India aspires to play a leading role beyond the South Asian theatre into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Its latest step? The deal to purchase 26 Rafale Marine (M) fighter jets from France under a USD 7.4 billion agreement. With USD 8.8 billion already spent in 2016 on the Air Force variant, India’s total Rafale spending now stands at USD 16.2 billion.

India’s IOR grand strategy begins to look more like strategic outsourcing.

The latest package includes 22 single-seat aircraft and four twin-seat trainers. The deal also involves the integration of India’s indigenous Astra missiles, the development of local maintenance facilities, and enhanced compatibility between the navy’s Rafales and the existing air force fleet. Despite these extravagant purchases, India’s strategic ailments are not likely to subside.

To begin with, the April 2025 splurge is merely a partial move to assert greater influence in the IOR. In 2022, India commissioned INS Visakhapatnam, a stealth guided missile destroyer. The Navy also acquired MH-60R Seahawk helicopters from the US. Moreover, with “Project 75I,” India will add six Kalavari Class air-independent propulsion (AIP) powered submarines into service, the first being inducted by September 2025. However, when stitched together with foreign-supplied jets, a weak domestic industrial base, and professional incompetence, India’s IOR grand strategy begins to look more like strategic outsourcing.

Secondly, by strengthening sea-based air power through the Rafale M deal, India aims to enhance its image as a reliable QUAD partner. However, its desire to preserve strategic autonomy, despite the US vision for India as a “net security provider” in the Indo-Pacific, limits New Delhi’s focus to the IOR only. Mohamed Zeeshan, author of Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership, notes that India’s global ambitions often fall short because of its unwillingness to fully commit to multilateral security efforts.

Capability without control is a liability.

Thirdly, India’s decision to procure the Rafale M is driven not only by the need to replace its ageing MiG-29K fleet, but also by the desire to counter China’s maritime presence, a counter to its hegemonic aspirations in the region. New Delhi understands that over 80 per cent of China’s energy imports and 95 per cent of India’s trade flow through vital chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, making maritime control a strategic imperative. The Indian military elite remain increasingly anxious about China–Pakistan peaceful cooperation in Gwadar and the operationalisation of China’s naval base in Djibouti. In this context, the Rafale M becomes more than an aircraft; it is a floating message of strategic intent.

And even if these jets do arrive, they won’t solve India’s deeper professional problems. In March 2022, a BrahMos missile was erroneously launched into Pakistani territory, allegedly due to mishandling/willing launch. It is also a reminder that capability without control is a liability. Similarly, on 29–30 April 2025, Pakistan’s electronic warfare assets detected and disrupted four IAF Rafale F3R jets operating near the LoC. And the grand episode: on the night between May 6 and 7, the Pakistan Air Force managed to down seven aircraft, including three Rafale fighter jets. This indicates that India’s high-profile acquisitions often fail to translate into credible power projection.

In addition, the Indian military’s objectives carry an underlying coercive undertone, and regional states are becoming increasingly unreceptive to this approach. The 2023–24 Maldives episode illustrates this clearly. After taking office, President Mohamed Muizzu urged India to withdraw its troops from the region, describing their actions as overly intrusive. India’s hydrographic survey ships and surveillance aircraft were perceived not as part of a cooperative endeavour, but as an attempt to assert strategic dominance.

The Rafale M becomes more than an aircraft; it is a floating message of strategic intent.

Moreover, India continues its intensified monitoring of key maritime routes around the Maldives, which Malé rightly views as a form of maritime coercion. While New Delhi aspires to be a net security provider in the IOR, its conduct suggests the risk of evolving into a unilateral actor with each military purchase. Consequently, a region that should value collaborative approaches for a smooth maritime trade can become a pivot for bloc-led naval posture to counter transgressive neighbours.

In addition, India has secured access to bases in Réunion and Darwin through logistics agreements with the US, France, and Australia. This also raises concerns among IOR nations, which sit at the nexus of Gulf–Asia trade. In contrast to the Indian aspirations, Pakistan has consistently endorsed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea standards and refused to militarise its seaborne diplomacy, instead proposing multilateral naval coexistence.

Regional naval multilateralism offers more secure and equitable marine trade assurances than any coercive undertone can.

India’s mere enthusiasm for purchasing Rafale M does not ensure a strategic edge in the wake of operational incompetence. Having a large fleet or so-called advanced technology should not be an impetus to aspire for regional naval hegemony. In contrast, regional naval multilateralism offers more secure and equitable marine trade assurances than any coercive undertone can.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the views, beliefs, or policies of the Stratheia.