For nearly eight decades, the US dollar has held primacy in global finance. That dominance was entrenched throughthe  Bretton Woods institutions and reinforced by the IMF and World Bank. As of Q1 2025, IMF COFER data confirm the dollar still accounts for 57.7 percent of allocated global reserves. This marks a slight decline from 57.8 percent at the end of 2024. The euro has increased to 20.1 percent and the Swiss franc to 0.8 percent, its highest level since 1999. These shifts, though modest, suggest a gradual diversification in global reserve preferences.

BRICS Plus now accounts for over 56% of the global population and 44% of world GDP (PPP).

BRICS has now evolved into BRICS Plus, a broader platform seeking alternatives to Western-led financial systems. As of July 2025, the grouping includes 10 full members and 10 partner countries. Indonesia formally joined in January 2025, and Vietnam became a partner in June. The expanded bloc now represents over 56 percent of the global population and approximately 44 percent of world GDP based on purchasing power parity, according to estimates published by the Carnegie Endowment and South Centre.

The 17th BRICS Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro on 6 and 7 July 2025, reinforced the bloc’s commitment to institutional reform. The Rio Declaration called for restructuring the IMF and UN Security Council and expressed concern over rising global protectionism. Although the statement avoided naming the United States directly, Brazilian President Lula da Silva openly supported reducing dollar dependency by promoting trade in local currencies.

However, the summit exposed internal fragility. China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin participated remotely. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and several other new members were also absent physically. Analysts from the Financial Times and the Atlantic Council noted this lack of cohesion, reflecting ideological divergence between democracies and authoritarian regimes within the bloc.

Despite these challenges, BRICS Plus continues to build financial frameworks to challenge dollar hegemony. Russia and China have expanded trade in roubles and yuan using alternative settlement systems. India and Russia have similarly shifted over 90 percent of their bilateral trade to rupees and roubles, supported by the Reserve Bank of India’s special rupee vostro account mechanism. Central banks from both nations are coordinating to establish a direct rupee–rouble exchange platform to eliminate reliance on the US dollar as an intermediary. This marks a significant de-dollarisation milestone, as confirmed in joint press briefings and trade statements from both governments in early 2025.

Over 90% of India–Russia trade is settled in rupees and roubles, bypassing the US dollar.

The New Development Bank has issued bonds in local currencies, including the renminbi, rupee, rand, dirham and riyal. It has also expanded lending in national currencies to support intra-bloc infrastructure and technology projects. A BIS working paper published in 2025 argues that such regional blocs can gradually develop into credible alternatives to dollar-based financial systems if backed by transparent governance and institutional depth.

Discussions about a BRICS trading currency resurfaced during the Rio Summit. The proposal involves a supranational currency backed by a basket of national units and commodities such as oil and gold. The idea draws from Keynes’ 1944 Bancor proposal. However, Kenneth Rogoff has warned that monetary unions without political and fiscal integration lack durability. Benjamin Cohen, in his work Currency Power, notes that a reserve currency must be supported by strong institutions, open capital markets and the rule of law, criteria not yet met by BRICS Plus.

Energy trade represents a critical domain for de-dollarisation. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have begun pricing a portion of their oil exports to China in yuan. Russia is increasingly using local currencies for oil trade with Asian partners. Economist Zoltan Pozsar, in his Bretton Woods III thesis, argues that global finance may shift toward commodity-backed mechanisms, with Eurasian actors leading the transition. BRICS Plus, with its commodity reserves and industrial base, could potentially anchor such a transformation.

Nonetheless, the bloc’s internal contradictions persist. It lacks a shared legal framework, unified fiscal coordination or a central financial institution. Strategic mistrust between India and China remains unresolved. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia continue despite diplomatic normalisation. Notably, BRICS foreign ministers failed to issue a communique during their April 2025 meeting, underlining policy divergence and fragile consensus.

A BIS working paper argues that regional blocs can become credible financial alternatives with transparent governance.

At the technological level, BRICS members are developing interoperable payment platforms. Russia’s SPFS, China’s CIPS, and India’s UPI are being upgraded to support cross-border transactions. If aligned effectively, these systems could reduce reliance on the SWIFT network. UNCTAD and the South Centre have both recently advocated for stronger South-South financial connectivity to reduce vulnerability to sanctions and dependency on Northern financial infrastructure.

BRICS Plus is laying institutional groundwork for a parallel economic system. Its demographic and resource advantages offer long-term potential. However, the US dollar remains dominant, backed by investor trust, legal safeguards and market liquidity. The July 2025 BRICS Summit revealed both the promise and the limits of this multipolar ambition. While BRICS Plus is no longer merely symbolic, it is not yet structurally mature. Its future depends on overcoming internal rivalries, institutionalising common objectives and delivering operational coherence. Until then, the dollar remains secure but no longer unchallenged.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.