In the ancient Greek mythology, there is this famous contest between Ajax and Odysseus, it is the story of two legendary warriors, competing for the prized armor of Achilles, regarded as the symbol of dominance in the battlefield. Thousands of years later, nearly a similar contest played out, not in the city of Troy, but in Bengalaru at Aero India 2025 exhibition. This time, the rivals were two cutting-edge fifth-generation fighter jets—Russia’s Su-57 Felon, and America’s F-35 Lightning II, both of which were vying for India’s attention claiming to be the panacea of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) growing vulnerabilities. In this scenario, one question that looms large in the air is: What will be India’s choice to secure its skies? And at what cost?

Let us consider the first option, i.e. the F-35. The US President, Donald Trump, pitched the sale of the F-35 to India, during the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US. It is pertinent to mention that as per the IAF Chief, AP Singh, India has not received any formal offer from the US.

However, if supposedly India receives a formal offer, will it give a serious consideration to it? The answer to this is in negative due to two key factors. The first is the high cost of acquiring and maintaining an F-35 – one of the most expensive fighter jets, with each unit costing around $80 million to $110 million. Moreover, its lifetime operational cost is estimated to exceed $1.5 trillion. India’s opposition parties have already criticized Trump’s offer due to this factor.

Under the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative, India has increasingly prioritized co-production agreements and technology transfers to pace-up its economic development and enhance indigenous defense capabilities

Secondly, the likely reluctance on the part of the US to co-produce parts of the F-35 in India, could serve as another discouraging factor for India to go ahead with the proposal. Under the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative, India has increasingly prioritized co-production agreements and technology transfers to pace-up its economic development and enhance indigenous defense capabilities.

A single unit cost of SU-57 is between $35 million to $40million, which makes it a more viable option for India

Now, let us turn to the second option: the Russian SU-57 Felon. In comparison with F-35, the SU-57 stands a better chance. Firstly, unlike the US, Russia has formally offered the SU-57 to India, and that too on highly favorable terms for India as is evident from the statement of Mr. Denis Alipov, the Russian Ambassador to India recently stated. Additionally, a single unit cost of SU-57 is between $35 million to $40million, which makes it a more viable option for India.

Since the SU-57 appears to be the more likely option for India, its acquisition could have repercussions for India’s foreign relations, particularly with the US. Reportedly, the US has already expressed displeasure over India’s potential acquisition of the SU-57, many analysts have argued that Trump’s pitch to sell the F-35 to India was primarily aimed at derailing ongoing negotiations between Russia and India regarding the SU-57. Furthermore, we have also seen a glimpse of Trump administration’s displeasure during Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to the United States, where India was compelled to make several concessions, including slashing tariffs on US imports.

It aligns with the US’ s long-standing strategy of strengthening partnerships across the Indo-Pacific by equipping regional allies with US made fighter jets to create a strategic “cobweb” to contain China

The Trump administration’s discomfort over India’s likely tilt towards the SU-57 stems from its primary strategic goal of containing China. For the US administration, the potential sale of the F-35 to India would not be just a military sale deal, but a strategic move to strengthen its alliance with India against rising China. It aligns with the US’ s long-standing strategy of strengthening partnerships across the Indo-Pacific by equipping regional allies with US made fighter jets to create a strategic “cobweb” to contain China. If one examines the region, this strategy becomes evident. For instance, Japan  and South Korea possess the F-35; the Philippines has been equipped with the FA-50 Fighting Eagle; Australia operates F-35; Thailand and Singapore operates the F-16 while  Singapore will soon acquire the F-35; and lastly, Malaysia has the F-18.

By integrating India into the F-35 ecosystem, the U.S aims to beef up this strategic encirclement. However, India has consistently refrained from acquiring U.S made fighter jets, despite the fact that it has acquired other state-of-the-art US military assets, such as the C-130J transport aircraft, Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, Boeing CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter, the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk utility tactical transport helicopter, and soon to be inducted the advanced MQ-9B Predator drones.

This avoidance has persisted even in the face of significant US offers, such as the Lockheed Martin’s proposal to establish a F-21 production plant in India in 2023. This specially configured F-16 for the IAF named as F-21 was to be manufactured through collaboration with the Ambani-led conglomerate to addressed India’s longstanding demand for technology transfer and indigenous manufacturing. However, India still avoided  a US fighter jet which has been a constant source of displeasure for the US.

All in all, one thing is clear, whether India opts for the F-35, or SU-57, its journey towards acquiring a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, at the cost of its indigenous AMCA, is unlikely to be a smooth sailing venture

All in all, one thing is clear, whether India opts for the F-35, or SU-57, its journey towards acquiring a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, at the cost of its indigenous AMCA, is unlikely to be a smooth sailing venture. Each option comes with its own set of challenges—be it financial constraints, or geopolitical repercussions.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.

Author