In recent years, there have been numerous Taconic shifts in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. The prominent among these is the rise of mini-lateral alliances (formal and informal) and the nature of their interaction (either complementary or conflictual) with the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN). The case of Indo-Pacific Four (IP-4) in this regard is important in terms of its membership (i.e., Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia) and its growing ties with NATO.
IP-4’s NATO-backed approach bypasses ASEAN’s consensus model, weakening institutional cohesion.
Based on the recognition of China and North Korea as “systematic challenges” for the regional security and peace, IP-4 has gained notable attention on the global stage and has consecutively participated in the NATO summits to reinforce the shared beliefs. Parallel to that is the advocacy of the centrality principle and the rule-based order by the ASEAN leaders in the recent summits. For instance, ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) provides guidelines for ASEAN’s engagement with the regional and global forums as well as actors.
Here arises a crucial question: how both these two developments interlinked? Although IP-4 operates outside the forums of ASEAN (e.g., ARF, ASEAN+3), there is a systematic synergy between the operational dynamics of both groups owing to their similar vision in the domain of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) of the Asia-Pacific. However, the issue arises over the potential spillover of the cooperation in the NTS areas into the traditional security domain, as Japan has already hinted at the formation of the Asian NATO. For reference, the stance of the IP-4 group on the key regional issues (i.e. dispute in the South China Sea) supplemented by NATO’s direction, has divided the core states of ASEAN.
This study fills the research gap by focusing on the impact of interaction of the NATO-led IP-4 on the centrality principle of ASEAN by looking at the normative, institutional, structural, and policy framework, while considering the Regional Security Governance, to see if the interaction complements or results into the competition between the informal mini-lateral group and the multi-lateral regional organization.
Gained recognition initially at the NATO Brussels summit (2021), Indo-Pacific 4 has since institutionalized itself to incorporate the evolving strategic landscape in its vision. This strategic shift is marked by the trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues (not to confuse it with the formal, mini-lateral QUAD) discussing the Indo-Pacific strategy of each member state, the normative vision for the rule-based order, and cementing the freedom of navigation and the counter-coercive measures. These dialogues usually take place directly and sometimes indirectly (on the sidelines of EAF, ARF, and ADMM+).
Moreover, the institutional collaboration is visible through the joint military exercises between its members. For instance, military drills of IP-4 members – such as RIMPAC exercises, Korea-Australia bilateral drills, and NATO-IP partners’ summit – showcase military readiness, operational compatibility, and the ability to counter the hybrid threats. Also, it is supplemented by the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and its bilateral engagement with the member states of IP-4 (i.e. defense pact with Japan, and commitments under QUAD).
NATO’s purpose behind supporting IP-4, as visible in the Strategic Concept (2022), is to organize an informal coalition of like-minded states in the Indo-Pacific on common issues; however, this is a slight deviation from its strategy of formal engagement on similar principles in the other regions. Thus, it can be said that IP-4 acts as a functional arm of NATO in the Indo-Pacific.
Divergent ASEAN views on China risk paralyzing its decision-making.
IP-4 on the other hand, provides a defense and industrial support to NATO owing to its stretched manufacturing capacity amid the Ukraine conflict. The operational collaboration between NATO and IP-4 expands across various domains: information sharing, maintaining the stability of the supply-chain operations, maritime awareness, mitigating cyber threats, countering the rogue state (North Korea), and pressurizing the Dragon.
These activities of IP-4 though, supplement ASEAN’s regional vision (e.g., security, freedom of navigation, and rule-based order), they bypass ASEAN’s forums that operate following the principles of consensus building, non-interference, and inclusivity among its members. IP-4 do not engage with ASEAN as a unit. Instead, it fosters bilateral and issue-based cooperation with its members (i.e. Philippines).
It reflects the evolving dual nature challenge for ASEAN: verbal support for ASEAN’s centrality and neglecting the same in the operational domain. Adding complexity in the equation, ASEAN’s inability to tackle the South China Sea Dispute with China, the Thai-Cambodia War, Myanmar’s instability, and the unified response towards other key regional issues further question its credibility.
Moreover, weak and small states prefer direct, speedy, and issue-based talks with IP-4 states to bypass the slow, consensus-based model of ASEAN. For example, IP-4 led IDMPA directly sidelines ASEAN’s EAMF in the maritime domain. Also, the new model of strategic collaboration adds a normative challenge to ASEAN’s AIOP. Though it may seem that IP-4 shares a common agenda like that of AOIP, there is a fear that states will gradually fall into the hands of Washington due to the ongoing Nash equilibria between the great powers (China and the U.S.).
Moreover, the hardcore confrontational policy of IP-4 towards Beijing adds another layer of tension. For reference, not all ASEAN states adopt anti-China rhetoric, but those having serious extra-territorial disputes with China (impacting the day-to-day trade, business, and other commercial activities) advocate for the U.S.-style confrontational policies. The other states i.e., Brunei, Timor-Leste, and Malaysia, focus more on the infrastructural projects, digital governance, and bilateral trade with China. So, this divergent preference regarding China in ASEAN could paralyze the institutional framework of the organization, sidelining its norms and inclusivity.
Informal IP-4 ties foster functional cooperation but erode ASEAN centrality.
On the other hand, IP-4 is only concerned with those states sharing a similar view regarding China. This informal engagement enables it to maneuver in the crisis while holding its pawns responsible for the possible escalation with Beijing on the one hand, and breaking the collective outlook of ASEAN during the crisis situation on the other hand. Normatively, one can say that the risk of marginalization of ASEAN (and its core principles) persists unless deliberate attempts are made by IP-4 to directly engage with the institutional forums instead of focusing on the functional partnership.
This shifts one’s attention towards another important aspect: the lack of a formal institutional mechanism between ASEAN and IP-4. Though diplomatic engagement across different tracks persists, the formal engagement has not yet been observed. In contrast, ASEAN has a well-coordinated framework of engagement with AUKUS and QUAD. Different stakeholders from these forums regularly talk about the areas of mutual concerns and interests directly or on the sidelines of ASEAN’s forum. But, in the given case, the absence showcases the asymmetrical pattern, making ASEAN vulnerable to internal division.
Despite strategic repercussions, ASEAN remains a normative forum for the intra-group dialogues between the members of the IP-4 group. As mentioned earlier, mutual discussions during ARF and EAS, by the individual members of IP-4 i.e., Japan, help in the formation of coordinated policy discourse to deal with the shared issues. Also, in its limited capacity, ASEAN serves as a forum for a coordinated response to the serious challenges. Yet, there is a need to make structural changes to address the changing geopolitical realities.
For instance, there should be a written agreement following ASEAN’s AOIP and IP-4’s shared vision of the Indo-Pacific, addressing the areas of cooperation, their nature, and the limitations. Moreover, if necessary, the partnership should be redirected towards formal engagement without the involvement of a third party, i.e., NATO. Above all, China’s threat should not be capitalized on in the ties or else the Asian version of “Iron Curtain” would be established, deteriorating not only the mutual trust, but also the trade and bilateral relations of ASEAN members and Beijing.
A confrontational anti-China stance could accelerate the formation of an “Asian NATO.”
One can say that IP-4 engagement with the member states of ASEAN, though apparently reflects a win-win scenario and supplements AOIP, it challenges ASEAN’s centrality principle and the possibility could generate the notion of the Asian NATO, owing to its confrontational and anti-China rhetoric, something that is detrimental for ASEAN itself and the region.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
