The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is a well-known agreement signed in 1960 between Pakistan and India under the auspices of the World Bank. It has long been hailed as a rare piece of cooperation between two countries that have often been at odds. It has been regulating the use of water in the Indus River system for over 60 years, assigning the eastern rivers, the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi, to India and the western rivers, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, to Pakistan. But India put the arrangement in potentially perilous perspective when it decided to block the treaty following an attack by a group of militants in Pahalgam, Kashmir, in April 2025.

India’s suspension of the IWT after the Pahalgam attack signals a strategic move to assert dominance over shared waters.

This move, based on the argument of national security threat, demonstrates the growing assertive position of India over common water resources, threatening to put the existence of millions of Pakistanis in jeopardy as well as destabilise an already fragile region. Lies a deeper inspection of what India has done, a strategic effort to weaponise water, sabotaging decades of cautious diplomacy, and potentially deadly to the South Asian region.

The IWT is an intricately designed treaty intended to fairly share the waters of the Indus River System, which are utilised for agriculture, energy, and livelihoods in both countries. Pakistan, the downstream nation, depends on the Indus and its tributaries to supply irrigated agriculture (accounting for 25 per cent of its GDP and 65 per cent of national employment in that sector) to about 80 per cent of its agricultural areas.

The treaty allocates 80.52 per cent of the water in the system, which is mainly supplied by the western rivers, to Pakistan, with India reserving a 19.48 per cent portion of the eastern waters. This separation, which is often criticised by Indian policymakers as being unfair, aligns with the geography of the situation: the Indus and its tributaries all flow through Indian-controlled territory before reaching Pakistan, providing India with considerable upstream advantages.

The Fact that India has suspended the IWT in April 2025 in the wake of a terrorist attack, allegedly carried out by Pakistan, is a dangerous step. The judgment, described by Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri as one that is being kept in abeyance until Pakistan credibly renounces cross-border terrorism, puts on hold data sharing obligations, design restrictions on infrastructure, and minimum flow obligations.

Although India cannot currently prevent billions of cubic meters of water from flowing due to its inadequate storage system, its actions reveal a more significant agenda of dominating the Indus Basin, given its upstream location and the pressure it is exerting on Pakistan. Nevertheless, some form of diplomatic resolution, such as third-party mediation or renegotiation of the existing treaty, might help decrease tensions and revive the treaty’s effectiveness.

Pakistan relies on the western rivers for 80% of its irrigated agriculture, making water flow disruption a critical threat.

India has taken the position that the suspension of IWT should be viewed through the lens of security. However, a more in-depth examination reveals that this was a tactical move to renegotiate the treaty under more favourable conditions for New Delhi. India has issued notices to Pakistan since 2023 to “review and amend” the IWT, citing outdated streams, population growth, and climate change as reasons.

Although not without justification, these arguments conceal a larger plan by India to exercise greater control over the western rivers, where its entitlement only extends to non-consumptive uses, such as hydropower generation. Old sources of disagreement include projects like the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric plants, with Pakistan complaining that the Indian design enables these facilities to control the downstream flow.

Senior Indian officials, including former Indus Water Commissioner Pradeep Kumar Saxena, have publicly acknowledged that they utilised the suspension of the treaty to carry out sediment flushing activities at dams such as Baglihar and Salal without providing prior notice to Pakistan. These activities may potentially involve the release of silt-heavy water to ensure reservoir efficiency, which could disrupt the Pakistani sowing seasons, especially during critical periods.

The activity involved a reduction in water flow by almost 90 per cent by India at a central receiving point in Pakistan in early May 2025, to carry out maintenance work at its Baglihar dam, which Pakistan termed “the weaponisation of water.” However, these operations, which are technically allowable under a suspended treaty, indicate that India does not hesitate to utilise its upstream advantage, regardless of the consequences downstream.

Pakistan depends significantly on the Indus River system. Overall, 300 million people in the two countries are provided with water through the basin; however, due to the dry weather and the absence of other water resources, Pakistan serves as a prime example of a nation prone to water shortages.

Suspension of hydrological data-sharing imperils flood warning systems and exacerbates climate-related disaster risks in Pakistan.

The farmlands in the Punjab and Sindh provinces are primarily supplied by the western rivers, mainly the Indus and its tributaries; approximately 80 per cent of all Pakistani agricultural land is irrigated by the Indus and its tributaries. Any loss in these flows, even a momentary one, could trigger a halt in crop production, further deteriorate food security, and damage an economy already preoccupied with inflation and extreme weather events.

Immediately threatening is the suspension of hydrological data-sharing, which is a critical element of the IWT. Pakistan can hardly manage its water resources without the timely data on river flows, monsoon patterns, or flood risks. More recently, major floods in Pakistan in the year 2022 resulted in the deaths of more than 1,700 citizens and the displacement of millions of people, at least in part, due to a lack of sufficient early warning efforts.

The decision by India to withhold data may further exacerbate such disasters, as lives and livelihoods are at stake. Naseer Memon, a Pakistani water governance expert, has cautioned that unchecked water releases may induce flooding downstream populations, especially in Sindh, whose farmers are already experiencing water insecurity as a result of upstream diversion.

The fact that India seems insistent on developing its hydropower and storage systems in the western rivers also stems from its hegemonic ambitions. Degrading Canals: Multipurpose projects, such as the Shahpurkandi dam on the Ravi, and the proposed canal to divert Indus waters to Indian states, have long-term implications in maximising water use by India.

Despite Indian analysts stating that the country had not exploited its 20 per cent share because it lacks proper infrastructure to support development, the speed at which such projects are being implemented causes concern to Pakistanis. Building on the 2013 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision in Kishanganga, India gained the right to continue its project. Still, it was not permitted to carry out drawdown flushing, which may diminish downstream flows, a practice India now wishes to avoid.

These development programs, in the form of infrastructure, as they are being packaged as a necessity in the country, pose enormous dangers to India itself. Most of these projects are found in the Himalayan region, which is prone to earthquake activity and glacial lake outburst floods. In the case we have been discussing, ecological disasters can happen because of rushing to build infrastructure without detailed environmental checks and balances, as is showcased by the 2021 Uttarakhand flood, which caused the death of more than 200 people.

Moreover, China, which presides over the upper flows of the Indus and Brahmaputra rivers, may respond with penalties against India. In 2024, China modified its proposal for a mega-dam on the Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra) River, which had worried India, as it feared any loss of upstream water supply. The aggressive Indian position regarding the IWT may therefore be reciprocated, making its water security impractical.

The repercussions of India’s suspension of the IWT are felt beyond Pakistan. Bangladesh, a riparian country downstream of the Ganges and dependent on the water-sharing treaty with India, has expressed apprehension about how New Delhi intends to respect the water accords.

The Ganges treaty is now in question, as Bangladeshi water expert Prof. Ainun Nishat has cautioned that what India did on the Indus would be used as a precedent to play water politics like a geopolitical weapon. Likewise, Nepal, a Transboundary Rivers partner of India, can interpret the IWT suspension as an indicator of Indian domination in the region, a factor that aggravates bilateral relations.

The World Bank has joined other international communities in declaring mediation to quell the tension. Conflicts have traditionally been addressed through the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT, which comprises the Permanent Indus Commission, an Executive of a Neutral Expert, and a Court of Arbitration. This mechanism was utilised in the Baglihar dispute in 2007 and the Kishanganga dispute in 2013. Still, the fact that India denied the Court of Arbitration’s jurisdiction by giving preference to the Neutral Expert proceedings demonstrates its willingness to minimise external control, which further undermines trust.

The suspension of the IWT is a foolish speculation that threatens to plunge South Asia into a water tussle. The grievances of India, anachronistic clauses in treaties, unsustainable population growth, and climate change are not bogus or superfluous; these issues should be discussed and addressed to be solved by means other than one-sided action.

Pakistan should also play its part neutrally, assuring India of its security and promoting a fair sharing of water. The World Bank, negotiating on behalf of the treaty, must immediately initiate talks aimed at resuscitating data sharing and ushering in a new era of a modernised framework where climate resilience and environmental flows are integrated, as stated in the 2013 Brisbane Declaration.

Diplomatic mediation and treaty modernization, incorporating climate resilience, are essential to prevent a water crisis and maintain peace.

In the case of India, the solution lies in acknowledging that the hegemony of water is not a long-term strategy. There is scope to mitigate the effects of climate change through collaboration in water management, which includes joint monitoring and transparency of data, promoting sustainability in resource usage between the two countries.

In the case of Pakistan, this would entail modernising its irrigation infrastructure and addressing its internal water management issues as a strategy to reduce vulnerability. The IWT can be summed up this way: the resurgence of the IWT would require the two nations to reaffirm the spirit of cooperation that guided it in the first place, or, worse, come a time when water is not only a lifeline but also a possible source of contention.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.