The removal of Assad from power will of course be a significant step in the changing of Syrian society, but the future may be as fragmented as its present years of warfare. The internal divisions of the country and the exterior counter forces make it a enormity for unity of any kind. New leadership will have great challenges within a highly polarized context where no political actor can claim absolute sovereignty.

The fall of Assad will challenge Gulf states to balance involvement in Syria’s reconstruction with avoiding deeper regional instability.

This shattered structure has emerged with such crucial questions of governance: will it be a transitional government as the international accords have intended; or will local regional warlords and extraneous influences determine the shape of the state? The post-Assad Syria will not only be a challenge for the Syrians but for the rest of the Middle Eastern and specifically for the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The GCC countries, although located far from Syria’s borders, have not been less involved in the Syrian conflict.

Specifically, Qatar has supported one part of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia has backed the other part, and, finally, the UAE has issued calls for recognizing the Assad regime in recent times. The collapse of the regime will leave the Gulf states grappling with several dilemmas: Should they interact with the emergent leadership in Syria, aware that this interaction may lead to new instability, or should they stay away from the country, to avoid getting involved in another long-standing conflict? They are exercised to affect the stability of the region in the long run.

The consequences of the conflict are not limited to Syria as they affect all the states of the Gulf. The collapse of the Assad regime will therefore be followed by a decline in Iranian influence that has been using Syria as a base to project power in the Levant region. Although this may allow the Gulf states to level the playing field in the region it also brings uncertainty. That pressure is likely to be especially acute without Assad: Tehran could increase its efforts to continue backing its influence in Syria through proxy forces, thus provoking more tensions with Gulf states.

Furthermore, the Syrian situation might provoke the emergence of security vices that could give the role to extreme powers thus becoming a threat to the entire Gulf area especially since its countries depend on internal stability to guarantee economic progress and political consolidation. Besides, economic considerations are also expected to emerge more actively.

Tehran’s influence in Syria may decline, but proxy conflicts could intensify, raising tensions with Gulf states.

The Gulf states have the money to help rebuild Syria, but will they decide to? If they start investing in the Syrian reconstruction they will inevitably find themselves involved in the Syrian internal conflicts and maybe even face an armed confrontation with other regional players such as Turkey or Russia. On the other hand, failure to assist Syria can open the door for competitors to establish themselves in a strategic region of the Iraqi neighborhood in the Middle East.

Managing all these economic and strategic considerations will be a delicate proposition for the leadership in the Gulf. For the Gulf states, the greatest and most immediate challenge to consider may well be, how can it diplomatically interact with post-Assad Syria. will they go a democratic push for governance that includes all groups or will they embrace authoritarianism and search for a strongman that will put down dissent and bring order.

The decision will have a long-term bearing on the influence of the Gulf states in the entirety of the region. Backing democrats could help dissipate intellectually the model of authoritarianism linked to the gulf monarchies but it could prove counter-productive if it fuels instability.

On the other hand, supporting autocratic sentiments might act against the reformist’s goals within any given region and demoralize the youthful population across the Arab world.

Already daunting internal problems in Syria come hand in hand with the local interest of regional players including Turkey and Iraq. For instance, Turkey might not leave northern Syria due to the emergence of the Kurdish-dominated autonomous region. As is the case in Iraq, internal factions can pose a huge threat to the nation, and this perception might make Iraq nose-dive on any confusion in Syria.

The Gulf states face a strategic dilemma: whether to back democratic governance or authoritarian stability in post-Assad Syria.

These dynamics will, of course, add further pressure on the Gulf states for them to help the other players in the region as a mediator/intermediary. They also have to ensure that Syria’s future leadership is capable of dealing with international concerns of extremism making a comeback.

If the emerging government cannot conduct security in the country, the Gulf states most especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE could witness conflicts being exported back to them.

Further cooperation will be pared since Syria cannot tolerate turning into a center for radicalization. However, pursuing such initiatives demands a level of unity among regional actors a phenomenon that has been notably demonstrated to be exceptionally hard to achieve in the context of the Middle East.

The crossroad for Syria and the repercussions on the Gulf region security situation remains questionable. To this end, the GCC states will need to consider whether their engagement will address or worsen the risks of change in Syria.

Syria’s internal instability risks exporting extremism to neighboring Gulf countries, emphasizing the need for proactive engagement.

The question then arises if they can do so without aggravating the existing fault lines in an already unstable area. As the international community looks towards the post-Assad transition in Syria, it is a region-wide question how gulf states will approach this future hoping that their policies will not only define the future of Syria but also their relative status as regional powers.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.