Dueck makes a gallant effort to make sense of Trump’s trade, immigration, security, and foreign policies by setting them in the perspective of a century of Republican and conservative ideology in his short book Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism. He ultimately fails because it is hard to situate Trump in any serious, meticulously planned, cogent policy context. Trump, in Dueck’s view, represents “the longest U.S. foreign policy tradition in existence” since he is fundamentally a conservative nationalist.

Dueck asserts three major factions within American conservative nationalism: internationalists, non-interventionists, and hardliners. Conservative internationalists favor the United States playing a more active role abroad, particularly through alliances, military commitments, and foreign aid. Non-interventionists oppose all forms of military commitment and intervention. Conservative hardliners oppose global participation and military operations but support high defense spending and a strong military response to threats directly to the United States in favor of the United States playing a more active role abroad, particularly through alliances, military commitments, and foreign aid.

Trump’s self-interest, the single factor, costs America dearly.

Non-interventionists oppose all forms of military commitment and intervention. Conservative hardliners oppose global participation and military operations but support high defense spending and a strong military response to threats directly to the United States. These three trends might be referred to as the neocon strategy, the Steve Bannon method (or Cato Institute approach), and the John Bolton approach, respectively. Where exactly the president fits in is unclear, given Trump’s track record of dismissing proponents of each of these strategies, he hired hardly any neocons and fired both Bannon and Bolton.

Trump isn’t Roosevelt. “Don’t bluster, don’t flourish your pistol, and never draw until you mean to shoot, was Roosevelt’s slogan, according to Dueck. Trump’s approach to Kim Jong-un shows the opposite. He boasts. He threatens opponents. He concedes. Trump cancelled two major US-North Korea military drills, while Kim resumed long-range ballistic missile launches. Dueck points out Trump’s similarities to interwar Republican governments, even though they don’t paint him in a positive light. Like Trump, Republicans supported hefty tariffs in the 1920s. Given the large debts that plagued both World War I winners and losers, such levies directly assisted Nazi Germany and provoked World War II.

Trump, like Republican governments in the 1920s, has asked private citizens to represent ambassadors on international economic policy. Rudy Giuliani is Trump’s unofficial envoy, but banker Charles Dawes and businessman Owen Young renegotiated and reduced Germany’s debt. Giuliani’s engagement in Ukraine has destabilized American foreign relations, unlike the 1920s unofficial diplomats stabilized the world economy. It drove the Democrats’ impeachment and removal of the president.

He established and exacerbated binary oppositions between ‘we’ and ‘them,’ separating the country and exposing social divisions.

Eisenhower supported NATO and the US military in Europe, but he did not want them to stay. He joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, led the US into the Central Treaty Organization, and supported the Baghdad Pact. Dueck notes that Eisenhower convinced most conservative Republican nationalists to support his internationalist policies. He also led “a historic reversal in GOP objectives on trade and foreign aid,” according to Dueck. Trump’s summitry, Israel support, and economic nationalism mirror Nixon’s.

Both Donald Trump and Barack Obama profited from the public’s disillusionment with the Middle Eastern wars. Additionally, there was a rise in partisan public opposition to America’s long-standing support for decreasing trade barriers. According to Dueck, in the years leading up to the 2016 election, “maybe half of the Republican voters had turned sour on the benefits of globalization, contrary to GOP establishment preferences.” In prior cycles, no Republican presidential contender had properly expressed that dissatisfaction.

No Democrat had taken such action. It was significant that all four candidates, Democrats Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, Republicans Ted Cruz and Donald Trump, who made it through their respective party primaries, supported trade restrictions, particularly against American participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which the Obama administration had started. Trump, more than Clinton, tapped into the public’s frustration with long-standing internationalist American policy after defeating Cruz and winning the nomination. It turned out to be a crucial element in his successful presidential campaign.

It may be said that Trump most closely resembles the ideologies of conservative hardliners because, like them, he opposes international institutions, non-military foreign aid, and humanitarian involvement while advocating for a potent national defense. Hardliners, however, also have a propensity to view dialogue with enemies with suspicion. Trump, on the other hand, appears to enjoy these discussions a lot more than he does those with leaders of allies.

Trump appears at ease with a variety of people, not just Putin. He proudly displays his friendships with Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping of China, and Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey appears to be a better fit for him than the presidents of other significant NATO members; however, it is unclear how committed Erdogan is to NATO, given his cordial ties to Putin.

Trump’s ideology is likely neutral. Conservative nationalists support Trump’s strong defenses. Trump has linked illegal immigration to national security. Trump’s campaign promise to halt “endless conflicts” influenced his decision to remove troops from the Middle East and Afghanistan. “A hybrid or blend of the nationalist with the conservative internationalist” describes the Trump Administration’s foreign policy decisions, views, and results.

Trump mocks the consensus.

After discussing Trump’s ideas, Dueck argues that the president is a symptom of conservatism. Conservative views haven’t changed, but Trump’s actions have. Dueck summarizes his conservative foreign policy principles. He favors Eisenhower-Nixon’s conservative internationalism. Nation-building, military operations, and supranational organizations like the Human Rights Council and International Criminal Court worry him.

He opposes “offshore balancing” and abrogating America’s international obligations. Russia, like China, is a major threat to American dominance, notwithstanding Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. He emphasizes the importance of diplomacy to achieve American goals. He follows H.R. McMaster and his team’s national security strategy, the Washington Consensus, in all of these ways. Trump mocks the consensus. Dueck knows public opinion favors an inward-looking American security posture. His book argues that Trump’s activities are ideologically based on change. Dueck fails to convince. Trump acts without ideology. Trump’s self-interest—the single factor—costs America dearly.

Trump firmly believed that he could only lead the nation and attain national honor by serving as president. He believes that presidents who came before him deceived the American people and wrecked the nation’s economy. His actions continued to be mainly at odds with the liberal internationalism that America has embraced since the Second World War. A contest between an inward-looking, nationalist, isolationist America and an outward-looking, globalist, liberal, internationalist America was the focus of the 2016 elections.

Even though it is thought that his strategy was largely hardline and zero-sum, he was nonetheless successful in ways that no other US president in history could. Their biggest accomplishments were his meeting with Kim Jong-un, his agreement with the Taliban, his insistence that NATO countries increase their defense budgets, and his cautious yet practical attitude towards Syria and other global hotspots, all of which were criticized for obvious reasons. In addition, by pursuing an “America First” policy, his words and deeds unnerved the US allies and sparked claims by academics that he revived isolationist sentiments in US discourse.

He hated freeloaders who he believed stole from the US. He fired John Bolton, his national security adviser, for his severe approach, withdrew from the JCPOA, and reimposed sanctions on Iran. He called King Jong-un “little rocket man” and was the first sitting US president to meet him. As a Jacksonian president, he avoided useless wars, but in Syria, he used maximum force. President Trump withdrew from key multilateral agreements, enabling China and Russia to fill the hole. Since Trump’s rise coincided with China’s, his policies favored China. Even if the US has been in relative decline, its greatest strength has been its attractiveness as the Promised Land and the leader of the free world, eager to commit its resources to the defense and promotion of its ideas worldwide.

His policies were a continuation of the Jacksonian tradition that has dominated American politics.

As a populist leader, he established and exacerbated binary oppositions between “we” and “them,” separating the country and exposing social divisions. He went after his party elite and the opposition because he believed they were trying to take his legitimate position and interfere with his government. He united “we,” or white Americans, and white nationalists. Trump’s presidency was a “one-of-a-kind presidency,” but his policies were a continuation of the Jacksonian tradition that has dominated American politics for most of its existence.

No populist has been president since Andrew Jackson. His populist 2016 and 2020 election campaigns attracted the furious masses who had lost their jobs and lives in the recurring economic disasters, particularly in 2008. In 2008, Barack Obama’s election sparked optimism about racial harmony in the US, and colorblindness and a post-racial future entered the media vernacular.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.