Russia has a reputation of being a traditional partner of India, yet it has never been a direct rival of Pakistan’s, with perhaps the decade of Afghan Jihad being an exception. Even during the Cold War, there were instances of cautious engagement between the two sides, especially in the 60s, but they were abortive and receded into the backwaters of history. After the dissolution of the USSR, Russian foreign policy was recalibrated and came to be directed by a set of principles known as the Primakov Doctrine.
Pakistan’s geostrategic location positions it as a vital link for Russia’s trade and energy routes.
Two core concepts therein are that Russia must play the role of a vanguard in Eurasian integration amongst the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and those in the region at large. Secondly, to promote a multipolar world order by facilitating the creation and proliferation of regional blocs based on shared economic, security, or ideological interests to prevent power from accumulating in a unitary locus.[i] Since 1997 the relations between the two countries progressively thawed, starting from diplomatic overtures to high-level visits and joint military Friendship exercises in 2017.[ii]
Bilateral Trade:
The two countries have been seeking to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for the past two decades; however, Russia’s membership in the Eurasian Customs Union has complicated the process, which now requires it to get approval from other member states.[iii] From 2011 to 2020, bilateral trade between Russia and Pakistan multiplied by 108%; however, this also saw the most significant trade imbalance, amounting to $469 million, with a 270% increase in imports from Russia and a 24% decline in exports.[iv]
The first cargo of Russian crude oil arriving in Karachi marks a transformative step in Pakistan-Russia energy cooperation.
This can be attributed to the fact that most of the exports to Russia are usually low-value agricultural produce such as oranges, onions, and potatoes, along with some leather and textile items. About half of the imports from Russia are used to meet Pakistan’s grain requirements.[v] As recently as May 2023 in Kazan, Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce signed a bilateral trade agreement with their Russian counterparts to curtail duties and expedite customs framework for transportation of goods.[vi] This led to the opening of a direct cargo service by Pakistan Shaheens Pvt Ltd and Russia’s Neco Line from Karachi to Saint Petersburg, curtailing the shipping time by half to just 24 days from 50 days in the past, which involved transhipment via another country.[vii]
Russian investments primarily in the energy sector can help alleviate Pakistan’s balance of payment and power crises, leading to an increase in industrial and agricultural output. Under CASA-1000 (Central-Asia-South-Asia Power Project), Pakistan’s long-standing energy crisis can be serviced with its potential to provide up to 1300MW of electricity upon completion.[viii] However the project saw many hiccups, such as regime change in Kabul and the withdrawal of US funding as a result.
Alongside technical and financial aid, Russia announced a USD 14 billion investment package in 2019 as part of the greater move to create new markets for their energy exports since European economies, who have been thus far the largest importers of Russian gas, are gradually shifting towards green energy part of the European Green Deal 2020.[ix] The first-ever cargo of 45,000 metric tonnes of crude oil that arrived in Karachi port in June 2023 was lauded as a ‘transformative’ development in the Russo-Pak partnership, resulting in a drop in petroleum prices.[x]
Roadblocks:
The annual trade between the two sides has the potential to cross the $5 Billion mark, but several factors are critical in turning it into reality. While many MoUs and deals have been signed with positive intents by the two parties, hardly any of these megaprojects have hitherto seen the light of day. The North-South Gas pipeline, which runs from Lahore to Karachi, has been halted due to the war in Ukraine and sanctions on RT Global, the firm earmarked to carry out construction.[xi]
The North-South Gas pipeline project faces delays due to sanctions, underscoring challenges in actualizing bilateral agreements.
Despite Russia’s renewed interest in Pakistan as part of its ‘look eastward’ policy, how common objectives are being approached can be at best described as sluggish and half-hearted. Russia has also urged the Afghan Taliban govt to revive the 1800 km long Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline for its strategic allure to lay the groundwork for regional connectivity and expand its influence in the region.[xii] Strained relations with the pariah Afghan regime and its sketchy human rights record may impede such ventures from ever operating at their full potential.
While payment in Yuan for Russian goods may help preserve Pakistan’s Dollar reserves, it could also backfire in the form of hardened criteria to procure bailout packages from Western financial institutions such as the IMF on which Pakistan is highly dependent. It may prove disastrous for Pakistan to be dragged into the Russia versus West rivalry.
Potential:
Pakistan’s geostrategic location ideally straddles the Central and South Asian regions while providing immediate access to Middle East via land and sea.[xiii] With this advantage, Pakistan can serve as a missing link in the continental trade network where Russia can find new markets for its goods to counteract the burden of heavy Western sanctions on its economy. With the development of a tunnelled highway along the Wakhan corridor, which is 13km at its narrowest between Pakistan and Tajikistan, the shortest all-weather land route to Central Asia can be opened, connecting EAEU with BRI and providing these landlocked countries access to the Arabian Sea bolstering the overall strategic framework of the region.[xiv]
Infrastructure projects like the Wakhan Corridor and UAP Railway can boost regional trade connectivity.
It would also open a secure alternative route to Russia bypassing the militancy-torn areas of Afghanistan.[xv] Additionally, the 760 km tripartite Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway from Peshawar to Tashkent is expected to be completed by 2027, shall run on a 1,520mm narrow (Russian) gauge, and would lay down a multi-vectored regional trade network with Pakistan as the nexus point.[xvi] The abandoned Pakistan Stream can be resurrected from the Gwadar terminal by involving Chinese investors hence also connecting it with the Iran-Pakistan pipeline.[xvii] By diversifying Its LNG resources, Pakistan can bring competition into the equation and even win discounted rates from its existing major supplier, i.e. Qatar.[xviii]
Conclusion:
While the US is playing a balancing act in the region by forming military and economic alliances with India, Russia may well serve as an alternative to lessen Pakistan’s dependency on the US. Russia can also provide Pakistan with military hardware that it usually needs to meet its security challenges at the same time, help normalize tensions with India using its influence in New Delhi. Pakistan’s territory can serve as an ideal land route to both India and the Indian Ocean, for which stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s own insurgency-torn province of Baluchistan would be a prerequisite. A well-entrenched trade network with Pakistan shall contribute to achieving the geostrategic objectives envisioned by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and open collaboration channels with BRICS and CPEC. A good starting point for both would be to overcome the historical baggage of mistrust by putting in a committed effort to actualize the signed deals while strictly maintaining an autonomous foreign policy.
References:
[i] Sheila Khalid, “Pakistan–Russia Relations: Kashmir and the Primakov Doctrine”, Journal of Development and Social Sciences 3, no. II (2022), https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2022(3-ii)85.
[ii] Prospects for Cooperation Between Russia and Pakistan — Valdai Club
[iii] Pakistan Business Council (PBC), “Potential for a Pakistan-Russia Free Trade Agreement,” accessed September 22, 2023, https://www.pbc.org.pk/research/potential-for-a-pakistan-russia-free-trade-agreement/.
[iv] Pakistan Business Council, “Pak Russia Free Trade Agreement”.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] Mubarak Zeb Khan, “Pakistan, Russia sign deal to boost economic cooperation,” Dawn, May 20th, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1754513.
[vii] Pakistan, Russia open direct shipping route (tribune.com.pk)
[viii] www.casa-1000.org/pakistan.
[ix] Claudia Chia and Zheng Haiti, “Russia-Pakistan Economic Relations: Energy Partnership and the China Factor,” Nus.edu.sg (Institute of South Asian studies National University of Singapore, October 6, 2021), https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/russia-pakistan-economic-relations-energy-partnership-and-the-china-factor/.
[x] Pakistan gets first shipment of Russian crude under discount deal | Oil and Gas News | Al Jazeera
[xi] World Pipelines, “Pakistan imports Russian gas,” World Pipelines, July 2023, https://www.worldpipelines.com/project-news/02082023/pakistan-imports-russian-gas/ (accessed November 21, 2023).
[xii] European Parliamentary Research Service, “TAPI natural gas pipeline project,” Briefing, (2016): 1-12, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593554/EPRS_BRI(2016)593554_EN.pdf.
[xiii] Andrew Korybko, “Pakistan Is The “Zipper” Of Pan-Eurasian Integration”, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, (2015), https://riss.ru/en/news/other/pakistan-is-the-zipper-of-pan-eurasian-integration/?sphrase_id=55288.
[xiv] Strategic Importance of the Wakhan Corridor – The Karakoram
[xv] Dr Muhammad Shafiq and Dr Muhammad Munir, “GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF WAKHAN CORRIDOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, CHINA AND PAKISTAN”, Margalla Papers, 2018, 203–15.
[xvi] Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan agree to build UAP Railway – International Railway Journal (railjournal.com)
[xvii] Govt considers reviving Pakistan-Russia gas pipeline project (tribune.com.pk)
[xviii] Pakistan in talks with Russia for LNG imports (tribune.com.pk)
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
