Almost everyone in Pakistan, with a few exceptions, will disagree when the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is characterised as more of a tragedy than a treaty for the river basin’s people and ecology. The IWT was an artefact of its times, when Pakistan felt chronically, and in retrospect unreasonably, threatened by India’s potential to stop water flows into Pakistan.

General Ayub Khan (President of Pakistan 1958-69), acknowledged that there was ‘no cause for rejoicing [upon signing of the treaty, but]

Out of that paranoia, and an ambition for infrastructure based development, both the impulses that sadly persist, Pakistan signed the IWT in 1960. Even at the time, the chief proponent of it, against the advice of political parties and technocrats—General Ayub Khan (President of Pakistan 1958-69), acknowledged that there was ‘no cause for rejoicing [upon signing of the treaty, but] . . . cause for satisfaction that a possibly very ugly situation had been averted’. The ugly situation that Ayub Khan referred to was India’s potential to halt water flows into Pakistan. That eventuality was not founded in science, or any understanding of hydrology or geography, and it still is not.

India had the capability to stop any canals flowing into Pakistan, and it did halt the flow of Upper Bari Doab and Dipalpur canals in April 1948. Canals are human-made, and the ability to open and shut them is obvious, unlike naturally flowing rivers. Natural rivers flow not only on the surface but also below it. In the 1950s, we didn’t fully understand surface groundwater dynamics, though we do in academia. Unfortunately, that knowledge hasn’t reached Pakistan’s water institutions, not due to incompetence, but because they are run by civil engineers, not scientists or hydrologists.

Under the IWT, Pakistan surrendered its right to equitable apportionment of the three eastern rivers to India

India had the potential to significantly degrade water flows from the three eastern rivers—Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—into Pakistan, not through storage but diversion. Through the IWT, Pakistan handed India the formal right to do so. Article II of the IWT states: “All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India.” India built the Bhakra, Pandoh, and Nangol dams on the Sutlej, the Pong dam on the Beas, and the Indira Gandhi canal from Harike barrage to siphon massive amounts of Sutlej water to Rajasthan. India could do this because it had millions of hectares of arable land, and Pakistan gave it the formal right. Under the IWT, Pakistan surrendered its right to equitable apportionment of the three eastern rivers to India—the rivers that mattered most to India in terms of economic potential.

For the Western, Indus, Jehlum and Chenab Rivers, under Article III(2) of the IWT: ‘India shall be under and obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers . . . except for:

(a) Domestic Use;
(b) Non-Consumptive Use [where water is not removed from the system, e.g. hydro-electricity
generation, recreation etc.]
(c) Agricultural use [within specific areas]
(d) Generation of hydro-electric power.’

It is the three Western Rivers that are causing the most anxiety in Pakistan after the (illegal) unilateral suspension of the IWT by India. Illegal because the World Bank is a guarantor of the IWT and India has not approached it. And because the IWT can only be modified or revoked by the consent of the two countries, and there is no provision for its suspension. But let’s leave that aside for now.

A brief look at the map and any familiarity with the geography of the headwaters of three Western rivers will quickly reveal that there are no plain arable lands in Kashmir or Ladakh that could be irrigated with any economic or technical rationality. Hydro-electric dams are essentially waterfalls that release water for electricity generation, with no meaningful impact on substantial water flows in the mainstem rivers. They may affect the timing of flows, but the size of storage required is simply not viable given the seismic activity and silt loads in the three Western Rivers.

Over 90% of the Indus River’s flow originates within Pakistani territory before reaching Tarbela

Over 90% of the Indus River’s flow originates within Pakistani territory before reaching Tarbela. The Jhelum starts at Chashma Verinag in the eastern Kashmir valley, and there are no viable major damming sites on its mainstem in India. The only potential site is the Uri gorge, where a few hundred-foot dam would submerge all of Kashmir valley, effectively ending the Kashmir dispute. Additionally, there is no substantial need for irrigation in Kashmir valley, as it is water-rich.

The Chenab emerges from its mountain gorge and almost immediately enters Pakistan at Marala, with little arable lands in its headwaters. People may talk about tunnels and canals at right angles to the natural drainage taking its waters to Punjab, but any canal running across drainage will be breached quickly (as seen with the Kachi canal in DG Khan). Any tunnel would be destroyed by the high debris loads in the Chenab (like the Neelum Jehlum project’s tunnel collapse).

Today, groundwater supplies 80% of crop water in the fresh groundwater zone. That’s where Pakistan’s water security lies

Geography has provided Pakistan with water security it has failed to recognize, instead indulging in paranoid fantasies. The fanatic attachment to hydro-control in India and hydro-vulnerability in Pakistan is almost comical. Pakistan has built all the infrastructure it could with IWT funding, and no one can take it away. Today, groundwater supplies 80% of crop water in the fresh groundwater zone. That’s where Pakistan’s water security lies.

The most perverse part of the IWT is its stipulation in Article IV of obligating Pakistan to receive all the industrial and agricultural waste water 

The most perverse part of the IWT is its stipulation in Article IV of obligating Pakistan to receive all the industrial and agricultural waste water through Hudiara, Kasur, Salimshah and Fazilka drains from Indian Punjab. The toxic water poisons our land, people and groundwater and it is the most tragic gift of the IWT.

If India has given Pakistan a window to renegotiate the Treaty, perhaps sealing off those drains might be a start. The second step might be to reassert Pakistan’s right under international and customary law to the equitable and ecological flows of the three eastern rivers. And if one has the temerity—perhaps not worry about the Western Rivers? Geography and hydrology will not let anyone take them away from Pakistan.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.