This insight explores the emergence of minilateral groupings, also referred as alliances, due to their cooperative nature based on mutual interests like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in the contemporary international affairs. It highlights the driving factors shaping the development of Quad, its role in the military might of India and implications for the region. It critically analyzes the emphasis of Quad on geopolitical interests and its potential for non-traditional security cooperation.

Emerging Global Order:

The emerging global order is witnessing a new trend in international cooperation. It is a shift from formal multilateral system to an informal, selective and issue-based cooperation model, namely the minilateral alliances. The inability of the traditional multilateral framework for the global governance – United Nations (UN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and others – to maintain peace and develop new course of actions designed in accordance with the modern security issues, made the foundation for fast and efficient structures to mitigate emerging new challenges.

Likewise, in the Asia-Pacific, it prompts a reaction in the form of an attempt to check the rise of China. Beijing’s growing power and neo-mercantilist approach have actually pushed the necessity of the emergence of more compact associations that could contain China’s actions quickly, unlike the dysfunctional multilateral organizations.[1] The exhibition of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in the Asia-Pacific and also the most recent collaborations Australia, United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) as well as India, Israel, United Arab Emirates and the United States (I2U2), and Chip 4 are the examples of minilateral alliance.^[2]

Shinzo Abe:

The Quad’s creation was proposed by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 as a flexible political wing consisting of the US, Japan, Australia and India that later gained much attention as a small military coalition. Over time, the Quad has moved from a mere consultative forum to cover more strategic and defense aspects, suggesting that it may take the shape of a military alliance in the Asia-Pacific region.^[3] The Quad activities were ceased in 2008 after Australia pulled out for its concern over ties with China.^[4] However, the growing military activities of China in the Indian Ocean made Australia revive its status in Quad in 2017. The Quad revival was a new approach to its concept of security cooperation among the member countries to demonstrate the military side of the Quad.^[5]

Eventually, the US and India started joint military exercises bilaterally – the Malabar naval exercise in 1992, later joined by Australia and Japan in 2007 – has now become annual.

^[6] The Malabar Naval exercise is meant for the cooperation, interoperability, and synergy among the four navies.^[7] The drills demonstrate perspective alignment of the member states on maritime affairs and their common commitment to an inclusive and open Asia-Pacific region based on international norms.

Free And Open Asia-Pacific:

Further, the concept of ‘free and open Asia-Pacific’ (US Asia Pacific Strategy), at the core of the Quad has dramatic military connotations. Cooperatively, this phrase commonly adopted by Quad members in their official communique reasserts this group’s determination to ensure freedom of navigation in international waters, particularly China. Military preparedness, protection of the sea lines of communication and fostering maritime security are part of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

The Quad’s shift from a relatively informal strategic discussion forum to a minilateral military alliance signals the shift in security relations in the Asia-Pacific region. While Quad is not an alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), still it has become relevant in the geopolitical dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region with more emphasis on military cooperation and strategic deterrence. Taking the edge in this context, India, though a swing state in the past, has increased cooperation with Quad and enhanced its military and economic capabilities for its ambitions to emerge as the hegemonic power in the region.

Implications For South Asia:

Considering the implications for the South Asian region, this changing role brings some questions and considerations to India’s regional policy desires. For India, engagement in the Quad framework is seen as a part of the country’s effort to increase its military might.^[8] The Quad aims to utilize its relations with the major world powers to pressure the Asia-Pacific hegemon and safeguard India’s regional interests.^[9] India’s aspirations are, for this reason, seen in its strategy for developing its naval forces and arming expansion in the Indian Ocean. India, too, has ramped up its naval forces; the Indian Naval Ship Malabar was also initiated with Quad members and other Asian countries to prove a gesture of force in naval ambition and safeguard vital seaways.

Zooming into the Quad mechanism, we see that its essence is in the ability to set up imperialist goals. Firstly, it affects the balance of power in the South Asian region. India’s enhanced position through Quad is compelling the other regional nations, like Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh to make more conclusive decisions, in the changing power dynamics of the region, despite the fact that these countries have struggled to maintain an equilibrium between their relations with India and China for a long time.^[10] Secondly, India, the US and other Quad members have constantly described China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as the most significant geostrategic threat to their interests and have raised pressure on other states to stay away from the project.

Although Quad’s future holds an important security pillar with China, without focusing on infrastructure development, enhanced connectivity, strengthened resilience and diversity of supply chains, and non-traditional security issues, the Quad might not be effective in the region or creating a rules-based multipolar Asia-Pacific in future.

The Quad, with its emergence and transformation from minilateral grouping to a strong security cooperation in the Asia Pacific, holds serious implications for both Pakistan and South Asia. The Quad has proved to be an effective medium for US to empower India militarily in the Indian Ocean for its strategic role to contain China in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eventually, the India, considering itself a hegemon in the region, has left no stone unturned to disturb balance of power in South Asia as justified by some of the key incidents like missile launch in 2022. In this context, Pakistan needs to take a bold step and eradicate the narrative of camp politics and secure national interest in relations with any other state, in this case, Russia and China, and the US. Pakistan, after stabilizing the regional connectivity fostering economic, benefits.

References:

[1] David Scott, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’—New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US-India Strategic Convergence,” Asia-Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (November 2012): 85–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2012.738115.

^[2] Mariya Kanwal, “Issue Brief on ‘The Rise of Minilateralism’ | Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad,” August 21, 2024, https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-the-rise-of-minilateralism/.

^[3] Kei Koga, “Quad 3.0: Japan, Indo-Pacific and Minilateralism,” East Asian Policy 14, no. 01 (January 2022): 20–38, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793930522000022.

[4] Nick Bisley, “The Quad, AUKUS and Australian Security Minilateralism: China’s Rise and New Approaches to Security Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary China 0, no. 0 (n.d.): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2024.2365241.

^[5] Qian Jiayin, “Quad Collective Maritime Defense an Illusion in the 21st Century – Global Times,”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1296040.shtml.

[6] Ash Rossiter, Yee-Kuang Heng, and Brendon J. Cannon, “Looking under the Hood of Joint Naval Exercises: Motives and Perceived Benefits for Japan,” The Pacific Review 0, no. 0 (n.d.): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2024.2366791.

^[7] “Malabar Naval Exercises,” https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1696140.

^[8] Soumyodeep Deb, “The Coming of Quad and the Balance of Power in the Indo-Pacific,” Air University (AU), December 13, 2021.

^[9] Harsh V. Pant, ed., New Directions in India’s Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis (Cambridge New York, NY New Delhi Singapore New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[10] Sadia Khanum, “Indian Hegemonic Design Effect on the Neighbors -,” NDU Journal (2021).