Since 2014, Ukraine has been knocking on the doors of the EU, and NATO too, quite persistently. Membership in these organizations is not only a matter of economic development, but also of national security. So far, there has been little progress, although the West says that Ukraine will eventually become a member of these organizations. The only question is when this will happen and what price Ukraine will have to pay.

It is probably worth going back to the early 1990s and the main episode after the collapse of the USSR in the post-Soviet space – Ukraine’s giving up its security tool, the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in exchange for integration with the West – this is what the US offered to Ukraine looked like in the early 1990s:

“Finally, Ukraine cannot exercise the nuclear option without damaging its relations with the United States and other Western states, all of whom are steadfastly opposed to nuclear proliferation. Although Western states, without exception, want good relations with Ukraine, most will make nuclear Ukraine pay a price, if only to discourage other potential proliferators. Further, at least in the United States, Congress is so strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation that the Clinton administration would probably be unable to avoid imposing sanctions even if it wanted.”

Nuclear weapons in exchange for integration with the West – this is what the US offered to Ukraine looked like in the early 1990s.

This is an article in Foreign Affairs dated June 1, 1993. In fact, this is Washington’s foreign policy line on Ukraine and nuclear weapons. It is a tough line, where coercion of Ukraine by the United States takes a leading place:

“For Ukraine, then, there will be a tension, if not a trade-off, between the nuclear option and its basic grand strategic impulse to integrate with the West.”

Thus, under pressure from the United States, Ukraine was forced to give up nuclear weapons, its instrument of nuclear deterrence. Ukraine made a choice, albeit a kind of pressure, in favor of a “great strategic impulse to integrate with the West” by giving up nuclear weapons.

A question is worth mentioning here: In the 30 years since Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, has it integrated with the West? In what way? Has Ukraine become a member of the EU? No. Has Ukraine received an invitation from NATO to join the alliance? No. So what kind of integration was the West talking about back in 1993?

In general, did President Clinton at that time have any idea how and when this integration of Ukraine should take place? Is it really responsible for politicians of this level to let the issue of Ukraine’s integration languish for 30 years? Of course not. It is absolutely irresponsible.

It was then, in 1993, that the famous political scientist Mearsheimer predicted how this story of taking away Ukraine’s nuclear weapons would end – with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Probably, against the background of such irresponsibility, the so-called security instrument of Ukraine, the Budapest Memorandum, could have appeared in 1994. What did it guarantee Ukraine? Territorial integrity on the part of the guarantors?

It was then, in 1993, that the famous political scientist Mearsheimer predicted how this story of taking away Ukraine’s nuclear weapons would end – with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Peter Hilpold in his recent paper gave an excellent description of one of this historical episode: “To read today Professor Mearsheimer’s analysis of ‘The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,’ published nearly 30 years ago, might leave a somewhat ghastly impression: How is it possible that a political analyst, shortly after Ukraine had become independent, developed such an accurate prediction of the events that would unfold, slowly but inevitably, in the following decades? A development that would end up in the disastrous Russian aggression against Ukraine? At the center of Professor Mearsheimer’s prophecy stood the prescience that abandoning her nuclear deterrent capacity would expose Ukraine, sooner or later, to an invasion by her ancient nemesis Russia.”

In other words, the West has actually failed to fulfill two of its promises to Ukraine. The first was to guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the second was to integrate Ukraine into Western structures – the EU and NATO. At the same time, in the early 1990s, having stated that Ukraine should be happy doing so, below is a phrase from the last paragraph of that article in Foreign Affairs:

“Fortunately, Ukraine has already opted for the nonnuclear path. This choice enables Kyiv to avoid the great costs and risks of nuclear acquisition”.

“Yes, there are three of these red lines. The first is Georgia. The second is Kosovo, and the third is Ukraine, and the latter is the biggest of the red lines.”

It’s also worth mentioning an article by Steven Pifer written in 2011: “After the Trilateral Statement and Budapest Memorandum were signed, implementation proceeded relatively smoothly. By June 1, 1996, Ukraine had transferred the last of the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia for elimination, and the last START I-accountable strategic nuclear delivery vehicle, an SS-24 missile silo, was eliminated in 2001. More broadly, Ukraine’s denuclearization opened the way to an expanded US-Ukrainian bilateral relationship. Among other things, by the end of the 1990s, Ukraine was among the top recipients in the world of US assistance. Denuclearization also removed what would have been a major impediment to Ukraine’s development of relations with Europe. In 1997, NATO and Ukraine agreed to a “distinctive partnership” and established the NATO-Ukraine Council.” Recently, we see that Ukraine’s denuclearization opened the way to the Russia invasion of Ukraine.

So, this war, the broken Ukraine, the crushed lives and destinies of people. Is this happiness that Ukraine received for giving up nuclear weapons in the 1990s? Hundreds of thousands of dead and maimed people, the country’s infrastructure shattered. Is this can be called a situation where Ukraine “avoided great costs and risks?”.

Here we should recall the largely crucial year of 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest, and Russia’s infamous “red lines”.

“Does your country have any red lines that the West should not cross?” the ambassador asked the country’s leader. “Yes, there are three of these red lines. The first is Georgia. The second is Kosovo, and the third is Ukraine, and the latter is the biggest of the red lines.”

This conversation took place in 2008 between US Ambassador to Russia William Burns and Putin. It was during this conversation that the importance of Russia’s red lines in its relations with the West was first mentioned.

Washington, as the leader of NATO, is categorically against inviting Ukraine, because it could draw the alliance into a war with Russia.

William Burns described this conversation with Putin in detail in his memoir The Back Channel, conveying word for word the content of that conversation and his own feelings. A year later, in 2009, the next US president, Obama, introduced a new strategy in US relations with Russia, calling it “Reset”, which exhausted itself in 2012, after Putin replaced Medvedev as president of Russia.

But on February 8, 2008, two months before the infamous NATO summit in Bucharest, where Ukraine’s MAP was not approved, Burns wrote a letter to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, noting that the approval of Ukraine’s MAP in April would provoke Russia to take drastic steps. Literally, Burns said that “Russia will invade Crimea and Southeastern Ukraine.”

This is ironic: Ukraine did not receive the MAP from NATO back in 2008, but Russia invaded both Crimea and Donbas in 2014 anyway. Obviously, this was a strategic mistake by NATO, and President Bush Jr’s MAP initiative for Ukraine collapsed under pressure from Germany and France.

After that, the next US president, Democrat Obama, starting in 2009, should have at least motivated Brussels to make a political decision on accelerating Ukraine’s accession to the EU, which would have improved Ukraine’s institutional stability and increased the country’s defense capabilities. But Obama did not do even that. He was completely absorbed in the topic of the new strategy of relations with Russia – Reset, completely forgetting about Ukraine.

Back in 2016, Obama explained to The Atlantic why the United States had not responded more assertively to the Russian annexation of Crimea two years earlier. He said that Ukraine was more important to Russia than it was to the United States, that Washington had no treaty obligation toward Kyiv, and that Ukraine was Russia’s neighbor but was far from the United States. These realities invariably limited the options available to Washington. It is an irony to hear such a statement of regret from Biden who was Vice-President to President Obama and who could influence the foreign policy in more appropriate direction during eight years.

Now, during a full-scale war in Ukraine, Washington, as the leader of NATO, is categorically against inviting Ukraine, because it could draw the alliance into a war with Russia. Washington defines this argument as categorical. At the same time, a fair question arises: Why isn’t Ukraine in the EU yet? It is not a military-political bloc, and member states will not be involved in a war in Ukraine. It is a matter of following the EU’s moral imperative. The longer it takes for Ukraine to join the EU, the faster you devalue the moral imperative of the collective West.

George Kennan and George Shultz, two titans of geopolitics, compared diplomats to gardeners who diligently tend to the “plants” – partners and opportunities – and are constantly busy pruning, weeding and replanting the “trees” – problems. Obviously, the “great geopolitical garden” is now in a very poor state, and the West’s unsuccessful, haphazard diplomacy is one of the reasons why. A case of Ukraine’s security in long-run is an exam the West cannot pass.