Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in his book “The Myth of Independence,” made some interesting observations on India-U.S. relations, some of which have resonated in contemporary geopolitics. One of the central themes of Bhutto’s arguments was that the U.S. always preferred India as an ally in its “Asia strategy” but failed to secure an alliance due to India’s “independent neutralist policy.”
However, Bhutto concluded, “despite the feeling that India was being disobliging, the United States continued to entertain the hope that in the course of time she might change her outlook; and so nothing untoward was done to displease her.” Bhutto’s book was published in 1969, and so, it misses out on the later key events like the signing of the India-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in August 1971, which many Pakistanis believe was the catalyst for India’s temerity in orchestrating the breakaway of East Pakistan mere four months later. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s India progressively built closer ties with Moscow and its military evolved into ‘almost’ all things Soviet.
“For years, U.S. officials have extended unconditional concessions to India, even if reciprocity from India is limited.”
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, India began liberalising its economic and foreign policies based on geopolitical shifts to adapt to post-Cold War world. By late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. also began viewing India with a renewed interest for a prospective ally in its new “Asia strategy” to counter China, whose rise as Asiatic economic and military power appeared inexorable.
Although India’s nuclear tests in 1998 invited sanctions from the U.S., the fact was that the tests made India even more attractive choice as a “China counterbalance” for the U.S. It was only a little less than a year after the tests that President Bill Clinton made a five-day visit to India to strengthen ties. Since then, successive Presidents – George H. W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden- have all made trips to India, each seeking to not merely improve bilateral ties but elevate India’s status vis-à-vis China. As India opened itself to the U.S., each Presidential Administration began making unprecedented concessions to it, often at the at the expense of international norms and values set by the U.S. for itself.
Despite India’s status as an NPT holdout, President Bush concluded the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement, secured an NSG waiver, and signed a 10-year defense cooperation pact enabling military technology transfers. India also joined the QUAD in 2007 alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia, enhancing its role in the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR). Bush Administration also considered selling the Patriot ABM system, but the MTCR restrictions blocked both that and an Israeli Arrow sale.
President Obama, who designated India as a “major defense partner,” eventually secured India’s membership in the MTCR. Like Bush, Obama sought to strengthen India’s role in the IPR and accordingly concluded the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. President Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy further elevated India’s economic and defense role in the IPR and QUAD was also advanced to ministerial-level. While Trump’s CAATSA risked sanctions over India’s Russian defense ties, exemptions were later granted by President Biden, who further took initiative to foster military technology co-development and co-production.
“The real rupture came when Trump imposed 50% tariffs on India compared to just 19% on Pakistan.”
During Trump’s second term, the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership was widely expected to maintain its upward trajectory. However, the India-Pakistan conflict of May 2025 marked a turning point. Initially, the Trump administration refrained from intervening, in line with India’s preference for non-interference. However, as tensions escalated, Trump stepped in and claimed credit for brokering the ceasefire, asserting that his promises of expanded trade convinced both sides to disengage.
This narrative of U.S. influence over New Delhi’s decisions did not sit well in India, straining relations. But the real rupture came when, instead of following through on trade expansion, Trump imposed 50% tariffs on India compared to just 19% on Pakistan. This has triggered a sharp decline in Indo-U.S. ties. While some in India believe the downturn stems from New Delhi’s protests and Pakistan’s acquiescence to the U.S. during the May conflict, such a narrow explanation cannot fully account for the sudden collapse of a relationship built over decades.
The development was unanticipated but not surprising. On the surface, the rift stems from India’s purchase of Russian oil, flouting the U.S. interests while leveraging the CAATSA waiver. At a deeper level, however, it reflects a long-standing pattern of India frequently channelling benefits of Washington’s leeway elsewhere, much to U.S.’ frustration.
For instance, post–civil nuclear deal, India ordered only Russian reactors, stalled French projects, and made no progress with the U.S. suppliers. The U.S. based Westinghouse, which was earmarked for building a nuclear power plant in India but never could, eventually went bankrupt. Similarly, MTCR membership (indirectly) and CAATSA waiver facilitated India’s $5+ billion purchase of Russian S-400 systems, bypassing the U.S. PAC-3 and THAAD offers.
The U.S.-India defence agreements have also not yielded favourable outcomes for the U.S. While India has purchased some U.S. military equipment these are mostly limited to transport and force multipliers like C-17 and C-130J transport aircraft, Chinook transport helicopters, and P-8I maritime patrol aircraft. Except for Apache attack helicopters, India has mostly avoided buying big-ticket American offensive platforms, especially fighter jets like highly advanced F-16 Block 70/72 and F-18E/F, which New Delhi rejected in favour of French Rafale. In early 2025, President Trump expressed his willingness to “pave the way” for India to acquire F-35 stealth fighter jets.
“India’s rejection of U.S. frontline weapon systems undermines prospects for military synergy and interoperability within the QUAD.”
However, by mid-2025, India informed the U.S. of its disinterest in the aircraft. This was partly influenced by Trump’s announcement of tariffs on India. However, as Pakistan’s intentions of acquiring Chinese J-35 stealth fighters have become apparent India has contemplated acquiring stealth fighter from a foreign partner – once again not the U.S. but Russia. India’s rejection of U.S. frontline weapon systems come at the expense of Washington’s commercial and strategic interests, undermining prospects for military synergy and interoperability within the QUAD that the U.S. has long strived for.
For years, U.S. officials and strategists have advocated extending unconditional concessions and support to India, even if reciprocity from India is limited (this is something I too became privy to first hand). Influential voices continue to press Washington to sustain this approach, both implicitly and explicitly.
For example, following the 2021 AUKUS agreement, through which the U.S. and U.K. are to transfer nuclear propulsion technology to Australia, figures such as Ashley Tellis have argued that India should also be granted exceptions for its SSBN program. While not suggesting direct U.S. transfers, Tellis has proposed that Washington should “midwife” cooperation between India and France. In other words, Washington should allowed India to leverage its concessions to France or simply stay out of their way.
By advancing such exemptions, U.S. officials and strategists have placed Washington in a disadvantageous position. As the geopolitical landscape undergoes shifts- such as Indo-Pacific Strategy losing traction with countries like South Korea distancing themselves from it- the U.S. priorities are shifting back to the Middle East.
“If the U.S. is serious about engineering India’s ascent, it must condition its support on New Delhi conceding its so-called ‘strategic autonomy.’”
India’s regional influence is undercut by Bangladesh’s July Revolution, its dismal military performance in the May 2025 conflict with Pakistan- a question arises if it makes sense for the U.S. to continue with this approach. If the U.S. is still serious about continuing to engineer India’s geoeconomic and geopolitical ascent, it must ‘condition’ its support to New Delhi conceding its so-called “strategic autonomy.” Otherwise, the U.S. risks bearing the strategic costs of this partnership while benefits are reaped elsewhere.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
