The United States has sanctioned the National Development Complex (NDC), which is responsible for Pakistan’s long-range missile program. Along with the NDC, three other firms have also been sanctioned for assisting Pakistan’s ballistic missile development. Earlier this year, the US also sanctioned three Chinese firms for similar reasons which can be termed as silly excuses, at best.

The fact that US sanctions are biased and lack uniformity requires no explanation. It is amply clear that sanctions are not applied to enforce international norms such as non-proliferation, rather they are used against states that do not toe the American line. Pakistan has no missile that reaches the US mainland. Rather, it is India’s (the US’ geostrategic favorite for containing China), whose accelerating missile capability not only reaches the US homeland but also the entire Europe.

The US sanctions on Pakistan’s missile program highlight bias and geostrategic favoritism toward India, undermining regional stability.

This is a longstanding strategic issue being ignored by the world community. The US must have a balancing strategy in South Asia. Favoring one against the other has never been a viable strategy. Pakistan can never be ignored and undermined. If the modest balance is not kept, it will have repercussions on the South Asian strategic stability.

The Americans have always perceived Pakistan as a threat and have never welcomed its strategic missiles or nuclear programs. That Pakistan managed to become a nuclear power, notwithstanding its indigenous commitment and the leaderships’ vision, would not have been possible if Pakistan had not leveraged its indispensable position in the Cold War and the Afghan Jihad against communism.

The growing number of sanctions on Pakistan’s strategic programs are not just morally outrageous but also signal, albeit subtly, towards a risky future. The Stuxnet virus which infected the Iranian centrifuges in Natanz back in 2010, severely hampered Iran’s progress on its peaceful nuclear program. Common amongst the suspicions was the assumption that the virus had entered the centrifuges through a USB stick but given the tight security in and around such facilities, this idea seems far-fetched.

Another more probable theory suggests that American and Israeli intelligence infiltrated Iranian supply chains related to its nuclear program. The US and Israel succeeded in infiltrating and managed to compromise Siemens equipment, notably the Step7 software intended to be used in Iranian nuclear reactors.

The Hezbollah pager explosions in September 2024 also directed attention toward Israeli infiltration of Hezbollah’s supply chain, as the late head of the group Hassan Nasrallah advised its members to stop using smartphones to avoid being hacked or traced by Israeli intelligence. However, according to experts, Israel managed to plant explosives inside the pagers before they were delivered to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This shows how acts of sabotage can seriously hamper the safety and security of both personnel and critical infrastructure.

Reliance on black markets due to sanctions creates vulnerabilities to sabotage, compromising national security and strategic integrity.

C-I-A, confidentiality, integrity, and availability is a famous triad used in sensitive matters to gauge the level of security of a project. Acts of sabotage aim to compromise at least one of these elements.

What made the acts of sabotage possible in the two cases mentioned heretofore? The answer, to an extent, lies in sanctions and the resultant shift to black markets for procurement. Iran has been sanctioned by the US for decades making it impossible for it to trade industrial components using normal banking channels. In addition, the unwillingness of providers to engage with sanctioned entities creates scarcity which may hinder the development of a certain sector.

It is the norm for sanctioned entities, therefore, to shift to black markets which have no oversight and no mechanisms to ensure safe transactions. This undoubtedly allows sanctioned entities to continue procurement of equipment but the lack of institutional checks and balances in the black market also enables clandestine sabotage operations by the adversary. Much like how Western intelligence sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program through Stuxnet, and the compromising of Hezbollah-owned pagers by Mossad operatives – both of which are serious security breaches.

These concerns fit into the current discourse on Pakistan’s strategic and nuclear programs as well. As entities, both state and non-state, gradually come under the US sanctions umbrella, more and more of these entities will be forced to redirect their procurement operations through the black market. If such may be the case, Pakistan’s missile program may become susceptible to the risk of sabotage.

Historical sabotage examples like Stuxnet and Hezbollah pagers underline the risks of black-market reliance for sanctioned entities.

An entirely new domain of concern will open as a result, and the already surmounting challenges to the country’s strategic capabilities will pile up. No adversary has been able to stall Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic weapons’ programs but if one believes they will not attempt to limit our capabilities through sabotage is naïve optimism.

The custodians of our strategic weapons program might already know the challenges highlighted here. What remains to be done are proactive measures to stay safe and secure from acts of foreign subversion lest our strategic programs suffer a similar fate as that of Iran.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.