After a long and lengthy process, Timor-Leste joins the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) as an 11^th member state. The full membership status was officially granted at the 42^nd ASEAN Summit in Laos. The Secretory- General addressed this matter by referring to ASEAN’s long-standing commitment to inclusivity and regional unity. He also appreciated Timor-Leste’s internal economic reforms, adherence to ASEAN’s normative framework, and progress in its internal institutional capacity buildup.

Timor-Leste’s low GDP and institutional capacity may slow ASEAN’s consensus decision-making process.

For Timor-Leste, it is not only a diplomatic victory but also a key to enter into the integrated market of ASEAN. Given its low GPD and rising poverty issues over the past few years, the said membership is a win-win situation. For instance, it will increase the chances of investment flow, reduce aid dependency on the West, and provide the prospects for development under the regional mechanism.

The journey, however, was not easy at all. After it gained independence from the 24 years of the  brutal Indonesian occupation in 2002 – under a UN led referendum – Timor-Leste (East Timor, unofficially) activity worked on its exclusive institutions (designed firstly under the Portuguese control, and then extended under the Indonesian rule) and engaged Asia-Pacific nations in order to secure de-jure recognition and international developmental aid. Over the period of time, it has established itself as the most democratic and open state in the entire Southeast Asia.

But, there are some structural issues hindering its progress. As a report published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) shows, more than 40% of its total population’s lives below the national poverty line and its total GPD is less than $3 billion. These socio-economic constrains necessitated Timor-Leste to take some informed pro-active steps to improve its diplomatic image and the well-being of its population. For that purpose, ASEAN stands out as a perfect strategic choice. With its combine GDP of $ 3.48 Trillian, ASEAN is the fifth largest economy in the world.

Moreover, it consists of 4.5M km² of land area and inhabits 680 million population. Above all, it is situated at the cusp of Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and simultaneously engages most of the major regional and global powers though its diverse institutional framework i.e. ARF and EAS. These geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic dynamics have compelled East-Timor to bandwagon against ASEAN in order to achieve short and quick results.

For instance, since its inception as an observer state in ASEAN, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have provided it with the sufficient administrative, policy oriented, and economic assistance to meet ASEAN’s three community pillars, something which ASEAN’s fact-finding and technical mission found satisfactory in 2023. However, given the evolving U.S.-China rivalry and the hedging strategy of ASEAN, this succession will test ASEAN’s potential to maintain its strategic objectives: ability to manage internal fragmentation, while extending the membership to the new states, and ultimately converting this symbolic addition to a fully-functional cooperation.

Its reliance on China complicates ASEAN’s unified stance on South China Sea disputes.

This study addresses following questions: how might Timor-Leste’s integration into ASEAN affect its internal cohesion given the rising politico-economic asymmetrical discourse? Does this accession has the potential to alter “ASEAN Centrality” principle amid evolving U.S-China strategic competition in Southeast Asia? How could East Timor use its ASEAN membership to improve its developmental trajectory, and diplomatic portfolio?

The article 20 (1), (2) of ASEAN charter put emphasis on the unanimous, consensus based decisions. Often known as the ASEAN way, this provision has historically ensured harmony and cohesion among the member states over the key strategic matters i.e. rejecting the Indo-Pacific strategy of the U.S. as it neglects some of its member states. However, in the recent years, it resulted in the internal fragmentation over important issues: Myanmar’s Junta rule, and China’s assertion in the South China Sea.

Some states advocate for strict measures to address these challenges, while the other hold a moderate view. Timor-Leste’s integration adds fuel to the already burning fire as it lacks the ability to fit into this framework. For instance, the insufficient bureaucratic capacity and the diplomatic outreach to fit into this consensus based mechanism will increase the deliberation process given the diverse economic priorities of East Timor.

It could prefer its national interests when it comes to adopting diplomatic measures against China. Similarly, this mechanism will slow down the decision making process over the other matters of utmost importance which demand an immediate response. Timor-Leste’s inception has once again opened discussions over adopting a qualified majority voting mechanism (QMV) or simply know as majority-based decision. It can undermine the democratic notion of ASEAN on the one hand, and can affect the positioning of the low-income states on the other hand. Experts fear that the Timor card will help few economic giants, such as Singapore, to high-jack the foreign policy of ASEAN.

Secondly, its integration will lead towards widening the economic disparities among ASEAN. For reference, Singapore has $517 Billion GDP while Timor-Leste has only $2.1 Billion. Its GDP is even lower than Laos, a developing state in ASEAN. So, it will increase the burden on the developed states to help newly added Timor in the development of due capabilities to achieve a sustainable growth.

Or else, it will become an undue liability on the other states givens its immature procedural norms, product standards, and digital system. What could be avoided is the “two-speed” ASEAN, with few nations having the highest growth rate while the others are lagging behind, in order to avoid bizarre outcomes. The EU can serve as the best model in the given circumstances provided that it excellently managed the integration of the Eastern European states, having similar problems, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s.

ASEAN’s unanimity principle faces stress with the integration of a low-capacity, geopolitically vulnerable member.

Thirdly, ASEAN may have to sideline its passive, soft-institutionalism – an assumption that after the integration, states themselves are supposed to upgrade their internal capacity to match ASEAN’s requirements. In the given case, not only external help is required, but also a guided mechanism is needed to institutionalize the opportunity. Historically, few states have helped Timor-Leste in this regard since it gained an observer status. Now, it is a test-case for all the states to showcase their interest and welcome the new state with the technical, non-technical, bureaucratic, diplomatic, and digital support to achieve the desired outcomes.

Apart from that, there is also a concern regarding Timor-Leste, a small state, becoming a geopolitical pawn in the great game between the United States and China. Given its strategic dependency on China, important maritime waters, and digital vulnerabilities, it can play in the hands of both powers while affecting the ASEAN’s neutral and strategic autonomous foreign policy. Also, it can disturb the already deteriorated ASEAN’s centrality principle.

China has strategically invested in roads, ports, infrastructure, telecom, and petroleum facilities in Timor-Leste. Its companies such as Hawaii and CCECC have an extended role in its domestic politics. For instance, Hawaii has a monopoly over the digital infrastructure and the surveillance system of East Timor. Also, China funded $490 M in the development of Tiber Bay Port. Its excessive reliance on China is being argued as a direct extension of China’s digital Silk Road strategy. The issue in this regard is that of ASEAN’s collective stance over the code of conduct of China in the South and East China Sea.

Many ASEAN states have overlapping claims with China in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). But, the overall strategy is fragmented: some states, such as the Philippines, have a hardcore approach over this matter, while the other, i.e. Brunei, have moderate concerns given their positive bilateral ties with China, making it harder to take collective decision under unanimous, and consensus base mechanism of ASEAN. Timor-Leste’s tilt and tech-dependency on China is expected to further complicate this issue.

Given its strategic geographical location, U.S.A. on the other hand, approaches Timor-Leste with its soft-power. In this realm, it has opened its first embassy in Dili after 2 decades, and has provided $80 M in developmental aid. Moreover, humanitarian cooperation, excessive support to bureaucracy, media, and civil society under its USIAD (until recently), and military ties reflect its growing interests in East Timor under its evolving Indo-Pacific strategy. However, it is problematic for ASEAN’s centrality principle.

As the growing ties of the U.S. with ASEAN states are directed towards countering China’s influence in the region, not all the states are getting equal benefits. Previously, during the government of Obama, and Trump 1.0, the U.S. had had the similar attitude. The U.S. tried to leverage its bilateral ties with the few dominant ASEAN states while ignoring the others. It was objected by Indonesia and the other states by referring to ASEAN’s charter.

For instance, they choose collective development over the U.S. offer to align with its Indo-Pacific strategy, with minus-Myanmar status. So, once again, the similar situation has emerged. It would be a challenge for Timor-Leste to choose whether to prefer its leveraged bilateral partnership with the U.S. or to comply with the priorities of ASEAN.

Moreover, the important Sea Lanes of Communication pass through East Timor’s waters, and also it is geographically situated near Lombok and Ombai-Water Straits – the alternative passage to Malacca Strait. For QUAD, AUKUS, and other western states, the freedom of navigations and openness of this area is important for the trade and economic activities.

ASEAN membership provides Timor-Leste access to a $3.8 trillion market and diplomatic platforms for growth.

While on the other hand, China has secured favorable port deals with East-Timor, posing a threat to ASEAN’s autonomy and necessitating that Timor-Leste should make a clear, unambiguous policy over this issues. Or else, ASEAN will become a battleground for China-U.S. rivalry. So it is important for it to not become a swing state and respect the neutrality and centrality principle of ASEAN.

Moving further, beyond tensions, ASEAN’s membership offers promising returns to Timor-Leste to diversify its trade from oil and gas exports to incorporate agriculture, eco-tourism, service industry, fisheries, and the industrial products. The Economic Community of ASEAN enables East-Timor to access the $3.8 Trillian market that can help the latter to improve its HDI, industrial and digital capacity, and sign mutually beneficial trade deals under the Initiative for ASEAN integration (IAI). As said by Dr. Dewi F. Anwar from Jakarta Policy Institute, “ASEAN offers Timor-Leste the market, mentorship, and mechanism it could not build alone”.

Furthermore, the educational exchanges and scholarships under ASEAN academic framework could help East Timor build its educational connection with the academia and the policy makers of the developed regional states, e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and in a long-term period, this initiative will enable it to enhance its e-governance, expand digital infrastructure, and produce a highly-qualified bureaucracy and think-tanks that could play an important role in the internal development.

It is a challenge for East Timor to balance China and the U.S. while simultaneously maintaining ASEAN’s strategic autonomy, centrality, and neutrality principle.

The permanent membership will also enable it to diplomatically engage with the powerful regional and international actors using ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Post-Ministerial conference, and ASEAN+1 dialogue (ASEAN-EU, ASEAN-China, ASEAN-U.S.). It will allow East Timor to enhance its corporation beyond a particular region, ultimately resulting in an institutionalized framework that could benefit it in the short term, given its miserable politico-economic situation.

One can say that ASEAN membership is a positive step that, on the one hand, could help Timor-Leste grow its diplomatic footprint beyond the region, and on the other hand, could improve its internal capacity to incorporate the emerging trends in governance, economy, digital infrastructure, and connectivity. Also, it is a challenge for East Timor to balance China and the U.S. while simultaneously maintaining ASEAN’s strategic autonomy, centrality, and neutrality principle.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.