For a long time, the European Union (EU) has tried to reconcile its foreign policy goals of promoting human rights with pursuing energy security. It’s these relationships that are a microcosm of what makes Central Asia such an in many ways challenging region. In terms of the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—the EU’s relationship with them has changed over time and has been based not just on the priorities of the EU but also on the competing priorities in that region.
The EU’s pursuit of energy security in Central Asia often contradicts its commitment to human rights and democratic values.
Conversely, mutual dependence on stable energy supplies from a region in which democratic values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights, are often given less importance, characterizes the paradoxical relationship that exists between the EU and Central Asia.
Central Asia’s significance for strategic reasons is that it has extensive oil, natural gas, and uranium reserves as well as a geopolitical location between Russia, China, and the Middle East. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU’s interest in the region grew particularly in the early 2000s, when worries about being dependent on Russian energy gave an added impetus to the search for alternative suppliers.
An example of the EU’s commitment to sources other than Russia for its energy is the Southern Gas Corridor, a strategic initiative to carry Caspian gas to Europe. The massive oil reserves of Kazakhstan and the world’s fourth biggest gas reserves of Turkmenistan have made them especially important for the EU as energy partners.
But Central Asia is not only an energy source. It is also a goods and pipeline transit corridor that has a key position in the broader EU connectivity strategy. Thus, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s largest infrastructure project, has further enhanced the geopolitical importance of the region and has pushed the EU to step up its engagement to counterbalance the latter’s and Chinese influence in the region. The region of Central Asia, with its huge potential for strengthening cooperation on various topics including economic development, security, and human rights, was understood as a key partner of the EU in energy diversification.
Nevertheless, the region has proved to be one of the most repressive in the world despite the EU’s attempts to promote democracy and human rights in Central Asia. The Central Asian republics except for Kyrgyzstan have turned into authoritarian regimes that suppress dissent, restrict media freedom, and control civil society participation. Accusations of hypocrisy and double standards of the EU as a custodian of human rights, however, abound because, very frequently, the commitment to human rights contradicts the strategic interests of the EU.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are key energy suppliers to the EU, despite their authoritarian governance and poor human rights records.
For example, Kazakhstan is the EU’s biggest trading partner in Central Asia and a significant provider of oil and uranium. But its human rights record is poor, including oppression on political opposition, freedom of speech limitations, and forced labor allegations. One of the most closed and repressive regimes in the world, Turkmenistan maintains a poor human rights record—and continues to be criticized for it—yet it is a strong energy partner with immense gas reserves.
With regard to the region, the EU has used different mechanisms to encourage human rights such as bilateral agreements, human rights dialogues, and financial means to support the activities of civil society. Yet Central Asian governments tend to lack a meaningful political will to enact real reforms, however, the effectiveness of these measures is dubious.
The EU’s unwillingness to inflict powerful punishing measures is additional an indictment of its sway in the location. The EU has had certain preferences when contrasting itself to the United States, which at times has imposed sanctions on Central Asian officials for human rights abuses, having chosen mostly to deal with the problem through diplomacy rather than through compulsion.
The EU has been criticized for allowing energies to be overtaken by those of energy in this case and for putting economic interests ahead of moral ones. The most evident case is Turkmenistan, as the EU has been trying to meet its increasing gas demand while knowing the authoritarian traits that govern the country. A clear example of this pragmatic approach comes from the EU’s support of the Trans Caspian Pipeline, which seeks to carry Turkmen gas to Europe through Azerbaijan.
Kazakhstan’s use as an energy supplier has compelled the EU to take a more measured course in denouncing the authoritarian practices of its government. The EU’s dedication to human rights was tested by the brutal response of Kazakhstan’s security forces to the 2022 protests in that country. The EU denounced the violence but failed to take any equally strong punitive action and that illustrates the limitations of the EU’s normative power in pursuing this agenda when strategic interests are in play.
The EU faces competition from Russia and China in Central Asia, limiting its influence in promoting democratic governance.
The EU is, as a result, faced with a dilemma complicated by the fact that it seeks to compete with other global players in Central Asia. Many in the region can easily point to Russia’s hand in most of what occurs in the wider neighborhood, the dominant external actor on the block with its historical ties, security alliances, and energy cooperation.
Yet China comes out as a major player through its Belt and Road Initiative in which it invests billions in infrastructure and gains access to core energy resources. Against this background, the influence of the EU on the region is limited, and it is often unable to promote democratic governance due to the region’s geopolitical realities.
Central Asia’s political landscape is too complicated for the EU to engage more using a sweeping and non-realistic approach. It should not strive for one unrealistic one-size-fits-all policy, but tailor their strategy to the context of each of the countries. For example, in societies like Kyrgyzstan that are relatively open, the EU can be more active in supporting democratic institutions and civil society. Where fostering investment in Turkmenistan and other more repressive states obtains better results than focusing on human rights pressure.
Central Asia will remain a key geographical focus for the EU’s engagement with Central Asia, but one in which energy security will be a key driver of the EU’s role, being pursued though that may be in a way that does not entirely compromise EU commitment to human rights. This may be one such avenue, such as promoting transparency and good governance in the energy sector whereby revenues are used for sustained development, not the support of authoritarian rule. The EU’s backing of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is one small step, yet its impact is limited as long as there is no genuine political reform in the country.
In parallel, the EU must also bolster its strategic autonomy in energy policy such as by improvising its supply sources beyond Central Asia. Investing in green technologies that can generate their power, as well as renewable energy, would break dependence on authoritarian regimes and serve the EU’s broader climate goals as well.
A fundamental tension characterizes the relationship that the EU has with Central Asia: While the EU emphasizes the promotion of human rights, it relies on the region for energy to maintain security. Large economic and strategic opportunities as well as obstacles to its normative agenda are posed by the area’s authoritarian governance structures.
Strategic autonomy through renewable energy investment can reduce EU dependence on authoritarian regimes for energy security.
Therein lies the balancing act: the need for pragmatism in which one must play for long-term stability good governance, and eventually economic diversification. The EU must recognize that it can only engage with Central Asia on conditions it would not accept in the EU, without jeopardizing its credibility as a global promoter of democracy, human rights, and other core values.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.
