One might argue, that the most non-violent security gesture of the United States, in the last 80 years, has been the Marshall Plan after the Second World War. This was the first policy-level attempt to securitize a territory by reconstructing the infrastructures and institutions, a ‘soft’ way of addressing ‘hard’ security challenges. However, it wasn’t until the early 21st century that the developing, post-conflict, regions adopted the “no development without security, and no security without development” policy mantra.

The securitization of development in Balochistan has led to animosity toward security actors and a rise in local radical sympathies.

The policy dilemma that is usually prevalent in the developing world originates from the poor conceptualization of the security-development nexus, which has translated itself to the ‘securitization of development’. This interpretation entails that ‘development is co-opted by security actors to deliver security objectives’, and therefore, isolates development practitioners from the policy-level discussions on post-conflict regions.

Critics of the security-development nexus consider this approach as a means to legitimize external engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, which can loosely be understood as interventionist aspirations of the developed world in post-conflict regions. Such a ‘soft’ policy tool initially gained prominence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, followed by the Western classification of post-conflict developing countries as “weak” or “failed” states, under the Failed States Index (FSI).

This characterization entailed that post-conflict states have weak governance structures, that pave the way for issues of migration, law and order, weak financial systems, and poor institutions for human development, all of which are contributors to terrorism, militancy, and other forms of physical violence.

The construction of this idea into policy is evident in the US government’s establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (OCRS) during the War on Terror, which consists of experts from the State Department, Homeland Security, USAID, and other relevant security and development practitioners.

The British government, and its Department for International Development (DfID), were more explicit with their demands that ‘development projects in the post-conflict world should make “maximum possible contribution” to British national security’. While the developed world curtains its national security priorities under the veil of the security-development nexus, critics have provided instances in the developing world where external engagement through development assistance has prolonged conflicts and undermined development.

The failure of the security-development nexus as a policy tool has previously been discussed in the context of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where post-conflict reconstruction efforts and foreign development aid packages further exacerbated violent conflicts and organized crime.

Decades of militarization and development neglect have created a vicious cycle of instability and underdevelopment in Balochistan.

Peacebuilding scholars attribute one of the reasons to be a lack of coordination and comprehensiveness between the security and development branches, whereby the reconstruction efforts are dominated by practitioners of either domain, predominantly the security sector. A more orthodox critique comes from scholars of the constructivist school of thought who argue that the policy sphere is dominated by the realist paradigm, which assumes a worldview based on the primacy of military power in an anarchic environment.

Despite the variety of perspectives in the security-development discourse, expert commentary remains absent in the local context of Pakistan or even the regional context of South Asia. For decades, Pakistan has been at the receiving end of development aid by leading Western economies. How the aids have been operationalized, and the socioeconomic impact it had, has indeed been part of the academic and political discourse, however, it is yet to be evaluated through the critical lens of the security-development nexus.

According to several estimates, Balochistan is Pakistan’s most heavily militarized province, given the presence of violent separatist groups and terrorist organizations. The average Pakistani citizen remains in a dilemma, whether the lack of development in the province is due to the state’s negligence, or the retaliation of Baloch people themselves to development projects.

It has almost become a state of normalcy in Balochistan, whereby separatist groups have targeted, and killed, labor workers. In just the third quarter of 2024, a staggering 105 incidents of terror attacks occurred in Balochistan, killing 249 civilians and security officials, with a number of workers attacked at their respective project sites. Decades of similar instances have prompted the state to respond with counterinsurgency and counter-violent extremism (CVE) campaigns in the province, which was initially conceptualized as a “whole of the government” approach.

However, the operationalization of these policies became highly dominated by the security forces, and therefore the nexus evolved the “securitization of development”. As a result, each development project in the province, from resource extraction to infrastructure development, is heavily guarded by the state’s security forces, and the development practitioners as well as the government officials live under heavily guarded safe zones.

Increased participation of security actors in the development projects and local governance of Balochistan depicts quite a vivid image of the failure of the security-development nexus in the country. The animosity towards the security personnel, and by extension, the government, is ever-increasing among the Baloch population.

CPEC projects in Balochistan have created only 250,000 jobs by July 2024, far below the 2 million initially projected.

Local voices in the region, such as Rafiullah Kakkar, attribute the province’s instability to a number of key structural aspects of the development policy. For instance, urban centers such as Gwadar and Quetta which are the centerstage of Balochistan’s development policy are highly militarized zones and therefore garrisoned with check posts and cantonments.

Simultaneously, the undefined scope of vigilance and intervention by the security actors delegitimizes the political voices, thereby allowing the security actors to assume the responsibility of governance as well. These actors are then able to influence, even dictate, the development agendas and cherry-pick the beneficiaries of the project.

One example cited in research by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) claims that thousands of residents have been displaced, without adequate resettlement, as a result of the large-scale infrastructure projects. Moreover, numbers from the government suggest that up till July of 2024, less than 250,000 jobs have been created by CPEC projects, compared to the initial projection of 2 million. Resultantly, radical voices in the region can develop a larger pool of supporters and sympathizers by preying upon the animosity of the locals towards the ‘legitimate’ security actors.

The failure of the security-development nexus in Pakistan echoes the words of critics who describe similar situations as ‘development in reverse’. The government’s inability to balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ strategies in addressing the needs of the province exacerbates the conflict, making any sort of unaccompanied intervention by development actors increasingly difficult.

Unchecked security intervention delegitimizes local governance, displacing thousands and limiting development actors’ capacity to drive meaningful change.

Given that the training, objectives, and focus of traditional security actors provide limited perspective for restructuring, their overwhelming participation does not provide enough space for actors driven by human security concerns. What begins as a non-violent, development policy intervention to bring peace, ends up as the most critical node of the state’s security policy.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.