In 1945, the war ended with the US introduction of nuclear weapons by dropping Little Man and Fat Boy on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. Then subsequently, in 1949, the USSR also developed nuclear weapons, thus a domino effect (chain reaction) started. After the USSR, states like the UK, France, and China also developed nuclear weapons. Then in 1998, South Asian states Pakistan and India also went nuclear, and in 2006, North Korea also announced that it had acquired nuclear capabilities. The proliferation of nuclear weapons started with the US, and today we have nine nuclear weapon states (both de facto and dejure) in the world.

In 1995, an article named “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons” was published. The debate between Kenneth Waltz and Scott D. Sagan centered on nuclear proliferation across the globe. Sagan stated that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons would be disastrous for global peace and emphasized that “more may be worse.” Thus taking the stance of nuclear proliferation pessimism. On the other side, Kenneth Waltz maintained a contrasting narrative. He stated that “more may be better.” In the prevailing anarchic world order, states must acquire nuclear weapons to ensure their security, thus presenting a realist perspective. His argument revolved around nuclear deterrence, and because of the fear of mutually assured destruction, states would abstain from going into full-scale war.

The Cold War is the best example of strategic stability. Though there were conflicts at the smaller level, there was no war between the US and USSR at that time

Waltz stated that after the introduction of nuclear weapons, no general war has taken place. Furthermore, he said that the world has seen peace (absence of war) because of the invention of nuclear weapons. Due to the prevailing concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), states know that in case of any aggressive action, there will be total annihilation. Waltz brings attention to the presence of conflict, which is a constant part of the anarchic world. However, the presence of nuclear weapons aids in maintaining strategic stability among nuclear-armed states. The Cold War is the best example of strategic stability. Though there were conflicts at the smaller level, there was no war between the US and USSR at that time. The Cold War lasted 40 years, but neither of the states used their nuclear weapons against each other; instead, they’ve gone for proxy wars.

We have the best example from the Russia-Ukraine war; if Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons Russia wouldn’t invade Ukraine 

Waltz advocated for the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons across the globe. He argues that peace will only prevail if there exists a parity relation between states in terms of nuclear weapons. Due to existential deterrence, the mere presence of nuclear weapons will serve as a deterrent against their adversaries and abstain them from going into full-scale war. We have the best example from the Russia-Ukraine war; if Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons Russia wouldn’t invade Ukraine . But the P5 nuclear weapon states have developed and advanced their nuclear programs, while at the same time forbidding other states to develop their nuclear programs. For instance, articles I and II of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) restrict the transfer of nuclear material and related technology.

Other major proponents of the optimism side were that there should be no preventive strike against a developing nuclear weapon state in its transition period. If it met with a preventive strike and sustained that attack, in the near future that state can go aggressive against its adversary. Another thing optimists say is that nuclear weapon states will go for the attainment of a nuclear triad to have assured second-strike capability, which will ensure the survivability of nuclear forces.

Military involvement in domestic politics (both active and latent) will undermine military competence and the state’s deterrent capability

The nuclear proliferation pessimist, Scott D. Sagan, has proposed his argument that “more may be worse.” He’s also given the organizational theory, which states the problems or factors that pose a grave threat to deterrence stability. The first argument given by Sagan is that professional military organizations have their own biases, routines, and interests. Unless these organizations are checked by civilian organizations, that state can’t attain deterrence. The second argument given by Sagan is the lack of proper mechanisms for civilian control or stable civilian regimes. Proliferating states have mostly dictators or weak regimes; they make policies as directed by the military institutions. This intervention by military organizations will turn their focus on domestic politics rather than external threats. On the other hand, a weak civilian regime will promote military officers to protect their regime. In both cases, military involvement in domestic politics (both active and latent) will undermine military competence and the state’s deterrent capability.

Sagan, in his organizational theory, meant military organization. According to him, organizational perspectives and norms lead to preventive war. Military officers see war as inevitable—they don’t believe in diplomatic means. They have this mindset of “better now than later.” They believe in pure military logic, and victory means defeating an enemy. They are of the opinion that post-war management is a politician’s job, and it is not their concern. This kind of mindset stirs instability and endangers deterrence stability at a regional level.

India, Pakistan, and North Korea have developed their programs in a secret manner. Due to this, there is a lack of public debate on it and a lot of security concerns

Another concern of pessimists was regarding the safety of nuclear weapons. At that time they argued that most of the newly emergent states have “crude nukes,” which in their nature are highly unstable. In the 1991 Gulf War, the UN inspector general, upon inspection of the Iraq bomb, concluded that it was highly unstable and a bullet could detonate it. Furthermore, the covert and opaque nature of nuclear programs also affects safety problems. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have developed their programs in a secret manner. Due to this, there is a lack of public debate on it and a lot of security concerns.

When one claims that more may be better, they’re talking about deterrence, survivable nuclear forces, and strategic peace, but at the same time, they’re also neglecting unstable regimes, chances of preventive war, and nuclear weapon safety.

New nuclear states have this growing fear of decapitation strikes against their leadership and nuclear arsenal.  Which delegates authority to the low-level commander to carry out the decision on their own. Just like in the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Special Security Organization (SSO) was given 50 chemical warheads to attack Israel if Baghdad was attacked. Besides this, these states also face tight coupling problems. First countries took many hours to target via strategic bombers, and other states have that equal time to interpret and make decisions accordingly. But now, due to technological advancement, they have very little time to react, i.e., 30 minutes in the case of ICBM.

Till today, there is no consensus on any one perspective. When one claims that more may be better, they’re talking about deterrence, survivable nuclear forces, and strategic peace, but at the same time, they’re also neglecting unstable regimes, chances of preventive war, and nuclear weapon safety. There is no doubt that after the introduction of nuclear weapons, no major wars have happened, but the number of conflicts has increased gradually.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.