a first strike by decapitating most of the strategic forces and shooting down the remaining forces in a retaliatory strike
With the doctrinal and behavioral evolution, both states are vowing to develop new systems to either counter or gain the escalation dominance against each other. Pakistan tested the Ababeel missile for the first time in 2018 in response to India’s efforts to build BMD. Last year India tested Agni-P, which is capable of carrying three to ten warheads and has a range of 1000 km, making it Pakistan-centric. MIRV missiles, in sum with BMD, increase Indian temptation for a first strike by decapitating most of the strategic forces and shooting down the remaining forces in a retaliatory strike. MIRV missiles are, hence, offensive and against India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD).
Pakistan and India have fought four major wars with many skirmishes and clashes along the border. Both states held each other at the center in their threat perception. A huge trust deficit exists between them, and both have nuclear weapons. In such a strategic culture, there are few or no escalation control mechanisms, confidence-building measures, or arms control measures. South Asia is considered a flashpoint and one of the most crisis-prone regions. The absence of trust, strained diplomacy, and limited trade exacerbates the security dilemma, and any step for securitization is viewed with skepticism across the border, leads to reactionary measures generating an arms spiral and instability.
ISKP’s growing presence in the region and US’ statement praising Pakistan in its counter-terrorism efforts indicates that Pakistan and US interest can overlap in countering terrorism
Trump, in his previous term, has withdrawn from landmark agreements on arms control e.g Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and JCPOA. This time, with its pro India cabinet, Trump can likely furnish India with advance technology and cooperation in space and defence domain to counter China. Although Trump’s major focus is on containing China through Indo Pacific policy but ignoring regional interwoven complexities might backfire against US interest. For Instance, in South Asia, unbridled support to India and sanctioning or utterly ignoring Pakistan will not only push Pakistan more towards China but also can lead to intensification of arms race against India. This, too, can impact US interest in the region. ISKP’s growing presence in the region and US’ statement praising Pakistan in its counter-terrorism efforts indicates that Pakistan and US interest can overlap in countering terrorism. Therefore, a sound approach would be to engage with other South Asian countries as well while engaging with India to prevent destabilization of the regional dynamics.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
